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Recent Decisions
THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
RITE AID CORP. v. LEVY-GRAY: UNJUSTLY HOLDING
PHARMACIES LIABLE FOR BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY
BY PROVIDING DRUG INFORMATION AFTER
FILLING PRESCRIPTIONS
In Rite Aid Corp. v. Levy-Gray,' the Court of Appeals of Maryland
considered whether a pharmacy can be held liable for breaching an
express warranty for providing usage instructions for a prescription
drug to a consumer after purchase.2 The court found Rite Aid in
breach of an express warranty for its written advice to a customer re-
garding the use of a prescription drug.' The court errantly departed
from precedent in considering Rite Aid's statements to be part of its
bargain and to have created an express warranty because the customer
received the pamphlet after the exchange.4 Furthermore, the court
should not have found that Rite Aid induced the drug's purchase be-
cause the customer bought doxycycline-a drug which the store did
not advertise-only after her physician prescribed it.5 Finally, the
court erred in declining to insulate Rite Aid from liability under the
"learned intermediary" doctrine by misconstruing the contents of the
pamphlet given to the customer and by failing to acknowledge that
the customer did not rely on Rite Aid when using the medication.6
I. THE CASE
On October 25, 2000, Ellen Levy-Gray visited a Rite Aid pharmacy
in Timonium, Maryland to fill a prescription for doxycycline to treat
her Lyme disease.7 Along with the doxycycline, Levy-Gray received
statements from both the drug manufacturer and Rite Aid advising
her to take the drug with food or milk if she experienced gastric irrita-
Copyright © 2007 by Thomas M. Grace.
1. 391 Md. 608, 894 A.2d 563 (2006).
2. Id. at 618, 894 A.2d at 569.
3. Id.
4. See infra Part V.A. 1.
5. See infra Part IV.A.2.
6. See infta Part I.B.
7. Rite Aid, 391 Md. at 612, 894 A.2d at 565-66. Levy-Gray had previous dealings with
that same Rite Aid store. Id., 894 A.2d at 566.
RITE AID Cornp. v. LEVY-GRAY
tion.' Rite Aid's "Rite Advice" pamphlet further stated that its advice
was "INTENDED TO SUPPLEMENT, NOT SUBSTITUTE FOR, THE
EXPERTISE AND JUDGMENT OF [THE CUSTOMER'S] PHYSI-
CIAN, PHARMACIST OR OTHER HEALTHCARE PROFES-
SIONAL.... CONSULT YOUR HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONAL
BEFORE USING THIS DRUG."9
Two days after the purchase, Levy-Gray experienced an upset
stomach.'0 She then consumed a large amount of dairy products
while taking the doxycycline, but did not experience any alleviation of
her Lyme disease symptoms."' At the suggestion of her brother, a uro-
logical oncologist, Levy-Gray stopped consuming dairy products while
taking the drug. 2 Though her symptoms improved, Levy-Gray did
not fully recover from the Lyme disease.' 3 After a second course of
doxycycline failed to improve her symptoms, Levy-Gray was diagnosed
with post-Lyme syndrome. 4 On November 2, 2001, Levy-Gray sued
Rite-Aid in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, pursuing claims of
negligence, products liability, failure to warn, negligent misrepresen-
tation, and breach of express warranty. 5
At trial, the jury ruled in favor of Rite Aid with respect to the
negligence claim and decided in favor of Levy-Gray on the breach of
express warranty claim. 6 The Maryland Court of Special Appeals af-
firmed, finding that (1) Levy-Gray established reliance on Rite Aid's
pamphlet given her course of dealing with Rite Aid; (2) Rite Aid's
statements about doxycycline in its pamphlet were representations of
the drug's compatibility with food and milk; and (3) Levy-Gray did not
have to be aware of the express warranty at the time of her purchase
for the warranty to be effective. 7 The Court of Appeals granted certi-
orari to determine whether a pharmacy can be subject to a breach of
express warranty claim and, if so, whether under section 2-313 of the
Maryland Commercial Law Article, a pharmacy can breach an express
warranty when providing usage instructions for a prescription drug to
8. Id. at 612-13, 894 A.2d at 566.
9. Id. at 613, 894 A.2d at 566.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 613-14, 894 A.2d at 566-67.
12. Id. at 614, 894 A.2d at 567.
13. Id.
14. Id. Post-Lyme syndrome is a "chronic autoimmune response in which patients ex-
perience symptoms that mimic Lyme disease without an active bacterial infection." Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 615-17, 894 A.2d at 568. The trial judge dismissed the other claims at the
close of evidence. Id. at 615, 894 A.2d at 568.
17. Rite Aid Corp. v. Levy-Gray, 162 Md. App. 673, 691-92, 695-98, 876 A.2d 115, 126,
128-30 (2005).
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a customer after purchase that make no assurances regarding the
drug's performance, and of which the customer is previously
unaware. 18
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Section 2-313 of the Commercial Law Article provides that a
seller creates an express warranty when the statement at issue is an
"affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which
relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain."19
To evaluate the circumstances surrounding the basis of the bargain,
Maryland law requires an initial two-pronged analysis. First, the court
assesses whether the buyer received the seller's product statements
and assurances after purchasing the desired item; if so, those materials
do not comprise part of the basis of the bargain.2 ° Second, the court
asks whether the seller has specifically induced the sale with the buyer;
only if the seller has taken steps to advertise or market the sale will the
court hold the seller to have expressly warranted the sold product.21
Even if the elements of an express warranty are satisfied, Mary-
land law accords a special status to sellers of pharmaceuticals, reliev-
ing them of liability for warranting product performance when a
learned intermediary, such as a physician, more directly tends to the
customer-patient. 22 Because pharmacies merely fill physicians' pre-
scriptions and do not typically have an intimate knowledge of the
unique health situation of every customer or may not know the com-
plex composition of each drug, Maryland courts have held pharma-
cies to be atypical sellers and within the protection of the learned
intermediary doctrine.23
A. A Buyer Must Receive a Seller's Product Statements Before or at the
Time of Sale to Form the Basis of the Bargain and Create an
Express Warranty
Maryland courts examine the timing of the buyer's receipt of
product information to evaluate whether the express warranty ele-
18. Rite Aid, 391 Md. at 618, 894 A.2d at 569 (referencing MD. CODE ANN., CoM. LAw
§ 2-313 (LexisNexis 2002)).
19. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw § 2-313 (1)( a). Sections 2-313(1)(b) and (1)(c) merely
reiterate (1) (a) with respect to a "description of the goods" or a "sample or model" which
then become part of the "basis of the bargain," as in (1) (a).
20. See infra Part II.A.
21. See infra Part II.B.
22. See infra Part II.C.
23. See infra Part II.C.
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ments are present in a commercial exchange.24 On its face, official
comment 7 to section 2-313 of the Commercial Law Article suggests a
relaxed approach to timing, stating that the exact time when the
buyer receives the seller's statements, descriptions, instructions, or af-
firmations is immaterial; the question is "whether the language or
samples or models are fairly to be regarded as part of the contract." 25
The Court of Appeals has not adopted such an offhand approach to
timing, however, and has only acknowledged the existence of an ex-
press warranty based on the seller's product information pamphlets if
the buyer received them at or before the exchange.
For example, in Sensabaugh v. Morgan Bros. Farm Supply, Inc.,2 6 the
Court of Appeals rejected an express written warranty claim based on
statements in the seller's documents delivered to a customer a few
days after a sale precisely because the paper was delivered "too late to
attach conditions."27 In Sensabaugh, a contractor purchased a bull-
dozer and loader for construction purposes, but the sales agreement
that accompanied the sale contained no warranty of any kind.28 A few
days after the purchase, the buyer received the delivered equipment
along with a manual that had a warranty printed on the back.29 The
court recognized the buyer's inability to rely on the seller's statements
in making a purchase if the buyer received those statements after the
exchange.30 The Sensabaugh court thus found that the printed state-
ments could not create an express warranty by the seller because the
buyer received them after the sale's consummation.3 '
Applying Maryland law, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit has similarly insisted on proper timing with respect
to the buyer's receipt of the seller's product statements to create an
express warranty. In Distillers Distributing Corp. v. Sherwood Distilling
Co.,3 '2 a seller of grain alcohol permitted an agent to sell its product
and warrant to the buyer that the alcohol was first class and that any
"loss through evaporation" was slight. 3 Because of these assurances, a
customer bought 165 barrels from the seller, but the product was in
24. See, e.g., Sensabaugh v. Morgan Bros. Farm Supply, 223 Md. 593, 597, 165 A.2d 914,
916 (1960) (noting that the "written warranty was never brought to the attention of the
purchaser until after the machines were delivered and the sales consummated").
25. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw § 2-313 cmt. 7 (LexisNexis 2002).
26. 233 Md. 593, 165 A.2d 914 (1960).
27. Id. at 597, 165 A.2d at 916.
28. Id. at 594, 165 A.2d at 914.
29. Id. at 594-95, 165 A.2d at 914-15.
30. Id. at 596-97, 165 A.2d at 916.
31. Id. at 597, 165 A.2d at 916.
32. 180 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1950).
33. Id. at 802.
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fact substandard and had evaporated beyond an acceptable percent-
age.34 The court held that under Maryland law, the agent's assurances
formed an express warranty and were part of the basis of bargain be-
tween seller and buyer because the buyer received them before
purchasing the alcohol.35 The court further stated that the seller
need not explicitly state that his language is a warranty, but if the
seller couches his language in such a way that a reasonable buyer, re-
ceiving such statements prior to a purchase, would rely on that lan-
guage, the seller's language may constitute an express warranty. 6
Similarly, the United States District Court for the District of Mary-
land has strictly adhered to the express warranty timing requirement
in applying Maryland Law. In Shreve v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,3 7 the
court held that an express warranty does not exist even when the
seller delivered a product information manual at the time of sale if
the buyer does not read the seller's statements until after the sale. In
Shreve, the manufacturer of a snow thrower provided the buyer at the
time of sale with instructional statements regarding the product's use
in an owner's manual, which the buyer did not read until after the
purchase.3" The court found that such statements did not create an
express warranty because the buyer was unaware of such statements at
the time of the purchase and could not reasonably have considered
the instructions as part of the basis of the bargain.39 Thus under Ma-
ryland law, a seller-buyer exchange does not result in an express war-
ranty if a buyer receives or reads the seller's statements about the
product after the exchange, because such post-formation information
cannot form a basis of the buyer's bargain with the seller.
Unlike Maryland's stringent approach to timing, at least one New
York court has treated timing as irrelevant, and upheld an express
warranty claim when a buyer obtained a seller's statements about a
34. Id.
35. Id. at 801-03, 805. In reaching its conclusion, the Fourth Circuit relied upon a
statement from Osgood v. Lewis, 2 H. & G. 495, 518 (Md. 1829):
Any affirmation of the quality or condition of the thing sold, (not uttered as mat-
ter of opinion or belief,) made by the seller at the time of sale, for the purpose of
assuring the buyer of the truth of the fact affirmed, and inducing him to make
the purchase; if so received and relied on by the purchaser, is an express
warranty.
This position was also referenced with approval and adopted by the Supreme Court in
Shippen v. Bowen, 122 U.S. 575, 581 (1887).
36. Distillers, 180 F.2d at 802-03.
37. 166 F. Supp. 2d 378 (D. Md. 2001).
38. Id. at 386-87, 417.
39. Id. at 420-21.
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product after the sale. In Murphy v. Mallard Coach Co.,4" an intermedi-
ate appellate court in New York addressed a lawsuit for breach of war-
ranty brought by buyers of a motor home against a manufacturer and
retailer after the defendants' attempts to correct the defects in the
buyers' home were unsuccessful and after the defendants both re-
fused to furnish a refund.4 Although the mobile home sellers
presented the warranty to the buyers upon the home's delivery, which
occurred after the plaintiffs paid the purchase price, the court found
in favor of the buyers, reasoning that such presentation was suffi-
ciently proximate in time to the purchase so as to fairly be considered
a part of the basis of the bargain.42
In a similar departure from Maryland law, the Second Circuit, in
Bigelow v. Agway,4" applied Vermont law and adopted a flexible ap-
proach to timing.44 In Bigelow, a farmer bought a product from a
chemical dealer after seeing advertisements that the product retarded
mold growth in baled hay, allowing the hay to be baled at higher mois-
ture levels than normal.4" After the purchase, the seller's sales repre-
sentatives visited the farmer to address the use of the product on some
drying, unbaled hay in the buyer's barn and affirmed that the product
could safely and effectively be used on the hay.46 When the farmer
sprayed the product on the hay, however, it caused a spontaneous
combustion and the resulting fire consumed the farmer's hay and
barn.47 Even though the buyer received the sales representative's
statement regarding the product's effectiveness after the sale, the Sec-
ond Circuit found that this post-purchase language created an express
warranty because the seller's salesman guaranteed the safety and effec-
tiveness of his chemical in direct response to the buyer's concerns.48
The Bigelow court did not insist that the buyer receive the seller's
product statements before the sale, but found a warranty claim existed
because the seller's visit and statements addressed particular issues
and concerns upon which the buyer relied and acted.49
Despite contrary applications in the Second Circuit and New York
state courts, the Fourth Circuit-applying Maryland law-has af-
40. 582 N.Y.S.2d 528 (App. Div. 1992).
41. Id. at 529-30.
42. Id. at 531-32.
43. 506 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1974).
44. Id. at 553, 555-56.
45. Id. at 553.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 554-55.
49. Id. at 553-55.
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firmed that Maryland courts rigidly insist upon the proper timing in
creating an express warranty. In Duvall v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 5° a
customer sued the manufacturer of a penile prosthesis for breach of
express warranty when the product malfunctioned and did not con-
form to the seller's alleged representations that the product would
allow for normal sexual activity.5 The Fourth Circuit noted that to
find for the buyer, Maryland law requires that the goods fail to con-
form to an affirmation about a seller's product that is made to the
buyer prior to the purchase. 5' The Duvall court ruled that the buyer
could not recover on a breach of express warranty claim because the
customer who had received the penile prosthesis failed to establish
that the medical device manufacturer's representative had made oral
representations regarding the performance of the prosthesis prior to
or at the time of the vendor-customer bargain.53
B. A Seller Must Induce the Buyer's Purchase by Advertisement, Product
Assurances, or Specifically Urging a Particular Product in
Order to Create an Express Warranty
For an exchange to contain the necessary elements of an express
warranty, the Court of Appeals has also required that the seller solicit
the buyer and induce the sale through affirmations as to a product's
performance or effectiveness. In Greer v. Whalen,54 the court enunci-
ated this principle in an exchange involving a livestock dealer's offer
to a stockyard owner for the sale of cattle.55 In response to the offer
of a price not to exceed $2.85 per hundredweight of cattle in good
condition, the stockyard owner contracted to purchase forty heifers;
however, upon delivery, he received a notice from the seller charging
between $3.00 and $3.25 per hundredweight for the cattle.56 Because
the buyer relied on the seller's solicitation and price offer in entering
the contract, the Greer court held that the seller induced the sale and
was therefore liable for breach of warranty as to the quality and price
of the cattle.57
As an alternative to a seller's direct solicitation creating an ex-
press warranty, the Court of Appeals has also found that a seller's
50. 103 F.3d 324 (4th Cir. 1996).
51. Id. at 326, 331.
52. Id. at 331.
53. Id.
54. 125 Md. 273, 93 A. 521 (1915).
55. Id. at 274-75, 279, 93 A. at 521-23 (citing Osgood v. Lewis, 2 H. & G. 495, 518 (Md.
1829)).
56. Id. at 275-76, 93 A. at 521-22.
57. Id. at 279-80, 93 A. at 523.
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product assurances, given in response to a potential customer's ques-
tions and concerns, may induce a sale and create a warranty. In Schley
v. Zalis,5" a trader in vegetables and farm produce contacted a tomato
farmer and proposed to purchase 300 lugs of green tomatoes if the
farmer promised that the products were fresh and not frozen.5" After
the farmer gave such a guarantee and the trader purchased the toma-
toes, the produce was discovered to be frozen, thus destroying its com-
mercial value.6 ° The court held that the farmer was in breach of an
express warranty for the products' freshness, finding that the seller's
declarations as to the quality of the tomatoes induced the customer's
purchase. 6'
Likewise, in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Scarlett Harbor As-
sociates Ltd. Partnership,62 the Court of Special Appeals found that a
condominium developer's statements about the design and construc-
tion of a unit to a buyer formed the basis of a bargain and expressly
warranted the unit's performance and safety because the statements
induced the purchase.63 In Hartford, the seller of condominium units
promised the buyer in a written agreement that the mechanical,
plumbing, and electrical systems, roof, walls, and other structural ele-
ments of its building were safe and conformed to accepted industry
standards.64 However, after purchasing the condominium building,
the buyer discovered many faults, including leaky walls, design de-
fects, faulty telephone wires, violations in the "stairway pressurization"
system, and other structural errors.65 The Hartford court held that the
buyer could pursue its claim that the developer breached its warranty
because the buyer allegedly relied on the seller's statements at
purchase to build structurally sound, complete condominiums.66
The Court of Appeals has applied this same inducement require-
ment to pharmacies, holding that because treating physicians' pre-
scriptions induce the buyer's purchase of a drug, the pharmacy does
not bear the same liability as prescribing physicians for negligence or
breach of an express warranty. For example, in People's Service Drug
Stores, Inc. v. Somerville,67 a pharmacy accurately filled a customer's pre-
58. 172 Md. 336, 191 A. 563 (1937).
59. Id. at 337-38, 191 A. at 563.
60. Id. at 338, 191 A. at 563-64.
61. Id. at 339-40, 191 A. at 564.
62. 109 Md. App. 217, 674 A.2d 106 (1996).
63. Id. at 279-80 n.16, 674 A.2d at 136-37 n.16.
64. Id. at 231-32, 674 A.2d at 113.
65. Id. at 232-34, 674 A.2d at 113-14.
66. Id. at 249, 674 A.2d at 121-22.
67. 161 Md. 662, 158 A. 12 (1932).
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scription for strychnine, but the customer overdosed by following the
physician's dosage instructions on the drug container and exper-
ienced a weakened nervous condition and rigid bodily stiffness. 68 De-
spite admonishing the pharmacist for filling the prescription because
the prescribed dosage was too large, the court held that the pharmacy
bore no liability for a breach of express warranty because the phar-
macy accurately filled the prescription, the customer's physician's pre-
scription induced the drug purchase, and the patient overdosed on
the drug by following the prescription's instructions.69 Maryland
courts have thus emphasized that a seller does not induce a sale or
warrant a product's performance in the bargain with the buyer unless
the seller overtly markets a product or makes statements to solicit the
product's purchase.
Other jurisdictions echo Maryland courts' insistence on a seller's
inducement-to-buy as a requirement of an express warranty. In
Schmaltz v. Nissen,71 for example, the Supreme Court of South Dakota
noted that an express warranty does not exist if a seller's statements
did not induce a buyer's purchase.7 1 In Schmaltz, a seller's seed pack-
age displayed a statement indicating that the seed was of a higher
quality due to its prior insecticide treatment.7 2 Despite the inferior
quality of the seeds and the fact that the buyer received the statement
at the time of purchase, the court held that the seller's statement was
not part of the basis of the bargain and did not create an express
warranty because it was not seen by the buyer until after purchase and
thus could not have induced the sale. v3
Similar to Maryland's characterization of pharmacies as atypical
sellers in People's Service, the Southern District of New York, applying
Mississippi law, recently addressed in In re Rezulin Products Liability Liti-
gation7 1 whether pharmacies that dispense prescription medication to
customers may be held liable for breaching an express warranty as to
the failed or injurious performance of the medication. 75 The court
held that such liability does not exist and that any representation
68. Id. at 664, 158 A. at 12-13.
69. Id. at 666-67, 158 A. at 13-14.
70. 431 N.W.2d 657 (S.D. 1988).
71. Id. at 660-61; see also Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Alter, 834 S.W.2d 136, 146-47 (Ark. 1992)
(finding that a seller's statement regarding an herbicide's safety was not part of the basis of
the bargain where the buyer was not influenced by the statement to buy the product).
72. Schmaltz, 431 N.W.2d at 659.
73. Id. at 660-61; see also Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676, 680
(D.N.H. 1972) (finding that no express warranty existed after the plaintiff failed to demon-
strate that he acted based on the seller's representations in making his purchase).
74. 133 F. Supp. 2d 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
75. Id. at 291-92.
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made by a pharmacy would not form part of the basis of the bargain
because patients do not purchase prescription medications based on
representations from the pharmacy, but rather on advice from pre-
scribing physicians.76
In sum, for a Maryland court to find an express warranty, a seller
must have specifically induced the exchange with the buyer. Moreo-
ver, Maryland law requires inducement in addition to the proper tim-
ing; even if a seller's statements could have instigated the purchase,
such statements cannot be said to have induced the sale if they were
not read before the sale occurred.
C. A Customer May Not Justifiably Rely on the Pharmacy for the Use of
a Drug under the Learned Intermediary Doctrine
Even if the elements of an express warranty are established, Mary-
land law protects pharmacies from liability for a drug's performance
by designating pharmacies as atypical sellers; instead, liability falls on a
learned intermediary-a healthcare professional with particular
knowledge of the interaction of a specific drug with a unique individ-
ual.7 7 This protection was evident in People's Service, where the Court
of Appeals sought to insulate pharmacies from liability for the same
warranties to which the court held typical sellers because of the uncer-
tain nature of pharmaceuticals, the lack of knowledge of each cus-
tomer's unique medical conditions, and the chemical complexities of
drugs.78 In an effort to shield pharmacies from liability for filling pre-
scriptions, the People's Service court found that a pharmacy is not liable
for breach of express warranty as to the drug's performance when it
accurately follows a physician's instructions and provides a customer
with a pharmaceutical order.79
76. Id.
77. See People's Serv. Drug Stores, Inc. v. Somerville, 161 Md. 662, 663-64, 666, 158 A.
12, 13 (1932) (indicating hesitance to treat a pharmacy with the same level of liability as a
prescribing physician).
78. Id. at 666-67, 158 A. at 13-14.
79. Id. at 666, 158 A. at 13; see also In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 133 F. Supp. 2d 272,
291-92 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (adopting the learned intermediary doctrine to shield pharmacies
from express warranty liability, as customers may reasonably rely on their physician's ad-
vice, not statements from a pharmacy, while using a prescribed drug); Presto v. Sandoz
Pharms. Corp., 487 S.E.2d 70, 75 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997); Batiste v. Am. Home Prods. Corp.,
231 S.E.2d 269, 276 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977); Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 584 A.2d 1383,
1387 (Pa. 1991); and Makripodis v. Merrell-Dow Pharms., Inc., 523 A.2d 374, 376-77 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1987) (all indicating that courts in other jurisdictions have recognized that pa-
tients put confidence in their doctors' expertise rather than in a pharmacy's advice regard-
ing drug use).
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The Court of Appeals reiterated its intention to insulate pharma-
cies from liability for express warranties and to distinguish the legal
accountability of pharmacies from that of drug manufacturers and
physicians in a case under the Maryland Malpractice Claims Statute.
In Mancuso v. Giant Food, Inc.,s ° a customer complained that Giant
Food's pharmacy improperly filled her prescription, and the court ad-
dressed whether the pharmacy must submit to arbitration for the dam-
ages claimed as a condition precedent to the civil action."1 The court
stated that the pharmacy did not have to submit to the arbitration and
was not liable for breach of warranty, even though it improperly filled
the prescription, because pharmacies are not considered health care
providers under the statute and do not possess the same level of
knowledge about a patient's condition as prescribing physicians."2
In addition to generally subjecting pharmacies to a lesser degree
of liability than physicians and drug manufacturers, the Court of Ap-
peals has specifically used the learned intermediary doctrine to pro-
tect pharmaceutical companies from express warranty liability. In
Nolan v. Dillon,3 an obstetrician gave a patient an injection of
promazine hydrochloride to prepare the patient for childbirth. 4 Im-
mediately following the injection, the patient's left hand became dis-
colored and gangrene set in, forcing the doctors to amputate three of
the patient's fingers.8 5 The court held that the drug manufacturer's
warnings on the drug package and on the package insert that the drug
was restricted to intramuscular use were sufficient to protect the man-
ufacturer from liability by discharging its duty to warn onto the physi-
cian who supervised the patient's care. 6 The Nolan court considered
the physician to be a learned intermediary between the patient and
manufacturer, and as such, the physician's direct supervised treatment
and knowledge of the drug shielded the manufacturer from liability., 7
Likewise, in applying Maryland law, the Maryland federal district
courts have extended the learned intermediary doctrine to protect
manufacturers from express warranty claims even when the manufac-
turer's warnings on a prescription drug package were inadequate. In
Ames v. Apothecon, Inc.,88 a manufacturer of a generic version of amox-
80. 327 Md. 344, 609 A.2d 332 (1992).
81. Id. at 345-46, 609 A.2d at 333.
82. Id. at 348, 352, 609 A.2d at 334, 336.
83. 261 Md. 516, 276 A.2d 36 (1971).
84. Id. at 519, 276 A.2d at 38.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 522-23, 276 A.2d at 40.
87. Id. at 523, 534-35, 276 A.2d at 40, 46.
88. 431 F. Supp. 2d 566 (D. Md. 2006).
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icillin did not specifically warn doctors of early signs of a life-
threatening adverse reaction to the drug that causes the breakdown of
mucous membranes.8 9 The court found that the manufacturer's
warnings on the drug's package conformed to state law and ade-
quately apprised the physician of the risks associated with prescribing
the drug.9" Because the physician's medical training and familiarity
with amoxicillin adequately alerted him to the drug's potential effects,
the Ames court concluded that the manufacturer transferred its liabil-
ity to the physician, who was in the best position to treat the patient's
unique needs and weigh the benefits and risks of a particular treat-
ment." Thus, when an intermediary treating party-such as a physi-
cian or health care provider-is more involved with the patient and
drug than a distant party-such as a pharmacy or manufacturer-the
distant parties receive a protected status, insulating them from liability
for express warranty claims.
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In Rite Aid Corp. v. Levy-Gray, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and concluded that a phar-
macy could be held liable under a breach of express warranty claim
and that Rite Aid's instructions constituted an express warranty. 92
Writing for the majority, Judge Battaglia first explained that pharma-
cies may be held liable for a breach of express warranty because of the
nature of the contract between the customer and the pharmacy at the
time of a drug's purchase.93 The court determined that a jury reason-
89. Id. at 568-69.
90. Id. at 568, 573.
91. Id. at 572; see also Miller v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 121 F. Supp. 2d 831, 838 (D.
Md. 2000) (noting that manufacturers of medical devices, such as breast implants, have
"no duty to warn patients of risks associated with products used under the supervision of a
doctor"); Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 451-53, 379 A.2d 1014, 1026-27 (1977) (illustrating
the lengths to which physicians are protected in Maryland, as even those physicians with
knowledge of a patient's idiosyncrasies are protected from express warranty claims because
it is unreasonable, absent an express and absolute agreement, to insure or expect a particu-
lar result-medical results are inherently unpredictable and individual patients are
different).
92. Rite Aid, 391 Md. at 618, 894 A.2d at 569.
93. Id. at 621, 894 A.2d at 571. The court distinguished a pharmacy's liability based on
an express warranty claim, which is a contractual claim that rests on the individual bar-
gain's dickered aspects and depends on the characterization of a pharmaceutical as a
"good" under Maryland statutory law, from an implied warranty, which is a hybrid tort-
contract claim that rests on common factual scenarios or sets of conditions. Id. at 619-21,
894 A.2d at 571. The court rejected the notion that prescription drugs could be unique
based on their unpredictable efficacy and found the drugs, treated as any ordinary good
for sale, to be subject to express warranties. Id.
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ably could conclude that Rite Aid's statement to ingest doxycycline
with food or milk in the event of an upset stomach constituted an
express warranty as to the drug's effectiveness when taken under such
conditions.94 Although Rite Aid did not negotiate or discuss its state-
ments with Levy-Gray at the time of her purchase and although she
was unaware of the existence of the statements prior to the purchase,
the majority reasoned that Rite Aid's affirmation as to the drug's char-
acteristics became part of the basis of the bargain between the cus-
tomer and the pharmacy.95 The court found the precise timing of the
pharmacy's affirmations to Levy-Gray immaterial and instead ad-
dressed whether the post-purchase statements may fairly be regarded
as part of the contract.96 The court held that the jury reasonably
could find that the instructional pamphlet was part of Levy-Gray's con-
tract with Rite Aid because she reasonably anticipated receiving such
statements from the pharmacy.97
Next, the Court of Appeals addressed the learned intermediary
doctrine, which limits the degree to which a customer may justifiably
rely on a pharmacy's affirmations when using a drug.98 The court ac-
knowledged the use of this doctrine in other jurisdictions to insulate
pharmacies from liability for drugs sold and its own adoption of the
doctrine to protect pharmacies that merely fill a prescription as or-
dered by the customer's physician.99 The court declined, however, to
extend the learned intermediary doctrine to cases like Rite Aid, where
the pharmacy actively disseminates information about "the properties
and efficacy of a prescription drug." 100 The court held Rite Aid in
94. Id. at 635, 894 A.2d at 579.
95. Id. at 623, 626, 894 A.2d at 572, 574.
96. Id. at 623, 894 A.2d at 572 (citing MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 2-313, cmt. 7 (Lexis-
Nexis 2002)).
97. Id. at 624, 894 A.2d at 573. The majority emphasized that sellers commonly render
warranties to customers after purchases as part of typical marketplace behavior; therefore,
because Levy-Gray reasonably anticipated receiving the pamphlet, Rite Aid's statements
became part of the existing contract. Id at 625-26, 894 A.2d at 573-74. The court also
cautioned that a rule requiring that warranties be given during negotiation to be "part of
the basis of the bargain" ignores the reality that most warranties are only available after
purchase, and "would, in effect, render almost all consumer warranties an absolute nul-
lity." Id. at 626, 894 A.2d at 574 (quoting Murphy v. Mallard Coach Co., 582 N.Y.S.2d 528,
531 (App. Div. 1992)).
98. Id. at 631, 894 A.2d at 577.
99. Id. at 631, 634, 894 A.2d at 577-79.
100. Id. at 634, 894 A.2d at 579. The court distinguished People's Service Drug Stores, Inc.
v. Somerville, 161 Md. 662, 158 A. 12 (1932) and In re Rezulin Products Liability Litigation, 133
F. Supp. 2d 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) on the grounds that the pharmacies in those cases merely
filled prescriptions as instructed by physicians, whereas in the case at hand, Rite Aid took
the added step of providing affirmations about doxycycline, albeit in language approved by
the Food and Drug Administration. Rite Aid, 391 Md. at 632-34, 894 A.2d at 577-79.
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breach of an express warranty while finding the timing discrepancy
irrelevant and the learned intermediary doctrine inapplicable.''
Judge Harrell dissented, noting three flaws in the majority's rea-
soning.102 First, Judge Harrell disagreed with the majority's treatment
of the timing of Levy-Gray's receipt of the pamphlet.' 3 Rather, he
argued, Rite Aid's statements about the drug cannot reasonably be
thought of as part of the basis of the bargain because Levy-Gray re-
ceived the pamphlet after her purchase.10 4
Second, Judge Harrell insisted that the identification of who in-
duced Levy-Gray to purchase doxycycline must be treated as a sepa-
rate issue, which the majority failed to address.10 5 As to inducement,
Judge Harrell argued that statements in the "Rite Advice" pamphlet
were not a bargained aspect of the agreement between Rite Aid and
Levy-Gray because she bought the drug based on her physician's ad-
vice and prescription. 0 6 Therefore, the dissent reasoned, the lan-
guage may not be considered as part of the contract if the pharmacy
does not induce the sale by actively marketing the product to the
buyer; consequently, no express warranty existed.10 7
Third, Judge Harrell addressed the context in which Rite Aid may
be held liable as an atypical seller by a customer for a breach of ex-
press warranty."O8 Unlike the majority, Judge Harrell preferred the
approach of other state courts that have considered the issue and cho-
sen to insulate pharmacies from liability for breach of express war-
ranty with respect to statements about drugs that the pharmacy
dispenses to customers. 0 9 Judge Harrell maintained that the pam-
phlet was insufficient to exclude Rite Aid from the protection of the
101. Rite Aid, 391 Md. at 635, 894 A.2d at 579.
102. Id. at 636, 894 A.2d at 580 (Harrell, J., dissenting). Judge Rakerjoined Judge Har-
rell in dissent. Id.
103. Id. at 637-38, 894 A.2d at 581.
104. Id. Judge Harrell contended that by holding plaintiff's receipt of Rite Aid's pam-
phlet to be part of the parties' bargain-despite the fact that the pamphlet arguably would
not have factored into Levy-Gray's decision to buy the drug even if she had read it before
her purchase-the majority's interpretation entirely disposes of the requirement in section
2-313(1) of the Commercial Law Article that the pamphlet be part of the basis of the seller-
buyer exchange. Id. at 638, 894 A.2d at 581.
105. Id. at 638, 894 A.2d at 581.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 638-40, 894 A.2d at 581-82 (citing Presto v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 487
S.E.2d 70, 75 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997); Batiste v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 231 S.E.2d 269, 276
(N.C. Ct. App. 1977); Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 584 A.2d 1383, 1387 (Pa. 1991);
and Makripodis v. Merrell-Dow Pharms., Inc., 523 A.2d 374, 376-77 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987)).
2007] 969
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
learned intermediary doctrine. 1 0 Finally, he concluded that it would
be unfair to regard Rite Aid's pamphlet as part of its contract with
Levy-Gray because she could not reasonably have relied on the infor-
mation when purchasing or using the drug, given that she could con-
sult with her more knowledgeable and informed physician about any
concerns. 
1 1
IV. ANALYSIS
In Rite Aid Corp. v. Levy-Gray, the Court of Appeals held a Rite Aid
pharmacy liable for breach of express warranty regarding the "Rite
Advice" pamphlet that the pharmacy gave to a customer after she pur-
chased a drug. 12 The court erred by misconstruing precedent to find
that the sale of doxycycline and the exchange of the product pam-
phlet satisfied the elements of an express warranty, both for timing"
13
and inducement-to-buy.114 Even if the elements of an express war-
ranty had been present, the court failed to properly apply the learned
intermediary doctrine to insulate Rite Aid from liability given its status
as an atypical seller. 15
A. The Rite Aid Court Erroneously Concluded that the Pharmacy-
Customer Exchange Satisfied the Elements of Express Warranty
1. Timing
The Rite Aid majority improperly determined that Levy-Gray's re-
ceipt of the "Rite Advice" pamphlet satisfied the express warranty tim-
ing requirement. The majority ignored binding precedent and
federal application of Maryland law in deeming the timing of the
buyer's receipt of the seller's product statements as irrelevant.1 1 6 The
110. Id. at 642, 894 A.2d at 583.
111. Id. Even under a negligence theory-which Judge Harrell thought more appropri-
ate with respect to pharmacies because of their duty to warn and instruct customers about
its products-the dissent would not have held Rite Aid liable. Id. at 640-41, 894 A.2d at
582-83. Specifically, Judge Harrell explained that the Rite Aid pamphlet was not a substi-
tute for consultation with a physician; a reasonable consumer should anticipate the inher-
ent unpredictability of medicine and patients using drugs should rely on "the special
expertise of manufacturers, prescribing and treating health-care providers, and govern-
mental regulatory agencies." Id. at 640-41 n.5, 894 A.2d at 582-83 n.5 (quoting RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LtA. § 6 cmt. h (1997)).
112. Rite Aid, 391 Md. at 635, 894 A.2d at 579 (majority opinion).
113. See infra Part IV.A.1.
114. See infra Part IV.A.2.
115. See infra Part IV.B.
116. See supra notes 26-39 and accompanying text (illustrating that Maryland law does
not consider a seller's statement, received by the buyer after the purchase, to create an
express warranty regarding the purchased item).
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Court of Appeals has consistently held that the proper timing of a
buyer's receipt of a seller's statements is crucial, having rejected an
express warranty claim in Sensabaugh precisely because the documents
which the buyer claimed created the warranty were not delivered to
the buyer until after the sale had been consummated by purchase.' 1 7
Because Levy-Gray, like the contractor in Sensabaugh, received product
statements from the seller only after the purchase, the court should
have similarly found that the pamphlet did not create a warranty and
that the customer could not possibly have relied on such statements in
making the purchase."'
In addition, federal courts applying Maryland law have found that
an express warranty is not created without evidence showing that the
pharmacy-seller made representations about a drug at the time of or
prior to the sale." 9 Unlike the situation in Distillers, where a buyer
received the seller's product statements before purchasing the prod-
uct and it became a basis of the bargain, 120 Levy-Gray never demon-
strated that she received the "Rite Advice" pamphlet prior to
purchasing the doxycycline from Rite Aid.' But even if Levy-Gray
had received the pamphlet at the time of the doxycycline purchase,
her failure to read it at or before the sale signifies that Rite Aid cre-
ated no warranty as to that medication;122 the buyer must read the
product information before the sale.'2 ' Without a demonstration by
Levy-Gray that she had read or been aware of the contents of Rite
Aid's statements when she bought the product, the Rite Aid court
should have found that an express warranty did not exist.'2 4
The Rite Aid majority instead relied on other state and federal
cases that are not binding Maryland law, placing particular emphasis
on Bigelow v. Agway to find that statements made by the seller and
received by the buyer after purchase may be considered to create an
117. See Sensabaugh v. Morgan Bros. Farm Supply, 223 Md. 593, 597, 165 A.2d 914, 916
(1960) (stating that because the buyer noticed the warranty after purchase, it was "too late
to attach conditions").
118. See id. at 594-95, 165 A.2d at 914-15 (describing how the buyer was handed an
instruction manual with a warranty several days after his purchase).
119. See Duvall v. Bristol-Myers-Squibb Co., 103 F.3d 324, 331 (4th Cir. 1996); Distillers
Distrib. Corp. v. Sherwood Distilling Co., 180 F.2d 800, 802 (4th Cir. 1950); Shreve v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 166 F. Supp. 2d 378, 420 (D. Md. 2001).
120. Distillers, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 803.
121. Rite Aid, 391 Md. at 612-13, 894 A.2d at 566.
122. Id.
123. See Shreve, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 421 (pointing out that the manual containing the
warranty was not viewed prior to the buyer's purchase of the snow blower).
124. See id.
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express warranty.' 25 Unlike Levy-Gray's post-purchase receipt of the
statements in Rite Aid, in Bigelow, the salesman guaranteed the safety
and effectiveness of his product in direct response to particular con-
cerns raised by the buyer at the original exchange.126 Thus Bigelow
does not stand for the proposition that timing is absolutely irrelevant,
but rather that post-purchase seller statements may create an express
warranty when the buyer raises specific concerns that the seller then
addresses. 127
As Judge Harrell aptly noted in dissent, by holding Rite Aid liable
for statements which Levy-Gray read after her purchase, the majority
disposes of the statutory requirement that the statements form the ba-
sis of the bargain between the seller and buyer.' 28 Holding post-
purchase language to create an express warranty is not an accurate or
appropriate reflection of Maryland precedent, which emphasizes that
the seller must give its product statement to the buyer before or at the
time of purchase for the language to be part of the bargain. 129 Con-
sidering this body of precedent that emphasizes proper timing, the
majority should have realized that Maryland law does not recognize
Bigelow's narrow exception. Even if it did, Levy-Gray did not bring up
issues and concerns to Rite Aid that were initially raised at the time of
the doxycycline purchase, as is required by Bigelow's narrow exception
to the timing requirement. 130 Thus, the Rite Aid majority erred in
finding that Rite Aid created an express warranty because Levy-Gray
neither received nor read Rite Aid's pamphlet until after her
purchase. 13 1 Moreover, the court should have rejected Bigelow's non-
binding, narrow exception to the strict timing requirement because
Rite Aid did not make new, direct statements or overt efforts to re-
spond to specific concerns raised by Levy-Gray after the original
purchase.
125. Rite Aid, 391 Md. at 627-29, 894 A.2d 575-76 (citing Bigelow v. Agway, Inc., 506
F.2d 551, 553, 555-56 (2d Cir. 1974)). For examples of the majority's use of nonbinding
decisions to support its position that post-purchase language may create an express war-
ranty, see Murphy v. Mallard Coach Co., 582 N.Y.S.2d 528, 530-31 (App. Div. 1992) and
Distillers, 180 F.2d at 802.
126. Bigelow, 506 F.2d at 553, 555-56.
127. Id.
128. Rite Aid, 391 Md. at 638, 894 A.2d at 581 (Harrell, J., dissenting); Mr. CODE ANN.,
CoM. LAW § 2-313 (LexisNexis 2002).
129. Sensabaugh v. Morgan Bros. Farm Supply, 233 Md. 593, 597, 165 A.2d 914, 916
(1960).
130. Rite Aid, 391 Md. at 612-13, 894 A.2d at 566 (majority opinion); Bigelow, 506 F.2d at
553-55.
131. See Sensabaugh, 223 Md. at 596-97, 165 A.2d at 915-16 (1960) (indicating that state-
ments received by buyer after a purchase do not make the seller liable for a breach of
express warranty as to those statements).
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2. Inducement-to-Buy
In addition to its errant application of timing principles, the
Court of Appeals in Rite Aid overlooked the inducement-to-buy ele-
ment of an express warranty and instead skipped to an analysis of the
learned intermediary theory directly after assessing timing.'3 2 Mary-
land precedent indicates that the seller's acts which induce the buyer
to purchase a good or service are a crucial prerequisite to the creation
of an express warranty. '3 3 In past decisions such as Greer v. Whalen and
Schley v. Zalis, the Court of Appeals found an express warranty present
only when a seller made overt attempts to market his product, such as
soliciting a buyer or giving a buyer price comparisons upon request
and assurances as to his product.
134
Levy-Gray presented no evidence of any advertisement or market-
ing efforts by Rite Aid, and in particular no actions by Rite Aid specifi-
cally promoting doxycycline or responding to complaints that Levy-
Gray had while using the drug.'3 5 Unlike in Hartford, where a condo-
minium developer made statements to a prospective buyer regarding
the design and construction of a unit, inducing purchase and forming
the basis of the bargain, 136 Rite Aid neither marketed doxycycline to
Levy-Gray, nor solicited the purchase of this particular drug in any
way. Furthermore, the majority never acknowledged the principle
from Schley that a seller may not create an express warranty for a pur-
chased item without evidence that the buyer relied on the seller's mar-
keting efforts in making the purchase.' 3 7  Because a seller's
affirmations of warranty are not part of the basis of the bargain, Levy-
Gray cannot be said to have relied on Rite Aid's advertising efforts
132. See Rite Aid, 391 Md. at 631, 894 A.2d at 576-77 (discussing the learned intermedi-
ary doctrine without addressing inducement).
133. Greer v. Whalen, 125 Md. 273, 279-80, 93 A. 521, 523 (1915); People's Serv. Drug
Stores, Inc. v. Somerville, 161 Md. 662, 666-67, 158 A. 12, 13-14 (1932).
134. Greer, 125 Md. at 274, 279, 282, 93 A. at 521, 523-24; Schley v. Zalis, 172 Md. 336,
338-39, 191 A. 563, 564 (1937).
135. See supra Part I (describing the circumstances of Levy-Gray's purchase at the
pharmacy).
136. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Scarlett Harbor Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 109 Md.
App. 217, 249, 279 n.16, 674 A.2d 106, 121-22, 136 n.16 (1996); see also People's Serv., 161
Md. at 664-66, 158 A. at 13 (suggesting that a treating physician's prescription, not a phar-
macy, induces a drug's purchase).
137. Schley, 172 Md. at 338-39, 191 A. at 564. In Maryland, the inducement element of
warranty formation works in tandem with the timing requirement; only if the buyer re-
ceives the seller's solicitation efforts prior to or at the time of the purchase will the efforts
be held to induce the sale and to create an express warranty. Id.; see also Schmaltz v. Nis-
sen, 431 N.W.2d 657, 660-61 (S.D. 1988) (indicating that an express warranty does not
exist if a buyer does not see a seller's warranty until after the purchase).
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when purchasing doxycycline without evidence that Rite Aid ever mar-
keted that particular drug to Levy-Gray.138
The Rite Aid majority's decision was especially problematic given
that in the area of prescription drugs, any representation made by a
pharmacy does not form an express warranty because patients
purchase prescription medications based on advice from prescribing
physicians, not advertisements from the pharmacy."' Therefore, if a
customer purchases a particular drug on the advice and prescription
of his treating physician, and not on the basis of a pharmacy's adver-
tisement to the buyer or a pamphlet given to the buyer after the
purchase, the pharmacy did not induce the purchase and cannot be
said to have warranted the performance of the drug to the cus-
tomer. 14' Consequently, because Levy-Gray's physician prescribed the
doxycycline, which Rite Aid did not specifically market or advertise,
and because the "Rite Advice" pamphlet was received after the drug's
purchase, the court erred in finding that Rite Aid expressly warranted
the drug's performance.
B. The Rite Aid Court Failed to Properly Apply the Learned
Intermediary Doctrine to Shield Rite Aid from Liability
Even if the Rite Aid majority was correct in finding the express
warranty elements satisfied, the court errantly declined to shield Rite
Aid from liability under the learned intermediary doctrine. 4 ' When
the Court of Appeals adopted the learned intermediary doctrine, it
sought to insulate pharmacies from liability for dispensing prescrip-
tion drugs even when the express warranty elements were satisfied,
because patients rely on the advice of physicians-not pharmacies-
regarding drug use.14 2 Therefore, even if the court found that the
138. See Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Alter, 834 S.W.2d 136, 146-47 (Ark. 1992) (noting that an
express warranty exists only if a buyer shows that a seller's affirmation of the quality or
condition of the product sold is made at the time of sale and induces the buyer's
purchase); see also Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676, 680 (D.N.H.
1972) (explaining that the buyer has the burden of showing that the seller's representa-
tions induced his purchase).
139. See In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 133 F. Supp. 2d 272, 291-92 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(emphasizing that "the only representations regarding the intrinsic properties of the drug
that form the basis of the buyer's purchase are those of the physician"); see also People's
Serv., 161 Md. at 666-67, 158 A. at 13-14 (noting that a treating physician, not a pharmacy,
induces a drug's purchase when the purchase results from a physician's prescription).
140. In re Rezulin, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 291-92.
141. See Rite Aid, 391 Md. at 631-34, 894 A.2d at 577-79 (choosing not to extend the
learned intermediary doctrine to protect Rite Aid because the alternative is "without legal
justification").
142. People's Serv., 161 Md. at 664-66, 158 A. at 13.
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Rite Aid/Levy-Gray exchange adhered to the timing and inducement-
to-buy elements of an express warranty, it nevertheless should have
protected Rite Aid under the learned intermediary doctrine; Levy-
Gray could not reasonably and justifiably have relied on Rite Aid's
statements as to doxycycline's use because the pharmacy lacked the
intimate knowledge of the patient which her physician possessed.1
43
The Rite Aid majority also failed to acknowledge the breadth of this
protective doctrine. Other state appellate courts have protected phar-
macies with respect to dispensing prescription drugs under the doc-
trine, emphasizing that patients place confidence in their doctor's
skill, rather than a pharmacy's advice with respect to drug use.
1 4 4
Despite national acceptance and the court's own prior decisions
to the contrary, the Rite Aid majority erroneously distinguished the
case at hand from two significant cases. First, the Rite Aid majority
claimed that In re Rezulin, which protected pharmacies from liability as
atypical sellers and transferred liability to the customer's physicians,
was irrelevant because Rezulin did not involve a "patient package in-
sert" that was prepared and distributed by the pharmacy. 145 The Rite
Aid majority ignored the fact that the In re Rezulin court applied its
rationale to statements in information pamphlets distributed by phar-
macies as well as manufacturers, and found neither pamphlet distribu-
tor liable for an express warranty breach for statements about a
prescription drugs' safety, performance, or reliability. 146 The In re
Rezulin court specifically addressed the possibility of patient pam-
phlets, concluding that patients consult their physicians and not phar-
macists in how to use their drugs, and do not negotiate with a
pharmacy as they would with a typical seller. 147 Therefore, the Rite Aid
majority should have applied In re Rezulin rather than distinguished it,
and found that it would be unreasonable for Levy-Gray to have relied
upon Rite Aid's statements about the drug.148
143. Id.
144. Presto v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 487 S.E.2d 70, 75 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997); Batiste v.
Am. Home Prods. Corp., 231 S.E.2d 269, 276 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977); Coyle v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 584 A.2d 1383, 1387 (Pa. 1991); Makripokis v. Merrell-Dow Pharms., Inc., 523
A.2d 374, 376-77 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
145. Rite Aid, 391 Md. at 632-34, 894 A.2d at 577-79; In re Rezulin, 133 F. Supp. 2d at
291-92.
146. In re Rezulin, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 288-89.
147. Id. at 291-92.
148. Id.; see also Rite Aid, 391 Md. at 638, 640-41, 894 A.2d 563, 581-83 (Harrell, J.,
dissenting) (indicating that given the unpredictability inherent to medicine and custom-
ers' reliance on physicians' prescriptions, it would be unfair and unreasonable for a patient
to rely on a pharmacy's statement about a drug).
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Second, the Rite Aid majority erred in its attempt to distinguish its
seminal learned intermediary case, People's Service Drug Stores, Inc. v.
Somerville, to find Rite Aid in breach of an express warranty. 149 The
majority claimed that People's Service sought only to protect pharma-
cists who simply fill prescriptions according to physicians' orders, not
pharmacies that disseminate information about a prescription drug's
properties and efficacy. 150 However, this position misses the message
of People's Service, wherein the court sought to impose lesser liability on
pharmacists than other medical caregivers who are more closely in-
volved with the patient; even if a physician in a given case is found
liable, it does not also follow to hold the customer's pharmacist liable
to the same degree.
1 5 1
Furthermore, the Rite Aid majority should have considered the
Court of Appeals's precedential protection of pharmacies as com-
pared to drug manufacturers. 15 2 Because the court has insulated phar-
maceutical companies from express warranty liability when the drug
producers have provided customers with product information and has
held drug manufacturers to a stricter level of liability than pharma-
cies, the Rite Aid court should have similarly protected pharmacies
that disseminate product pamphlets.1 53 For example, the Rite Aid ma-
jority should have considered the protection of pharmacies as re-
flected in Mancuso v. Giant Food, Inc.154 Not only did the Rite Aid
majority fail to distinguish pharmacies from physicians and drug man-
ufacturers, which have stronger connections with both the patients
and medication, but it also failed to consider Mancuso, which decided
that the Maryland General Assembly did not intend that pharmacies
be considered health care providers.1 55 Mancuso extended People's Ser-
vice by insulating pharmacies that correctly or errantly fill a prescrip-
tion, shielding them from warranty liability because pharmacists have
much less knowledge of and interaction with the patient than does a
physician. 156 By failing to then apply this protection when a pharmacy
provides the customer with information about a drug's use, the Rite
149. See Rite Aid, 391 Md. at 633-34, 894 A.2d at 578-79 (majority opinion) (citing Peo-
ple's Serv. Drug Stores, Inc. v. Somerville, 161 Md. 662, 663-64, 666, 158 A. 12, 12-13
(1932)).
150. Rite Aid, 391 Md. at 634, 894 A.2d at 579.
151. Peopls Serv., 161 Md. at 666, 158 A. at 13.
152. See supra Part II.C.
153. See supra Part II.C.
154. 327 Md. 344, 345, 348, 352, 609 A.2d 332, 333-34, 336 (1992).
155. Id. at 352, 609 A.2d at 336.
156. Id. at 348, 352, 609 A.2d at 334, 336.
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Aid court overlooked its special treatment of pharmacies as dictated by
Mancuso and People's Service.
Considering that courts have even protected drug manufacturers
and physicians under the learned intermediary doctrine, 57 the Rite
Aid majority further erred in not extending this favored, protected
status to pharmacies that disseminate information to patients. Mary-
land's learned intermediary theory has protected both manufacturers
of labor-inducing chemicals for childbirth and makers of generic
amoxicillin-even when the drug producer had inadequate warnings
of risks on its products-finding that the patient-customer could not
reasonably rely on manufacturer statements when the patient is under
the care and supervision of a physician. 158 If a drug manufacturer is
protected under Maryland's learned intermediary doctrine when it
disseminates product information like in Nolan and Ames, it follows
that a pharmacy deserves the same protection, especially when a physi-
cian is directly involved with the customer and when the pharmacy's
language is identical to statements provided by the manufacturer.
The Court of Appeals erred by ignoring precedent regarding the
learned intermediary doctrine, made a flawed distinction based on
Rite Aid's "Rite Advice" pamphlet, and erroneously attempted to dis-
tinguish In re Rezulin, even though that court stated that its decision
covered instances where the pharmacy distributed product informa-
tion to its customers.
V. CONCLUSION
In Rite Aid Corp. v. Levy-Gray, the Court of Appeals found a phar-
macy in breach of an express warranty for providing a customer with a
pamphlet detailing how to take a particular drug if she experienced
gastric irritation.1 59 In finding that the sale and the pamphlet ex-
change constituted an express warranty, the court neglected to apply
precedent insisting on particular and appropriate timing.160 Specifi-
cally, because Levy-Gray received the "Rite Advice" pamphlet after her
157. Ames v. Apothecon, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 2d 566, 568 (D. Md. 2006); see also Miller v.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 121 F. Supp. 2d 831, 838 (D. Md. 2000) (using the learned inter-
mediary doctrine to protect manufacturers of medical devices from negligence claims re-
garding products used under the supervision of a doctor); Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432,
451-52, 379 A.2d 1014, 1026 (1977) (protecting physicians with knowledge of a patient's
idiosyncrasies because it is unreasonable to warrant a particular result given the unpredict-
able nature of the medical field).
158. Nolan v. Dillon, 261 Md. 516, 523, 276 A.2d 36, 40 (1971); Ames, 431 F. Supp. 2d at
572.
159. Rite Aid, 391 Md. at 635, 894 A.2d at 579.
160. See supra Part IV.A.1.
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purchase, the court should have found that Rite Aid's statements were
not part of its bargain with Levy-Gray and did not create an express
warranty. 16' Furthermore, the court gave short shrift to the require-
ment that a seller induce the sale for an express warranty to exist. 
162
Given that Levy-Gray's physician prescribed the doxycycline and Rite
Aid did not market the drug, the court should have found that Rite
Aid did not induce its purchase and did not create an express war-
ranty.' 63 In ruling that the learned intermediary doctrine shielded
Rite Aid from liability, the court errantly departed from prior cases
that protected both manufacturers when providing pharmaceutical in-
formation and once-removed sellers when the buyer is under the care
or supervision of a physician. 164 A better analysis would have adhered
to the timing and inducement-to-buy requirements for express war-
ranties, protecting pharmacies from breach when filling prescriptions
without the particular knowledge of each customer's medical idiosyn-
crasies, would correctly apply the court's precedential protection of
atypical sellers when the buyer is under the care of a better-informed
intermediary, and would encourage pharmacies to provide ample re-
sources to uninformed customers. 165
THOMAS M. GRACE
161. See supra Part W.A.1.
162. See supra Part IV.A.2.
163. See supra Part LV.A.2.
164. See supra Part IV.B.
165. See supra Part IV.
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KILMON v. STATE: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY
TO ADVANCE WOMEN'S RIGHTS
In Kilmon v. State,' the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered
whether ingesting cocaine while pregnant is criminally punishable
pursuant to section 3-204(a) (1) of the Criminal Law Article. 2 In do-
ing so, the Kilmon court reversed the lower court's conviction of two
women for endangering the lives of their respective children by in-
gesting cocaine while pregnant.3 The court's decision was properly
supported by a finding that the legislative intent behind section 3-204
of the Criminal Law Article-the reckless endangerment statute
under which the women were charged-did not include harm to a
fetus caused in utero by its mother.4 However, the Kilmon court missed
two important opportunities to address issues central to the advance-
ment of women's rights.5 First, the court should have analyzed the
Kilmon case in light of the State's attempt to expand fetal rights.6 Sec-
ond, the court should have addressed the potential violation of Mary-
land's Equal Rights Amendment by prosecuting women, and not men,
for drug use.7 By failing to take these extra steps to promote and
protect women's rights, the Kilmon court allowed for further prosecu-
tions of drug-addicted women, creating more harm to the women
themselves, their fetuses, and their children, and ultimately, advanc-
ing the stereotypes of domesticity that women have long fought to
overcome 8
I. THE CASE
On June 3, 2004, Regina Kilmon gave birth to a baby boy named
Andrew W. Kilmon.9 A drug screen performed on the baby showed
the presence of cocaine "at the level of 675 nanograms per millili-
Copyright © 2007 by Rebecca Caldwell.
1. 394 Md. 168, 905 A.2d 306 (2006).
2. Id. at 172, 905 A.2d at 308. The relevant part of this statute makes it a misde-
meanor for a person to recklessly "[e]ngage in conduct that creates a substantial risk of
death or serious physical injury to another." MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAw § 3-204(a) (1)
(LexisNexis 2006).
3. Kilmon, 394 Md. at 183, 905 A.2d at 315.
4. See infta Part IV.A.
5. See infta Part IV.B.
6. See infra Part IV.B.1.
7. See infra Part IV.B.2.
8. See infra Part W.C.
9. Kilmon, 394 Md. at 170, 905 A.2d at 307.
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ter"-well above the minimum sensitivity level of 300 nanograms per
milliliter. 10 Based on the level of cocaine in the baby's blood, in Au-
gust 2004, the Maryland State's Attorney filed several charges against
Ms. Kilmon, including: (1) second degree child abuse; (2) contribut-
ing to conditions to render a child delinquent; (3) reckless endanger-
ment; and (4) possession of a controlled dangerous substance. 1 The
State eventually agreed to nol pros12 charges (1), (2), and (4) in ex-
change for Ms. Kilmon's guilty plea on the reckless endangerment
charge.
13
In an agreed upon statement of facts, the State proffered that it
would have provided expert testimony showing the detrimental effects
of a pregnant woman's use of cocaine on her fetus. 14 According to
the State, such effects include the increased possibility of spontaneous
abortion, premature delivery, and the formation of blood clots in the
fetus's brain.15 Additionally, the State maintained that cocaine in the
baby's system may lead to a low birth weight, which in turn usually
leads to more health problems than those found in normal-size ba-
bies.' 6 Based on these facts and an assurance that Ms. Kilmon's guilty
plea was offered voluntarily, the Circuit Court for Talbot County ac-
cepted the plea and found Ms. Kilmon guilty of reckless endanger-
ment.' 7 She was sentenced to four years in prison.' 8
On January 13, 2005, Kelly Lynn Cruz delivered a son, Denadre
Michael Thomas Cross, weighing three pounds and two ounces.' 9 Ms.
Cruz's baby, like Ms. Kilmon's, tested positive for cocaine.20 Ms. Cruz
also tested positive for cocaine, although she denied using the drug.21
10. Id. at 170-71, 905 A.2d at 307.
11. Id.
12. This term is shorthand for the Latin phrase nolle prosequi which means "not to wish
to prosecute." BLACK's LAw DIcTIoNARY 1074 (8th ed. 2004). This term provides "legal
notice that a lawsuit or prosecution has been abandoned." Id.
13. Kilmon, 394 Md. at 170, 905 A.2d at 307. The reckless endangerment count was
based on Ms. Kilmon's use of cocaine while pregnant with Andrew Kilmon. Id. The State
claimed that Ms. Kilmon's cocaine use "created a substantial risk of death and serious
physical harm to Andrew Kilmon." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 171, 905 A.2d at 307.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 171-72, 905 A.2d at 308. Ms. Cruz was initially admitted to Easton Memorial
Hospital complaining of stomach pains. Id. She was approximately seven months preg-
nant at delivery. Id. at 172, 905 A.2d at 308.
20. Id.
21. Id. Ms. Cruz maintained that people around her used cocaine, which she believed
could explain why she tested positive for the drug. Id.
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Based on the presence of cocaine in Ms. Cruz's son's blood, the
State's Attorney filed similar charges against Ms. Cruz as those filed
against Ms. Kilmon. 22 The State again entered a nol pros for all the
charges except for reckless endangerment. 23 Unlike Ms. Kilmon, Ms.
Cruz pled not guilty to the reckless endangerment charge. 24 The Cir-
cuit Court for Talbot County found Ms. Cruz guilty and sentenced her
to five years in prison, with two-and-a-half years suspended, on condi-
tion of supervised probation and drug treatment upon release from
prison.2 5
Ms. Kilmon and Ms. Cruz both appealed to the Maryland Court
of Special Appeals. 26 However, the Court of Appeals granted certio-
rari before any proceedings took place.27 Because both the appeals
addressed similar issues, the Court of Appeals granted certiorari in
both cases to determine whether ingesting cocaine while pregnant is
criminally punishable pursuant to section 3-204 (a) (1) of the Criminal
Law Article.28
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Like many state legislatures, the Maryland General Assembly
chose to tackle the problem of drug-exposed babies through the civil
legal system. 29 Other states, often using this problem to expand fetal
rights, also attempted to remedy the situation through the enactment
of civil statutes.3 0 At the same time, state prosecutors across the coun-
try also tried using the criminal justice system to solve the problem of
drug-exposed babies. 3' Although the development of laws pertaining
to drug-exposed babies is a relatively new phenomenon, the issue is
inextricably intertwined with a much older concern-that of women's
rights.3 2 Federal women's rights jurisprudence has been evolving
since the nineteenth century.3 3 More recently, with the passage of
22. Id., 905 A.2d at 307-08. The reckless endangerment count mirrored Ms. Kilmon's,
stating that Ms. Cruz's use of cocaine while pregnant "created a substantial risk of death
and serious physical injury" to her son. Id. 909 A.2d at 308.
23. Id., 905 A.2d at 308.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id., 905 A.2d at 307-08.
27. Id., 905 A.2d at 308.
28. Id.
29. See infra Part II.A.
30. See infra Part II.B.1-2.
31. See infra Part II.B.2.
32. See infra Part II.C.
33. See infra Part II.C.1.
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Maryland's Equal Rights Amendment in 1972, Maryland has had to
develop its own local women's rights jurisprudence.3 4
A. History of Maryland's Legislative and Judicial Treatment of Harm
to Fetuses
The Maryland General Assembly and Maryland courts had many
opportunities to address the issues inherent in the problem of harm
to a fetus. First, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Maryland Gen-
eral Assembly debated statutes that would have enforced criminal or
civil sanctions in the context of children born drug-addicted due to
drug exposure in utero3 5 Second, the Maryland Court of Appeals
grappled with the question of whether the common law crime of man-
slaughter included the situation wherein harm caused to a fetus by a
third party resulted in the death of a "born alive" child.3 6
The "crack epidemic" of the mid-1980s challenged legislatures
across the country to develop laws to stem the problem of drug-
addicted babies. Maryland primarily addressed this problem through
the civil legal system.3 7 In the 1989 legislative session, House Bill 809
was introduced. 8 This bill would have expanded the definition of
"child abuse" to include the physical dependency of a newborn infant
on any controlled dangerous substance as defined under Maryland
law."°  House Bill 809 died, however, in the House Judiciary
Committee.
The 1990 legislative session similarly produced a number of bills
attempting to solve the drug-exposed baby problem. House Bill 1233
would have included in the definition of criminal child abuse any
physical injury to an unborn child that resulted from the child's
mother's use of illegal drugs during pregnancy.4 ° House Bill 689 re-
sembled HB 1233 except that it referred to the physical injury to "the
child," rather than to an "unborn child."41 It also would have made
physical injury to an unborn child due to maternal drug use a fel-
ony.42 Finally, House Bill 689 would have exempted those women
34. See infra Part II.C.2.
35. See infra notes 38-53 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 45-51 and accompanying text. Note, however, this does not mean
that Maryland has not also considered issues of fetal rights in the criminal justice system.
See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
38. Md. H.B. 809, 1989 Sess.
39. Id.
40. Md. H.B. 1233, 1990 Sess.
41. Md. H.B. 689, 1990 Sess.
42. Id.
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from punishment who, upon learning of their pregnancy, participated
in a drug abuse treatment program and subsequently abstained from
using any controlled substance.43 Both House Bill 1233 and House
Bill 689 died on the floor of the House Judiciary Committee.44
In 1997, the General Assembly decided to address the problem of
drug-exposed babies in the civil context with the passage of the Drug
Addiction at Birth Act (DABA) .45 DABA affected three different sec-
tions of the Maryland Code: (1) the section on juvenile court hearings
in child in need of assistance (CINA) hearings;46 (2) adoption pro-
ceedings under the Family Law Article;4 7 and (3) services provided by
the Departments of Human Resources and Health and Mental Hy-
giene to certain families in which abuse or neglect of a child is al-
leged.4" DABA created a presumption in CINA cases that a child born
with substantial exposure or presence of cocaine or heroin in his or
her system was not receiving adequate care and attention.49
DABA authorizes a local social services department to begin aju-
dicial proceeding to terminate a mother's parental rights within
ninety days after a child is born with illegal substances in his or her
system. 51 CINA proceedings may begin if the mother is offered admis-
sion into a drug treatment program and does not accept or fully par-
ticipate within a specified time period.5
In addition to civil sanctions under DABA, Maryland courts also
addressed the criminality of harm caused to fetuses by a third party in
43. Id.
44. That same year, the General Assembly also considered two statutes attempting to
add civil punishments for drug use during pregnancy-House Bill 1101 and Senate Bill
662. Md. H.B. 1101, 1990 Sess.; Md. S.B. 662, 1990 Sess. These bills would have expanded
the definition of both "child in need of assistance" and "neglect" under sections of the
Maryland Code to include a child's in utero exposure to a controlled substance. Md. H.B.
1101, 1990 Sess.; Md. S.B. 662, 1990 Sess. However, these programs proved too costly, and
HB 1101 and SB 662 died on the floor of the HouseJudiciary Committee as well. One or
both of these bills was before the Maryland General Assembly in 1991, 1992, 1995, 1996,
and 1997, but the General Assembly failed to pass any of them.
45. Act of May 8, 1997, ch. 367, 1997 Md. Laws 2522.
46. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. §§ 3-801 (f) (2), 3-818 (LexisNexis 2006). A child
will be deemed a CINA requiring state intervention if "[t]he child's parents, guardian, or
custodian are unable or unwilling to give proper care and attention to the child and the
child's needs." Id. § 3-801 (f) (2).
47. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 5-313, 5-710 (LexisNexis 2006).
48. Id. § 5-706.3.
49. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & Jun. PROC. § 3-818.
50. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-710(b) (2).
51. Id. Specifically, the mother must, within forty-five days, accept both admission to
the suggested program and level of drug treatment, and fully participate in such program
to avoid any sanction. Id.
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Williams v. State.52 In Williams, the Court of Special Appeals consid-
ered whether common law manslaughter is committed when an in-
fant, born alive, dies shortly thereafter as a result of wounds criminally
inflicted upon the infant's pregnant mother.5" The court considered
two opposing viewpoints hearkening back to English common law: (1)
Lord Hale's belief that neither the common law crimes of murder nor
manslaughter include a situation where injuries inflicted upon a preg-
nant woman subsequently cause her infant, born alive, to die;54 and
(2) Lord Coke's belief that a criminal homicide occurs when a child is
born alive and dies of wounds administered to him while he was in his
mother's womb.55 The court decided that Lord Coke's "born alive"
rule best reflected the common law interpretation of manslaughter
and adopted it as the law in Maryland so that harm caused to a fetus
that subsequently causes the death of the "born alive" child, is punish-
able as manslaughter.56
B. The Evolution of Fetal Rights in the United States
Until the early 1970s, the law did not recognize the mother and
the fetus as two separate entities.5 7 The rights and interests of the
fetus were so entangled with those of the mother that the fetus was
granted no separate legal rights.5" Eventually, courts began granting
rights to the fetus, contingent upon live birth, in actions against third
parties.59 Courts also increasingly recognized the fetus in contexts not
contingent upon live birth and often in stark contrast to the rights of
the women carrying them.6 ° Fetal rights again expanded with the on-
slaught of the drug war in the early 1990s. During this time, states
began to assert fetal rights as a basis for prosecuting pregnant women
who use drugs during pregnancy. 61
52. 77 Md. App. 411, 550 A.2d 722 (1988).
53. Id. at 414-15, 550 A.2d at 723-24.
54. Id. at 417, 550 A.2d at 724-25.
55. Id. at 418, 550 A.2d at 725.
56. Id. at 420, 550 A.2d at 726.
57. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) (noting that "the unborn have never
been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense").
58. Id. at 161. The law, the Roe Court recognized, had been reluctant to grant legal
rights to fetuses "except in narrowly defined situations and except when the rights [were]
contingent upon live birth." Id.
59. See infra Part II.B.1.
60. See infra Part II.B.2.
61. Id.
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1. Fetal Rights in Causes of Action Involving Third Parties
In the late 1800s, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
first considered the possibility of fetal rights in Deitrich v. Inhabitants of
Northampton.6 2 In Deitrich, a pregnant woman slipped on a defect in a
road and fell, inducing an early birth.6 3 Although there was testimony
that the fetus lived for ten or fifteen minutes, the fetus was not devel-
oped enough to survive." The woman brought suit, not only for the
damages she incurred, but also for the damages to her fetus.6 5 Then-
Massachusetts Justice Holmes, after analyzing the common law, 66 de-
termined that the infant did not qualify as a "person" under the in-
voked statute, for whose loss of life his mother could sue the town.
6 7
Soon after Deitrich, courts began to extend rights to fetuses in the
narrow context of property law68 and eventually in the arena of wrong-
ful death actions. 69 These courts stayed within the holding of Deitrich,
however, by making such rights contingent on the subsequent live
birth of the fetus.7 0 For example, in Cowles v. Cowles,71 the Supreme
Court of Connecticut found that the term "my grandchildren" in a
will referred to and gave rights to a child upon conception.7 2 In so
holding, the court stated that the "unborn grandchild was [at the
death of the testator], in contemplation of law, living and capable of
becoming a member of the class [of beneficiaries] .. .
62. 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
63. Id. at 14-15.
64. Id. at 15.
65. Id.
66. Id. First, Justice Holmes considered and rejected Lord Coke's "born alive" rule
because it grew out of criminal law and did not apply to civil cases. Id. The question,
Justice Holmes noted, involved whether an infant who dies before it could even survive on
its own should be considered a person recognized by the law. Id. at 16. In answering no to
this question,Justice Holmes cited a statute under which the punishment for attempting to
procure an unlawful miscarriage was substantially increased when the woman died as a
result of this attempt, but with no corresponding increase when the child died, whether in
utero or after leaving the womb. Id. at 17.
67. Id. at 17.
68. See Medlock v. Brown, 136 S.E. 551, 553 (Ga. 1927) (holding that a conveyance of
land by a deed to a married woman "and her children" includes a child in utero so long as it
is subsequently born alive); McLain v. Howald, 79 N.W. 182, 183 (Mich. 1899) (finding
that a bequest of money may be made to a fetus). Despite the few state court holdings that
gave property rights to fetuses, the recognition of a fetus as a "person" throughout history
has been the exception, even in property law. See, e.g., In re Peabody, 158 N.E.2d 841, 845
(N.Y. 1959) (determining that a fetus is not a person for purposes of amending a trust).
69. See infra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 73-85 and accompanying text.
71. 13 A. 414 (Conn. 1887).
72. Id. at 417.
73. Id.
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In the mid-1900s, federal and state courts further expanded fetal
rights by recognizing wrongful death actions against a fetus, again em-
phasizing the need for the fetus to first be born alive. In Bonbrest v.
Kotz, 74 the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
upheld a medical malpractice action brought by a child for injuries
that occurred in utero.75 The court acknowledged, under Deitrich, that
a fetus has no judicial existence and is not to be regarded as a "sepa-
rate, distinct, and individual entity" from its mother.76 However, the
court noted that the case at hand, unlike Dietrich, involved a direct
injury to a viable child by the defendant doctors. 7 The Bonbrest court
observed that a fetus, once capable of "extra-uterine" life, is no longer
a "part" of its mother.78 Accordingly, the Bonbrest court held that a
viable fetus has a right to an action in the courts for injuries commit-
ted against it while in the womb.79
The Bonbrest case established the right of a living child to bring
action against a third party for injuries sustained in utero.8 ° Subse-
quent courts re-emphasized the need for the child to be alive to sus-
tain such a cause of action brought by the child itself. Courts also
permitted parents to bring wrongful death suits as a result of losing a
fetus.81 For example, in Volk v. Baldazo,82 the Idaho Supreme Court
allowed a wrongful death action by a parent of a viable, unborn fetus
who died due to injuries sustained in a car accident, stating that had
the child been born alive, it would have had a cause of action on its
own behalf.8"
74. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
75. Id. at 142.
76. Id. at 139.
77. Id. at 140.
78. Id. The Bonbrest court added that there are many examples of modern medicine
saving "living children" from the uterus of a dying mother. Id. Additionally, the court
questioned why a fetus was treated differently under property law and negligence; in the
former a fetus was treated as a human being from the moment of conception, while in the
latter the fetus was considered only a "part" of a mother. Id.
79. Id. at 141-42.
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., Dunn v. Rose Way, Inc., 333 N.W.2d 830,831-33 (Iowa 1983) (holding that
an unborn child has no wrongful death claim but that a parent, as a remedy for the loss of
his unborn child, may bring such an action).
82. 651 P.2d 11 (Idaho 1982).
83. Id. at 14.
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2. Fetal Rights and Causes of Actions Affecting Pregnant Women's
Rights
Fetal rights continued to expand when courts began to recognize
causes of action against the very women carrying the fetuses. For ex-
ample, in Grodin v. Grodin,84 Randy Grodin asserted that his mother,
Roberta Grodin, was negligent in continuing to take tetracycline dur-
ing her pregnancy.8 5 As a result of Roberta's continued tetracycline
use, Randy developed brown and discolored teeth.8 6 On appeal from
a motion for summary judgment, the Michigan Court of Appeals rec-
ognized a child's right to bring an action against its own mother for
injuries which occurred in utero.87
As fetal rights expanded, courts strayed from the strict require-
ment that such rights should depend on a subsequent live birth. In so
doing, courts placed fetal rights in direct conflict with the rights of the
women carrying them. As employers attempted to use expanded fetal
rights to exclude pregnant women from high-paying industrial jobs,88
courts used fetal rights to force pregnant women to have blood trans-
fusions8 9 and caesarean sections to save the life of a fetus.90 Most re-
cently, pregnant women have increasingly been forced to give up their
liberty and freedom when they are arrested and criminally charged
for prenatal drug use.9"
84. 301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
85. Id. at 869-70. Ms. Grodin's doctor assured her that she was unable to become
pregnant, so she continued taking tetracycline. Id, at 869. After consulting another doc-
tor, she became aware that she was seven or eight months pregnant and promptly stopped
taking the medication. Id.
86. Id. at 869.
87. Id. at 870-71. The court remanded the case for a determination of the reasonable-
ness of the mother's alleged negligent conduct. Id. at 871.
88. See, e.g., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (holding discrimina-
tory an employer's policy barring all women, except those who could prove their infertility,
from jobs involving actual or potential lead exposure).
89. See Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem'l Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537, 538 (N.J.
1964) (per curiam) (ordering that blood transfusions be administered to a pregnant wo-
man, despite her protests, if a presiding physician finds that such transfusions are necessary
to save her life or the life of her fetus). But see In re Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 405 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1997) (refusing to force a pregnant woman to submit to a blood transfusion against her
will, even though it could potentially save the life of her viable fetus).
90. SeeJefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457, 459-60 (Ga.
1981) (per curiam) (denying parents' motion for stay of an order requiring mother to
submit to a caesarean section, which she opposed for religious reasons, to sustain the life of
her unborn fetus). But see In reA.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1252-53 (D.C. 1990) (en banc) (vacat-
ing a court-ordered caesarean section on the grounds that courts should rarely authorize
major surgery over a patient's objection); In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App. Ct.
1994) (holding that a competent woman's refusal to obtain a caesarean section during
pregnancy must be upheld, even where such refusal would cause harm to her fetus).
91. See infra notes 98-119 and accompanying text.
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As courts across the country continued to expand civil fetal
rights, state prosecutors simultaneously attempted to expand criminal
law to encompass such rights, often minimizing pregnant women's lib-
erty. Reyes v. Superior Court2 was the first appellate case to consider
the prosecution of a woman under child abuse or endangerment stat-
utes for her drug addiction while pregnant.9 3 In Reyes, a woman was
arrested and charged with two counts of felony child endangering.
94
Ms. Reyes was addicted to heroin and her twins were born addicted
and suffered withdrawal.95 The Reyes court held that the word "child"
as used in California's felonious child endangerment statute did not
apply to a fetus and that Ms. Reyes could not be prosecuted for her
drug use during pregnancy under this statute. 6
In the years to follow, many state prosecutors would bring similar
charges to those in Reyes. Prosecutors attempted to charge pregnant
drug-addicted women with either child abuse or endangerment,97 or
with distribution of a controlled substance.9" Though most of these
cases addressed the issue of fetal rights openly by naming the fetus as
92. 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (Ct. App. 1977).
93. Id. at 913.
94. Id. at 912.
95. Id. at 912-13.
96. Id. at 913-14. The Reyes court relied on previous holdings stating that the defini-
tions of "human being," "minor child," and "person" in various California statutes, and
"dependent child" in a federal statute, did not extend to an unborn child. Id. at 913.
97. E.g., Reinesto v. Superior Court, 894 P.2d 733, 738 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (dis-
missing child abuse charges against a woman for ingestion of heroin during pregnancy
because the problem is best addressed by the legislature); State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140,
1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming the dismissal of charges against a drug-addicted
pregnant woman for aggravated child abuse); Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280,
283-85 (Ky. 1993) (determining that a child abuse statute did not include an expectant
mother's self-abuse); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710, 713 (Ohio 1992) (finding a child en-
dangerment statute inapplicable where a mother abuses drugs during pregnancy); Sheriff
v. Encoe, 885 P.2d 596, 597 (Nev. 1994) (per curiam) (finding that a statute criminalizing
child endangerment does not apply to the ingestion of illegal substances by a pregnant
woman); People v. Morabito, 580 N.Y.S.2d 843, 847 (N. Geneva City Ct. 1992) (dismissing a
mother's child endangerment charge because drug abuse while pregnant cannot consti-
tute endangerment to a "child"); Collins v. State, 890 S.W.2d 893, 898 (Tex. App. 1994)
(finding vague a Texas statute criminalizing injury to a child as applied to the effects of a
pregnant woman's drug use on her fetus). But see In re Ruiz, 27 Ohio Misc. 2d 31, 500
N.E.2d 935 (C.P. 1986) (holding that the effects of a mother's heroin use on her fetus
constitute child abuse).
98. E.g.,Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1296-97 (Fla. 1992) (overturning the con-
viction of a mother for delivery of a controlled substance to her fetus through her umbili-
cal cord); State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32, 33 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (determining that a statute
criminalizing distribution of a controlled substance did not include transmission of such
substance to a fetus).
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the victim, at least two sets of prosecutors, in State v. Luste?9 and Col-
lins v. State,'00 attempted to name the child as the victim and thereby
avoid the issue of fetal rights. Nonetheless, both the Luster court and
the Collins court explicitly rejected the prosecutors' attempts to impli-
cate the child and not the fetus, and held that the statutes at issue did
not give any rights to fetuses.'' Like these two cases, the majority of
courts hearing criminal fetal rights cases determined that the statutes
invoked against drug-addicted pregnant women did not encompass
actions taken by a mother against her unborn child."0 2
South Carolina is one of the few exceptions to this rule. 0 3 In two
cases, the Supreme Court of South Carolina upheld convictions of
pregnant women based on harms they caused their fetuses.10 4 In 1997,
the South Carolina Supreme Court in Whitner v. State 5 upheld a
mother's conviction for criminal child neglect due to her ingestion of
crack cocaine while pregnant.' 0 6 The court considered whether a via-
ble fetus is a "person" for purposes of the Children's Code 10 7 under
which Whitner was charged. 0 8 In upholding Whitner's conviction,
the court stated that South Carolina law has a long history of recogniz-
99. 419 S.E.2d 32 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). In Luster, the State charged the defendant
mother with possession and distribution of cocaine to her child asserting that the fetus
eventually became a "living, breathing person" when she was born. Id. at 34 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
100. 890 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. App. 1994). The Collins prosecutors argued that the defen-
dant mother could be prosecuted for reckless injury regardless of whether a fetus was pro-
tected by statute because the alleged injury took place after the child was born alive. Id. at
898. Such injury, the Collins prosecutors claimed, was pain from cocaine withdrawal. Id.
101. Luster, 419 S.E.2d at 34; Collins, 890 S.W.2d at 898. In explicitly implicating the
fetus, the Luster court noted that it would have been physically impossible for the defen-
dant mother to transfer cocaine to the live child. Luster, 419 S.E.2d at 34. Similarly, the
Collins court determined that the mother's conduct did not reach the reckless injury stat-
ute, as she harmed the fetus and not "a human being who has been born and is alive." 890
S.W.2d at 897-98.
102. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
103. See infra notes 104-115 and accompanying notes. Another exception is Ohio. In In
re Ruiz, an Ohio trial court determined that "child" in Ohio's child abuse statute covers a
viable fetus. 27 Ohio Misc. 2d 31, 35, 500 N.E.2d 935, 939 (C.P. 1986). The court relied
upon Ohio case law supporting the expansion of fetal rights, the Roe v. Wade holding that a
state has a compelling interest in potential human life at viability, and the changing con-
cepts of viability. Id. at 33-35, 500 N.E.2d at 937-38.
104. State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168 (S.C. 2003); Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777
(S.C. 1997).
105. 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997).
106. Id. at 778-79, 786.
107. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-50 (1985). The relevant portion of this statute makes it a
misdemeanor to endanger the life, health, or comfort of a child or helpless person
through neglect. Id.
108. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 779.
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ing viable fetuses as "persons holding certain legal rights and
privileges."1 9
Six years after Whitner, the Supreme Court of South Carolina up-
held another conviction involving a mother's harm caused to her fe-
tus in State v. McKnight."' In McKnight, the mother gave birth to a
stillborn child born with cocaine metabolites in her system."' 1 The
mother was convicted for homicide under a child abuse statute." 12 In
upholding the conviction, the court found that the plain language of
the statute did not preclude its application to the case of a stillborn.'1
The McKnight court observed that when the legislature amended the
child abuse statute in 2000, it was well aware of Whitner yet still failed
to omit viable fetus from the statute's applicability.' 14 This, the court
noted, was persuasive evidence that the legislature did not intend to
exempt fetuses from the statute's operation. 1
5
C. The History of Discrimination Against Women and Maryland's
Legislative Response
While the law has expanded to protect fetal rights through both
the criminal and civil systems, it has also expanded to protect and
promote an equal place for women in society. Throughout history,
women have been discriminated against for many reasons. In particu-
lar, women have endured harsh and unequal treatment due to their
physical ability to conceive children.' 16 The federal attempt of slow-
ing the tide of discrimination was the Equal Rights Amendment.117
Though this Act failed to become law, many states, including Mary-
land, had already passed their own version of an equality-based protec-
tion and have used these laws to enhance the status of women.'
1 8
109. Id. The court pointed to its past decisions upholding wrongful death suits brought
on behalf of a fetus-regardless of whether a live birth occurred-and a case upholding a
feticide conviction. Id. at 779-80. The Whitner court read the state's policy of "prevention
of children's problems" as support for its reading of the word "person" to include viable
fetuses. Id. at 780.
110. 576 S.E.2d 168, 179 (S.C. 2003).
111. Id. at 171.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 174.
114. Id. at 175.
115. Id.
116. See infra Part I.C.1.
117. Equal Rights Amendment, Proposed Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, H.RJ. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 86 Stat. 1523 (1972).
118. See infra Part II.C.2.
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1. A History of Discrimination Based on Women's Ability to Conceive
Children
The Supreme Court of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries played a large role in promoting the stereotypical view that a
woman's place was in the home, taking care of children. As early as
1873, the Court in Bradwell v. Illinois119 recognized states' authority to
bar women from becoming lawyers.12° Thirty-five years later, in Muller
v. Oregon,12' the Court upheld a statute limiting the amount of hours
that women, not men, could work in a single day because it did not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment.1 22 The Muller Court reasoned
that a state had adequate justification for infringing women's rights
because "healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring."' 23
Therefore, the statute, which the Court deemed to protect women
from the physical harm of long workdays, would aid in "preserv[ing]
the strength and vigor of the race. 1 24
The military, educational institutions, and employers continued
to discriminate against women based on their capacity to bear chil-
dren. For example, women were once automatically discharged from
the military if they became pregnant due to the belief that a woman's
priorities would lie with her maternal duties.1 25 Before the enactment
of Title IX in 1972,126 women were also denied participation in ath-
letic activity because rigorous competition was thought to cause physi-
cal and psychological harm, especially to a woman's reproductive
capabilities. Additionally, women were denied higher education be-
cause lawmakers believed it would interfere with their reproductive
organs.127 The Supreme Court also held, in Geduldig v. Aiello128 that
California's decision to exclude from its benefits program disabilities
119. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
120. Id. at 139.
121. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
122. Id. at 416-17, 422-23.
123. Id. at 421. In further rationalizing its holding, the Court stated "[t]hat woman's
physical structure and the performance of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage
in the struggle for subsistence is obvious." Id.
124. Id.; see also Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 282 (1937) (upholding a Georgia law
exempting women from a poll tax because of the "burdens necessarily borne by [women]
for the preservation of the race").
125. E.g., Struck v. Sec'y of Defense, 460 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 1971). Eventually, these
policies changed. See, e.g., Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F.2d 1114 (2d Cir. 1976) (striking
down the Marines' automatic pregnancy discharge under rational basis test).
126. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, §901, 86 Stat. 235, 373-74
(1972) (requiring equal participation of both sexes in sports programs in federally funded
education programs).
127. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 536-37 n.9 (1996).
128. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
20071
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resulting from normal pregnancies was not gender discrimination and
therefore, was not prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
129
Four years later, the tide turned when Congress amended the
Civil Rights Act with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act130 to prohibit
employment discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or re-
lated conditions. The Court followed this trend in Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 3' when it recognized a woman's
ability to become pregnant as protection against, and not a reason for,
a state-mandated role for women.
13 2
After two decades of movement toward equality, however, the
Court's recent ruling in Gonzales v. Carhart"3 ' is evidence that there is
much progress to be made before the ultimate goal of gender equality
is achieved. In Carhart, the Court upheld the Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban Act of 2003, which punishes doctors who "knowingly perform [ ]"
a "partial-birth [or late-term] abortion," '134 with no exception safe-
guarding a woman's health. '5 In coming to its conclusion, the Car-
hart Court took a step back and reverted to the familiar paternalistic
tone from Muller and Bradwell, as the majority sought to protect wo-
men from the "unexceptionable . . . depression and loss of self-
esteem" that will result from late-term abortions. 1 6
129. Id. at 496-97 & n.20; see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136-40 (1976)
(applying Geduldig in determining that the exclusion of pregnancy disability benefits from
GE's plan was not discrimination against women). Justice Brennan penned a prescient
dissent, stating: "by singling out for less favorable treatment a gender-linked disability pe-
culiar to women, the State has created a double standard for disability compensation ....
Such dissimilar treatment of men and women... inevitably constitutes sex discrimination."
Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 501 (Brennan,J., dissenting). Justice Brennan found support for this
argument in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) interpretation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 29 C.F.R. § 604.10 (b) (2006).
130. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
2000e(k) (2000). Though this Act merely proscribes discrimination against women based
on pregnancy related issues in the workplace, the Court declared in Newport News Shipbuild-
ing and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC that in passing the PDA, Congress rejected the idea that
differential treatment of pregnancy is not gender-based discrimination. 462 U.S. 669, 676
(1983).
131. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
132. The Casey Court noted that the government could not proscribe its own vision of a
woman's role upon her because of the intimacy of her child-carrying experience. Id at
852.
133. 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
134. Id. at 1624. In dissent, Justice Ginsburg disputed the majority's use of the term
"partial birth abortion," citing medical authorities referring to the practice as "either dila-
tion and extraction (D & X) or intact dilation and evacuation (intact D & E)." Id. at 1640
n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 1637-38 (majority opinion).
136. Id. at 1634.
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Even before Carhart, Congress was still unable to gather enough
support to pass the Equal Rights Amendment in 1982.117 Many states,
however, including Maryland, recognized the need for legislation to
help overcome this historical discrimination and passed their own
forms of protection for women in state Equal Rights Amendments.
2. Interpreting Maryland's Equal Rights Amendment
Article 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides that
"[e] quality of rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied
because of sex."' 38 Soon after the enactment of this amendment in
1972, the Court of Appeals of Maryland began interpreting its lan-
guage. In Rand v. Rand,'39 the Court of Appeals first analyzed the
meaning of the words found in the Maryland Equal Rights Amend-
ment (ERA).' 4 0 The Rand court examined Maryland's common law
practice of finding a father primarily liable for the support of his mi-
nor children.14" ' After examining the way other states interpreted
their respective ERAs, the Rand majority took a literal approach to
Article 46, stating that the "broad, sweeping, mandatory language" of
the Maryland ERA stood for Maryland's commitment to equal rights
for men and women.'4 2 Therefore, the court held that the sex of a
parent cannot be a factor in allocating the responsibility for child
support. 143
A few months later, in Coleman v. State,"' the Court of Special
Appeals applied the Maryland ERA in determining the constitutional-
ity of a criminal statute that made it illegal for a husband to fail to
support his wife, but not if the roles were reversed. 4 5 The court held
that this statute violated the Maryland ERA because the law discrimi-
nated based upon sex.' 4 6
In the 1980s, the Court of Appeals had many more chances to
apply the Rand court's interpretation of the ERA to particular statutes.
First, in Kline v. Ansell,'47 the court, following Rand, held that a com-
137. See supra note 117.
138. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 46.
139. 280 Md. 508, 374 A.2d 900 (1977).
140. Id. at 511-12, 374 A.2d at 902-03.
141. Id. at 510-11, 374 A.2d at 902.
142. Id. at 512-16, 374 A.2d at 902-05 (internal quotation marks omitted).
143. Id. at 516, 374 A.2d at 905.
144. 37 Md. App. 322, 377 A.2d 553 (1977).
145. Id. at 324, 377 A.2d at 554.
146. Id. at 329, 377 A.2d at 557.
147. 287 Md. 585, 414 A.2d 929 (1980). The Kline court based its ruling on a finding
that the common law action "provide[d] different benefits for and impose[d] different
burdens upon its citizens based solely upon their sex." Id. at 593, 414 A.2d at 933.
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mon law action giving husbands, but not wives, the right to sue for
adulterous acts, was unconstitutional. Next, in Condore v. Prince
George's County,148 the court invalidated a common law doctrine mak-
ing a husband liable for any "necessaries" purchased by his wife, in-
cluding medical bills, but in the face of a husband's debt, left the wife
unscathed.149 Under Rand, the court found again that this statute was
based on a sex-based classification and therefore, unconstitutional
under the ERA.15°
Most recently, in Giffin v. Crane,151 the Court of Appeals found
that a parent's sex could not serve as the sole basis for awarding child
custody.'5 2 The Griffin court stated that the Maryland ERA absolutely
forbids the determination of a citizen's legal rights solely on the basis
of one's sex.' 53 The Griffin court observed that the Maryland ERA
"flatly prohibits gender based classifications, absent substantial justifi-
cation, whether contained in legislative enactments, governmental
policies, or by application of common law rules."' 54 These cases illus-
trate the Court of Appeals's strong commitment to the advancement
of gender equality.
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In Kilmon, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the convic-
tions of two Talbot County women for the reckless endangerment of
their respective children.155 Writing for a unanimous court, Judge
Wilner began by observing that reckless endangerment in Maryland is
solely defined by section 3-204 of the Criminal Law Article.' 56
The court therefore turned to statutory interpretation, analyzing
the legislative intent behind section 3-204 by examining past court de-
cisions, public policy, and the legislative activity surrounding the en-
148. 289 Md. 516, 425 A.2d 1011 (1981).
149. Id. at 520, 532-33, 425 A.2d at 1013, 1019.
150. Id. at 530, 425 A.2d at 1018. Under the same principles, particularly that a statute
"provides different benefits to and imposes different burdens upon men and women," the
court in Turner v. State also held unconstitutional a statute making it unlawful to employ
female sitters in a bar, but not male sitters. 299 Md. 565, 575-76, 474 A.2d 1297, 1302
(1984). Additionally, the court in State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc. held that a statute afford-
ing preferential tax assessments to private country clubs and allowing these clubs to dis-
criminate based on sex violated the Maryland ERA. 315 Md. 254, 293-96, 554 A.2d 366,
386-87 (1989).
151. 351 Md. 133, 716 A.2d 1029 (1998).
152. Id. at 155, 716 A.2d at 1040.
153. Id. at 149, 716 A.2d at 1037.
154. Id.
155. 394 Md. at 183, 905 A.2d at 315.
156. Id. at 172, 905 A.2d at 308.
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actment of section 3-204. 17 First, the court acknowledged its
acceptance of the "born alive" rule, prior to enactment of section 3-
204. 158 The court, however, rejected the State's view that because this
common law rule existed at the time of enactment, it was the General
Assembly's intent to include the born-alive rule in the reckless endan-
germent statute."5 9 Instead, the Kilmon court agreed with the argu-
ments of Ms. Cruz and Ms. Kilmon, and found that the born-alive rule,
did not inform whether the General Assembly intended section 3-204
to apply to actions of pregnant women. 160
The court recognized the presumption that the legislature acts in
accordance with sensible public policy needs in enacting new laws. 161
With this in mind, the court observed that if it followed the State's
view that section 3-204 applied to the effect of a pregnant woman's
conduct on her unborn child "virtually any injury-prone activity" that
could reasonably endanger the child would also be covered.'62
The court went on to emphasize that in the sixteen years since
enactment of section 3-204, numerous attempts to criminalize the
conduct of pregnant mothers who ingest controlled dangerous sub-
stances had failed. 163 The court explained that the Maryland General
Assembly, attempted to address the problem of drug-addicted
newborns through changes in the civil system.' 64
157. Id. The court noted that section 3-204 was modeled after a provision of the Model
Penal Code, which was intended to create a comprehensive law applying to conduct plac-
ing another at risk of death or serious bodily harm, regardless of intent. Id., 905 A.2d at
309. The Kilmon court stated that it construed section 3-204 similarly, giving no weight to
intent, and basing guilt on whether the conduct was a gross departure from the standard of
conduct of an ordinary law-abiding citizen. Id. at 173, 905 A.2d at 309.
158. Id. at 175-76, 905 A.2d at 310.
159. Id. at 176, 905 A.2d at 311.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 177, 905 A.2d at 311.
162. Id. at 177-78, 905 A.2d at 311-12. Specifically, the court observed that such a view
of the statute could produce absurd results, such as criminalizing activities as not maintain-
ing a proper diet, failing to wear a seat belt while driving, or the continued use of legal
drugs that may be harmful during pregnancy. Id., 905 A.2d at 311.
163. Id. at 178-82, 905 A.2d at 312-14. The Kilmon court focused on the opposition of
the Department of Human Services (DHS) to these bills, and the DHS view that the ap-
proach taken in the proposed laws was not good public policy. Id. at 179, 905 A.2d at 312.
DHS provided several reasons for this view: (1) the difficulty of showing a correlation be-
tween a mother's drug use and injuries to her fetus; (2) drug use during pregnancy is
usually a result of a pregnant mother's inability to control her addiction, inadequate treat-
ment programs, or obliviousness to the adverse effects of such use; and (3) the absence of
a deterrent effect on drug-using pregnant women in states adhering to this type of criminal
statute. Id.
164. Id. at 179-80, 905 A.2d at 312-13.
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The Kilmon court explained that in 2005, the General Assembly
authorized persecutions for the murder and manslaughter of a viable
fetus when it enacted section 2-103 of the Criminal Law Article.
16 5
Specifically, the court emphasized that the statute clearly excluded
any actions taken by a pregnant woman with regard to her fetus.16 6
Given this exemption, the court observed that it would be anomalous
if the law criminalized a pregnant woman's drug use that caused harm
to a child born alive, while allowing a pregnant woman's drug use that
caused the death of her fetus.1 6 7 Thus, the court reversed the convic-
tions of Ms. Kilmon and Ms. Cruz, holding that section 3-204 did not
apply to drug ingestion by pregnant women. 6 8
IV. ANAiYsis
In Kilmon v. State, the Court of Appeals properly held that section
3-204 of the Criminal Law Article does not include harm to fetuses
caused in utero by their mothers.1 69 The Kilmon court's narrow hold-
ing, however, failed to affirmatively deny the State's attempted expan-
sion of fetal rights170 or to address potential ERA issues in applying
section 3-204 only to pregnant women, and not to the men who also
bear responsibility for the pregnancy.1 7' The Kilmon court's failure to
delineate the boundaries of prosecuting drug-addicted pregnant wo-
men risks future harm to these women through imprisonment and
further stereotyping.
172
A. The Court Correctly Interpreted Section 3-204 by Holding that the
Statute Did Not Encompass Acts by Mothers Against Fetuses
In properly reversing the mothers' convictions, the Kilmon court
looked to both the legislative history behind section 3-204 71 and judi-
cial application of criminal punishment involving harm to fetuses. 174
In so doing, the court appropriately found that neither the legislature,
nor its own jurisprudence supported a finding that section 3-204
should apply to a mother's drug use while pregnant.175
165. Id. at 180-81, 905 A.2d at 313.
166. Id. at 181, 905 A.2d at 313.
167. Id. at 182, 905 A.2d at 314.
168. Id., 905 A.2d at 315.
169. See infra Part IV.A.
170. See infra Part IV.B.1.
171. See infra Part IV.B.2.
172. See infra Part LV.C.
173. See infra notes 180-186 and accompanying text.
174. See infra notes 183-197 and accompanying text.
175. See supra Part II.A.
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As the parties disputed whether the language of section 3-204 cov-
ered alleged harm caused to a fetus by its mother's drug use, the
Kilmon court appropriately considered the legislative history.176 The
Kilmon court observed that the Maryland General Assembly had many
opportunities to address the issue of a mother's use of illegal drugs
while pregnant.177 Despite these opportunities, the General Assembly
failed to pass either House Bill 1233 or House Bill 689, each of which
attempted to criminalize injury caused to a fetus as a result of mater-
nal drug use during pregnancy.' 78
The Kilmon court explained that state agencies and private orga-
nizations dealing with drug-addicted mothers opposed the bills be-
cause they believed that these types of statutes were bad public
policy. 179 These organizations that opposed House Bills 809 and 1233
did not contend that criminal liability for prenatal exposure to illegal
drugs already existed under section 3-204."' °
The Kilmon court's interpretation of section 3-204 is also sup-
ported by the enactment of DABA by the General Assembly. Faced
with many proposed bills criminalizing prenatal exposure to illegal
drugs, the General Assembly instead passed a bill providing for civil
sanctions.' 8 ' The enactment of DABA, thus, is direct evidence of the
General Assembly's intent to provide civil sanctions, and not criminal
sanctions, for fetal exposure to illegal drugs. The Kilmon court prop-
erly looked to DABA's enactment in finding that section 3-204 did not
apply to fetal harm caused by maternal drug use during pregnancy. 18 2
The Kilmon court also properly distinguished the only criminal
statute in Maryland addressing harm to a fetus, section 2-103 of the
Criminal Law Article' 8 3-making the murder or manslaughter of a
viable fetus a crime-from the situation in Kilmon. 8 4 The court
found two valid reasons to distinguish section 2-103.1"5 First, section
176. See Mackey v. Compass, 391 Md. 117, 141, 892 A.2d 479, 493 (2006) (stating that if
statutes are ambiguous, courts must "resolve that ambiguity in light of the legislative in-
tent." (quoting Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 387, 835 A.2d 1221, 1226 (2003)).
177. Kilmon, 394 Md. at 178-79, 905 A.2d at 312; see also supra notes 38-51 and accompa-
nying text.
178. Kilmon, 394 Md. at 178-79, 905 A.2d at 312; Md. H.B. 1233, 1990 Sess.; Md. H.B.
689, 1990 Sess.
179. Kilmon, 394 Md. at 179, 905 A.2d at 312; see also supra note 163 and accompanying
text.
180. Id.
181. Act of May 8, 1997, ch. 367; see also supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
182. Kilmon, 394 Md. at 180, 183, 905 A.2d at 313, 315.
183. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAw § 2-103 (LexisNexis 2006).
184. Kilmon, 394 Md. at 180-81, 905 A.2d at 313.
185. Id.
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2-103 does not encompass reckless endangerment; it only refers to the
crimes of murder and manslaughter."8 6 Second, section 2-103 specifi-
cally exempts pregnant women's actions toward their fetuses from
punishment. t8 7 As the Kilmon court correctly noted, the language of
the statute specifically excludes the type of action the State attempted
to prosecute in Kilmon-" [n] othing in this section applies to an act or
failure to act of a pregnant woman with regard to her own fetus." '188
The Kilmon court also properly distinguished Williams v. State.' 9
The Williams court held that the crime of manslaughter under Mary-
land law may be committed when an infant, born alive, dies shortly
thereafter as a result of wounds criminally inflicted upon the infant's
pregnant mother.19 ° The State in Kilmon argued that the Williams
holding evidenced an intent by the General Assembly to include the
"born alive" rule in the reckless endangerment statute, and therefore
an intent to include prenatal exposure to illegal drugs in this statute
as well. 9 ' As the Kilmon court aptly recognized, however, Williams
does not speak to conduct committed by a pregnant woman with re-
gards to the fetus she is carrying. 92 Instead, Williams only reflected
the court's acceptance of the "born alive" rule with respect to com-
mon law homicides committed against pregnant women by others."19
The Kilmon court, therefore, properly determined that in the absence
of any direct evidence of legislative intent, Williams did not implicate a
pregnant woman's conduct affecting her fetus.
B. The Court Failed to Address the Issue of Fetal Rights and a Possible
Violation of Maryland's Equal Rights Amendment in the
Prosecution of Pregnant Drug-Users
Although the Kilmon court's holding was proper, it should have
recognized and rejected the State's attempt to expand fetal rights194
and analyzed the possible violations of Maryland's ERA in the State's
specific application of section 3-204 to women and not men.195
186. Id. (citing Cirm. LAw § 2-103).
187. Id. (citing CRmI. LAW § 2-103(f)).
188. Id. (quoting CRIM. LAW § 2-103(f) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
189. Id. at 775-78, 905 A.2d at 310-12.
190. Williams v. State, 77 Md. App. 411, 420, 550 A.2d 722, 726 (1988).
191. Brief of Appellee at 12-13, Cruz v. State, No. 106 (Md. Mar. 6, 2006).
192. Kilmon, 394 Md. at 176-77, 905 A.2d. at 311.
193. Williams, 77 Md. App. at 420, 550 A.2d. at 726. The Court of Appeals affirmed this
holding on appeal. Williams v. State, 316 Md. 677, 561 A.2d 216 (1989).
194. See infra Part IV.B. 1.
195. See infra Part IV.B.2.
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1. The Court Failed to Address the State's Attempt to Expand Fetal
Rights
The court in Kilmon did not acknowledge the State's attempt to
pursue an expansion of fetal rights. Specifically, the State argued that
its charges of reckless endangerment were not based on conduct relat-
ing to the fetuses of Ms. Cruz or Ms. Kilmon, but instead were aimed
at injury occurring "after [each] child's birth."'9 6 The Kilmon court
rejected in dicta the reasoning of the State's position, recognizing that
if the victims were the children and not the fetuses of Ms. Kilmon and
Ms. Cruz, the causation element of reckless endangerment is ne-
gated. 9 7 This is so because once a drug-abusing pregnant woman has
a child, the mere ingestion of drugs into her own body will no longer
"endanger" the newborn child. 9 ' Beyond this brief analysis, however,
the Kilmon court failed to further acknowledge the danger of the
State's position with regard to the expansion of fetal rights.
In contrast to the Kilmon court's brief treatment, many courts
across the country have addressed and rejected prosecutorial attempts
to read the word "fetus" into criminal statutes involving child abuse
and neglect or distribution of illegal drugs to minors.' 99 Two cases,
Reyes v. Superior Cour 0 0 and State v. Gethers,2 ' provide pertinent exam-
ples. Prosecutors in Reyes prosecuted a drug-abusing woman under a
child endangerment statute, while prosecutors in Gethers charged a
pregnant woman with aggravated child abuse.2 °2 Unlike the prosecu-
tors in Kilmon, the Reyes and Gethers prosecutors actually claimed the
fetus as the injured "person" in each respective case. 2° ' The courts in
both cases rejected this prosecutorial overreaching, 20 4 and are a small
sampling of the cases heard by courts across the country that deal with
substantially similar facts as those found in Kilmon, but that address
and reject the issue of expansive fetal rights. 205 The Kilmon court
should have considered these cases and provided a stronger barrier
against the expansion of fetal rights.
Two cases, State v. Luster and Collins v. State, are particularly analo-
gous to Kilmon and provide strong support for the Kilmon court's
196. Brief of Appellee, supra note 191, at 11-12 (internal quotation marks omitted).
197. Kilmon, 394 Md. at 173 n.2, 905 A.2d at 309 n.2.
198. Id.
199. See supra Part II.B.2.
200. 141 Cal. Rptr. 912, 912 (Ct. App. 1977).
201. 585 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
202. Reyes, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 912; Gethers, 585 So. 2d at 1140-41.
203. Reyes, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 913; Gethers, 585 So. 2d at 1141.
204. Reyes, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 913-14; Gethers 585 So. 2d at 1143.
205. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
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missed opportunity.2 °6 In both Luster and Collins, prosecutors brought
criminal charges against two women for maternal drug use during
pregnancy and attempted to name their children, rather than their
fetuses, as the victims.2 0 7 Both courts named the fetus as the victim
and held that the women could not be criminally charged as fetuses
had no rights under either of the implicated statutes. 20 8 Although the
Kilmon court cited these cases, it effectively ignored them by refusing
to bring to light the State's subtle attempt to expand fetal rights.
20 9
Like the courts in Luster and Collins, the Kilmon court should have
explicitly addressed the issue of fetal rights and pointed out the fallacy
of the State's claim that the victims were the subsequently born chil-
dren of Ms. Kilmon and Ms. Cruz.
2. The Court Failed to Address Potential Equal Rights Amendment
Violations Inherent In the Prosecution of Mothers Under
Section 3-204 of the Criminal Law Article
The Kilmon court failed to recognize that the State's use of sec-
tion 3-204 of the Criminal Law Article to prosecute drug-addicted wo-
men, and only women, for the effect of their drug use on their fetuses,
potentially violated Maryland's ERA. Ingesting narcotics is not a crim-
inally punishable offense in Maryland.2 "0 A person in Maryland can
be charged with either possession or distribution, but not simply with
"doing drugs."21  Therefore, by applying section 3-204 to pregnant
drug-addicted women, the State attempted to make using drugs a
criminal offense for women and not for men.212 In light of this dis-
crepancy, the Kilmon court should have paid particular attention to
Coleman v. State, where the Court of Special Appeals invalidated a stat-
ute that made it illegal for a husband to desert his wife, but not for a
206. The Luster charges were slightly different from those in Kilmon, as the defendant
mother was charged with possession and distribution of cocaine rather than for child abuse
or endangerment. State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32, 33 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
207. Luster, 419 S.E.2d at 34; Collins v. State, 890 S.W.2d 893, 898 (Tex. App. 1994).
208. Luster, 419 S.E.2d at 34; Collins, 890 S.W.2d at 898.
209. Kilmon, 394 Md. at 184-85 n.3, 905 A.2d. at 314-15 n.3.
210. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 5-601 to -603 (LexisNexis 2006) (criminalizing the
possession, administration, manufacture, or distribution of controlled dangerous
substances).
211. Id.
212. In Kilmon, not only did the State attempt to create a gender-based classification, but
it refused to acknowledge the effect that actions of men can have on a fetus's health. See
CYNTHIA K. DANIELS, AT WOMEN'S EXPENSE: STATE POWER AND THE POLITICS OF FETAL
RIGHTS 77, 111 (1993) (noting men's exposure to toxic levels before contraception can be
linked to birth defects and miscarriage, their exposure to radiation has been linked to
childhood cancer, and their abuse of drugs and alcohol may damage sperm and cause
health problems in the babies they father).
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wife to desert her husband.2" 3 The Kilmon court should have noted
the similarities between the facts in Coleman and those in Kilmon,2 14
and examined the potential violations of Maryland's ERA. Despite the
Coleman case and the Court of Appeals' numerous holdings finding
any type of gender-based discrimination to violate the Maryland
ERA,2" 5 the Kilmon court ignored the gender-based discrimination in-
herent in the application of section 3-204 to pregnant women.
It is possible that the Kilmon court ignored the issue of gender
classifications because the Supreme Court in Geduldig v. Aiello held
that classifications based on pregnancy would not count as gender
classifications. 216 But Congress 21 '7 and the Court itself218 have abro-
gated this narrow view of sex discrimination. The Court of Appeals
should have applied this reasoning to examine the Kilmon case in light
of the legislative and judicial view of gender discrimination.
Additionally, the Kilmon court, knowing that applicable Supreme
Court rulings on the United States Constitution merely provide a floor
for protection of individual rights of U.S. citizens, should have pro-
vided for a greater level of constitutional protection for their own citi-
zens. 219 The Court of Appeals has done just this in its history of
213. 37 Md. App. 322, 323, 377 A.2d 553, 554 (1977).
214. Both cases presented a fact pattern involving a criminal statute that, at least under
the interpretation of state prosecutors, punished the sexes differently for the same action.
See Coleman, 37 Md. App. at 323, 377 A.2d at 554 (examining the constitutionality of a law
punishing a man, but not a woman, for failing to "provide for the support and mainte-
nance of his wifd' (emphasis added)).
215. See supra Part II.C.2. For example, the Court of Appeals held that the sex of a
parent cannot be considered when allocating child support payments. Rand v. Rand, 280
Md. 508, 515, 374 A.2d 900, 905 (1977); see also State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., 315 Md.
254, 263, 554 A.2d 366, 371 (1989) (determining a statute violative of Maryland's ERA
because it afforded preferential tax assessments to private country clubs that served or
benefitted members of a particular sex); Turner v. State, 299 Md. 565, 576, 474 A.2d 1297,
1302 (1984) (holding a statute unconstitutional that made it unlawful to employ female
sitters in a bar, but not male sitters); Condore v. Prince George's County, 289 Md. 516,
532-33, 425 A.2d 1011, 1019 (1981) (invalidating a common law doctrine making a hus-
band liable for any "necessaries"-including medical bills-purchased by his wife); Kline v.
Ansell, 287 Md. 585, 592-93, 414 A.2d 929, 933 (1980) (finding unconstitutional a com-
mon law action giving men, but not women, the right to sue their spouses or other men for
adulterous acts).
216. 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 & n.20 (1974).
217. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified as
amended 42 U.S.C. 2000e(k) (2000). This Act outlaws sex discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.
218. The court in Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC determined that
"discrimination based on a woman's pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because of
her sex." 462 U.S. 669, 684 (1983).
219. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HA-v. L. REv. 489, 495 (1977) (applauding the efforts of state courts to expand constitu-
tional rights).
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interpreting the Maryland ERA.22 0 Whereas the Supreme Court re-
quires that gender-based classifications be supported by "important
governmental objectives,"221 the Court of Appeals requires a version
of strict scrutiny for gender-based classifications. 2. 2 In Maryland,
therefore, the government must provide substantial justification for
such classifications.223
The Kilmon court should have applied the strict standard of its
ERA line of cases in Kilmon. The Rand court's expansive view of the
ERA indicated the court's desire to fully commit to providing equal
rights for men and women. 224 The Kilmon court's failure to apply an
ERA analysis missed an opportunity to further promote Maryland's
stated commitment to providing equal rights for men and women.
C. The Failure of the Kilmon Court to Affirmatively Rule Against the
Prosecution of Drug-Addicted Pregnant Women Leaves Room
for Future Harm to Women
Although the Kilmon court properly held that section 3-204 did
not encompass a pregnant woman's harm to her fetus due to maternal
drug use, the court erred in confining its holding to this narrow statu-
tory context.225 The Kilmon court holding left open the possibility of
future prosecutions against pregnant drug addicts under any number
of other statutes, 226 resulting in the possibility of harm to pregnant
women, their fetuses, and their children. 227 Drastic regulations of
pregnant women's behavior might still be possible and the Kilmon
court provided little room for discussion of a better solution. 228 Fi-
nally, the Kilmon court's failure to address Maryland ERA implications
may result in further stereotyping of women based on their ability to
bear children. 229 Future courts should follow the Kilmon court's lead
in rejecting the prosecution of pregnant women for maternal drug
220. See supra Part II.C.2.
221. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
222. See, e.g., Giffin v. Crane, 351 Md. 133, 148-49, 716 A.2d 1029, 1037 (1998) (finding
that Maryland's ERA prohibits all gender-based classifications unless "substantially"
justified).
223. Id.
224. Rand v. Rand, 280 Md., 508, 515-16, 374 A.2d 900, 904-05 (1977).
225. Kilmon, 394 Md. at 183, 905 A.2d at 315.
226. See generally James G. Hodge, Jr., Annotation, Prosecution of Mother for Prenatal Sub-
stance Abuse Based on Endangerment of or Delivery of Controlled Substance to Child, 70 A.L.R. 5TH
461 (1999) (discussing the prosecution of drug-abusing pregnant women under a myriad
of child abuse and neglect statutes as well as drug delivery or possession statutes).
227. See infra Part IV.C.1.
228. See infra Part IV.C.2.
229. See infra Part IV.C.3.
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use, but should also seek to establish the limits of this type of harmful
prosecution on women and their place in society.230
1. The Continued Possibility of Prosecution and Jail Time Will
Further Harm Pregnant Women, Their Fetuses, and Their
Children
By failing to affirmatively deny the expansion of fetal rights,2 3 '
the Kilmon court left open the possibility of further arrests and impris-
onment for pregnant women, especially drug-addicted women.
Though once recognized as having no rights independent of the wo-
man carrying it, 2 3 2 over time courts have slowly increased fetal rights
under the law. 23 3 Expanded fetal rights have been used in attempts to
prevent women from participating in high-paying jobs2 4 as well as at-
tempts (and successes) to hinder a woman's right to make decisions
regarding her own health and medical treatment.235 In at least one
case, fetal rights even contributed to the loss of a woman's life.2 3 6 Ad-
ditionally, one study conducted in 1992 found that since the late
1980s, over 167 women were arrested and criminally charged on the
basis of their drug addiction during pregnancy.23 7 These examples
demonstrate the willingness of both states and courts to "curtail some
230. See infra Part IV.C.3.
231. See supra Part IV.B.1.
232. See Deitrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 17 (1884) (determining
that an undeveloped fetus did not qualify as a "person" and therefore, his mother could
not sue for his loss of life when she was induced into early birth by a fall on a negligently
built highway).
233. See supra notes 62-83 and accompanying text.
234. See UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (holding that the em-
ployer's fetal-protection policy, which excluded women with childbearing capacity from all
jobs in which they might be exposure to lead, was sex discrimination forbidden under Title
VII).
235. See Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869, 870 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (recognizing a
child's right to bring an action against his own mother for alleged injuries occurring in
utero); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem'l Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537, 538 (N.J. 1964)
(per curiam) (ordering blood transfusions for a pregnant woman against her wishes, if a
presiding physician finds that such transfusions are necessary to save her life or the life of
her fetus); Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457, 460 (Ga.
1981) (per curiam) (denying a pregnant mother a stay of an order to submit to a caesarean
section, to sustain the life of her unborn fetus). But see In re Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 405
(Ill. App. 1997) (refusing to override the decision of a pregnant woman to refuse a blood
transfusion, even though it might save the life of her viable fetus).
236. See In reA.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1253 (D.C. 1990) (en banc) (vacating a court-ordered
caesarean section that was listed as a contributing factor to the mother's death on her
death certificate).
237. LYNN M. PALTROW, CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS AGAINST PREGNANT WOMEN: NATIONAL
UPDATE AND OVERVIEW (1992), available at http://www.advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/
articles/1992stat.htm.
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persons' constitutional rights by adding new persons to the constitu-
tional population."2 8 In the face of this history, the Kilmon court's
narrow holding will continue to allow the imprisonment of pregnant
women due to their drug use. Such jail time has adverse affects on
women, their fetuses, and their children." 9 Furthermore, the threat
of prosecution and jail may deter pregnant drug-using women from
seeking help.24° Finally, the continued prosecution and imprison-
ment of pregnant drug-users disproportionately harms poor, black
women.
24 1
The Kilmon court's failure to limit the State's expansive view of
fetal rights may result in disproportionate prosecutions of women
seeking abortions. There are at least 36 states with homicide laws that
define a fetus as a person, 242 including Maryland 4.2 " Recently, a jury
in Texas condemned a man to death for killing a woman and her
fetus-the first death sentence related to a fetal homicide. 244 Though
this case involved the death of a fetus caused by a third party, the case
of Regina McKnight, a pregnant drug-addicted woman now serving a
twelve-year sentence for homicide after suffering an unintentional
stillbirth,245 illustrates the potential criminal charges against women
should Roe v. Wade get overturned-feticide. The Tennessee General
Assembly proposed a bill that would require clinics to create death
certificates for aborted fetuses, creating a public record of women
who have had abortions. 24 6 Such existing and proposed legislation
demonstrates that the Court of Appeals and other state appellate
238. Lynn M. Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, Fetal Persons, and the Threat to Roe v. Wade, 62
ALB. L. REv. 999, 1010 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Planned
Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 913 n.2 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part)).
239. See infta notes 262-271 and accompanying text.
240. See infra notes 273-278 and accompanying text.
241. See infra notes 279-283 and accompanying text.
242. National Conference of State Legislatures, Fetal Homicide, http://www.ncsl.org/
programs/health/fethom.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2007).
243. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-103 (LexisNexis 2006).
244. Elizabeth White, Texas Man Gets Death for Killing Fetus, ABC NEWS, Feb. 7, 2007,
http://www.abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=28581 4 2. This sentencing came on the
heels of a change in the definition of the word "individual" in the Texas Penal Code to
include an "unborn child at every stage of gestation from fertilization until birth." TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07 (a)(26) (Vernon 2006).
245. See State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168 (S.C. 2003) (affirming McKnight's homicide
conviction and sentence).
246. Erik Schelzig, Death Certificates on Abortions Proposed, ABC NEWS, Feb. 14, 2007,
http://abcnews.go.com/US/wirestory?id=2875144. Although Tennessee already requires
the recording of abortions at the Office of Vital Records, these proposed reports could also
reveal the identity of the women having abortions. Id.
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courts must stay vigilant in upholding women's rights to control their
own bodies.
Because the Kilmon court's holding only addressed the narrow
statutory issue, jail time for drug-addicted pregnant women remains a
possibility in Maryland.247 Though such regulations purport to pro-
tect both "kids and families "248 imprisoning new mothers on the
grounds that their fetus's rights trump their own right to liberty will
only compound the problems of drug-exposed children.249 Separat-
ing children from their mother can cause emotional and mental harm
as well as hinder their growth and development.2 ° This separation
prevents the development of parent-child bonding that is integral to a
child's psychological growth.25  Further obstacles created by the im-
prisonment of drug-addicted mothers include the location of prisons,
which are often far away from the urban neighborhoods where chil-
dren of incarcerated women live, obscure visiting hours, and prison
policies limiting the amount of contact a mother can have with her
children. 252 Finally, those women most likely to be imprisoned for
drug use during pregnancy are the same women most vulnerable to
"child welfare" policies and practices. 251
Additionally, jailing pregnant women can directly harm their fe-
tuses. Putting women in jail provides an environment ripe with drugs
and often lacking in prenatal care,25 4 an environment that can have
devastating effects. For example, in Maryland, Kari Parsons failed a
drug test as part of probation for shoplifting, and was imprisoned to
247. Although the Kilmon court's holding specifically stated that section 3-204 does not
apply to a mother's actions that might harm her fetus, Kilmon, 394 Md. at 183, 905 A.2d at
315, the court left open the possibility for criminal prosecution under other abuse statutes
that use the word "another" or "person" or "child" because the court did not determine
that a fetus is not a "person" with fights protected by the state. See id. at 173 n.2, 905 A.2d
at 309 n.2 (declining to rule on the State's anomalous position that the victims were the
newborn children of Ms. Cruz and Ms. Kilmon, not their fetuses).
248. SeeJulie B. Ehrlich & Lynn Paltrow, Jailing Pregnant Women Raises Health Risks, Wo-
MEN'S E-NEWS, Sept. 20, 2006, http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/2894
(quoting Cathy Mols, the social services director for Talbot County-where Regina Kilmon
and Kelly Lynn Cruz were arrested and charged-as saying that such prosecutions were
"helpful in protecting children and families").
249. Paltrow, supra note 238, at 1028-29.
250. Id. at 1028.
251. Id. at 1028-29.
252. Beth E. Richie, Social Impact of Mass Incarceration on Women, in INVISIBLE PUNISH-
MENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 139-40 (Marc Maher &
Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002).
253. Id. at 140-41.
254. See Carol Jean Sovinski, The Criminalization of Maternal Substance Abuse: A Quick Fix to
a Complex Problem, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 107, 129-30 (1997).
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protect her unborn baby's health.25 5 Three weeks later, Parsons gave
birth to her son in a dirty jail cell furnished only with a toilet and a
mattress. 256 Despite her repeated cries and other inmates' pleas that
she be taken to the hospital, the guards simply took her out of the
holding area and put her in a cell by herself.257 Parsons gave birth
alone, without any support or medical care, and her son quickly devel-
oped an infection due to the unsanitary conditions.2 58 In addition to
the absent prenatal care, imprisoned pregnant women also often must
wear shackles, despite contrary international norms prohibiting this
259practice.   Courts like Kilmon must recognize and consider these
dangerous conditions and recognize that jailing pregnant women is
simply not in the best interest of the woman or the fetus she is
carrying.
Prosecutors, like those in Kilmon, cite deterrence as a justification
for imposing jail time on pregnant drug-users. 26" The Kilmon court's
narrow holding ignores the fact that threats of prosecution, jail time,
and the loss of child custody, do not deter drug-addicted pregnant
women from stopping drug use.2 6 ' Instead, "[t]he threat of criminal
punishment fosters a climate of fear and mistrust between doctors and
patients, imperiling the health of both women and their future chil-
dren."26 2 In the face of punishment for drug use during pregnancy,
255. Ehrlich & Paltrow, supra note 247.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. In September 2006, a similar situation to Ms. Parsons occurred unfolded in a
Texas jail cell, when a pregnant woman who cried for medical attention, was forced to give
birth in a jail cell with no medical support. Id.
259. AMNESTY INT'L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RIGHTS FOR ALL: "NOT PART OF MY SEN-
TENCE " Violations of the Human Rights of Women in Custody (1999) http://web.amnesty.org/
library/Index/ENGAMR510011999. Contrary to international standards, it is a common
practice in the U.S. for pregnant women, whether or not they pose a threat, to be held in
some form of mechanical restraint while being transported and sometimes while in the
hospital. Id.; see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, USA Women in Prison: A Fact Sheet, (2005),
http://www.amnestyusa.org/women/pdf/womeninprison.pdf (stating that shackling preg-
nant prisoners is a federal policy). Because pregnant women often must quickly maneuver
their legs during labor, shackling can increase the risk of injury to women and their fe-
tuses. AMNESTY INT'L, "NOT PART OF MY SENTENCE," supra.
260. Brief of Appellee, supra note 191, at 14.
261. Ehrlich & Paltrow, supra note 248; see also Sovinski, supra note 254, at 128 (noting
that many women imprisoned for drug use are addicts who become pregnant and cannot
simply end their substance abuse based on the threat of incarceration).
262. Drug Policy Alliance, Arresting Pregnant Women for Drug Use, Sept. 27, 2006, http://
www.drugpolicy.org/library/factsheets/women/index.cfm. The American Society of Ad-
diction Medicine believes that criminalizing maternal substance abuse is counterproduc-
tive because pregnant drug-addicted women will not seek treatment for fear of
prosecution. Sovinski, supra note 254, at 130.
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some women have even resorted to giving birth in their own homes.2 63
Prenatal and continuing medical care can mitigate health risks to wo-
men, fetuses, and children.264 The absence of adequate prenatal
health care, may be even more detrimental to the fetus's health than
drug use during pregnancy. 265 In the face of such data, courts such as
the Kilmon court must take every opportunity to discourage punitive
approaches to substance abuse during pregnancy.
Because prosecutions against drug-addicted women dispropor-
tionately affect poor women of color,2 6 6 the Kilmon court's failure to
affirmatively negate the future possibility of these prosecutions places
an added burden on an already disadvantaged population. The "war
on drugs" has had a substantially harsher effect on people of color
than on white people.267 The prosecutorial fervor for criminally
charging drug-addicted mothers has turned the war on drugs into a
war on poor, black women. This perpetuates a past governmental pol-
icy of refusing support for unwed black mothers because illegitimacy
was seen as an inherent race-based trait due to black mothers' sexual
irresponsibility. 268 It is the responsibility of the Court of Appeals and
other appellate courts to protect poor minorities from the stereotyp-
ing caused by prosecutions of the type in the Kilmon case.269
2. The Future Holds More Drastic Regulations with No Room for a
Better Solution
By failing to take a strong stand against the prosecution of preg-
nant drug-addicted women, the Kilmon court left room for the State to
impose other measures regulating women's behavior during preg-
nancy and made no attempt to advocate any solution for the problem
of drug-exposed babies other than criminalization. The Kilmon court
acknowledged that the State's reading of reckless endangerment
could lead to the criminalization of a "whole host" of conceivably reck-
less activities such as horseback riding or skiing during pregnancy.270
Yet, by failing to bar these types of prosecutions, the court allowed for
263. Sovinski, supra note 254, at 131.
264. Ehrlich & Paltrow, supra note 248.
265. Sovinski, supra note 254, at 130. Results from a 1985 study in Florida established
that a baby born to a normal women without prenatal care is in greater danger than one
born to a drug abusing mother who has regular visits with a physician. Id. at 130-31.
266. Paltrow, supra note 238, at 1002, 1023.
267. Shalini Bhargava, Note, Challenging Punishment and Privatization: A Response to the
Conviction of Regina McKnight, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv. 513, 522 (2004).
268. Id. at 521.
269. See Brennan, supra note 219, at 491 ("(S]tate courts [and] federal [courts] are and
ought to be the guardians of our libert[y].").
270. 394 Md. at 177, 905 A.2d at 311.
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the possibility of other types of drastic measures. 271 For example, gov-
ernment agencies could withhold public benefits from pregnant wo-
men who refuse physical examinations or to abstain from drug use or
alcohol consumption.272 States could require parents deemed "high
risk" to undergo genetic testing.273 Some have even proposed that
punitive damages be available against women who intentionally cause
harm to their fetuses. 274 The Kilmon court missed an opportunity to
restrict these types of harmful policies before they begin.
By confining its holding so narrowly, the Kilmon court also left
lower courts and policymakers with little guidance for seeking alterna-
tive ways of helping drug-addicted pregnant women. Targeting low-
income drug-addicted pregnant women for prosecution reinforces
stereotypical notions that such women are disinterested and selfish,
and refuses to recognize the hardships faced by such women.275 For
example, few drug-treatment programs accept pregnant women or
women with young children. 276  In fact, in 2000, there were only
twenty-seven drug treatment beds for women in the entire state of Ma-
ryland, and only eleven which allowed a woman to have a child with
her.277 The Kilmon court's narrow holding left little room to explore
alternatives to prosecution, and in so doing, missed an opportunity to
suggest better options for drug-addicted women, such as better access
to affordable medical care and access to drug treatment facilities that
meet their needs. 278
271. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Consti-
tutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 605-07 (1986) (ex-
plaining that expansive fetal rights could lead to civil and criminal liability for pregnant
mothers for activities like smoking and drinking, but also for engaging in excessive sexual
intercourse for exposing herself to an infectious disease).
272. Id. at 608.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Paltrow, supra note 238, at 1026.
276. Id. A 1989 study of the drug treatment facilities in New York City showed that 87%
refused to treat pregnant women on Medicaid who were addicted to crack cocaine, 67%
would not accept pregnant women on Medicaid at all, and 54% refused to treat any preg-
nant woman. Sovinski, supra note 254, at 133. Another survey established that two-thirds
of hospitals nationwide have no place to refer pregnant women for drug and alcohol treat-
ment. Id.
277. Andrew Reese & Caroline L. Burry, Evaluating Maryland's Response to Drug-Exposed
Babies: SB 512 Children in Need of Assistance-Drug-Addicted Babies, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y &
L. 343, 367 n.156 (2004).
278. April Cherry, Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, The Social Construction of Maternal Deviance, and
Some Thoughts About Love and Justice, 8 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 245, 258 (1999). To provide
sufficient drug addiction treatment for pregnant women, facilities should have family-ori-
ented services, job skills training, emotional support groups, and help with basic needs
such as food, clothing, and shelter. Reese & Burry, supra note 277, at 367 n.157.
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3. The Kilmon Holding Does Little to Advance the Status of Women
Throughout the history of the United States, courts and the legis-
lative system have promoted the advancement of women in society.
These gains, however, have come at a very slow pace and have been
hampered by both the fight for fetal rights2 79 and society's stereotypes
about women based on their ability to have children. 8 ° Because wo-
men were historically unequal to men, and are still not equal to
men,2 8 ' courts such as the Kilmon court must take every opportunity to
continue the advancement of such equality.
The Kilmon court should have emphasized that the key concept
behind equal rights jurisprudence is to prohibit discrimination based
on stereotypes.2 8 2 Although cases involving equal rights jurispru-
dence have improved women's status under the law and in society,
women are still not equal to men. For example, a study conducted in
2000 indicated that women earned only about 76% of what men
earned that year. 283 In 2006, only twenty of the CEOs at Fortune 1000
companies were women. 28 4 These numbers are particularly alarming
when compared to the large number of women in the workforce, at
colleges or in professional schools, and when viewed in light of the
fact that it has now been more than seventy years since the first wo-
man was appointed to a major corporate board. 28 5
The sports world is another example of gender inequality. Secon-
dary educational institutions still provide more opportunities for
males than females in athletic programs at every level. 286 The Kilmon
court should have recognized that until women and men are on an
equal playing field, courts must use every opportunity to support and
279. See supra Part II.C.1.
280. See supra Part II.C.1.
281. See infra notes 282-286.
282. David H. Gans, Note, Stereotyping and Difference: Planned Parenthood v. Casey and
the Future of Sex Discrimination Law, 104 YALE L.J. 1875, 1876 (1995); see also supra Part
II.C.1-2.
283. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Women's Earnings 76 Percent of Men's in 2000, Sept. 5, 2001,
http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2O01/sept/wkl/artO2.htm.
284. CnnMoney.com, Women CEOs for Fortune 500 Companies, http://money.cnn.com/
magazines/fortune/fortune500/womenceos.
285. Lisa M. Fairfax, Clogs in the Pipeline: The Mixed Data on Women Directors and Continued
Barriers to their Advancement, 65 MD. L. REv. 579, 584-85 (2006). Professor Fairfax also
noted that studies show that there has been only a half a percentage point increase per
year in the number of board seats held by women directors. Id. at 586. "At that rate, it will
be almost seventy years before women's percentage on boards will reach 50%." Id.
286. See, e.g., Deborah Brake, The Struggle for Sex Equality in Sport and the Theory Behind
Title IX 34 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 13, 19 (2001) (explaining that although 2.6 million high
school girls participated in athletics in 1999, 3.8 million high school boys participated in
school sports programs).
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further advance women's rights and thus, should have affirmatively
found the prosecutions of Ms. Kilmon and Ms. Cruz violative of the
Maryland ERA in addition to its narrow holding.
The Court of Appeals should also have used the Kilmon case to
stop the State from perpetuating the stereotypical view that a woman's
place in society is in the home. By applying section 3-204 to pregnant
drug-using women, and not drug-using men who might harm their
own family environments, the State emphasized the view that women
should be primarily charged with caring for children, whether living
or in the womb. Maryland's ERA cases2 87 and the Supreme Court's
sex and pregnancy-related discrimination cases 288 demonstrate that
women have historically been denied opportunities due to the es-
poused "[c] oncern for a woman's existing or potential offspring."289
Being pregnant and drug-addicted has resulted in loss of women's lib-
erty, as can be seen by the convictions of Cornelia Whitner and Re-
gina McKnight in South Carolina for criminal child abuse and
manslaughter, due to their ingestion of drugs during pregnancy. 290
South Carolina's harmful and discriminatory treatment of women, es-
pecially in terms of abortion rights, is quite distinct from the treat-
ment of women in Maryland. 291 Thus, the Kilmon court should have
followed the lead of its legislature and its own precedents and applied
an ERA analysis to further distinguish Maryland from states like South
Carolina.
Moreover, the Kilmon court, in line with the history of Maryland
and the federal government of advancing gender equality, 29 2 should
287. See supra Part II.C.2.
288. See supra Part 11.C. 1.
289. See Gans, supra note 282, at 1894 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
UAW v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 211 (1991) (Blackmun,J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)).
290. See supra notes 105-115 and accompanying text (relating the history and disposi-
tion of these cases).
291. While the Maryland General Assembly is predominantly pro-choice and has passed
a number of laws protecting a woman's right to choose, South Carolina's legislature is
almost entirely anti-choice and has passed some of the most restrictive laws against women
and their right to choose. Compare NARAL Pro-Choice America, Who Decides?: The Status of
Women's Reproductive Rights in the United States, Maryland, http://www.naral.org/choice-ac-
tion-center/inyour-state/who-decides/state-profiles/maryland.html (last visited Sept. 2,
2007) (outlining pro-choice Maryland abortion laws and regulations, including Maryland's
prohibition on insurers from discriminating against women using prescription contracep-
tion), with NARAL Pro-Choice America, Who Decides?: The Status of Women's Reproductive
Rights in the United States, South Carolina, http://www.naral.org/choice-action-center/in_
your state/who-decides/state-profiles/south-carolina.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2007) (list-
ing over ten areas concerning abortion rights, including disclosure of private medical
records, where South Carolina is anti-choice).
292. See supra Part II.C.1-2.
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have noted the inherent paternalism in taking a punitive approach to
"harmful" maternal behavior. As a majority of Justices stated in Casey,
the experience of a mother who carries her child to term "is too inti-
mate and personal for the State to insist... upon its own vision of the
woman's role. 29 3 Instead, women must be allowed to shape their own
destiny based on their conceptions of their place in society.2 4 De-
spite these convincing words from our highest court, prosecutors and
legislators across the country are attempting to control women's be-
havior through pregnancy-based regulations. 29" The belief that third
parties are more equipped to make decisions regarding a fetus than
the woman carrying that fetus has, throughout history, infringed on
women's, and not men's, right to work in certain environments, 296
right to refuse certain medical procedures, 297 and now, their right to
liberty. It is ironic that although pregnant women have been forced
to undergo medical procedures against their will, the Supreme Court
and lower federal courts have prohibited attempts to compel criminal
defendants and mental patients-those over whom the state exerts a
great deal of control-to undergo certain medical procedures.298
Such discrepancies in the treatment of pregnant women reflect the
false notion that women are not capable of making intelligent, in-
formed decisions about their own bodies.299 This devaluation of a wo-
293. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
294. Id.
295. See, e.g., Bhargava, supra note 267, at 516-17 (discussing the punishment of Regina
McKnight, a 22-year old, borderline mentally retarded woman, for drug use while pregnant
that resulted in the stillbirth of her child).
296. Howard Minkoff & Lynn M. Paltrow, The Rights of "Unborn Children" and the Value of
Pregnant Women, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, 2 Mar.-Apr. 2006, at 26 (explaining that before
the Supreme Court ruled against policies excluding women from environmental toxins in
1991, "companies used 'fetal protection' policies as a basis for prohibiting fertile women
from taking high-paying blue collar jobs that might expose them to lead.")
297. See cases cited supra notes 235-236 and accompanying text; see also Gonzales v. Car-
hart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1626 (2007) (finding constitutional an act banning a particular
method of ending pregnancies despite the lack of an exception for the health of the
mother).
298. Johnsen, supra note 271, at 615-16; see also Daniels, supra note 212, at 33 ("At least
thirty-six cases of forced medical treatment have been reported in the courts by twenty-six
states. Pregnant women have been forced to have blood transfusions against their will;
they have been sedated, stripped down, and forced to undergo major surgery; they have
been physically detained in hospitals when physicians suspected they weren't following
medical orders.").
299. See Bhargava, supra note 267, at 525 (noting that the prosecution of drug-using
pregnant women demonstrates a "nasty kind of paternalism"). Even the Supreme Court
continues to question the ability of women to make their own, well-informed choices. For
example, in Carhart, Justice Kennedy justifies the majority decision to uphold the Partial-
Birth Abortion Ban Act by insisting that "some women come to regret the choice to abort"
and suffer "[s]evere depression and loss of esteem" as a result. 127 S. Ct. at 1634. Where
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man's ability to make decisions and to know what is best for her fetus
and herself is another roadblock in the advancement of women's
rights that the Kilmon court should have recognized and rejected.
The Kilmon case offered a prime opportunity for the highest
court in Maryland to take a stand against the erosion of women's
rights through the expansion of fetal rights. Even further, the Kilmon
case provided an opportunity for the court to express its unfaltering
commitment to advance women's rights in Maryland. By ignoring the
State's attempt to expand fetal rights and solidity stereotypical views of
women's place in society, the Kilmon court allowed the questioning of
women's place in society to go unanswered.
V. CONCLUSION
In Kilmon v. State, the Court of Appeals reversed the reckless en-
dangerment convictions of two Talbot County women that were based
on their drug-use during pregnancy.300 Although the court's holding
was properly supported by its finding that the Maryland General As-
sembly did not intend section 3-204 of the Criminal Law Article to
include harm to fetuses caused in utero by their mothers,"0 ' the Kilmon
court missed two important opportunities.0 2 The Kilmon court failed
to expressly reject the State's attempts to expand fetal rights30 3 and to
address the potential Equal Rights Amendment issues inherent in the
State's use of section 3-204 to prosecute women, and not men, for
drug use.30 a The Kilmon court's narrow holding resulted in the possi-
bility of further prosecutions and imprisonment of pregnant drug-
abusers as well as to further traditional stereotypes of women as best
suited for domestic roles.30 5 The Court of Appeals should learn from
the Kilmon court's decision and in the future, affirmatively deny any
attempt to prosecute and jail pregnant drug-users.
REBECCA CALDWELL
once the Court insisted that the State could not impose "its own vision of the women's
role," Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992), the
court now claims that the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act "recognizes [the] reality" of
"[r]espect for human life ... in the bond of love the mother has for her child." Carhart,
127 S. Ct. at 1634.
300. Kilmon, 394 Md. at 183, 905 A.2d at 315.
301. See supra Part W.A.
302. See supra Part P.B.
303. See supra Part IV.B.1.
304. See supra Part IV.B.2.
305. See supra Part I.C.
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SCHLAMP v. STATE: READING THE RIOT ACT: THE VAGARIES
OF MARYLAND'S COMMON LAW RIOT REQUIRE
CODIFICATION OF THE CRIME
In Schlamp v. State,' the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered
whether a fight between two groups of individuals, which led to the
stabbing death of a twenty-year-old college student, had the requisite
elements of unlawful assembly and public terror sufficient to justify a
conviction for common law riot.2 In a unanimous decision, the Court
of Appeals reversed the lower court's riot conviction, finding neither
unlawful assembly nor public terror present.3 The court held that no
riot took place because the defendant's group was not unlawfully as-
sembled to "carry out a common purpose" that would terrorize
others.4 Further, the court found that the group's activities did not
terrorize the public because the aggression prior to the incident was
completely verbal and mostly diffused.5
In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals properly construed
the English common law rule for riot.6 However, the court's assertion
that the offense must be "planned and deliberate" to constitute unlaw-
ful assembly,7 and its inability to find that public terror arose from a
loud fight on a public street,' imply an overly restrictive interpretation
of the common law elements.9 Moreover, the court's forced adher-
ence to narrow common law vestiges should urge the Maryland legisla-
ture to follow other jurisdictions and the federal government and
codify the crime.1 ° By enacting legislation, Maryland can abrogate an-
tiquated and confusing words of art, such as "unlawful assembly" and
"public terror," and focus the court's attention on tangible elements,
such as the defendant's conduct.1 1 Shifting away from the common
law, in turn, will promote greater consistency and understanding in
Copyright © 2007 by Thomas K. Prevas.
1. 390 Md. 724, 891 A.2d 327 (2006).
2. Id. at 725, 891 A.2d at 328.
3. Id. at 725-26, 891 A.2d at 328.
4. Id. at 737, 891 A.2d at 335.
5. Id.
6. See infra Part W.A.
7. Schlamp, 390 Md. at 732, 891 A.2d at 332.
8. Id. at 737, 891 A.2d at 328.
9. See infra Part IV.B-C.
10. See infra Part IV.D.
11. See infra part LV.D.
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trial courts and will provide prosecutors with a workable tool for com-
bating group-instigated violence.12
I. THE CASE
On November 9, 2002, the University of Maryland football team
defeated Atlantic Coast Conference rival North Carolina State in a
24-21 homecoming victory. 3 To celebrate, University of Maryland
student Brandon Malstrom, accompanied by his brother Bill and their
friends Brandon Conheim, Matt Swope, Matt Mitchell, and Paul
Speakman (Malstrom's group), set out around 11:30 p.m. that night
to attend parties around campus.14 The group eventually settled into
adjacent Dickinson Avenue1" backyard parties.16
Around the same time, a second group of individuals who were
not students at the University of Maryland-John Ryan Schlamp, Rob-
ert Fournier, Quan Davis, Kenny Brock, and Jacob Adams (Schlamp's
group)-were also making arrangements to attend College Park par-
ties that night.' 7 Schlamp and Adams had spent the day at Fournier's
house watching the football game and drinking alcohol."8 On their
way to College Park, they stopped at a liquor store where they ran into
Quan Davis and three of his friends.19 Schlamp's group invited Davis
and his friends to meet them at another friend's house near the Uni-
versity of Maryland campus.2 ° Once there, Schlamp and the other
members of his group resumed drinking.2' By midnight, the highly
inebriated group left the house and went to Dickinson Avenue. 22
As members of Schlamp's group traveled down Dickinson Ave-
nue, they started verbal confrontations with individuals attending
backyard parties. 2' The group eventually reached Scott Ehrlich's
12. See infra Part IV.D.
13. Schlamp, 390 Md. at 726, 891 A.2d at 328.
14. Id.
15. The record is confused as to the actual name of the street. The Court of Appeals
uses the name Dickerson Avenue. Id. at 726, 891 A.2d 328-29. The actual name of the
street is Dickinson Avenue. See Google Maps, http://maps.google.com/maps?oi=map&q=
Dickinson+Avenue,+College+Park,+MD (last visited Dec. 4. 2007).
16. Schlamp, 390 Md. at 726, 891 A.2d at 328-29.
17. Id. at 726, 891 A.2d at 329.
18. Id. Fournier testified that he and Schlamp drank between fifteen and twenty bot-
tles of beer that day. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 726-27, 891 A.2d at 329. Testimony indicated that Schlamp and members of
the group were consuming grain alcohol at this time. Id. at 727, 891 A.2d at 329.
22. Id. at 726-27, 891 A.2d at 329.
23. Id.
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party, where they continued to verbally harass invited guests. 24 At one
point during the party, Davis brandished a concealed "Rambo knife"
to his friend Adams.2 5 Later, Davis was forced to leave Ehrlich's party
after a girl complained that Davis inappropriately rubbed against
her.26
In response to the group's general demeanor and partygoers'
complaints, Ehrlich repeatedly asked the remainder of Schlamp's
group to leave.27 Shortly thereafter, Ehrlich asked all guests to leave
his backyard, and everyone present, including Schlamp's group,
obliged. 8
Malstrom's group reconvened on Dickinson Avenue in front of
Ehrlich's house, as did Schlamp's group.2 9 Another verbal confronta-
tion broke out; this time, Schlamp accused someone in Malstrom's
group of taking his or Davis's cell phone, and demanded that the
group empty their pockets.3° Brandon Malstrom told Schlamp that
no one had the cell phone and refused to comply with Schlamp's de-
mand.3 Immediately, Schlamp shoved Brandon, and Fournier held
Brandon from behind, immobilizing him.3 2 Allegedly, it was during
this brief scuffle that Brandon was stabbed to death. 3
Around this time, a police car arrived on the scene and the crowd
scattered.34 Conheim and Mitchell remained and told the officer that
Schlamp had started the fight.35 The police took Schlamp into cus-
tody.36 Members of Malstrom's group came back, but Brandon was
missing. 7 After an extensive search, Brandon was discovered lying
mortally wounded on the ground behind Ehrlich's house.38
The State's Attorney charged Schlamp with "first and second de-
gree murder, first and second degree assault, and common law riot"
24. Id. at 727, 891 A.2d at 329.
25. Id. Davis described the knife as "big and sharp, with a serrated edge." Id.
26. Id.
27. Schlamp v. State, 161 Md. App. 280, 287-88, 868 A.2d 914, 918 (2005).
28. Schlamp, 390 Md. at 727, 891 A.2d at 329.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. No one, in fact, had anyone else's cell phone. Id.
32. Id. at 728, 891 A.2d at 330.
33. Id. Conheim testified that Davis was present and seemed to be "favoring his hip
[like he was] reaching for something." Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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in connection with Brandon's death. 9 Following a trial in the Circuit
Court for Prince George's County, a jury acquitted Schlamp of mur-
der and first degree assault, but found him guilty of second degree
assault and riot.4" Schlamp was sentenced to ten years in prison for
riot and three years for second degree assault, to be served
consecutively.4 1
On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, Schlamp argued that
the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for common law
riot.4 2 The court disagreed, finding evidence of unlawful assembly
and public terror sufficient to sustain the jury verdict.4 3 First, the
court found unlawful assembly because the group functioned as a unit
during the night through its repeated confrontations with
partygoers. 44 The court also found that the group acted with a com-
mon violent purpose, as Fournier held Brandon from behind,
Schlamp swung at Brandon, and everyone in Schlamp's group con-
verged around Brandon during the altercation.4 5 Second, the court
found that the common purpose was carried out in a way that terrified
others because a knife was brought to the party, and Fournier's
chokehold, which constituted a battery, was sufficient to breach the
peace.4 6
Subsequently, Schlamp petitioned for certiorari to the Court of
Appeals to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain
his conviction for common law riot.4 7 The Court of Appeals granted
certiorari on June 9, 2005, to review the issue of common law riot for
the first time since 1937 and for the third time in the court's history.4"
39. Id. at 725, 891 A.2d at 328. The State also charged Davis with "first and second
degree murder, first and second degree assault, riot, and carrying a dangerous weapon
openly with intent to injure." Id at 725 n.1, 891 A.2d at 328 n.1.
40. Id. at 725, 891 A.2d at 328.
41. Id. In mandating a ten-year sentence for riot, the trial court recognized that it
exceeded the sentencing guidelines; however, itjustified its decision by finding that the
harm was excessive and that without Schlamp's threats and aggressive behavior, the cir-
cumstances leading to Maistrom's death would not have been set in motion. Schlamp v.
State, 161 Md. App. 280, 298-99, 868 A.2d 914, 924-25 (2005).
42. Schlamp, 161 Md. App. at 285, 868 A.2d at 917. Schlamp also challenged the ten-
year sentence as cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 295, 868 A.2d at 922.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 296-97, 868 A.2d at 923.
47. Schlamp, 390 Md. at 725-26, 891 A.2d at 328.
48. Id. at 725, 729, 891 A.2d at 328, 330. The Court of Appeals has only reviewed two
common law riot cases in the past: Kaefer v. State, 143 Md. 151, 122 A. 30 (1923), and Cohen
v. State, 173 Md. 216, 195 A. 532 (1937). Schlamp, 390 Md. at 729, 891 A.2d at 330.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Criminal riot, in Maryland and under accepted common law,
consists of three distinct elements:4" (1) "three or more persons" ;50
(2) "unlawfully assembled to carry out a common purpose";5 1 (3) "in
such a violent or turbulent manner as to terrify others. '5 2 Maryland is
one of the few states that has not codified criminal riot by statute.
Instead, Maryland maintains the crime of riot through Article V of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights, which entitles Maryland inhabitants
to the common law of England as it existed on July 4, 1776.51 Moreo-
ver, Maryland courts must consider two factors when interpreting
each element of criminal riot: first, the English common law interpre-
tation of each element in 1776; and second, previous interpretations
of each element by the Court of Appeals. Further, statutes from other
jurisdictions are also particularly useful. In this vein, the Federal Anti-
Riot Act, 18 U.S.C. sections 2101-02, and D.C. Code section 22-1322
provide strong bases for comparison.54
A. Element One: The Three-Person Requirement
At common law, a gathering of three or more persons was neces-
sary to constitute criminal riot.55 Accordingly, Maryland courts have
applied the three-person rule in previous cases.56 Similarly, most
United States jurisdictions require a fixed minimum number of per-
sons to constitute a criminal riot.5 7 Some states distinguish felony riot
49. See Cohen, 173 Md. at 221, 195 A. at 534 (articulating the three-part common law
definition of riot as the Maryland standard).
50. See infra Part II.A.
51. See infra Part II.B.
52. See infra Part I1.C.
53. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 5, ("That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to
the Common Law of England . . .and to the benefit of such of the English statutes as
existed on Uuly 4, 1776].").
54. See infra Part IV.D.
55. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 146 (1769) (not-
ing also that riots and unlawful assemblies must have three or more persons); see also 1
WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 293 (6th ed. 1788) (requiring
three persons for riot); 5 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 198 (1924)
(noting that the "rule of three" originated with the Court of Star Chamber).
56. E.g., Cohen v. State, 173 Md. 216, 221, 195 A. 532, 534 (1937).
57. Some jurisdictions keep the common law rule of three or more persons. See, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. § 2102 (2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.71 (West 2006). Massachusetts, a com-
mon law jurisdiction like Maryland, also requires that three persons be assembled for riot.
Commonwealth v. Berry, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 94 (1862). Other jurisdictions have differing
number requirements. For example, California requires two or more persons, CAL. PENAL
CODE § 404 (West 2006), D.C. requires five or more persons, D.C. CODE § 22-1322 (2006),
Connecticut requires six or more persons, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-175 (2006), and Texas
requires seven or more persons. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.02 (Vernon 2006). Less com-
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from misdemeanor riot based on the number of people assembled. 58
This approach also has roots in the English common law. 9
In Maryland, and other jurisdictions,6" the minimum number re-
quirement applies only to the number of people unlawfully assem-
bled; there is no requirement that the state charge a minimum
number of defendants with riot.61 Thus, in Cohen v. State,6 2 Cohen was
the only defendant charged with riot for his role in leading and incit-
ing a tumultuous taxi cab strike in Baltimore City.63 Cohen argued
that the State failed to satisfy the minimum three-person requirement
because he was the only named defendant.64 The Court of Appeals
rejected Cohen's argument and adopted the common law rule as ar-
ticulated in Commonwealth v. Berry,6 5 holding that so long as the defen-
dant is engaged with at least two other persons, those persons need
not be named if unknown to the grand jury.6 6
B. Element Two: Unlawful Assembly for a Common Purpose
Neither common law, Maryland law, nor other jurisdictions offer
a clear standard for the requirement of unlawful assembly for a com-
mon purpose. Some treatises on common law maintain that riot is
impossible without first having criminal unlawful assembly-meaning,
the crime requires a preconceived unlawful purpose or design before
the group assembles.67 Other scholars, most notably Blackstone, do
not require a common purpose but only the execution of an unlawful
act by three or more persons. 68  This confusion over whether a
preconceived common purpose, or the crime of unlawful assembly, is
a prerequisite to the crime of riot, has led to inconsistent application
of the common law riot doctrine in Maryland69 and in other
jurisdictions.7"
monly, the Indiana legislature has designated no minimum number. IND. CODE § 35-45-1-2
(2006).
58. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.05 (McKinney 2006) (specifying four or more per-
sons for second degree riot, and ten or more persons for first degree riot).
59. BLACKSTONE, supra note 55, at 143 (citing I GEo. I c. 5 (1714)).
60. E.g., Craig v. State, 114 S.W.2d 1073, 1074 (Ark. 1938); Loomis v. Edwards, 56
S.E.2d 183 (Ga. Ct. App. 1949).
61. Cohen, 173 Md. at 221-22, 195 A. at 534.
62. 173 Md. 216, 195 A. 532 (1937).
63. Id. at 220-21, 195 A.2d at 533.
64. Id.
65. 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 93 (1862).
66. Cohen, 173 Md. at 222, 195 A. at 534.
67. See, e.g., ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAw 483 (3d ed. 1982).
68. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 55, at 146.
69. See infra Part II.B.2.
70. See infra Part II.B.3.
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1. Unlawful Assembly for a Common Purpose at Common Law
The relationship between unlawful assembly and riot is easily con-
fused because unlawful assembly is both an element of riot and stands
alone as a separate offense against the public. Perkins and Boyce de-
scribe the two offenses as pyramiding offenses. 7' Thus, unlawful as-
sembly occurs when three or more persons assemble with the purpose
of doing an unlawful act but without making any motion towards it;
whereas riot occurs when this same group gathers together to carry
out an act, whether lawful or unlawful, and then executes this act with
such force and tumult as to terrorize the public.72 In short, the crimes
are pyramiding because without the first, the second is impossible.73
Though leading English common law scholars agreed that a
preconceived common purpose or design was a necessary element of
unlawful assembly," they split over whether the same common cause
was necessary for criminal riot. According to Blackstone, whereas un-
lawful assembly required a gathering upon contemplation of a
preconceived unlawful or violent purpose,75 riot could occur without
a common cause or quarrel so long as the executed act was sufficiently
violent and tumultuous to terrorize the public.76
Hawkins, on the other hand, arguably required a higher eviden-
tiary standard for unlawful assembly to constitute an element of riot:
group confederation with promises of mutual assistance. 77 For Haw-
kins, the promise of mutual assistance is essential because it indicates
when those otherwise innocently gathered became rioters-confeder-
ated for the common purpose of breaking the peace.78 Although
Hawkins suggested a stricter showing of unlawful assembly than did
Blackstone, he failed to address whether a showing of mutual assis-
tance is necessary when a group is already confederated before the
dispute arises.
2. Unlawful Assembly for a Common Purpose in Maryland
Maryland courts follow the common law by mandating unlawful
assembly in riot cases, but courts have applied differing levels of scru-
71. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 67, at 483.
72. BLACKSTONE, supra note 55, at 146; HAWKINS, supra note 55, at 297. This appears to
be a generally accepted standard today as well.
73. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 67, at 483.
74. E.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 55, at 146; HAWKINS, supra note 55, at 297.
75. BLACKSTONE, supra note 55, at 146.
76. Id.
77. HAWKINS, supra note 55, at 293.
78. Id. at 294-95.
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tiny when determining whether a group is unlawfully assembled with a
common intent. In Kaefer v. State,79 the Court of Appeals considered
whether to overturn a jury conviction of riot, unlawful assembly, and
assault when Kaefer and thirteen other defendants prevented a group
of fellow miners from entering the work site by throwing stones, using
clubs, and threatening bodily injury.8 ° Although the court did not
expressly create a Maryland rule for riot in this case, it accepted as
sufficient the state's indictment, which alleged that thirteen men un-
lawfully and riotously assembled to disturb the public peace." Im-
pliedly, by upholding the indictment, the Kaefer court both required
and found unlawful assembly.82
Fourteen years later, in Cohen, the Court of Appeals explicitly re-
quired unlawful assembly for a common purpose when it set forth the
Maryland rule for riot.8 Cohen, the leader of a cabdriver strike in
Baltimore City, was convicted on charges of riot and inciting a riot,
stemming from a violent exchange between taxi cab picketers and
workers.84 In the days leading up to the strike at union meetings, Co-
hen allegedly made numerous remarks inciting workers to physically
prevent cabs from driving off the lot.8 5 On the day of the strike, 150
Yellow Cab drivers assaulted working cabs with missiles, rocks, stones
and beer bottles.86 Although Cohen himself was not present at the
riot, the Court of Appeals found that his role in assembling, inciting,
and aiding and abetting the unlawful acts was sufficient to uphold his
conviction under the Maryland rule.87
The Court of Special Appeals has reviewed three cases involving
prison riots and has found unlawful assembly and upheld riot convic-
tions in each. In McClelland v. State,88 McClelland was sentenced to
ten years in prison for rioting in a Baltimore City prison.89 McClel-
land contended that the evidence was insufficient to maintain the
conviction, arguing, in part, that the inmates "pull[ed] a protest" only
79. 143 Md. 151, 122 A. 30 (1923).
80. Id. at 153, 157, 122 A. at 31, 33.
81. See id. at 156-57, 122 A. at 32-34. Kaefer challenged his riot and unlawful assembly
convictions by arguing that the State failed to allege the requisite elements in the indict-
ment. Id. at 155, 122 A. at 32.
82. Id.
83. 173 Md. 216, 221, 195 A. 532, 534 (1937) ("The assembly must be unlawful, else
there is no riot, and the unlawful assembly must be charged in the indictment.").
84. Id. at 220, 227, 195 A. at 533, 537.
85. Id. at 227-28, 195 A. at 537.
86. Id. at 225, 195 A. at 536.
87. Id. at 228, 195 A. at 537.
88. 4 Md. App. 18, 240 A.2d 769 (1968).
89. Id. at 19, 240 A.2d at 770.
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after officers had stifled their efforts to protestjailhouse corruption by
non-violent means. 90 McClelland attempted to justify the inmates'
planned riot as lawful by arguing that it was the last possible action
that inmates could take to ameliorate the inhumane treatment in-
flicted upon them by corrupt prison officials.9 The Court of Special
Appeals rejected this argument.9 2 The court reasoned that McClel-
land-by setting fires to signal the beginning of the protest and by
outfitting inmates with baseball bats and other weapons-not only
participated in the riot, but acted as a leader.93 Although the court
never explicitly reached a finding of unlawful assembly, it cited nu-
merous facts that spoke to the inmates' predetermined plan to assem-
ble for a common and unlawful purpose. 4
Though a specific intent to join or a predetermined plan is con-
clusive evidence of unlawful assembly,9 5 the Court of Special Appeals
has found this high standard unnecessary, ruling that the intent to
join two others in an unlawful act is not required to maintain a riot
conviction. In Briscoe v. State,96 Briscoe was convicted of riot by a jury
based on evidence that he waved a wooden board over his head while
yelling at police and participating in the looting of the prison's com-
missary.9 7 Briscoe challenged his conviction, in part, by arguing that
the state failed to allege a specific intent to riot in its indictment.9"
The court, in rejecting this argument, found that a previous agree-
ment or a specific intent is not essential to the offense of riot.9 9 The
Briscoe court further explained that the intent, which is an element of
the offense, is simply the intent to join or encourage the riotous
act.' By holding that no specific intent or previous agreement was
90. Id. at 30, 240 A.2d at 776.
91. See id. for a full explanation of McClelland's justification defense. McClelland also
argued that his acts did not terrorize the public. Id. at 30-31, A.2d at 777.
92. Id.
93. Id. The court carefully noted that McClelland's degree of leadership was only rele-
vant in so far as it helped to show his involvement and planning of the riot generally. Id. at
30, 240 A.2d at 777.
94. See id., 240 A.2d at 777.
95. See, e.g., Cohen v. State, 173 Md. 216, 228, 195 A. 532, 537 (1937) (finding the
unlawful assembly element satisfied when the defendant planned a taxi driver riot but did
not participate in the riot).
96. 3 Md. App. 462, 240 A.2d 109 (1968).
97. Id. at 465, 240 A.2d at 111.
98. Id. at 467, 240 A.2d at 112.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 467-68, 240 A.2d at 112. The Briscoe court found that an indictment need not
allege intent since it is a matter of proof. Id. at 468, 240 A.2d at 112.
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required, the Briscoe court did not interpret the element of unlawfu!
assembly as requiring pre-articulated promises of mutual assistance."'
Similarly, in Gibson v. State,10 2 the Court of Special Appeals up-
held a jury conviction for riot under the weaker Briscoe standard. In
Gibson, two of the prisoner-defendants led officers into a recreation
room with forty to fifty other inmates.10 3 Once there, another defen-
dant approached the officers with a club, ordered them up against the
wall, and threatened to beat them." 4 Without inquiring into whether
the defendants had a preconceived common purpose, the court ap-
plied the Briscoe standard and found riot based solely on evidence that
three defendants assembled and acted violently.10 5
3. Unlawful Assembly in Other Jurisdictions
Although unlawful assembly for a common purpose has been ap-
plied in Maryland over the years, many states have either abrogated or
modified this element by statute, or follow the Briscoe interpretation m6
and require no preconceived common purpose or concert of action.
In states where unlawful assembly has been abolished as an element, it
is often replaced with language emphasizing the conduct of the actors
over their intentions for assembling. D.C. Code section 22-1322, for
example, defines riot simply as "an assemblage of [five] or more per-
sons" who disturb the public peace "by tumultuous or violent conduct
or the threat thereof."' 10 7
Some states prefer to statutorily modify the common law ele-
ments without eradicating them entirely. For example, in New Hamp-
shire and Utah, riot lies when a person recklessly engages in conduct
that causes public alarm, or when a person assembles with two others
with the purpose of engaging in illegal activity or causing injury to
another. 10 8 By making the common law elements disjunctive, these
101. Id. at 467, 240 A.2d at 112. The Briscoe rule stands in stark contrast to the Court of
Appeals's narrow interpretation of Hawkins, and appears to accord more with Blackstone's
articulation of riot. See infra Part IV.B.2.
102. Gibson v. State, 17 Md. App. 246, 300 A.2d 692 (1973).
103. Id. at 262, 300 A.2d at 700.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 261-62, 300 A.2d at 700-01. In fact, there was additional evidence that one
inmate intervened on an officer's behalf and another inmate took an officer to receive
first-aid treatment. Id. at 262, 300 A.2d at 700. This evidence may have further suggested
to the court that the inmates did not have a common intent to riot.
106. Briscoe, 3 Md. App. at 467-68, 240 A.2d at 112 (1968) (quoting 77 C.J.S. Riot § 6
(1994)).
107. D.C. CODE § 22-1322(a) (2001); see also infranotes 156-160 and accompanying text.
108. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 644:1 (1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-101, (1) (a) (b) (c)
(2003).
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states deemphasize unlawful assembly and force the conduct of the
actor to play a greater role in proving the crime. Other states have
similarly modified and deemphasized the importance of unlawful as-
sembly by making lawful assembly an affirmative defense to riot.'1 9
Even when states retain the language of unlawful assembly in
their statutes, courts do not require evidence of a planned or deliber-
ate common unlawful purpose. Indiana, for instance, defines riot as
when "[a] person who, being a member of an unlawful assembly, reck-
lessly, knowingly, or intentionally engages in tumultuous conduct."110
In Kiphart v. State,"' however, a defendant challenged his conviction
by alleging that the state failed to charge him with unlawful assem-
bly-a necessary prerequisite under the statute. 1 2 The Supreme
Court of Indiana disagreed." 3 Despite the statutory language, the
court found that riot was simply an act committed by three or more in
a violent or tumultuous manner.' 1 4 Similarly, in Bolin v. State,"5 the
court held that the common purpose with which persons do the vio-
lent or tumultuous act is not part of the statutory definition of riot." 6
Thus, even though statutes may specify unlawful assembly as an ele-
ment, some courts nevertheless do not require a showing of a precon-
ceived common purpose.
C. Element Three: Violent and Tumultuous Activity Causing Public
Terror
The public terror or in terrorum populi requirement is a vestige of
riot's evolutionary past." 7 Originally, riot was associated with the
crime of treason, a crime committed against the state or the king." l8
Over time, riot became a distinct crime from treason, but remained
true to its lineage as an offense against the public by retaining public
109. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.02 (Vernon 2003). But see Henry v. State, 149
S.W.2d 115, 118 (Tex. Crim. App. 1941) (holding, without explanation, that riot can have
no meaning under the statute without the element of unlawful assembly).
110. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-1-2 (LexisNexis 2004).
111. 2 Ind. 273 (1873).
112. Id. at 274-75.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 139 N.E. 659, 663 (Ind. 1923).
116. Bolin v. State, 139 N.E. 659, 663 (Ind. 1923) ("The authorities cited by counsel
from other jurisdictions where the definition of riot embraces an unlawful assembling to-
gether as an essential element of the offense are not in point.").
117. 1 EDWARD EAST, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 73 (1806).
118. Id.
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terror as a necessary component." 9 Despite this history, jurisdictions,
including Maryland, 2 ° have taken significant steps to limit the public
terror element, either by abrogating it by statute, or by broadly inter-
preting it as a breach of the public peace.121
1. Application of the Public Terror Element in Maryland
Maryland courts consistently require proof of public terror, but
inconsistently apply the element. The Court of Appeals has addressed
the issue of public terror twice. In Kaefer, the court, without further
explanation, accepted as sufficient an indictment alleging that Kaefer
breached the peace by making noises, tumults, and disturbances. 122
The court narrowed this broad definition of public terror in Cohen. In
Cohen, the Court of Appeals articulated Maryland's rule for riot, re-
quiring tumultuous or violent activity to the terror of the public.123
The Cohen court then applied the rule and found that although Co-
hen had the right to organize a strike and unionize employees, he had
no right to use violent means to disturb the public peace "or to create
a reign of terror."'24 Thus, the court affirmed Cohen's conviction. 125
The Court of Special Appeals, in itsjailhouse riot cases, expanded
the meaning of public terror to include situations where the public is
not actually terrorized. 126  In Briscoe, Briscoe unsuccessfully chal-
lenged his riot conviction by arguing that the state could not meet the
public terror requirement because the acts were confined to the jail-
house, and there was no evidence that anyone in the jailhouse was
afraid. 12' The court rejected both the legal and factual bases of these
arguments. 128 First, as a factual matter, the court found that the pris-
oners behaved in a violent and tumultuous manner by smashing win-
dows, burning buildings, and looting the commissary, and that this
119. See HAWKINS, supra note 55, at 293-94. Hawkins describes riot, in part, as when
three or more people who engage in a violent and turbulent act to the terror of the peo-
ple, regardless of whether the intended act is lawful or unlawful. Id. But see BLACKSTONE,
supra note 55, at 146 (omitting any language of public terror and describing riot as three
or more persons who engage in "an unlawful act of violence," or do a lawful act in a "vio-
lent and tumultuous manner").
120. See infta Part II.C.I.
121. See infra Part II.C.2.
122. Kaefer v. State, 143 Md. 151, 155, 157, 122 A. 30, 31, 34 (1923).
123. Cohen v. State, 173 Md. 216, 221, 195 A. 532, 534 (1937).
124. Id. at 228, 195 A. at 537.
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., Briscoe v. State, 3 Md. App. 462, 468-69, 240 A.2d 109, 113 (1968)
("[T]here may be a riot, even though no person or persons are actually terrified .
127. Id.
128. Id.
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activity terrorized every officer in Baltimore City who was called to the
jailhouse by radio.1 29 Second, as a legal matter, the Briscoe court held
that there may be a riot even when no one is actually terrified, so long
as the act "tends to alarm and terrify law-abiding citizens in the peace-
ful exercise of their constitutional rights and privileges."' 13" The court
reiterated this notion two weeks later in McClelland v. State,13' holding
that a defendant's identical argument in the same jailhouse riot
lacked merit.
2. The Public Terror Requirement in Other Jurisdictions
Although many jurisdictions require a public disturbance compo-
nent, 3 2 fewjurisdictions strictly require that the public actually be ter-
rified by the violent or unlawful activity.'13  Moreover, in states where
riot is codified by statute, the common law language of public terror is
either nonexistent or weakened and modified to "public disturbance"
or to "causing a substantial risk of public alarm.' 34 Finally, in at least
four jurisdictions without statutes, state courts require a showing of
"public terror" only when there is no evidence that a group of three or
more committed a violent or unlawful act. 13 5
Few jurisdictions require actual public terror. However, in Inter-
national Wire Works v. Hanover Fire Insurance Co., l 6 the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court found no riot when vandals committed unlawful acts at
night away from public view. In Wire Works, a plaintiff sought recovery
against his property insurance company for riot protection when at
least three vandals broke into a factory during the night and inten-
tionally destroyed valuable machinery.' 3 7 Deciding the case for the
insurer, the court found that the common law definition of riot ap-
plied to insurance claims, and held that a necessary element of riot is
the actual disturbance of persons other than those engaged in the
129. Id. at 468, 240 A.2d at 113.
130. Id. at 469, 240 A.2d at 113.
131. 4 Md. App. 18, 240 A.2d 769 (1968).
132. See, e.g., State v. Beasley, 317 So. 2d 750, 753 (Fla. 1975) (finding that even if the
legislature defined riot by statute, a breach of the peace would be required by common
law).
133. But see Int'l Wire Works v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 283 N.W. 292 (Wis. 1939), dis-
cussed infra notes 136-139 and accompanying text.
134. See infra notes 141-151 and accompanying text.
135. See infra notes 149-150 and accompanying text.
136. 283 N.W. 292, 294 (Wis. 1939).
137. Id. at 293.
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violent or tumultuous act. 138 Thus, impliedly, the court denied cover-
age because the public was not actually terrified.
139
Wire Works is not representative of the modern statutory trend to
either entirely abrogate the "public terror" requirement or to substan-
tially modify it. States abrogating "public terror" often define riot sim-
ply as a certain number of people engaging in violent or tumultuous
conduct. 4 ° States that statutorily modify the element generally do so
by weakening the language from "public terror" to "disturbing the
public peace, " "' "grave risk of causing public alarm,"142 or "risk of
causing public terror. " "'
Even in states where public terror remains part of the statute,
courts, like the Briscoe court, often interpret the element as requiring
no more than a breach of the peace.'44 For example, in United States
v. Bridgeman,'45 the D.C. Circuit, in rejecting a prisoner's argument
that his activity was out of the public's view, interpreted "public distur-
bance" as "breach of the peace," and placed any activity threatening
the security and tranquility that the law affords individuals within the
ambit of a public disturbance.' 46 Similarly, in Minnesota, another
state with a statutory public disturbance requirement,'4 7 the Minne-
sota Supreme Court found that the repercussions of riot can disturb
138. Id. at 293-94.
139. Id. at 294 ("No riot exists in the absence of publicity at the time of the violent or
tumultuous acts.").
140. See supra note 57 (describing the different number of persons required for riot in
various states).
141. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 22-1322(a) (2001) ("A riot in the District of Columbia is a
public disturbance involving an assemblage of 5 or more persons which by tumultuous and
violent conduct or the threat thereof creates grave danger of damage or injury to property
or persons.").
142. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-176 (West 2001) (using the language "grave
risk of causing public alarm"); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 644:1 (1996) (making risk of public
alarm one of several possible ways to prove riot).
143. See, e.g., MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 752.541 (West 2004) (defining riot as "5 or more
persons, acting in concert to wrongfully engage in violent conduct and thereby intention-
ally or recklessly cause or create a serious risk of causing public terror or alarm").
144. Compare United States v. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d 1099, 1114-15 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (de-
fining breach of the peace as "tranquility enjoyed by a community when good order reigns
amongst its members"), with Briscoe v. State, 3 Md. App. 462, 469, 240 A.2d 109, 113
(1968) (defining public terror as that which "tends to alarm and terrify law-abiding citizens
in the peaceful exercise of their constitutional rights and privileges").
145. 523 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
146. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d at 1114. The D.C. Circuit also noted that Congress created the
D.C. law as a model for modernized riot legislation with the purpose of removing anti-
quated common law obstructions. Id. at 1113-14; see infra Parts IV.C-D.
147. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.71 (West 2003).
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the public peace even when the disturbance is neither seen nor
heard. '48
At least four jurisdictions without riot statutes interpret the com-
mon law as requiring public terror only when citizens tumultuously
assemble, but do not commit a violent or unlawful act. For example,
in Commonwealth v. Runnels,'49 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court found that the in terrorem populi element only applies when citi-
zens assemble armed with weapons, but do not commit any act. Ten-
nessee and Indiana also follow this interpretation.1 5 0  In all, the
majority of states either follow a broad "breach of the peace" interpre-
tation of public terror, or find the element nonessential when the
prosecution can produce evidence of violent or unlawful activity. 151
D. Model Statutes: D.C. Code Section 22-1322 and 28 U.S. C. Section
2102
The tumult of the late 1960s and early 1970s challenged Congress
to modernize riot legislation to give the federal government an effec-
tive tool to prosecute violent protestors.1 52 What followed-D.C.
Code section 22-1322, and the Federal Anti-Riot Act, 18 U.S.C. sec-
tions 2101-02-were attempts by Congress to codify riot law to permit
United States Attorneys to prosecute riot by focusing on the conduct
of the actors."5 ' This moved riot away from the common law notion
that prosecution must proceed through ancillary, prerequisite crimes
such as unlawful assembly.154 These statutes have successfully with-
stood attacks on a variety of constitutional fronts by remaining true to
underlying common law concepts, while respecting free speech and
148. State v. Winkels, 283 N.W. 763, 764 (Minn. 1939).
149. 10 Mass. (9 Tyng) 518, 519 (1813) (citing Lord Holt's treatise on English Common
Law).
150. See, e.g., State v. Whitesides, 31 Tenn. (1 Swan) 88, 89 (1851); Thayer v. State, 11
Ind. 287, 288 (1858) ("We think it was not necessary to allege that the act was to the
terror . . ").
151. See United States v. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d 1099, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Modern
courts' interpretation of the public terror requirement recalls the classic philosophical
question, "if a tree falls in the forest, does it make a sound?" On one hand, some courts
require that the public actually be afraid of, or hear, the riotous activity. E.g., Int'l Wire
Works v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 283 N.W. 292, 294 (Wis. 1939) (denying riot insurance
when no one was present to witness the unlawful activity). On the other hand, many courts
hold that if the public is naturally apt to be afraid, even if they are not present and capable
of being afraid, riot still lies. E.g., Bridgeman, 523 F.2d at 1115; Briscoe v. State, 3 Md. App.
462, 469, 240 A.2d 109, 114 (1968).
152. Allan L. Schwartz, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Federal Anti-
Riot Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C.S. §§ 2101-02), 22 A.L.R. FED. 256, § 2 (1975).
153. Id.
154. See infra notes 156-160 and accompanying text.
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providing clarity for riot prosecution, and have been endorsed by state
courts. 
5 5
D.C. Code section 22-1322 describes a riot as a public disturbance
involving an assembly of five or more persons, who "by tumultuous
and violent conduct or the threat thereof creates grave danger of
damage or injury to property or persons."15 6 In Bridgeman, the D.C.
Circuit discussed Congress's intent in passing the statute. 57 The
Bridgeman defendant challenged his conviction for incitement to riot,
in part, by arguing that because Congress only intended the statute to
apply to street riots, the common law element of public terror as ap-
plied by the lower court to the jailhouse was insufficiently alleged and
proven. 1 5  In rejecting this argument, the court found that the stat-
ute's primary purpose was to clarify riot and incitement to riot, of-
fenses whose meaning under the common law were uncertain. 159 The
court further noted that the Justice Department viewed D.C. Code sec-
tion 22-1322 as a model local law that "incorporates the basic thrust of
the common law statutes found in many jurisdictions and at the same
time modernizes the law and takes cognizance of the First
Amendment."1 60
The Federal Anti-Riot Act, like the D.C. statute, defines riot in a
modern way. 161 Section 2102 of the Act defines riot as
a public disturbance involving (1) an act . . . of violence by
one or more persons part of an assemblage of three or more
persons, which act or acts shall constitute a clear and present
danger of, or shall result in, damage or injury to the property
of any other person or to the person of any other individual
or (2) the threat thereof with the power of execution.' 62
At least one state court has called upon its own legislature to
adopt legislation similar to the Federal Anti-Riot Act. In State v.
155. See infra notes 161-164 and accompanying text.
156. D.C. CODE § 22-1322 (2006), previously D.C. CODE § 22-1122 (2001).
157. 523 F.2d 1099, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
158. Id. at 1113.
159. Id. Thus, the Bridgeman court held that Congress intended the law to apply to the
streets and jailhouses equally. Id. at 1114.
160. Id. at 1114.
161. See 18 U.S.C. § 2102 (2000). The forthcoming discussion is limited to § 2102. 18
U.S.C. § 2101 significantly limits the practicality of the Federal Anti-Riot Act, and places
very real obstacles in the way of effective prosecution. Schwartz, supra note 152, § 2[a].
These practical problems stem from the fact that federal riot jurisdiction is predicated
upon the Commerce Clause and interstate travel. Id.; see § 2101 (a).
162. 18 U.S.C. § 2102 (2000). There have been various constitutional challenges to the
Federal Anti-Riot Act, but none have succeeded. See Schwartz, supra note 152, §§ 3-4.
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Beasely,163 the Florida Supreme Court in dicta recommended that if
the state were to define riot by statute, it should adopt language simi-
lar to the Federal Anti-Riot Act.'
64
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In Schlamp v. State, the Court of Appeals unanimously overturned
the Court of Special Appeals and the Circuit Court for Prince
George's County, and acquitted Schlamp of criminal riot.165 The
Court of Appeals defined riot as "three or more persons 'unlawfully
assembled to carry out a common purpose in such violent or turbu-
lent manner as to terrify others."166 The court held that Schlamp's
group, although "boorish and obnoxious," was not unlawfully assem-
bled, was not organized for a common purpose, and did not engage in
behavior that struck terror or was likely to strike terror in the heart of
the public. '6 7
Judge Wilner began by noting that although many states have
codified criminal riot, Maryland remains one of the few jurisdictions
that maintains riot as a common law offense. 16' The court traced the
roots of common law riot from England. 1 69 Riot originated in the law
of treason and later became unique as an offense against the public
peace rather than as an offense against any single individual. 170 The
court then explained that, as an offense against the peace, riot be-
came associated with unlawful assembly and rout.' 7' Articulating the
three offenses as "pyramiding crimes," the court explained the com-
mon law distinctions between unlawful assembly, rout, and riot. 1 72
The court also addressed Hawkins's common law rule for criminal
riot, which included promises of mutual assistance and sufficient vio-
lence and tumult to terrorize the public.1 7 1
The court found that despite a broad interpretation of riot by
Hawkins and other Eighteenth Century treatise writers, "the true gra-
vamen of the offense was planned and deliberate violent or tumultu-
163. 317 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 1975).
164. Id. at 753. Florida has a riot statute, but the statute fails to offer a definition. See
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 870.01(2) (West 2000) ("All persons guilty of a riot, or of inciting or
encouraging a riot, shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree .. .
165. Schlamp, 390 Md. at 737, 891 A.2d at 335.
166. Id. (quoting Cohen v. State, 173 Md. 216, 221, 195 A. 532, 534 (1937)).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 729, 891 A.2d at 330.
169. Id. at 729-30, 891 A.2d at 330-31.
170. Id. at 730, 891 A.2d at 331.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 731, 891 A.2d at 332 (citing PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 67).
173. Id. at 731-32, 891 A.2d at 332-33.
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ous behavior."' 74 The court cited Hawkins for this view, emphasizing
his example that riot involved either pre-arranged meetings to carry
out a common unlawful or violent act, or innocently gathered persons
who confederate themselves into groups with promises of mutual assis-
tance to disturb the peace.
175
The court also used the Hawkins treatise to interpret the public
terror requirement. 176 The court observed that riot at common law
was not a crime against injured persons or property, but that it was a
crime against the public peace. 177 Thus, the court observed that in
every riot there must be some act that will evoke public terror. 78
Next, the court provided an overview of statutes codifying riot in
other states. The court found that although varied in wording and
approach, there are three common themes of state statutes: (1) a con-
federation of a certain number, (2) tumultuous or violent conduct
and (3) the instigation of public disturbance, terror or alarm.179
Turning its attention to Maryland riot cases, the court discussed
the convictions in Kaefer v. State and Cohen v. State. Looking at Kaefer
from the lens of its common law rule, the court emphasized the Kaefer
court's finding that the state's indictment sufficiently alleged the nec-
essary three elements for riot."8 ° The court then explained that the
Cohen's indictment was substantively equivalent to Kaefer's indict-
ment because it properly alleged that the taxi cab strikers unlawfully
assembled with "great noise," and remained together for fifteen min-
utes "to the great terror and disturbance" of those nearby.1 8 ' The
court ended its discussion of precedent by addressing the Court of
Special Appeals's jailhouse riot cases.' Notably, the court acknowl-
edged Briscoe's holding that riot may lie when the activity is of a nature
that tends to terrify citizens, even if no one is actually terrified.18 1
174. Id. at 732, 891 A.2d at 332.
175. Id. (citing HAWKINS, supra note 55, at 514).
176. Id. at 732-33, 891 A.2d at 332-33.
177. Id.
178. Id. ("[F]or every offence must be laid to be done in terrorempopuli." (quoting HAW-
KINS, supra note 55, at 515)).
179. Id. at 733, 891 A.2d at 333. The elements of the offense nonetheless vary byjuris-
diction, as some require or omit a showing of actual terror, an unlawful act, or injury to a
person or property. Id.
180. Id. at 733-35, 891 A.2d at 333-34 (citing Kaefer v. State, 143 Md. 151, 153-55, 122
A. 30, 31-32 (1923)).
181. Id. at 734, 891 A.2d at 334. The court emphasized that riot only requires the partic-
ipation of three or more people in the tumultuous or violent act, not that all persons
involved are individually named in the indictment. Id. at 734, 891 A.2d at 334; Cohen v.
State, 173 Md. 216, 221, 195 A. 532, 534 (1937).
182. Schlamp, 390 Md. at 735-37, 891 A.2d at 334-35.
183. Id. at 736, 891 A.2d at 335.
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Based on its consideration of common law and relevant prece-
dent, the court concluded that Schlamp and his comrades were not
unlawfully assembled for a common purpose because the aggression
displayed was individualized and the members of each group had not
organized into groups before carrying out violent acts.' 84 The court
also stressed that the group's activity failed to sufficiently create public
terror because prior to the stabbing there were neither fights nor tu-
multuous behavior that was likely to strike terror into anyone.' 8 5 In
concluding, the court observed that there was "at least a manslaughter
and possibly a murder, committed by someone, but there was not a
riot."1 8 6
IV. ANALYSIS
In Schlamp v. State, the Court of Appeals reversed the jury verdict
and the Court of Special Appeals, overturning Schlamp's ten-year riot
sentence because there was insufficient evidence of unlawful assembly
or public terror.'87 In reaching this conclusion, the court used the
appropriate common law rule,'88 but interpreted the elements of un-
lawful assembly and public terror far too rigidly. 89 First, the court's
requirement that the actions of Schlamp's group be "planned and de-
liberate" to constitute unlawful assembly' 90 was a narrow and poten-
tially inaccurate characterization of Hawkins's description of the
element and ignored Blackstone's definition entirely. 1 ' Second, the
court's strict interpretation of unlawful assembly deviated substantially
from Briscoe and the modern trend in other jurisdictions.'92 Third,
though the court acknowledged that Briscoe required a mere public
disturbance to satisfy the public terror element, the court's inability to
find "public terror" in this case implies an exceedingly strict reading
of the public terror element that is inconsistent with Briscoe and the
majority of other jurisdictions.19
184. Id. at 737, 891 A.2d at 335.
185. Id. The court noted that the group's aggression before the incident was verbal,
involved no destruction of property, and did not result in any reports of excessive noise.
Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 737, 891 A.2d at 335.
188. See infra Part W.A.
189. See infra Parts IV.B-C.
190. Schlamp, 390 Md. at 732, 891 A.2d at 332.
191. See infra Part IV.B.1.
192. See infra Part IV.B.2.
193. See infta Part IV.C.
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In so strictly interpreting these elements, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland has unnecessarily burdened Maryland riot law with unclear
common law concepts that are difficult to prosecute and to apply. It
also ignores the trend set by the federal government and other juris-
dictions to modernize riot law by focusing prosecutions on the con-
duct of the actors. 194 Moreover, the court's nuanced decision in
Schlamp should urge the Maryland legislature to clarify the state's riot
law by passing a statute similar to section 2102 of the Federal Anti-Riot
Act or D.C. Code section 22-1322.' Such an action should withstand
constitutional scrutiny, create consistent application by trial courts,
and give prosecutors a usable and predictable tool to combat group-
organized crime. 196
A. The Court of Appeals Correctly Determined the Three-Part Common
Law Rule for Riot
In the absence of a statute, the Schlamp court was bound by En-
glish common law under Article V of the Maryland Constitution and
its own precedent in Kaefer and Cohen. Cohen clearly establishes that
the Maryland common law interpretation of riot consists of "three or
more persons . . .unlawfully assembled to carry out a common pur-
pose in such violent or turbulent manner as to terrify the others."1 97
Furthermore, though Blackstone, Hawkins, and other common law
treatises differ in their approach to each element, modern courts gen-
erally recognize these three elements as common law riot.'98 Thus, it
was not within the power of the court to usurp legislative power and
remove the elements of unlawful assembly or public terror from the
definition of riot.199 The court, therefore, correctly interpreted and
applied Article V of the Maryland Constitution when applying the rule
for riot articulated in Cohen.
B. The Schlamp Court's Strict Interpretation of Common Law
Unlawful Assembly Was Unreasonably Narrow
The Schlamp court's strict interpretation of common law unlawful
assembly was unreasonably narrow in light of English treatises and
trends in other jurisdictions. First, the court relied almost exclusively
194. See infra Part IV.D.
195. See infra Part IV.D.
196. See infra Part IV.D.
197. Cohen v. State, 173 Md. 216, 221, 195 A. 532, 534 (1937).
198. 77 C.J.S. Riot § 1 (2006).
199. See State v. Beasley, 317 So. 2d 750, 753 (Fla. 1975) (noting that it is within the state
legislature's power to consider defining riot differently from the common law).
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on Hawkins when strictly interpreting unlawful assembly as requiring
"promises of mutual assistance," but failed to distinguish the present
case from Hawkins's hypothetical,200 which dealt with individuals not
previously associated with one another.20 1 Second, the court disre-
garded Blackstone's interpretation, which requires no showing of as-
sociation or purposeful assembly when a group executes a violent or
unlawful act.2" 2 Finally, the court's interpretation of unlawful assem-
bly deviates substantially from Maryland cases and trends in other ju-
risdictions, which have abrogated or judicially weakened the unlawful
assembly element because it is an impractical method for proving
riot.2
03
1. The Schlamp Court's Interpretation of Unlawful Assembly as
Requiring Planned and Deliberate Behavior is too Strict in
Light of the Common Law Treatises
Though the Schlamp court properly required unlawful assembly in
accordance with Article V of the Maryland Constitution, the court's
decision to require planned and deliberate activity is a narrow inter-
pretation of Hawkins and ignores Blackstone's definition.20 4 The
court's interpretation of unlawful assembly for the purposes of riot
focuses on Hawkins's analysis of "How far the intention with which
such persons assemble together must be unlawful."20 5 In this section,
Hawkins describes a fight that unexpectedly erupts from an originally
innocent gathering, and finds that those engaging in the fight are not
guilty of riot unless they group themselves together and promise to
assist each other before engaging in an unlawful, violent, or tumultu-
ous act. 206 From this example the Schlamp court infers that "planned
and deliberate" unlawful or violent activity, or organized group con-
frontation, is essential for riot.20 7
The Schlamp court's reading of the Hawkins hypothetical as re-
quiring "planned and deliberate" activity is a narrow and potentially
inaccurate characterization of the Hawkins standard. Hawkins sets
200. HAWKINS, supra note 55, at 294.
201. See infra notes 204-217 and accompanying text.
202. See infra notes 218-237 and accompanying text.
203. See infra notes 224-235 and accompanying text.
204. See Schlamp, 390 Md. at 731-32, 891 A.2d at 331-32. Despite the fact that the court
quotes directly from Blackstone, it gives little weight to this quotation in its analysis.
205. See id. at 732, 891 A.2d at 332 (citing HAWKINS, supra note 55, at 294). The court's
treatment of unlawful assembly is brief. The court merely states the rule that the crux of
the offense is planned and deliberate behavior and then cites Hawkins's example. See id.
206. HAWKINS, supra note 55, at 294-95.
207. Schlamp, 390 Md. at 732, 737, 891 A.2d at 332, 335.
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the scene of his hypothetical brawl in a public forum, such as a fair or
marketplace, where those who are gathered are not yet an organized
group, but happen upon a sudden quarrel.2 °8 Hawkins then explains
that in such a situation, if one participates in the fight without confed-
erating himself with a group, he is only guilty of affray; if he confeder-
ates with promises of mutual assistance, then he is guilty of riot.209
Thus, essential to Hawkins's hypothetical, which teases out the distinc-
tion between riot and affray, is that individuals are not yet associated
with any particular group.210
Because Schlamp's group was confederated before the violent
and tumultuous act in question, Schlamp is distinct from the Hawkins
hypothetical. After meeting at a friend's house, Schlamp's group set
out to Dickinson Avenue to attend parties.211 Once there, the group
verbally confronted partygoers, which caused Scott Ehrlich to ask
them to leave his party.212 By the time the fight broke out, Schlamp's
group had functioned as a unit for at least several hours.21' Further-
more, when Schlamp confronted Brandon Malstrom about the alleg-
edly stolen cell phone, at least three members of the pre-confederated
group exhibited an intent to join the violent and unlawful distur-
bance: Davis verbally confronted Brandon and demanded to search
him for a cell phone and closed in around Brandon while Fournier
held him; 21 4 Fournier placed Brandon in a chokehold; 2 15 Schlamp
also took a swing at Brandon and berated him.2 16 Nevertheless, the
Schlamp court found no unlawful assembly because the group's con-
frontation was not organized, pre-planned, or deliberate.217 By re-
quiring evidence of organized and planned confrontation when the
group had already functioned as a unit for several hours, the Schlamp
court took an exceptionally narrow view of Hawkins's hypothetical
and overlooked its purpose, which was to distinguish a riot from an
affray when members of a fight had no predetermined connection
with one another.
208. HAWKINS, supra note 55, at 294.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Schlamp, 390 Md. at 726-27, 891 A.2d at 329.
212. Id. at 727, 891 A.2d at 329.
213. See Schlamp v. State, 161 Md. App. 280, 295, 868 A.2d 914, 922 (2005) (describing
the group as "functioning as a continuing unit throughout the evening").
214. Id. at 286, 868 A.2d at 917.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Schlamp, 390 Md. at 737, 891 A.2d at 335.
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Likewise, the court's narrow view of unlawful assembly is inconsis-
tent with Blackstone's interpretation of riot, which does not require a
planned or deliberate common purpose.2"' Blackstone does not con-
strue unlawful assembly as a prerequisite to riot, but defines each
crime separately.2 9 For Blackstone, the crime of unlawful assembly
requires planned and deliberate behavior because without an exe-
cuted act, plans and deliberations are the only evidence that an assem-
bly is unlawful.220 An unlawful act is not necessary for riot, however,
because riot only occurs when a group takes the next step and exe-
cutes such an act.22 1 Presumably, it is based on this evidentiary dis-
tinction that Blackstone explicitly finds that a riot can occur, "either
with or without a common cause or quarrel." '22 2 Put another way,
Blackstone requires only that the actor has the intent to join the
group in the riotous activity; the actor need not share with the group a
specific intent to carry out a preconceived common plan. Applying
the Blackstone standard to Schlamp, Schlamp began the fight with the
victim, Fournier put the victim in a chokehold, and Davis encouraged
them and closed in on the victim in a threatening way.223 Because
each manifested an intent to join the violent and unlawful activity
through his actions, each unlawfully assembled for a common pur-
pose. The Schlamp court, by requiring a "planned and deliberate"
group purpose, ignored Blackstone's interpretation and instead chose
to rely solely on a narrow reading of Hawkins.
2. The Schlamp Court's Narrow Interpretation of Unlawful Assembly
is also Inconsistent with the Persuasive Authority of the
Court of Special Appeals and other Jurisdictions
The Schlamp court's decision to narrowly construe Hawkins's
common law standard and to require planned and deliberate activity
is inconsistent with Briscoe and Gibson.2 24 In Briscoe, the defendant
218. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 55, at 146.
219. Id.
220. Id.; cf Schlamp v. State, 161 Md. App. 280, 295, 868 A.2d 914, 923 (2005) (describ-
ing the difficulty of proving the common purpose element of riot).
221. BLACKSTONE, supra note 55, at 146.
222. Id.
223. Schlamp, 161 Md. App. at 295-96, 868 A.2d at 923.
224. Briscoe v. State, 3 Md. App. 462, 240 A.2d 109 (1968); Gibson v. State, 17 Md. App.
246, 300 A.2d 692 (1973). The decisions in Kaefer, Cohen, and McClelland did not reach the
issue of whether a preconceived common plan is necessary to constitute a riot. In Kaefer,
the court accepted the indictment as alleging the proper elements of riot without explana-
tion. Kaefer v. State, 143 Md. 151, 157, 122 A. 30, 32-34 (1923). In Cohen, the conviction
was predicated completely on a preconceived plan, as Cohen was indicted for inciting a
riot but did not actually participate in the riot. Cohen v. State, 173 Md. 216, 228, 195 A.
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challenged his conviction in ajailhouse riot, arguing that the state did
not allege a specific intent to riot in his indictment. 2 5 The court, in
rejecting the defendant's challenge, found that specific intent is not
necessary to establish riot, as it is not essential, and a previous agree-
ment need not exist.2 26 The court held that the only intent needed is
the intent to join or encourage the riot.22 7
Four years later in Gibson, the Court of Special Appeals applied
the standard from Briscoe and upheld a conviction in ajailhouse riot
without explicidy finding any proof that inmates had planned, delib-
erated, or confederated for the unlawful purpose of rioting.2 2 In
short, the most recent cases decided in Maryland-Briscoe and Gib-
son-interpreted unlawful assembly in accordance with Blackstone
and focused only on whether the defendant intended to engage in a
riotous act;2 29 they did not require evidence that the defendant's acts
be preconceived, planned, or deliberate z. 2 3  The Schlamp court's deci-
sion to require evidence of "planned and deliberate" confederation
not only narrowly interprets the common law, 231 but deviates substan-
tially from the latest interpretations from the Maryland judiciary.
The Schlamp court's narrow reconfiguration of unlawful assembly
also contrasts sharply with trends in other jurisdictions-which either
entirely omit unlawful assembly or apply the Briscoe standard. 23 2 Eigh-
teen states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government have
completely removed the language of unlawful assembly for a common
purpose from riot law.23 ' Even Indiana, a state that has retained the
532, 537 (1937). Likewise, in McClelland, there was ample evidence of a preconceived com-
mon plan, as McClelland set fires to signal the start of the riot. McClelland v. State, 4 Md.
App. 18, 30, 240 A.2d 769, 776 (1968). Thus, before Schlamp, Briscoe and Gibson stood as
the only Maryland cases in which the court was called upon to decide riot without evidence
of a common, deliberate or pre-formed group intent.
225. Briscoe, 3 Md. App. at 465, 240 A.2d at 111.
226. Id. at 467, 240 A.2d at 112.
227. Id. at 467-68, 240 A.2d at 112.
228. Gibson, 17 Md. App. at 261-62, 300 A.2d at 700.
229. Compare Briscoe, 3 Md. App. at 467, 240 A.2d at 112 (finding mutual assistance un-
necessary and holding that the only intent necessary is the intent to join the riot), and
Gibson, 17 Md. App. at 261, 300 A.2d at 700 (same), with BLACKSTONE, supra note 55, at 146
(finding that no pre-established common cause or quarrel is necessary for a riot).
230. See Schlamp, 390 Md. at 732, 891 A.2d 332.
231. See supra Part IV.B.1.
232. See, e.g., United States v. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d 1099, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (finding
that the D.C. riot statute was created by the legislature as an all-encompassing law to elimi-
nate reliance on common law offenses, such as unlawful assembly); infra Part IV.D.
233. ALA. CODE § 13A-11-3 (LexisNexis 2005); ALAsKA STAT. § 11.61.100 (LexisNexis
2006); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2903 (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-201 (LexisNexis
2005); CAL. PENAL CODE § 404 (West 1999); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-101 (West 2004);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-175 (West 2001); D.C. CODE § 22-1322 (West 2001); GA.
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language of unlawful assembly in its statutory text, interprets unlawful
assembly analogously to Briscoe, requiring only the intent to partici-
pate in the riot.2 34 Likewise, New Hampshire and Utah retain unlaw-
ful assembly in their statutes, but mitigate the difficulty of proving the
element by making it optional.23 In all, at least twenty-four United
States jurisdictions have abrogated the unlawful assembly element
from riot, making the Court of Appeals's interpretation in Schlamp a
significant step back towards the malleable and difficult-to-prosecute
common law definition.
C. The Schlamp Court's Unwillingness to Find Public Terror Suggests
a Diversion from the Widely Accepted Public Disturbance
Interpretation
Despite the Schlamp court's affirmation of the Briscoe standard of
public terror, the court's inability to find evidence of a public distur-
bance suggests a return to an antiquated notion of public terror-
where prosecutors must prove that the public was actually terrified.236
This view requires a level of proof previously unnecessary in Maryland
under Briscoe and Gibson. It also breaks with the national trend of
moving riot law away from elusive common law elements, distinguish-
ing Maryland from the majority of other jurisdictions.
In Maryland, under Briscoe, an act sufficiently terrorizes the pub-
lic when it "tends to alarm and terrify law-abiding citizens in the
peaceful exercise of their constitutional rights and privileges. "237
CODE ANN. § 16-11-30 (LexisNexis 2003); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6401 (2004); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-4104 (1995); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 525.010(5) (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 329.1 (2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752-541 (West 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.71
(West 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-103 (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:1 (1996);
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 240.05-240.06 (McKinney 2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-25-01 (1997);
OR. REV. STAT. § 166.015 (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-301(3) (2006); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 42.02 (Vernon 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-101 (2003); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2405 (2004).
234. Compare IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-1-2 (LexisNexis 2004) ("A person who, being part
of an unlawful assembly, recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally engages in tumultuous con-
duct commits rioting . . . ."), with Kiphart v. State, 2 Ind. 273, 275 (1873) (holding that
state does not need to charge defendant with lesser included act of unlawful assembly),
and Bolin v. State, 139 N.E. 659, 663 (Ind. 1923) (finding that unlawful assembly is not a
necessary element of riot).
235. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 644:1 (1996) (providing alternative definitions of riot
that include and exclude requirement of common purpose); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-101
(2003) (same).
236. See, e.g., Int'l Wire Works v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 283 N.W. 292, 294 (Wis. 1939)
(finding that a vandalism by three or more tinder cover of darkness and out of the public's
view was not a riot because the public was not actually terrorized).
237. See Briscoe v. State, 3 Md. App. 462, 468-69, 240 A.2d 109, 113 (1968) (rejecting a
defendant's argument that there was no riot because the unlawful activity was confined to
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Likewise, a victim's terror in being threatened with violence can con-
stitute fear sufficient to meet the public terror requirement. 238
In Schlamp, Fournier held Brandon Malstrom from behind and
Schlamp berated him and swung at him.239 Davis, likewise, engaged
in verbal taunts and approached Malstrom in a threatening way as he
closed in on him.24" Furthermore, the group had functioned as a unit
throughout the night causing a number of disturbances at Dickinson
Avenue parties, and each disturbance, including the fight with Bran-
don Malstrom, occurred in a public forum. 241' Thus, if the court con-
sidered the victim's apprehension under the public terror calculus,
the jury's verdict was on sound footing. But even if the victim's fear is
not considered under the public terror requirement, and the court
solely applies Briscoe, it was reasonable for a jury to find that a battery
on a public street, which led to the stabbing death of a college stu-
dent, would disturb the peace and tranquility that law-abiding citizens
feel in the University of Maryland community. 24 2 In short, although
the court acknowledged the Briscoe standard for public terror, its in-
ability to find sufficient evidence to support a jury finding of public
terror in this case implies a far narrower interpretation of the element
than previously required.
The court's narrow interpretation of public terror is likewise un-
reasonable in light of trends in other jurisdictions that generally
broaden or abrogate the public terror requirement. At least twenty-
four states broadly interpret the public terror requirement as breach
of the public peace or public disturbance similar to Briscoe.245 Of the
the jailhouse and therefore did not terrorize the public). Often, progressive courts con-
sider any unlawful act to sufficiently terrify law-abiding citizens, finding that a breach in the
peace is a breach that affects the public at large. E.g., United States v. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d
1099, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (finding public terror in a disturbance confined to a jail).
238. See Gibson v. State, 17 Md. App. 246, 261-62, 300 A.2d 692, 700-01 (1973) (using
officers' testimony that they were placed in fear as the defendant approached them with a
club as relevant to establishing public terror).
239. Schlamp v. State, 161 Md. App. 280, 287-88, 868 A.2d 914, 918 (2005).
240. Id. at 295, 868 A.2d at 924. There was testimony that Davis was favoring his hip and
that he had a knife. See id. at 297, 868 A.2d at 923 (using testimony about the knife as
evidence of the public terror requirement).
241. Id. at 292, 868 A.2d at 925.
242. Cf Briscoe, 3 Md. App. at 468-69, 240 A.2d at 113 (finding the public terror require-
ment met, in part, because people in the Baltimore community could be terrorized by
knowledge of a jailhouse riot); see also Bridgeman, 523 F.2d at 1114-15 (explaining that
breach of the peace is any activity that threatens a citizen's interest in tranquility, law, and
order).
243. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d at 1115 n.13. The Cohen court also used the language of public
disturbance: "[Cohen] had no right to resort to violence, disturbance of the public peace,
or to create a reign of terror." Cohen v. State, 173 Md. 216, 228, 195 A. 532, 537 (1937).
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remaining states, some have deleted the language of public distur-
bance entirely,244 while others have broadened the language to in-
clude the creation of a substantial or grave risk of public terror.24 5
Even other common law jurisdictions have modernized their riot law
by reinterpreting the public terror requirement, holding that it only
applies when assembled citizens are armed, but do not commit any
violent acts.2 ' Given this clear trend in U.S. jurisdictions to move
away from a strict application of the public terror requirement, the
Schlamp court should not have narrowed Briscoe's scope by overturning
the jury's finding of public terror.
D. The Schlamp Court's Nuanced Interpretation of the Common Law
Should Urge the Maryland Legislature to Adopt a Conduct-
Based Riot Statute Similar to the Federal Anti-Riot Act or
D.C. Code Section 22-1322
The Schlamp court's narrow interpretation of the unlawful assem-
bly and public terror requirements elevates antiquated common law
concepts over a common sense understanding of riot, and should
urge the Maryland legislature to modernize and codify riot law.24 7
Legislatures have adopted a balancing approach when adopting mod-
ern riot law statutes.248 On the one hand, a clear desire to abrogate
confusing, prerequisite common law crimes, such as unlawful assem-
bly, is key for effective prosecution and consistent judicial applica-
tion.249 On the other hand, avoiding the complete preemption of
common law standards is desirable, as such an act may be found un-
constitutional by state supreme courts. 25' Taking these factors into
consideration, an all-encompassing, modernized riot statute similar to
244. Eg., CAL. PENAL CODE § 404 (West 1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-30 (LexisNexis
2003); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.02 (Vernon 2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-405 (2004).
245. E.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-3 (LexisNexis 2005); ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.100 (Lexis-
Nexis 2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-175 (West 2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752-
541 (West 2004); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 240.05-240.06 (McKinney 2006); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 166.015 (2005); see also N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 644:1 (1996) (making substantial risk of
public alarm an option); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-101 (2003) (same).
246. Commonwealth v. Runnels, 10 Mass. (9 Tyng) 518, 519, (1813); State v. Sims, 16
S.C. 486 (1882) (finding application of the terror requirement necessary only when a law-
ful act is committed); State v. Whiteside, 31 Tenn. (1 Swan) 88 (1851) (same).
247. See, e.g., State v. Beasley, 317 So. 2d 750, 753 (Fla. 1975) (recommending that the
Florida legislature define riot and use a broad definition similar to the Federal Anti-Riot
Act).
248. See United States v. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d 1099, 1113-14 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (describ-
ing the enactment of the D.C. riot statute).
249. Id. at 1114.
250. See Beasley, 317 So. 2d at 753 (requiring any definition to include breach of the
public peace under the state constitution); see also Bridgeman, 523 F.2d at 1114 (explaining
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section 2102 of the Federal Anti-Riot Act or D.C. Code section 22-1322
would provide Maryland with a suitable modern riot statute that re-
tains basic common law concepts without relying on confusing com-
mon law terms of art.25 1 Such a statute would focus Maryland courts
on the conduct of the actors rather than on those actors' hard-to-
determine preconceived plans or the intangible terror of the public.
This, in turn, will create a more understandable riot law that will be an
effective tool for prosecutors while promoting consistent application
by trial courts.25 2
V. CONCLUSION
Although the Court of Appeals was bound to follow precedent
and had little choice but to apply the elements of unlawful assembly
and public terror,253 its mandate that "planned and deliberate" vio-
lent behavior must precede a riot,254 and its strict application of the
"public terror" requirement deviated substantially from Briscoe v. State
and trends in other jurisdictions.255 Furthermore, the court's narrow
interpretation placed undue emphasis on malleable common law ele-
ments while ignoring the common sense approach of focusing on the
conduct of the actors.256 The Maryland legislature should view the
court's decision in Schlamp as an opportunity to modernize the State's
riot law by adopting a statutory definition similar to 18 U.S.C. section
2102 (a), or D.C. Code section 22-1322.257 By defining riot in this
conduct-based manner, Maryland can retain basic common law con-
cepts, such as public disturbance, while providing a clear, effective
tool for prosecutors and enabling trial courts to consistently apply the
law. 258
THOMAS K. PREvAS
that the Justice Department intended to preserve underlying common law concepts in the
D.C. riot statute).
251. See supra Part II.D.
252. See Bridgeman, 523 F.2d at 1114.
253. See supra Part IV.A.
254. See supra Parts IV.B-C.
255. See supra Parts IV.B-C.
256. See supra Parts IV.B-C.
257. See supra Part IV.D.
258. See supra Part 1V.D.
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CHOW v. STATE: HOW THE COURT OF APPEALS'S NARROW
INTERPRETATION OF "TRANSFER" COULD IMPAIR
GUN CONTROL POLICY AND INCREASE
HANDGUN VIOLENCE
In Chow v. State,' the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered
whether the word "transfer," as used in a Maryland handgun statute,
encompasses only permanent exchanges of handguns between indi-
viduals or whether it refers more broadly to all exchanges of hand-
guns, permanent or temporary.2 The court held that the word
"transfer" in Article 27, section 442(d) refers only to permanent ex-
changes and thus a temporary handgun exchange was not a violation
of the statute.' In so holding, the court misconstrued the meaning of
the word "transfer."4 The court's interpretation of "transfer" also con-
tradicted the legislative intent of the statute, as well as federal and
state gun control policies.5 The court's holding will likely hinder
crime investigation, make gun control more difficult, and increase in-
stances of violent crimes.6 Instead of excluding temporary handgun
exchanges, the Court of Appeals should have concluded that "trans-
fer" encompasses all exchanges that last for "more than a momentary
period."7
1. THE CASE
On April 2, 2003, Man Nguyen contacted his friend Todd Lin
Chow and told Chow that he needed to buy a gun.' The two met the
Copyright © 2007 by Jennifer H. Stinnette.
1. 393 Md. 431, 903 A.2d 388 (2006).
2. Id. at 433-34, 903 A.2d at 389.
3. Id. at 462, 903 A.2d at 406-07. In 2003, the Maryland General Assembly repealed
Article 27 in its entirety and reenacted it; section 442(d) is now located at section 5-124 of
the Public Safety Article. Act of October 1, 2003, ch. 5, 2003 Md. Laws 14, 22-23, 234.
Article 27, section 442(d) is part of the Regulated Firearms Subheading, which is com-
posed of Article 27, sections 441, and subsequent related sections. Chow, 393 Md. at 434
n.2, 903 A.2d at 389 n.2.
4. See infra Part W.A.
5. See infra Part IV.B.
6. See infra Part IV.C.
7. Chow, 393 Md. at 475, 903 A.2d at 414 (Wilner, J., dissenting); see infra Part IV.D.
8. Chow v. State, 163 Md. App. 492, 497, 881 A.2d 1148, 1151 (2005). Although
Nguyen claimed that he simply asked if he could "hold on" to Chow's gun for a week or
two, Nguyen admittedly contacted Chow on April 2, 2003, and expressed he was anxious to
purchase a gun because his previous pistol had been confiscated by the police the day
before, during a traffic stop. Id. at 497-99, 881 A.2d at 1151-52.
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same day and Chow gave Nguyen his handgun.' They subsequently
parted ways, with Chow's handgun remaining in Nguyen's vehicle and
no money changing hands.'" Two days later, on April 4, 2003,
Nguyen was driving when he was stopped by police officers from the
Prince George's County Police Department."1 The police searched
Nguyen's car and found Chow's handgun. 12 OnJuly 31, 2003, Chow
was charged with illegally transferring a firearm under section 442 of
Article 27.13 A bench trial ensued on November 25, 2003 in the Cir-
cuit Court for Prince George's County. 14 The circuit court held that
there was a temporary transfer and found Chow guilty, sentencing
him to sixty days in prison and a $200 fine.' 5
Chow appealed the circuit court's decision, disputing in part the
court's interpretation of section 442(d).' 6 The Court of Special Ap-
peals of Maryland affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, holding
that "transfer" in section 442(d) included a temporary exchange of a
handgun between an owner and another individual.1 7 In so holding,
the court considered several dictionary definitions of the verb "trans-
fer," and ultimately refused to define "transfer" as a "permanent ex-
change of title or possession."18 Rather, the court examined the
ordinary meaning of the word and looked at the word in the context
9. Id. at 497, 881 A.2d at 1151. According to testimony at trial, this handgun had
been formally transferred to Chow on November 27, 1996. Id. at 499, 881 A.2d at 1152.
10. Id. at 498, 881 A.2d at 1151. Initially, the two men drove in Nguyen's car toward a
firing range because Nguyen wanted to test fire Chow's handgun, but they ended the trip
when Nguyen received a business call. Id. at 497-98, 881 A.2d at 1151.
11. Id. at 498, 881 A.2d at 1151. The police stopped Nguyen pursuant to an arrest
warrant issued for illegally carrying the gun that had been confiscated earlier that week.
Id.
12. Id.
13. Chow, 393 Md. at 435, 903 A.2d at 390. According to testimony at Chow's trial,
there were no records of subsequent transfers of Chow's handgun or applications for trans-
fer from Chow to Nguyen. Chow, 163 Md. App. at 499, 881 A.2d at 1152.
14. Chow, 393 Md. at 435, 903 A.2d at 390.
15. Chow, 163 Md. App. at 500, 881 A.2d at 1152-53. Chow's sentence was suspended.
Id., 881 A.2d at 1153.
16. Id. Chow also challenged the circuit court's decision that he "knowingly" violated
section 442(d). Id.
17. Id. at 496, 881 A.2d at 1150.
18. Id. at 502-03, 881 A.2d at 1154. The court reasoned that defining transfer as a
permanent exchange "would run afoul of the rule that [o]rdinary and popular under-
standing of the English language dictates interpretation of terminology within legislation."
Id. at 503, 881 A.2d at 1154 (quoting Deville v. State, 383 Md. 217, 223, 858 A.2d 484, 487
(2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The court also reasoned that "transfer" does
not logically include only permanent exchanges and cannot merely mean "gift." Id. at
503-504, 881 A.2d at 1154-55.
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of the statute to determine that section 442(d) prohibits the loan of a
firearm.'"
In reaching its conclusion, the Court of Special Appeals also ex-
amined the legislative history of section 442(d) and found that be-
cause it was part of two bills proposed specifically to reduce gun
violence in Maryland, 20 "[t]o read § 442(d) as exempting the loan of a
regulated firearm would undermine the laudable purpose of the legis-
lative scheme. ' 21 Moreover, the court found that the legislature in-
tended remedial application of section 442(d), and that to achieve its
remedial intention of decreasing firearms in the illegal market, the
words in section 442(d) should be expansively construed.2 2 The court
therefore concluded that a gun owner violates section 442(d) when he
loans a firearm to another individual before that person completes
the firearm application process and waiting period.23
After this decision, Chow filed a motion for reconsideration,
which the Court of Special Appeals denied on October 4, 2005.24
Chow then filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Ap-
peals.25 On December 19, 2005, the Court of Appeals granted certio-
rari26 to determine the meaning of "transfer" as used in section
442(d) and to "decide whether a temporary gratuitous exchange or
loan of a regulated firearm constitutes a 'transfer' under § 442(d)."27
19. Id. at 502-06, 881 A.2d at 1154-56.
20. Id. at 507, 881 A.2d at 1156-57 (quoting Maryland Gun Violence Act of 1996: Briefing
Statement on S.B. 215 and H.B. 297 Before the S. Judicial Proceeding Comm. and the H. Judiciary
Comm. 412th Session 2 (1996) (statement of Bonnie A. Kirkland, Chief Legislative Officer,
Governor's Legislative Office, and Colonel David B. Mitchell, Superintendent of State Po-
lice)) [hereinafter Briefing Statement]. The court also found that the purpose of section
442(d) was to disrupt "established gun trafficking patterns by reducing the supply of regu-
lated firearms to the illegal market." Id. at 508, 881 A.2d at 1158 (quoting Briefing State-
ment, supra, at 5) (internal quotation marks omitted).
21. Id. at 508-09, 881 A.2d at 1158.
22. Id. at 509, 881 A.2d at 1158.
23. Id. at 509-10, 881 A.2d at 1158. The Court of Special Appeals also considered the
mens rea required to violate section 442(d), finding that the gun owner must "knowingly
participate[ ] in the illegal sale, rental, transfer, purchase, possession, or receipt of a regu-
lated firearm." Id. at 511, 881 A.2d at 1159. The court determined that "knowingly" means
that the defendant knew of the facts that would make up the offense. Id.
24. Chow, 393 Md. at 435, 903 A.2d at 390.
25. Id.
26. Chow v. State, 390 Md. 284, 888 A.2d 341 (2005).
27. Chow, 393 Md. at 434, 903 A.2d at 389.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Maryland courts have developed rules for statutory interpretation
to guide attempts to define specific words in statutes.2" These rules
mandate that courts consider the intent of the legislature, construe
the words of a statute according to their common understanding, and,
if the plain meaning of a word is ambiguous, consider the legislative
history of the statute.29 Although "transfer" is not explicitly defined in
Article 27, section 442,30 the legislative history of section 442(d) indi-
cates that the statute was enacted to reduce a violent crime epidemic
in Maryland and to better regulate handgun exchanges.3 ' These pur-
poses mimic the common goal of both federal and state gun control
regulations to reduce violent crime by limiting the availability of hand-
guns, and specifically restricting access to handguns by convicted
felons and other potentially violent individuals.12
A. Statutoy Interpretation
The Court of Appeals has established rules for statutory interpre-
tation that aim to give effect to the intent of the legislature.33 A court
begins by examining the statute's plain language.34 In looking at the
plain language of a statute, a court should not alter the language in a
way that would either misconstrue the obvious intent of the statute or
change its scope.35 A court should also read the statute in such a way
that no word, sentence, or phrase would become "surplusage, super-
fluous, meaningless or nugatory."36 When a word included in a stat-
ute has not been defined by the legislature, then a court should assign
the word its common, ordinary, popular, and natural meaning. 37 Be-
28. See, e.g., State Dep't of Assessments & Taxation v. Maryland-National Capital Park &
Planning Comm'n, 348 Md. 2, 13, 702 A.2d 690, 696 (1997) (explaining that because a
disputed term had not been defined in a statute, the court would have to engage in statu-
tory construction).
29. See infra Part II.A.
30. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 442 (1996).
31. See infra Part II.B.
32. See infra Part II.C.
33. See, e.g., Kushell v. Dep't of Natural Res., 385 Md. 563, 576-77, 870 A.2d 186,
193-94 (2005) (explaining the rules of statutory interpretation); Collins v. State, 383 Md.
684, 688-89, 861 A.2d 727, 730 (2004) (same); Deville v. State, 383 Md. 217, 223, 858 A.2d
484, 487 (2004) (same); Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 387-88, 835 A.2d 1221, 1226 (2003)
(same).
34. Deville, 383 Md. at 223, 858 A.2d at 487.
35. Kushe, 385 Md. at 576-77, 870 A.2d at 193.
36. Thomas v. Police Comm'r of Balt. City, 211 Md. 357, 361, 127 A.2d 625, 627 (1956).
37. See Deville, 383 Md. at 223, 858 A.2d at 487 ("Ordinary and popular understanding
of the English language dictates interpretation of terminology within legislation."); Tucker
v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 73, 517 A.2d 730, 731-32 (1986) (explaining that
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cause the goal of statutory construction is to give effect to the legisla-
ture's intent, a court must harmonize all of the provisions of the
statute that address the same topic and interpret them together."'
If the words of the statute are clear and indicate the intent of the
legislature, then a court's inquiry into the meaning of the statute
ends.39 If there is a concern that a literal interpretation of a statute
would be inconsistent with the legislative intent, however, a court may
examine more than just the literal meaning of the statute.4" Also,
when there are several possible meanings of a statute, the statute is
deemed ambiguous. 4 A court must then consider the statutory pur-
pose thoroughly, examining the connection between the common un-
derstanding of the statute's words and the statute's purpose and
setting.4 2 A court analyzes the language in light of the overall statu-
tory scheme.4" Furthermore, in determining the intent behind legis-
lation, a court may consider the results that would stem from adopting
one interpretation over another and accept the "construction which
avoids an illogical or unreasonable result, or one which is inconsistent
with common sense. 44
B. The Legislative History of Article 27, Section 442(d)
In 1941, the Maryland General Assembly enacted legislation for
the regulation of handguns.4' This statute required firearms dealers
to keep records of pistols or revolvers that were sold or transferred.46
In 1957, the General Assembly re-codified this provision, without mak-
ing any substantial changes, into Article 27, section 442. 47 The section
was then repealed and subsequently re-enacted in 1966.48 Substantial
changes were made to the regulations at that time.49 One significant
when a statute does not offer the definition of a word, the word "should ordinarily be given
its usual and natural meaning").
38. Navarro-Monzo v. Wash. Adventist Hosp., 380 Md. 195, 204, 844 A.2d 406, 411
(2004).
39. Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 387, 835 A.2d 1221, 1226 (2003).
40. Brown v. State, 359 Md. 180, 189, 753 A.2d 84, 88 (2000).
41. Deville, 383 Md. at 223, 858 A.2d at 487.
42. Collins v. State, 383 Md. 684, 691-92, 861 A.2d 727, 732 (2004).
43. Deville, 383 Md. at 223, 858 A.2d at 487.
44. Tucker v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 75, 517 A.2d 730, 732 (1986).
45. Act of June 1, 1941, § 531B, ch. 622, 1941 Md. Laws 1064.
46. Id.
47. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 442 (1957).
48. Act of June 1, 1966, § 442, ch. 502, 1966 Md. Laws 819.
49. Compare MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 442, with § 442, 1966 Md. Laws at 828-31.
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change was that the new version of the statute provided rules for the
sale and transfer of handguns by dealers.50
It was not until 1996 that subsection (d) was added to Article 27,
section 442.51 Subsection (d) states:
A person who is not a regulated firearms dealer may not sell,
rent, transfer, or purchase any regulated firearm until after 7
days shall have elapsed from the time an application to
purchase or transfer shall have been executed by the pro-
spective purchaser or transferee, in triplicate, and the origi-
nal copy is forwarded by a regulated firearms dealer to the
Secretary.52
Subsection (d) was added to Article 27, section 442 pursuant to
the Maryland Gun Violence Act (the Act) .5 The Act was introduced
in 1996.5' The Act aimed to reduce the gun violence epidemic in
Maryland that stemmed from the "ready availability of firearms. ' 55
Moreover, in order to stop the countless gun-related deaths and inju-
ries in Maryland, the Act intended to reduce the availability of guns to
"prohibited persons."56
To prevent prohibited persons from obtaining regulated fire-
arms, the Act proposed several changes to the existing regulated
handgun statute, one of which was the addition of section 442(d). 7
Section 442(d) required sales, rentals, and transfers of weapons be-
50. § 442, 1966 Md. Laws at 828-31. The statute stated:
No dealer shall sell or transfer any pistol or revolver until after seven days shall
have elapsed from the time an application to purchase or transfer shall have been
executed by the prospective purchaser or transferee, in triplicate, and forwarded
by the prospective seller or transferor to the superintendent of the Maryland
State Police.
Id. at 828 (emphasis added).
51. Maryland Gun Violence Act of 1996, § 442, ch. 561, 1996 Md. Laws 3139, 3152-53;
Maryland Gun Violence Act of 1996, § 442, ch. 562, 1996 Md. Laws 3175, 3188-89.
52. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 442(d) (1996) (emphasis added).
53. § 442, 1996 Md. Laws 3139, 3152-53; § 442, 1996 Md. Laws 3175, 3189. The Act
supplemented existing handgun laws by requiring additional information on firearm trans-
fer applications, subjecting rentals of firearms by firearm dealers to the seven-day waiting
period requirement, and limiting legal purchases of regulated handguns to one purchase
in a thirty-day period. S.JUD. PROC. COMM., BILL ANALvsis: S.B. 215, 1996 Leg., 412th Sess.
(Md. 1996) [hereinafter BILL ANALysis].
54. JUD. COMM., BILL ANALYSiS: S.B. 215, 1996 Leg., 412th Sess. (Md. 1996) [hereinafter
JUDIARY COMM.]; S. JuD. PROC. COMM., FLOOR REP.: S.B. 215, 1996 Leg., 412th Sess., at I
(Md. 1996) [hereinafter FLOOR REp.].
55. Briefing Statement, supra note 20, at 2; see alsoJUDICARv COMM., supra note 54 ("This
bill is aimed at reducing gun-related violent crime in Maryland...
56. Briefing Statement, supra note 20, at 2.
57. S.B. 215, 1996 Leg., 412th Sess. (Md. 1996); H.B. 297, 1996 Leg., 412th Sess. (Md.
1996).
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tween individuals to undergo the same process required for initial
purchases from a licensed gun dealer, including a background check
and a seven-day waiting period.5" In accordance with the overall pur-
pose of the Act, this section endeavored to reduce the availability of
guns and keep guns out of the hands of prohibited individuals. 9 The
legislative history of the Act similarly indicates that the purpose of ad-
ding section 442(d) was to reduce gun-related violent crime in
Maryland.6°
C. Federal and State Gun Control Policies
The general purpose of federal and state gun control regulation
is to lower the number of violent crimes.6' Federal and state legisla-
tures have two primary methods of achieving this purpose: first, by
preventing certain individuals from obtaining handguns, while simul-
taneously ensuring that individuals who are legally allowed to own and
possess handguns can obtain them;6 2 and second, by reducing and
restricting the supply and exchange of handguns.63
1. Legislative Balancing-Keeping Certain People From Obtaining
Handguns While Allowing Other Non-Prohibited Individuals
to Obtain and Possess Them
Both federal and state legislatures have enacted regulations de-
signed to reduce violent crime by preventing convicted felons and
other potentially dangerous individuals from obtaining handguns,
while at the same time endeavoring to protect the rights of individuals
who are legally permitted to own and possess guns. First, with respect
to the restriction of handguns, several federal and state handgun laws
have demonstrated that legislatures have a strong desire to keep hand-
guns away from certain types of individuals. Beginning with the Om-
58. Briefing Statement, supra note 20, at 5.
59. Id. at 2.
60. SeeJUDICIARY COMM., supra note 54 (explaining that the bill was intended to reduce
violent gun-related crimes in Maryland by making "several substantive, as well as nonsub-
stantive, changes to the current law governing the sale, transfer, and possession of pistols,
revolvers, and assault weapons"); FLOOR REP., supra note 54, at 1 (same); S. JUD. PROC.
COMM., FLOOR REP.: H.B. 297, 1996 Leg., 412th Sess. (Md. 1996) [hereinafter S.JuD. PROC.
COmm.: FLOOR REP.] (same).
61. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 76 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112,
2164 (expressing Congress's belief that the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968 will help reduce the gun abuse problem in the United States);JuDmlCARv COMM., supra
note 54, at I (explaining that the Maryland Gun Violence Act was enacted to reduce gun
violence in Maryland).
62. See infta Part IlCI.
63. See infra Part II.C.2.
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nibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, the United States
Congress expressed concern over the availability of firearms to
criminals, juveniles, drug addicts, individuals with mental deficiencies,
and "others whose possession of such weapons is similarly contrary to
the public interest. '"64 Congress addressed this concern by enacting a
law prohibiting licensed dealers, manufacturers, and distributors from
selling guns to certain categories of individuals, namely convicted
felons and fugitives.65 With this Act, Congress also put federal fire-
arms licensees in charge of the sale and shipment of handguns.
66
Within the same year, Congress amended the federal laws by pass-
ing the Gun Control Act of 1968.67 According to the Supreme Court
of the United States, the Gun Control Act of 1968 had the same inten-
tion of preventing potentially dangerous individuals from obtaining
handguns.68 This Act extended the categories of persons to whom
licensed dealers, manufacturers, or distributors were prohibited from
selling guns, including drug users and individuals deemed mentally
defective.6 9
In enacting the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act in
1993,7o Congress expressed similar motives. The Brady Act required
that a background check be performed on all individuals attempting
to purchase handguns, as well as a five-day waiting period, before a
handgun could be transferred to anyone.7 ' According to congres-
64. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 901 (a) (2), 82 Stat. 197, 225 (1968). Four months later, with
the Gun Control Act of 1968, Congress amended and re-enacted Tide IV of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 120 n.6
(1979) (citing Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968)).
65. Pub. L. No. 90-351, §§ 901(a), 922(b)-(k), 82 Stat. at 225-26, 230-31. Congress
explained that the main goals of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act "are to
aid in making it possible to keep firearms out of the hands of those not legally entitled to
possess them ... and to assist law enforcement authorities in the States and their subdivi-
sions in combating the increasing prevalence of crime in the United States." S. REP. No.
90-1097, at 28 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2113-14.
66. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 922, 82 Stat. at 228-29.
67. H.R. REoP. No. 90-1577, at 1 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4410, 4410.
68. See Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 218 (1976) (reasoning that the construc-
tion and organization of the 1968 Gun Control Act indicates that Congress aspired to keep
firearms away from individuals whom Congress had labeled "potentially irresponsible and
dangerous").
69. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213, 1220.
70. Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993).
71. H.R. REP. No. 103-344, at 7, 10 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1984, 1984,
1987. The Brady Act also mandated that a national instant criminal background check
system be created, and that the waiting period be terminated once the system comes into
effect. Id. at 10, as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1987. In Printz v. United States, the Su-
preme Court held that the provision of the Brady Act requiring state and local law enforce-
ment officers to perform background checks was unconstitutional. 521 U.S. 898, 933
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sional documents, the purposes behind the Brady Act were to prevent
convicted felons and other dangerous persons from purchasing
guns, 72 and to decrease handgun-related crime. 7' These goals would
be accomplished with the waiting period and the background check,
which would ensure that a prospective buyer was permitted to own a
handgun.4
Like Congress, the Maryland General Assembly enacted handgun
regulations with the intention of keeping certain types of individuals
from obtaining handguns. In 1941, the Maryland General Assembly
passed a law prohibiting dealers or individuals from selling or transfer-
ring a handgun to a fugitive or a person convicted of a violent crime.7 5
In this same statute, Maryland made it illegal for any individuals who
have been convicted of violent crimes or who are fugitives to possess a
handgun. 76 As interpreted by the Court of Special Appeals, the 1941
statute was intended to keep individuals "who have already demon-
strated a propensity for violence, as evidenced by a conviction of a
crime of violence" from obtaining and retaining handguns. 77 In 1966,
the General Assembly bolstered these sections by banning additional
categories of individuals from being sold or transferred guns, and
making it illegal for such individuals to possess guns.78
In 1996, the General Assembly again acted to restrict certain indi-
viduals from obtaining handguns. With the Maryland Gun Violence
Act of 1996, the General Assembly attempted to reduce gun-related
violence and death in Maryland by preventing "prohibited persons"
from obtaining handguns. 79 The desire to keep certain individuals
(1997). Despite this holding, the congressional intent of the Brady Act remains undis-
turbed, as the Printz holding does not necessarily negate congressional intent.
72. Id. at 7, as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1984.
73. 139 CONG. REC. H9098-99 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1993) (statement of Rep. Castle).
Identifying the correlation between preventing such individuals from obtaining handguns
and the prevalence of violent crimes in the United States, a House Report stated that "it is
clear from the number of crimes committed with firearms that criminals have relatively
easy access to guns." H.R. REP. No. 103-344, at 8-9, as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1984,
1985-86.
74. 139 CONG. REc. H8649, H8651 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1993) (statement of Rep. Schiff).
75. Act of June 1, 1941, § 531D, ch. 622, 1941 Md. Laws 1064, 1065.
76. Id.
77. Johnson v. State, 67 Md. App. 347, 378, 507 A.2d 1134, 1150 (1986).
78. Act of June 1, 1966, ch. 502, 1966 Md. Laws 819, 834-35. Specifically, the General
Assembly added habitual drunkards, addicts or habitual users of narcotics, those of un-
sound mind, those under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and individuals under age
twenty-one to the list of people to whom dealers cannot sell handguns, and added habitual
drunkards and addicts or habitual users of narcotics to the list of individuals who cannot
legally possess handguns. Id.
79. Briefing Statement, supra note 20, at 2.
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from possessing handguns also motivated the General Assembly to
pass the Responsible Gun Safety Act of 2000.80 The Responsible Gun
Safety Act imposed punishments on individuals wrongfully possessing
a gun because of prior convictions. 81
Although federal and state gun control policies aim to prevent
certain individuals from obtaining handguns, at the same time, Con-
gress and the Maryland General Assembly have endeavored to protect
the rights of individuals who are legally permitted to own and possess
handguns. At the federal level, Congress clarified when it enacted the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 that while it was
prohibiting certain individuals from obtaining firearms, it did not in-
tend to deter or encumber citizens who are allowed to possess guns
from obtaining or using them legally.8 2 Then, in 1986, with the Fire-
arms Owners' Protection Act, Congress modified the Gun Control Act
of 1968 because it had been found to hinder law-abiding citizens in
lawfully obtaining and using their handguns.8" Among other things,
the modifications allowed for the purchase of shotguns and rifles
from another state, provided that the sale was legal in both the state of
purchase and the buyer's home state; compelled mandatory penalties
for individuals who employed a firearm while committing a federal
crime; and permitted the transportation between states of unloaded
weapons.84
80. See ch. 2, 2000 Md. Laws 6-7 (stating that its purpose was to ban individuals who
have been found delinquent of certain crimes involving firearms from obtaining a hand-
gun permit, "purchasing, renting, or transferring a handgun, and possessing a handgun"
until they have reached a certain age, and also to ban dealers from transferring or selling
handguns to individuals who have been found guilty of firearms crimes until such individu-
als have reached a certain age); see also Melton v. State, 379 Md. 471, 484, 842 A.2d 743,
750-51 (2004) (explaining that the intent behind the passage of the Responsible Gun
Safety Act of 2000 was to keep guns away from felons and other possibly violent
individuals).
81. MD. DEP'T OF LEG. SERVS., LEGISLATIVE WRAp UP, ISSUE No. 00-14 (2000).
82. See Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 901(b), 82 Stat. 197, 226 ("[I]t is not the purpose of this
title to place any undue or unnecessary Federal restrictions or burdens on law-abiding
citizens with respect to the acquisition, possession, or use of firearms appropriate to the
purpose of hunting, trap shooting, target shooting, personal protection, or any other law-
ful activity . . ").
83. See H.R. REP. No. 99-495, at 1 (1986), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327, 1327
(stating that the bill is intended to "relieve the nation's sportsmen and firearms owners
and dealers from unnecessary burdens under the Gun Control Act of 1968"); Firearms
Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 1, 100 Stat. 449, 449 (1986) (asserting that
Congress found it necessary to enact further legislation to rectify existing firearms regula-
tions and policies because of the citizens' right to keep and bear arms; to security against
unreasonable searches and seizures; against uncompensated taking of property; and
against unconstitutional exercise of authority).
84. 132 CONG. Rc. 9598, 9603 (daily ed. May 6, 1986) (statement of Sen. McClure).
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The Maryland General Assembly has likewise acted to ensure
that, while prohibited persons do not obtain handguns, other citizens
can lawfully and easily obtain handguns. The General Assembly seem-
ingly had this goal in mind when it enacted the Maryland Gun Vio-
lence Act, as the Act did not include any restrictions on legal uses of
firearms, such as hunting and sport shooting.15
2. Federal and State Legislation to Reduce the Availability of and
Facilitated Access to Handguns
Federal and state handgun regulations consistently exhibit a de-
sire to reduce the occurrence of violent crimes by reducing the availa-
bility of handguns. For example, Congress passed the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 because it found that the
ease and availability of handguns to the masses, including criminals,
was a major contributing factor in the pervasiveness of violent crime
in the United States.8 6 Congress intended the Omnibus Act to reduce
crime and gun abuse by reducing public firearms access and exercis-
ing more effective control over firearms.8 7 Congress thus mandated
that firearms be shipped only to and from licensed federal firearms
dealers, manufacturers, and distributors."8
The Maryland General Assembly has also worked to reduce vio-
lent crime by limiting the facilitated access to handguns. Much like
Congress's Omnibus Act, in 1972 the Maryland legislature enacted a
statute to address the prevalent use of firearms in the fulfillment of
crimes.8 9 The General Assembly opined that the increase in violent
crimes necessitated a vast restriction of the instances when individuals
are legally allowed to transport weapons.9 ° The General Assembly also
expressed the goal of reducing gun-related violence by limiting hand-
85. Briefing Statement, supra note 20, at 6.
86. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 901 (a) (2), 82 Stat. at 225. Congress also warned that the
ready availability of firearms "is a matter of serious national concern." S. REP. No. 90-1097,
at 28 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2114.
87. See S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 76 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2164
(stating that evidence shows that gun control is an effective method of reducing gun
abuse).
88. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 922(a), 82 Stat. at 228-29.
89. See Act of March 27, 1972, § 36B, ch. 13, 1972 Md. Laws 38, 40 (averring that in-
stances of violent crimes have increased, a large number of those crimes have involved
handguns, and the current laws have been ineffective in reducing the use of handguns in
the commission of crimes).
90. Id.
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gun availability with the Maryland Gun Violence Act of 1996."' To
accomplish this objective, the Maryland Gun Violence Act proposed a
variety of measures, such as prohibiting straw purchases, requiring a
license to purchase a firearm, treating secondary sales of handguns
like dealer sales, and limiting firearm purchases to one purchase in a
thirty-day period.92
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In Chow v. State, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of
the Court of Special Appeals and held that the temporary loan of a
handgun between two adults who are allowed to possess regulated
handguns is not an illegal "transfer."93 Writing for the court, Judge
Cathell first considered the plain language of the statute to determine
the meaning of "transfer" as used in section 442(d)." Looking at the
ordinary and common understanding of "transfer" by consulting vari-
ous dictionaries, the court was persuaded that dictionaries available
prior to the enactment of the predecessor statute defined "transfer" as
"a permanent exchange of title or possession."95
Next, the Chow majority acknowledged that words can have sev-
eral ordinary meanings and that it must therefore look to the whole
statute and its context to determine the intended meaning of "trans-
fer."96 The court examined the use of the word "transfer" in various
other sections of the statute97 and concluded that "transfer," when
read in conjunction with the other provisions of the Regulated Fire-
91. See Briefing Statement, supra note 20, at 2 (explaining that in order to stop the vio-
lence epidemic in Maryland, the Maryland Gun Violence Act focuses on decreasing hand-
gun availability).
92. Id.
93. Chow, 393 Md. at 472-73, 903 A.2d at 413.
94. Id. at 444-48, 903 A.2d at 396-98.
95. Id. at 445-47, 903 A.2d at 396-97. The predecessor statute to the Regulated Fire-
arms Subheading was enacted in 1941. Id. at 446, 903 A.2d at 397. The court reasoned
that the statute has always contained the word "transfer," and that "the meaning and con-
text of the term have not been altered over the course of the years, even though other
definitions may have changed." Id. at 447, 903 A.2d at 397.
96. Id. at 448, 903 A.2d at 398.
97. Id. at 448-55, 903 A.2d at 398-402. For instance, after considering section 441,
which supplies the definitions for the Regulated Firearms subheading, the Chow court de-
termined that each time "transfer" was used, it was employed to mean a "permanent ex-
change of tide or possession of the regulated firearm for consideration." Id. at 448-49, 903
A.2d at 398. Moreover, the court noted, in section 443, which addresses licenses for regu-
lated firearm dealers, "transfer" is also used to mean a permanent exchange of tide for
consideration. Id. at 451-52, 903 A.2d at 400.
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arms subheading, unambiguously means a permanent "exchange of
title or possession.'98
The Court of Appeals then turned to the legislative intent behind
section 442(d)."0 First, the court described how the Uniform Ma-
chine Gun Act was passed before the predecessor of the Regulated
Firearms subheading was enacted.1 00 The court reasoned that be-
cause the legislature included "loan" in the Uniform Machine Gun
Act, it could have done so with the Regulated Firearms statute had it
intended the statute to cover temporary exchanges.t01 Next, the court
explained that subsection (d) was added to Article 27, section 442 in
1996, as part of the Maryland Gun Violence Act, 10 2 the goal of which
was to reduce the gun violence epidemic in Maryland. 1°3 The Chow
court observed that the purpose of that Act was to regulate sales and
ban multiple permanent sales transactions of firearms, and that a nar-
row construction of "transfer" encompassing only permanent ex-
changes best served this purpose. 10 4 The majority then stated that it
would respect the finding of the circuit court that the exchange in the
present case was temporary, reiterated that "transfer" as used in sec-
tion 442(d) excludes temporary gratuitous exchanges, and concluded
that Chow did not violate section 442(d).' °5
Judge Wilner dissented, arguing that the transfer between Chow
and Nguyen violated section 442(d)."' Judge Wilner contended that
the majority's interpretation of "transfer" rendered the word mean-
ingless.' 7 Judge Wilner also argued that, while dictionary definitions
like those relied upon by the majority are helpful in determining the
98. Id. at 454-55, 903 A.2d at 401-02. The Chow majority maintained that "[t]he con-
text in which the term 'transfer' is used in the Regulated Firearms subheading's statutory
scheme as a whole must be harmonized with its use in § 442(d)." Id. at 452, 903 A.2d at
400.
99. Id. at 455-63, 903 A.2d at 402-07. Although the court found the meaning of
"transfer" unambiguous, it nevertheless examined the purpose of the Regulated Firearms
subheading to confirm its interpretation that "transfer" means a permanent exchange. Id.
at 455, 903 A.2d at 402.
100. Id. at 455-56, 903 A.2d at 402.
101. Id. at 456-58, 903 A.2d at 402-04.
102. Id. at 459, 903 A.2d at 405.
103. Id. (quoting Briefing Statement, supra note 20, at 2).
104. Id. at 460-61, 903 A.2d at 405-06.
105. Id. at 462-63, 903 A.2d at 406-07. As a final matter, the court examined the mens
rea requirement in section 449(f). Id. at 463-72, 903 A.2d at 407-12. The court deter-
mined that specific intent is needed, whereby "a defendant 'knows' that the sale, rental,
transfer, purchase, possession, or receipt of a regulated firearm of which they are a partici-
pant in is in a manner that is illegal and not a legal sale." Id. at 471, 903 A.2d at 412.
106. Id. at 473, 903 A.2d at 413 (Wilner, J., dissenting). Judges Raker and Battaglia
joined in dissent. Id.
107. Id.
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meaning of a word, the crucial concern is the legislative intent behind
the statute.'0°
According to Judge Wilner, the purpose of section 442(d) was to
fix a loophole in the former law that allowed secondary firearms trans-
actions to go unregulated. 10 9 He expressed doubt that the legislature
intended to open a larger loophole than the one it closed "by allowing
both dealers and non-dealers to lend regulated firearms to persons without
complying with the seven-day waiting period."" 0 Thus, Judge Wilner
would have held that the word "transfer" encompasses a loan in which
a firearm is surrendered for "anything more than a momentary
period." 1 1
IV. ANALYSIS
In Chow v. State, the Court of Appeals held that the word "trans-
fer," as used in Article 27, section 442(d), refers only to permanent
exchanges of handguns between individuals, and thus the temporary
transfer between Chow and Nguyen was not an illegal transfer under
the statute. 1 2 In so holding, the court erroneously concluded that
"transfer" clearly and unambiguously refers only to permanent ex-
changes." 3 The Chow court's holding is improper because it contra-
venes the legislature's intent in enacting the statute, as well as federal
and state gun control policies.1 14 Furthermore, the majority's holding
will likely hinder crime investigation, make gun control more difficult,
and increase violent crime." 5 Hence, a more appropriate interpreta-
tion of "transfer" would be that the term encompasses all exchanges
between individuals that last for "more than a momentary period.""' 6
A. The Court of Appeals Improperly Determined that "Transfer"
Unambiguously Refers only to Permanent Exchanges
In Chow, the Court of Appeals claimed that the unambiguous
meaning of the word "transfer" includes only permanent ex-
108. Id. at 473-74, 903 A.2d at 413.
109. Id. at 474-75, 903 A.2d at 414.
110. Id. at 475, 903 A.2d at 414.
111. Id. Hence, Judge Wilner argued, if Chow and Nguyen had completed their inten-
tion of only test firing the gun, then the statute would not have been violated; however,
when Chow permitted Nguyen to possess the gun for a period of time, an illegal transfer
took place. Id. at 476, 903 A.2d at 415.
112. Id. at 462-63, 903 A.2d at 406-07 (majority opinion).
113. See infra Part IV.A.
114. See infra Part IV.B.
115. See infra Part IV.C.
116. See Chow, 393 Md. at 475, 903 A.2d at 414 (Wilner, J., dissenting); infta Part 1V.D.
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changes.' 1 7 Both the common meaning of the word and strict appli-
cation of the rules of statutory construction show, however, that the
meaning of "transfer" in the statute is ambiguous and could cover
temporary exchanges as well.
The rules of statutory interpretation dictate that a court first look
at the plain language of a statute. 1 ' If the plain language is not
clear-as in section 442, because "transfer" is not definedt 9 -the
court must apply the commonly understood meaning.1 20 Although
"[o] rdinary and popular understanding of the English language dic-
tates interpretation of terminology within legislation,"1 21 the Court of
Appeals did not fully consider the ordinary and popular meaning of
"transfer" because it relied on definitions from 1941 and earlier, when
the predecessor statute to the Regulated Firearms Subheading was
first enacted. 122 Contrary to the Chow court's assertions, a definition
from 1941 should not be exclusively relied upon to obtain the ordi-
nary and popular understanding of a word. 123 Instead, to obtain the
commonly understood meaning of the word, the court should have
also relied upon contemporary dictionaries. 124
Two commonly used contemporary dictionaries define "transfer"
broadly and impart meanings that significantly differ from the Chow
court's definition. The Oxford English Dictionary provides two defini-
tions: "1. trans. To convey or take from one place, person, etc. to an-
other; to transmit, transport; to give or hand over from one to
117. Chow, 393 Md. at 455, 903 A.2d at 402 (majority opinion).
118. See Deville v. State, 383 Md. 217, 223, 858 A.2d 484, 487 (2004) (explaining that the
first step in statutory construction is to consider the statute's plain language).
119. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 442 (1996).
120. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (explaining that when a word in a statute
is not defined within the statute, the court should define the word according to its com-
mon and popular meaning).
121. Deville, 383 Md. at 223, 858 A.2d at 487.
122. See Chow, 393 Md. at 446-48, 903 A.2d at 396-98. The Chow court acknowledged
that the lower court had consulted several different dictionaries, but the Chow court ulti-
mately defined "transfer" solely based on the definitions found in dictionaries from 1941.
Id. at 445-48, 903 A.2d at 396-98.
123. It is debatable whether a 1941 definition, examined in a vacuum, can be consid-
ered the "ordinary and popular understanding" of a word, and whether such an old defini-
tion should be relied upon exclusively in determining the meaning of a disputed word. See
Rossville Vending Mach. Corp. v. Comptroller of Treasury, 97 Md. App. 305, 316-17, 629
A.2d 1283, 1289 (1993) (consulting dictionaries that were present at the time of a statute's
enactment, then checking contemporary versions of the dictionaries, to see if the under-
standing of the words changed over the years).
124. See Harvey v. Marshall, 389 Md. 243, 260-61 n.11, 884 A.2d 1171, 1181 n.11 (2005)
(noting that when attempting to ascertain the legislative intent behind specific words in a
statute, courts should consult both current editions of dictionaries and editions in exis-
tence when the statute was enacted).
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another," and "2. Law. To convey or make over (title, right, or prop-
erty) by deed or legal process.' 1 25 Likewise, in Black's Law Dictionary,
"transfer" is defined as "1. To convey or remove from one place or
one person to another; to pass or hand over from one to another, esp.
to change over the possession or control of," and "2. To sell or
give."126 These contemporary definitions, considered alone and in
comparison to the 1941 definitions, show that the meaning of "trans-
fer" is ambiguous and could refer to either temporary or permanent
exchanges. Because the meaning of transfer is ambiguous, the Chow
court should have engaged in a full analysis of the legislative intent
behind section 442 (d).127
B. The Court of Appeals's Holding is Inconsistent with the Legislative
Intent Behind Section 442(d) and Federal and State Gun
Control Policies
Because the meaning of the word "transfer" is ambiguous, the
Chow court had an obligation under the rules of statutory interpreta-
tion to fully consider the legislative history of section 442(d) and to
give effect to the legislative intent. 2  Not only did the Court of Ap-
peals engage in a cursory examination of the legislative history of sec-
tion 442(d), but it also misinterpreted the legislative intent.' 29 The
Chow court's holding also contravenes section 442(d)'s legislative in-
tent and federal and state gun control policy.130
1. The Court of Appeals Misinterpreted the Legislative History of
Section 442(d)
Had the Chow court fully considered the legislative history of sec-
tion 442(d), the court would have recognized that the legislature in-
tended for the Maryland Gun Violence Act and section 442(d) to
strictly regulate both temporary exchanges and sales of handguns in
the secondary market."' The Maryland General Assembly enacted
125. 18 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIoNARY 396 (2d ed. 1989).
126. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1536 (8th ed. 2004).
127. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text (explaining that when a statute is
deemed ambiguous, a court must consider the statutory purpose and statutory scheme).
128. Even if the Chow court found the meaning of "transfer" unambiguous, it had lati-
tude to look beyond the language of the statute; courts are free to do so when there is
some concern as to whether a literal interpretation of a statute would be inconsistent with
the legislative intent. Brown v. State, 359 Md. 180, 188-89, 753 A.2d 84, 88 (2000).
129. See infra Part IV.B.1.
130. See infra Part IV.B.2.
131. See supra Part II.B; see also Chow, 393 Md. at 474, 903 A.2d at 413 (Wilner, J., dissent-
ing) ("The provision in question was added to the law as part of what the Legislature called
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the Maryland Gun Violence Act, and more specifically section 442(d),
with the goal of reducing the gun violence epidemic in Maryland by
restricting handgun availability to prohibited persons.'31 2 According
to the legislature, this objective would be accomplished in part by sub-
jecting secondary sales and exchanges to the same requirements as
those applicable to dealers.' 3 3 These goals are consistent with other
state and federal handgun control measures which have endeavored
to lower violent crime by keeping certain individuals from obtaining
handguns and reducing the facilitated access to handguns."'
Despite contrary indications in the legislative history of 442(d),
the Chow court found that the purpose of the Act was to regulate only
permanent sales transactions, and not temporary exchanges. 135 The
court thus determined that a narrow construction of "transfer," in
which only permanent exchanges are included, met the intent of the
legislature.' 36 Such an interpretation is erroneous. The General As-
sembly indicated a desire to regulate more than just permanent ex-
changes, and to reduce the gun violence epidemic in Maryland, by
regulating all trafficking in the secondary market.13 7 Furthermore,
while admittedly there is some indication in the legislative history of
the Maryland Gun Violence Act that section 442(d) only pertains to
secondary or private sales, 138 there is also evidence that 442(d) was
intended to regulate more exchanges than just sales between individu-
als. 139 The Chow court failed to consider this evidence in reaching its
erroneous conclusion about the meaning of "transfer."
the Maryland Gun Violence Act of 1996, which was a comprehensive law designed to place
additional limits on the trafficking in regulated firearms.").
132. See supra Part I.B.
133. See supra Part II.B.
134. See supra Part II.C.
135. Chow, 393 Md. at 460-61, 903 A.2d at 405-06.
136. Id. at 461, 903 A.2d at 406.
137. See supra Part I.B.
138. See, e.g.,JUDICIARY COMM., supra note 54 (noting under the heading "Secondary or
Private Sales of Guns" that the bill "requires sales between individuals to be transacted in
the same way as are initial purchases from licensed gun dealers"); S. JuD. PROC. COMM.:
FLOOR REP., supra note 60, at 2 (same). But see BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 53 (noting under
the heading "7-Day Waiting Period-Secondary Sales" that the bill dictates that the waiting
period of seven days applies to any non-dealer "who sells, rents, transfers or purchases any
regulated firearm") (emphasis added).
139. See, e.g., MARYLAND GEN. ASSEMBLY DEP'T OF FISCAL SERVICES, FISCAL NOTE ON S.B.
215, at 1 (1996) (stating that the bill "[e]xtends to transactions between individuals the
requirement that a person receiving a firearm must complete a transfer application and is
subject to a seven-day waiting period") (emphasis added).
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2. The Court of Appeals's Holding Contradicts the Legislative Intent
of Section 442(d) and Federal and State Gun Control
Policies
Not only did the Chow court misinterpret the legislative intent of
section 442(d), its conclusion is inconsistent with federal and state
gun control policies of reducing violent crime by preventing certain
types of individuals from obtaining guns and limiting handgun availa-
bility. Specifically, as the Court of Special Appeals recognized, to limit
"transfer" to permanent exchanges potentially allows prohibited indi-
viduals to possess firearms.1 4 1 With the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 and the Gun Control Act of 1968, Congress
expressly prohibited certain categories of individuals from being sold
guns. 4 ' Maryland likewise banned certain categories of individuals
from obtaining and possessing handguns in 1941, 1966, and 2000.142
With the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Congress reiter-
ated its desire to prevent certain individuals from obtaining hand-
guns, this time establishing a waiting period and background check to
ensure that handguns are kept out of the hands of convicted felons
and other dangerous persons. 143 Having "transfer" only encompass
permanent exchanges means that temporary exchanges between indi-
viduals would not be subjected to the waiting period and background
check requirement. 144 This plainly undermines the policy behind the
140. Chow v. State, 163 Md. App. 492, 508-09, 881 A.2d 1148, 1158 (2005). The Court
of Special Appeals in Chow stated:
To read § 442(d) as exempting the loan of a regulated firearm would undermine
the laudable purpose of the legislative scheme. One cannot imagine that the
General Assembly intended the unrestricted shifting of possession of a regulated
firearm from one who lawfully possesses it to one who might not satisfy the re-
quirements for gun possession laid out in § 442(h).
Id.
141. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351,
§ 922(b)-(k), 82 Stat. 197, 230-31; Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat.
1213, 1220.
142. Act of June 1, 1941, § 531D, ch. 622, 1941 Md. Laws 1064, 1065; Act of June 1,
1966, ch. 502, 1966 Md. Laws 819, 834-35; Responsible Gun Safety Act of 2000, ch. 2, 2000
Md. Laws 6-7; see also supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
143. Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993); H.R. REP. No. 103-344, at 7-10, as
reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1984, 1984-87; 139 CONG. REC. H9098-99 (daily ed. Nov. 10,
1993); 139 CONG. REc. H8649, H8651 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1993) (statement of Rep. Schiff);
see also supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
144. This follows logically from the fact that section 442(d) mandates that purchases,
sales, rentals, and transfers not be consummated until an application has been completed
and seven days have passed. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 442(d) (1996). If "transfer" does
not include temporary exchanges, then temporary exchanges would not be subject to sec-
tion 442(d)'s requirements, including the waiting period, purchase application, and back-
ground check.
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Brady Act. Furthermore, by exempting prohibited individuals from
the waiting period and background check requirements, such individ-
uals might be able to obtain handguns more easily, because a legal
gun owner could transfer his handgun to another person without
knowing whether that person is legally allowed to possess a hand-
gun.' 4 5 By allowing temporary exchanges to take place without any
regulations, the Chow court has circumvented and impeded federal
and state attempts to decrease the rates of violent crime by keeping
handguns away from prohibited persons.
Moreover, the Chow court's narrow definition of "transfer" also
conflicts with the legislative intent behind section 442(d) and federal
and state gun control policies because its holding renders handguns
more easily accessible. Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act based on the belief that the ready availability of
handguns to criminals contributed to the high rates of violent crime
in the United States.' 4 6 Maryland also attempted to restrict the availa-
bility of handguns in 1972 by limiting the instances when individuals
are legally allowed to transport weapons. 14 7 The Chow court explicitly
undermined these goals and policies by making handguns more ac-
cessible, in particular, by allowing individuals to temporarily possess
handguns without complying with any statutory requirements.' 4 8
Without having to undergo a background check or waiting period,
prohibited individuals will have an easier time obtaining handguns.
The Chow court's holding, therefore, defies both the federal and Ma-
ryland gun control policies of reducing the facilitated access to
firearms.
C. The Court of Appeals's Holding is Likely to Have Negative Social
Implications
Beyond erroneously defining "transfer" '1 4 9 and contradicting leg-
islative intent and federal and state gun control policies,' the Chow
court's holding is likely to have harmful social consequences. The
145. Cf Chow, 393 Md. at 474, 903 A.2d at 413 (Wilner, J., dissenting) ("The purpose of
the waiting period [imposed on firearms dealers selling to individuals] was, and remains,
to give the Secretary an opportunity to make an investigation and determine whether the
prospective transferee is eligible to own and possess the weapon.").
146. Pub. L. No. 90-351, §§ 901 (a) (2), 922(a), 82 Stat. at 225.
147. Act of March 27, 1972, § 36B, ch. 13, 1972 Md. Laws 38, 40.
148. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (explaining how having "transfer" en-
compass only permanent exchanges means temporary transfers are not subjected to sec-
tion 442(d)'s requirements, including the waiting period and background check).
149. See supra Part W.A.
150. See supra Part IV.B.
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court's holding will undoubtedly hinder crime investigation"' and
impede gun control efforts.' 52 Most troubling, however, is that the
Chow court's holding will likely increase instances of violent crime.153
1. The Chow Court's Holding Will Hinder Crime Investigation
In holding that "transfer" does not encompass all exchanges, the
Chow court will make crime investigations substantially more difficult
by impairing gun tracing. A gun tracing system was first made possi-
ble with the 1968 Gun Control Act, as that Act required that firearms
be stamped with a serial number; that Federal Firearms Licensees,
manufacturers, and others record all transactions; and that records of
firearms transactions be transferred to the Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco, and Firearms.154 The Gun Control Act essentially established a
paper trail of gun transactions for gun tracers to follow.' 55 Gun trac-
ing is a significant aspect of crime investigation; such tracing may as-
certain the suspect of a crime or aid in building evidence against a
crime suspect. 56 Gun tracing has also contributed to research and
the general understanding of the channels by which criminals obtain
handguns. 1
57
The Chow court's holding that "transfer" only encompasses per-
manent exchanges will debilitate gun tracing, because temporary ex-
changes of handguns can take place without abiding by any of the
statutory requirements, including the filing of transactions
paperwork. 158 By allowing temporary handgun transactions to take
place without any records of the transactions, it will be nearly impossi-
ble to keep track of who owns or is merely borrowing a gun, thus
hindering effective crime investigation and research by making it im-
151. See infra Part IV.C.1.
152. See infra Part IV.C.2.
153. See infra Part IV.C.3.
154. Philip J. Cook & Anthony A. Braga, Comprehensive Firearms Tracing: Strategic and In-
vestigative Uses of New Data on Firearms Markets, 43 Ajuz. L. REV. 277, 277, 280 (2001).
155. Id.
156. See id. at 277-78 ("Best practice in a police investigation of a gun homicide or
assault often includes submitting the gun (if available) for tracing, in the hope of identify-
ing a suspect or developing the case against a suspect.").
157. Id. at 277.
158. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (explaining how construing "transfer" to
only encompass permanent exchanges means temporary changes are not subject to section
442(d)'s requirements); see also Anthony A. Braga et al., The Illegal Supply of Firearms, 29
CRIME & JusT. 319, 323 (2002) (explaining that private citizens can sell firearms under
federal law without keeping any records of the transactions).
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possible to determine who was in possession of a handgun used to
commit a crime.
15 9
2. The Chow Court's Holding Will Hamper Gun Control Efforts
Gun control as a whole will also be affected by the Chow court's
decision. The court's definition of "transfer" means that temporary
exchanges between individuals can legally take place without any re-
strictions, including the background check and waiting period.' 60
This result frustrates the legitimate efforts of legislatures and other
authorities in controlling access to handguns.' 6 ' Anyone could tem-
porarily give a gun to someone else without knowing whether the re-
cipient is prohibited by law from possessing a handgun. 2
The court's holding will also affect interstate gun control efforts.
The Chow court's interpretation of "transfer" weakens Maryland's
handgun regulations,' 63 thereby potentially increasing the interstate
trafficking of handguns and undercutting the handgun regulations of
other states.
1 64
Finally, the Chow court's definition of "transfer" could obstruct
the prosecution of individuals who transfer guns to prohibited per-
sons. Because an individual can only be prosecuted for selling a fire-
arm to a prohibited person if he knew that the purchaser was not
allowed to possess a handgun, and because Chow enables private citi-
zens to transfer firearms to others without doing background checks,
the Court of Appeals's decision could make it difficult to prosecute
countless temporary transferors. 65
159. See Braga et al., supra note 158, at 323 (explaining that one consequence of not
requiring private citizens to keep records of gun sales is that it makes it especially difficult
to trace the various transactions of a particular firearm recovered during a crime
investigation).
160. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (explaining how section 442(d)'s re-
quirements for transfer would not apply to temporary exchanges, because of the Chow
court's refusal to include temporary exchanges in its definition of "transfer").
161. See 139 CONG. REc. H9088, H9089 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1993) (statement of Rep.
Derrick) (arguing that the Brady Bill will prevent legally prohibited persons from ob-
taining handguns).
162. See supra notes 144-145 and accompanying text.
163. By only construing "transfer" to encompass permanent exchanges, the Chow court
has left temporary handgun exchanges unregulated.
164. Cf Braga et al., supra note 158, at 321 (explaining that a significant goal of federal
law is to keep one state's weaker handgun regulation laws from undermining another
state's more restrictive laws).
165. See id. at 323 (explaining that private citizens can sell firearms to others without
doing background checks, and consequently, prosecuting sellers for selling to prohibited
persons is very hard because such transactions are only illegal if the seller knew that the
firearm buyer was not allowed to possess the gun).
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3. The Chow Court's Holding Will Increase Incidents of Violent
Crime in Maryland
Long term, the Chow court's holding will likely increase the acts
of violence in a state which already has a very high murder and crime
rate,1 66 and thus detrimentally impact Maryland citizens. First, there
will undoubtedly be increased acts of violence because those not sub-
ject to the waiting period required in permanent gun exchanges-
meaning, individuals engaging in temporary exchanges-would not
have the corresponding benefit of having time to regain their compo-
sure and think logically before shooting someone on impulse.
1 67
Second, by overlooking the secondary market, the decision in
Chow makes it easier for criminals to obtain and use handguns in the
commission of violent crimes. Most criminals acquire handguns in
the secondary market.1 68 The Maryland General Assembly recognized
this very fact in the course of debating the Maryland Gun Violence
Act.169 Logically, then, many handguns that are used in the commis-
sion of violent crimes are obtained through secondary transactions.'
70
By excluding temporary exchanges from the definition of "transfer,"
the Court of Appeals has left a substantial amount of exchanges un-
regulated. This in turn makes handguns more accessible, especially to
166. In 2005, 552 individuals in Maryland were murdered, and there were 39,369 violent
crimes. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES (2005), http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/O5cius/data/table_05.html. This is a very high
murder rate when compared to other states' murder rates per 100,000 inhabitants-the
only other state with a comparable rate is Louisiana, which has the exact same murder rate
as Maryland. Id. Likewise, Maryland has a high violent crime rate when compared to other
states' violent crime rate per 100,000 inhabitants-only Florida and South Carolina have
higher violent crime rates. Id.
167. A waiting period could very well prevent upset or angry individuals from obtaining
a handgun and killing someone immediately. James B. Jacobs, Off Target: Gun Control Advo-
cates Miss the Point: Laws Won't Keep Guns Out of the Wrong Hands, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Jan.-Feb.
2003, at 18, 20; cf. 139 CONG. REC. H9088, H9089 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1993) (statement of
Rep. Derrick) (explaining that the waiting period required by the Brady Act "will save lives
by providing a cooling off period that will prevent handgun purchases in the heat of pas-
sion"). But see 139 CONG. REC. at H9092 (statement of Rep. Volkmer) ("There is no evi-
dence that a waiting period of any length . . . prevents violent crime. As a matter of fact
waiting periods of any length have not been effective.").
168. PhilipJ. Cook &Jens Ludwig, Principles for Effective Gun Policy, 73 FORDHAM L. REV.
589, 610 (2004);Jacobs, supra note 167, at 18; GeorgeJ. Thomas, The Brady Act, The Tenth
Amendment, and America's Gun Cult, 30 UWLA L. REV. 23, 59 (1999).
169. According to testimony before the Senate and House Committees, "[a] majority of
criminals obtain regulated firearms through the secondary sales market and 'straw
purchases.'" Briefing Statement, supra note 20, at 3.
170. See Thomas, supra note 168, at 59 (explaining that the majority of juveniles and
criminals acquire their handguns in the secondary market, and that most crimes are com-
mitted with those guns).
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criminals and juveniles, thereby increasing the number and intensity
of violent crimes that are committed in Maryland.'
7 1
D. The Court of Appeals Should Have Held That "Transfer" Includes
All More-Than-Momentary Handgun Exchanges
The court in Chow misinterpreted the common understanding of
the word "transfer,"' 72 contravened the legislative intent behind the
enactment of section 442(d), as well as federal and state gun control
polices, 73 and overlooked the negative social implications of its deci-
sion. 174 Thus, as Judge Wilner argued in dissent, it would have been
more accurate and reasonable for the Court of Appeals to have de-
fined "transfer" as any more-than-momentary exchange that takes
place between a gun owner and another individual.' 5 Such a defini-
tion is more consistent with both the intent of section 442(d) and
federal and state gun control policies, 176 supported by other provi-
sions of the Maryland Gun Violence Act, 177 and in harmony with a
federal definition of "transfer."
7 8
171. See PhilipJ. Cook et al., Regulating Gun Markets, 86J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 59, 62
(1995) ("While the widespread availability of guns in urban areas is not a 'root cause' of
violent crime, it significantly adds to the deadliness of that violence."); Hugh LaFollette,
Gun Contro4 110 ETHICS 263, 275 (2000) ("Perhaps the most well-established statistic is this:
the more widely available guns (especially handguns) are, the more people are mur-
dered."); Thomas, supra note 168, at 41 (explaining that easy access to guns intensifies
violence, and that reducing such access could reduce gun crime). But see Cook & Ludwig,
supra note 168, at 606 (claiming that the Brady Act, which imposed a background check,
has not had any effect on either homicides by use of guns or homicides generally); Cook et
al., supra, at 62 ("Effective control over the distribution of guns would have little effect on
the volume of assaults and robberies, but it would reduce the homicide rate.").
172. See supra Part [V.A.
173. See supra Part IV.B.
174. See supra Part V.C.
175. Chow, 393 Md. at 475, 903 A.2d at 414 (Wilner, J., dissenting) ("I would hold that
'transfer' includes a loan-at least one in which possession and control of the firearm is
relinquished for anything more than a momentary period."). A mere momentary ex-
change would not be illegal, because dominion or control over the weapon would have to
be surrendered for there to be a transfer. United States v. Hurd, 642 F.2d 1179, 1182 (9th
Cir. 1981).
176. See infra Part IW.D.1.
177. See infra Part IV.D.2.
178. See infra Part IV.D.3.
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1. A Broad Definition of "Transfer" Is More Consistent with the
Legislative Intent Behind Section 442(d) and with Federal
and State Gun Control Policies
The goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent
of the legislature.' 7 9 Holding that "transfer" refers to all more-than-
momentary exchanges that take place between individuals would ef-
fectuate the intent of the Maryland General Assembly in enacting sec-
tion 442(d). By the same reasoning, such a holding would be more
consistent with federal and state gun control policies.
As the Court of Special Appeals properly recognized, the legisla-
tive history of section 442(d) clearly signals that a broad definition of
"transfer" would be correct.1 80 The unmistakable purpose of section
442(d) was to reduce the gun violence epidemic in Maryland by re-
stricting the availability of handguns and preventing prohibited indi-
viduals from obtaining handguns.1 8 ' Moreover, the Maryland Gun
Violence Act and section 442(d) were meant to regulate both sales
and temporary exchanges in the secondary market.8 2 To properly
fulfill these goals, as well as to abide by federal and state gun control
policies, it is necessary to interpret "transfer" broadly and include tem-
porary exchanges within the definition.8 8 To read the word more
restrictively allows for many handgun exchanges to be unregulated.
184
Such a reading would not alleviate gun-related violent crimes in Mary-
land, and in fact, will probably increase it.'
8 5
On the other hand, had the Chow court appropriately interpreted
"transfer" broadly to include temporary exchanges-subjecting such
exchanges to the waiting period and background check require-
ments-the court could have reduced the gun violence epidemic, be-
179. E.g., Kushell v. Dep't of Natural Res., 385 Md. 563, 576, 870 A.2d 186, 193 (2005);
Collins v. State, 383 Md. 684, 688, 861 A.2d 727, 730 (2004); Deville v. State, 383 Md. 217,
223, 858 A.2d 484, 487 (2004); Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 387, 835 A.2d 1221, 1226
(2003).
180. See Chow v. State, 163 Md. App. 492, 506, 881 A.2d 1148, 1156 (2005) ("We con-
clude that attributing to the verb 'transfer' its ordinary meaning and reading the word in
context makes plain the intent of § 442(d). The statute prohibits, among other forms of
transfer, a loan of a regulated firearm without there first being compliance with the stat-
ute's requirement of an application and seven-day waiting period.").
181. See supra Part IV.B.
182. See supra Part IV.B.
183. Chow, 163 Md. App. at 509, 881 A.2d at 1158.
184. See supra Part IV.B; see also Chow, 163 Md. App. at 506, 881 A.2d at 1156 ("Indeed, a
construction of § 442(d) that does not include the loan of a regulated firearm could result
in a complete end-run around the statute. The General Assembly could not have intended
such an absurd result.").
185. See supra Part IV.C.3.
[Voi,. 66:10411064
CHOW V. STATE
cause prohibited individuals will surely be screened through
background checks."8 6  Additionally, by interpreting "transfer"
broadly to include temporary exchanges, and by regulating all ex-
changes within the secondary market, gun control could be more ef-
fective, and facilitated access to handguns could be reduced. 8 7 Such
regulation would not only be consistent with the intent of the Mary-
land General Assembly in enacting section 442(d),' but would also
bolster federal and state gun control policies.
189
2. Maryland Gun Violence Act Provisions Support a Broad
Interpretation of "Transfer"
Although "transfer" is not defined within Article 27, section
442,"' it is possible to discern the intended meaning of this word by
examining other provisions of the Maryland Gun Violence Act. In
that Act, the Maryland General Assembly broadened the situations in
which firearm dealers were required to accept applications and apply
the seven-day waiting period; the statute was extended to firearm rent-
als, in addition to sales and transfers by dealers.' As Judge Wilner
noted, the legislative history indicates that the purpose of this exten-
sion was to close a loophole in the previous statute, whereby individu-
als could buy firearms and then rent them to others without
completing a background check. 19
2
Likewise, the General Assembly included the word "rent" in its
proposed section 442(d).l"3 The legislature's intentions to curb rent-
als by dealers and individuals logically extends to temporary ex-
changes between individuals, as a rental is essentially a temporary
186. Cf 139 CONG. REC. H9088, H9089 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1993) (statement of Rep.
Derrick) (arguing that the Brady Bill will prevent persons who are not permitted under the
law to have handguns from obtaining them). The implementation of the Brady Act and its
background check requirement has already resulted in the rejection of a substantial num-
ber of applications, and has prevented countless prohibited individuals from obtaining
firearms. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BACKGROUND CHECKS
FOR FIREARMS TRANSFERS, 2002 (2003), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/bcftO2.pdf.
("Since the inception of the Brady Act (the interim provisions went into effect on March 1,
1994), nearly 46 million applications for firearm transfers have been checked, of which
976,000 were rejected, a rejection rate of 2.1%.").
187. See Thomas, supra note 168, at 48 (arguing that regulating the secondary market
for handguns would effectively control handgun movement).
188. See supra Part II.B.
189. See supra Part II.C.
190. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 442 (1996).
191. BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 53.
192. Chow, 393 Md. at 474-75, 903 A.2d at 414 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
193. S.B. 215, 1996 Leg., 412th Sess. (Md. 1996); H.B. 297, 1996 Leg., 412th Sess. (Md.
1996).
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exchange, with consideration. Because the only difference between a
rental and a temporary loan of a firearm is that a rental includes con-
sideration, the policy implications for regulating rentals and tempo-
rary exchanges are essentially the same. It would therefore have been
more reasonable to have "transfer" cover temporary exchanges.
3. Congress's Construction of "Transfer" Dictates that "Transfer"
Refers to All More-Than-Momentary Exchanges
Federal law similarly favors a construction of "transfer" that en-
compasses temporary exchanges. Because federal law can be consid-
ered when applying Article 27, section 442,' it is possible to consult
federal law to define "transfer" in the context of section 442(d). Such
a comparison supports the argument that "transfer" should be broadly
construed to encompass all exchanges, including temporary ones.
Part of the federal Gun Control Act of 1968 provided for the im-
position of taxes on the making and transferring of firearms.1"5
Among other things, the Act dictated that a firearm is not to be trans-
ferred until several conditions are met, including the filing of a trans-
fer application; the identification within the application of the
transferor and the transferee of the firearm; and the payment of any
applicable taxes.1 96 The definition section states that "[t]he term
'transfer' and the various derivatives of such word, shall include sell-
ing, assigning, pledging, leasing, loaning, giving away, or otherwise dis-
posing of.' 9 7  Based on this definition, Congress has broadly
construed "transfer" to cover a variety of exchanges. Since a federal
law, which addresses the making, use, and exchanging of handguns,
and which frequently uses the word "transfer" throughout its text, 19 8
has defined transfer to refer to all exchanges, and because federal law
can be considered in applying the provisions of Article 27, section
442,' the word "transfer" in section 442(d) should likewise be con-
strued broadly to encompass temporary exchanges.20 0
194. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Berg, 342 Md. 126, 139, 674 A.2d 513, 519 (1996).
195. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213, 1227-36.
196. Id. at 1228.
197. Id. at 1232 (emphasis added).
198. See id. at 1227-36.
199. See Berg, 342 Md. at 139, 674 A.2d at 519.
200. While the federal Gun Control Act did not explicitly include gratuitous temporary
exchanges within the meaning of "transfer," it did include the "loaning" of firearms, which
has essentially the same meaning as a temporary gratuitous exchange. See supra Part
IV.D.3.
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V. CONCLUSION
In Chow v. State, the Court of Appeals held that the word "trans-
fer," as used in Article 27, section 442(d), refers only to permanent
exchanges of handguns between individuals, and thus the temporary
exchange that took place between Chow and his friend was not a viola-
tion of section 442(d).201 With this holding, the court erroneously
concluded that "transfer" clearly and unambiguously refers only to
permanent exchanges. 20 2 More significantly, however, the court's
holding is contrary to the legislative intent behind section 442 (d) and
federal and Maryland gun control policies. 20 3 In addition, the court's
holding will likely hinder crime investigation, impede gun control ef-
forts, and increase the prevalence of violent crimes.20 4 Hence, the
Court of Appeals should have instead held that "transfer" encom-
passes all more-than-momentary exchanges.20 5
JENNIFER H. STINNETTE
201. Chow, 393 Md. at 462-63, 903 A.2d at 406-07.
202. See supra Part IV.A.
203. See supra Part IV.B.
204. See supra Part IV.C.
205. See supra Part IV.D.
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BYNDLOSS v. STATE: EXPANDING AN OFFICER'S
INVESTIGATIVE OPPORTUNITIES DURING A TRAFFIC STOP
AT THE EXPENSE OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S FREEDOM
In Byndloss v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered
whether a thirty-minute detention resulting from an initially valid traf-
fic stop was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.2 The court
held that the detention was reasonable in scope because the detaining
officer diligently pursued the license, registration, warrant, and crimi-
nal history checks that were delayed by a computer malfunction.' As a
result, the court refused to suppress evidence obtained in the interim
because it found that the initial purpose of the stop had not yet been
fulfilled.4 Therefore, the court determined that the conduct of the
officer and the duration of the detention did not taint the discovery of
narcotics during the delay.5
In so holding, the Court of Appeals failed to fully consider Fourth
Amendment precedent and thus misinterpreted the scope limitations
of a reasonable traffic stop.6 In particular, the court improperly ana-
lyzed the scope limitations as applied to the officer's actions7 and the
duration of the stop.' As a result, the court's decision threatens the
constitutionally protected rights of individuals to be free from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, sets a confusing standard for lower
courts, and sanctions the use of delay tactics to support other investi-
gative desires.9
I. THE CASE
On November 19, 2003, at 10:58 a.m., Sergeant Clifford Hughes
pulled over a vehicle because its plastic license plate cover partially
obstructed the registration tags.' ° When Sergeant Hughes called in
the stop, an officer at the College Park police barrack advised him
that the system to check the driver's license, vehicle registration, out-
Copyright © 2007 by Melissa L. Bilchik.
1. 391 Md. 462, 893 A.2d 1119 (2006).
2. Id. at 478-79, 893 A.2d at 1129.
3. Id. at 479, 893 A.2d at 1129.
4. Id. at 476-77, 893 A.2d at 1128.
5. Id. at 479, 893 A.2d at 1129.
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See infra Part IV.A.
8. See infra Part IV.B.
9. See infra Part IV.C.
10. Byndloss, 391 Md. at 468-69, 893 A.2d at 1123.
1068
BYNDLOSS V. STATE
standing warrants, and criminal history was temporarily down."
While waiting for the system to begin working, Sergeant Hughes pro-
ceeded to the front passenger side window of the car and obtained the
license and registration of the driver, Joan Henry Malone, and the
license of the passenger, Orlando Byndloss.' 2
Sergeant Hughes had a brief conversation with Malone in which
she stated that she was traveling from Florida to New York. 3 Malone
offered to remove the plastic cover from the license plate, but Ser-
geant Hughes replied that it was too dangerous for her to do that on I-
95.14 Sergeant Hughes later noted that Malone seemed nervous and
shaky during this interaction. 5 Sergeant Hughes then returned to his
vehicle, called for a canine unit, and wrote a warning for the license
plate cover. 6 Although Sergeant Hughes finished writing the warn-
ing, he decided not to give it to Malone.' 7
At 11:08 a.m., Sergeant Hughes called the College Park barrack
again and was informed that the system was still down."s He was told
to call the Rockville or Forestville barrack where the systems were
working. 9 Instead, Sergeant Hughes called the Waterloo barrack and
was informed that he would receive a call back with the results of the
license and warrant checks. 20
While waiting for the checks, Sergeant Hughes went back to Ma-
lone's car, ordered her to step out, and explained that she could not
leave until he learned the results of the checks.21 Sergeant Hughes
then questioned Malone again about where she was going, how long
she would be there, and the amount of luggage in her vehicle.22
Once again, Sergeant Hughes noted that Malone appeared nervous,
shaking, and was even crying at certain moments. 23
At 11:19 a.m., the College Park dispatcher called Sergeant
Hughes to inform him that the canine handler was having trouble
11. Id. at 469, 893 A.2d at 1123.
12. Id. at 469-70, 893 A.2d at 1123-24.
13. Id. at 470, 893 A.2d at 1124.
14. Id. at 469, 893 A.2d at 1124.
15. Id. at 470, 893 A.2d at 1124.
16. Id.
17. Id. Hughes pointed out Malone's nervousness to the other police officer on the
scene and indicated that he wanted to talk to her further. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 470-71, 893 A.2d at 1124.
21. Id. at 471, 893 A.2d at 1124-25.
22. Id., 893 A.2d at 1125.
23. Id. Sergeant Hughes also noted that Malone's answers about her trip were incon-
sistent with previous answers. Id.
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finding him on the highway, but was on the way.24 Immediately after
hanging up, and again at 11:23 a.m., Sergeant Hughes called the Wa-
terloo barrack to inquire about the status of the checks.25 Both times
the barrack told him to continue to wait.26 Sergeant Hughes asked
Malone if she would like to wait in his vehicle, and she agreed. 27 After
explaining to Malone that he was still awaiting the results of the
checks, Sergeant Hughes asked her whether there were "any weapons,
narcotics, untaxed cigarettes, contraband, [or] currency" in the vehi-
cle, to which Malone responded that there were none.
28
At 11:26 a.m., the canine team arrived and the dogs immediately
began to sniff the vehicle.29 One minute later, the Waterloo barrack
called and told Sergeant Hughes that Byndloss, the passenger, had an
extensive criminal background.3 ° At 11:30 a.m., over thirty minutes
after Sergeant Hughes made the initial stop, the dog gave a positive
"sit alert" indicating the presence of narcotics in the vehicle.3 The
officers conducted a search of the vehicle and discovered approxi-
mately two kilograms of cocaine in a suitcase in the trunk.3 2 Byndloss
and Malone were subsequently arrested for possession of drugs with
the intent to distribute. 3
Following his arrest, Byndloss moved to suppress the evidence re-
covered during the search of the vehicle on the ground that his deten-
tion exceeded the length necessary to effectuate the traffic stop,
thereby violating his Fourth Amendment rights.34 Byndloss argued
that the traffic stop surpassed the reasonable time it should take an
officer to complete the various checks, and a second detention began
that required independent justification to be valid.35 Without such
justification, Byndloss claimed, the canine sniff and subsequent dis-
covery of narcotics were invalid.36
24. Id. at 472, 893 A.2d at 1125.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. From approximately 11:10 to 11:20 a.m., while Sergeant Hughes was making
phone calls, Malone stood outside of her vehicle alongside 1-95. Id. at 471, 893 A.2d at
1124-25.
28. Id. at 472, 893 A.2d at 1125.
29. Id.
30. Id. The Waterloo barrack did not report on Malone's criminal history or the li-
cense, registration, and warrant checks of Malone or Byndloss. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 472-73, 893 A.2d at 1125-26.
33. Id. at 473, 893 A.2d at 1126.
34. Byndloss v. State, 162 Md. App. 286, 299-300, 873 A.2d 1233, 1241 (2005).
35. Byndloss, 391 Md. at 478 & n.14, 893 A.2d at 1129 & n.14.
36. Id. at 479, 893 A.2d at 1129.
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The Circuit Court for Prince George's County denied the mo-
tion, reasoning that there was no second detention because Sergeant
Hughes diligently pursued the initial justification for the stop. 37 The
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the trial court's ruling,
finding that the duration of the detention was reasonable to complete
the necessary procedures of the traffic stop.3 8 Byndloss appealed the
decision, and the Court of Appeals granted certiorari to determine
whether a prolonged detention caused by a computer malfunction is
unreasonable in scope, and if so, whether the officer had the requisite
justification to validate a second detention.3 9
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,4" pro-
vides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated."4 1 The purpose of the Fourth Amend-
ment is to safeguard individuals against unreasonable governmental
invasions of their privacy."2 Thus, the Supreme Court of the United
States has held that stopping an automobile for a traffic violation is
within the meaning and protection of the Fourth Amendment.4 3
Traffic stops, like other warrantless seizures, are subject to a two-prong
standard: (1) the purpose of the stop must be justified;44 and (2) the
scope of the stop must be reasonable.4 5 However, when the scope of
the stop is exceeded, a second detention ensues that must be indepen-
dently warranted.4 6
A. The Contours of a Permissible Traffic Stop Under the Fourth
Amendment
The Supreme Court first considered the legitimacy of a warrant-
less seizure in Terry v. Ohio.4 7 In Terry, a police officer observed Terry
37. Byndloss, 162 Md. App. at 290, 297, 873 A.2d at 1236, 1240.
38. Id. at 314-15, 873 A.2d at 1250-51.
39. Byndloss, 391 Md. at 478-79 & n.14, 893 A.2d at 1129 & n.14.
40. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV; see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (noting that
the Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment).
41. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
42. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
43. See infra Part II.A.
44. See infra Part 1I.B.
45. See infra Part II.C.
46. See infra Part II.C.
47. 392 U.S. at 4.
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and another man engaging in suspicious behavior on the sidewalk
outside of a department store, leading the officer to believe that they
were planning to commit a robbery.4" The officer approached Terry
and asked him several questions.49 Based on his prior observations
and Terry's answers, the officer frisked the outside of Terry's clothing,
fearing that he may be armed.5" During the frisk, the officer found a
pistol and arrested Terry for carrying a concealed weapon."
The Terry Court identified the officer's encounter with Terry as a
"seizure"-restraining a person's freedom of movement under cir-
cumstances where a reasonable person would not feel free to leave.52
To constrain law enforcement officials from conducting unreasonable
seizures, the Court articulated a two-prong test for a constitutional
seizure: first, the officer's action must be 'Justified at its inception,"
and second, the action must be "reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."5
The Court in Terry explained that if either of these requirements are
violated, the court must enforce the exclusionary rule and suppress
the evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
54
Seven years later, in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,5 5 the Supreme
Court considered for the first time whether a traffic stop is a seizure
that implicates the Fourth Amendment.56 In Brignoni-Ponce, a police
officer stopped the defendant while conducting roving patrols of the
Mexican border.57 The government asserted that the police had au-
thority to randomly stop any car near the border to determine
whether it contained illegal aliens or was involved in smuggling opera-
tions.58 However, the Court disagreed, and applied Terry to conclude
that a traffic stop is a seizure protected by the Fourth Amendment
because the occupant of the vehicle has been restrained by a police
officer and does not feel free to walk away.59 The Court held that
48. Id. at 6.
49. Id. at 6-7.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 7.
52. Id. at 19 n.16.
53. Id. at 19-20.
54. Id. at 28-29. The exclusionary rule is a judicial device used to enforce a defen-
dant's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures; it
mandates that any evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be ex-
cluded. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961) (explaining that the exclusionary rule
began as a "deterrent remedy").
55. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
56. Id. at 874.
57. Id. at 874-75.
58. Id. at 877.
59. Id. at 877-78.
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stopping cars on a random basis, absent justification, was unreasona-
ble.60 Thus, Brignoni-Ponce established that a traffic stop must be rea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment, and an officer's actions
during the stop are subject to the constraints of Terry.6 '
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court continued to follow
Brignoni-Ponce62 and further added that a person has an expectation of
privacy in their vehicle, and that such expectation is one that society
recognizes as reasonable.63 The Court therefore clarified that be-
cause a traffic stop is more analogous to a detention than an arrest, it
is analyzed under the seizure limitations in Terry.6 4 Thus, a traffic stop
must be: (1) 'Justified at its inception," and (2) "reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first
place."65
B. Terry's First Prong: The Justification Required to Initiate a Traffic
Stop
Less than four years after Brignoni-Ponce, the Supreme Court clari-
fied the nature of a constitutional traffic stop in Delaware v. Prouse.6 6
In Prouse, a police officer stopped the defendant's vehicle to check his
driver's license and registration.6" As he approached the vehicle, the
officer smelled marijuana; when he reached the car window, the of-
ficer seized marijuana that was in plain view.68 The police officer ad-
mitted that he had not witnessed any suspicious activity or a traffic
infraction to warrant the stop, but that in his mind, the stop was
"routine.""
In determining whether the automobile stop was justified, the
Prouse Court noted that under the first prong of Terry, courts must
analyze whether there was pre-existing, sufficient evidence to justify
the stop.70 The Prouse Court explained that probable cause will justify
the initiation of a traffic stop,71 adding that most traffic stops are sub-
60. Id. at 883.
61. Id. at 881-82.
62. See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985); Berkemer v. McCarty,
468 U.S. 420, 436-37 (1984).
63. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662-63 (1979).
64. Id. at 653.
65. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968).
66. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653-54.
67. Id. at 650.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 650-51.
70. Id. at 661 (citing Tery, 392 U.S. at 22).
71. The Prouse Court added that "articulable and reasonable suspicion" may also justify
the initiation of a traffic stop. Id. at 663. The standard of "reasonable articulable suspi-
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stantiated by probable cause because, typically, the officer witnesses a
traffic infraction. 72 Thus, in Prouse, the Court held that because the
police officer randomly stopped the defendant to check his license
and registration without sufficient justification, the seizure was unrea-
sonably intrusive.73
After the Prouse decision, scholars argued that given the high oc-
currence of traffic infractions, and the fact that virtually anyone could
be stopped, there should be guidelines to limit law enforcement au-
thority to conduct traffic stops. 7 4 However, more than fifteen years
later in Whren v. United States,v5 when given an opportunity to restrict
an officer's broad ability to conduct a traffic stop, the Supreme Court
refused to do SO. 7 6 In Whren, plain-clothes officers patrolling an area
known for high drug activity stopped the defendant for failing to use
his signal when changing lanes. 7 When the officer approached the
vehicle, he immediately observed drugs in plain view.78 The defen-
dant argued that this was a "pretextual stop. '79 Unconcerned with
pretext, however, the Court opined that an officer's subjective motiva-
tion for the stop is irrelevant so long as the temporary detention was
justified at its inception by the belief that the driver committed a traf-
fic infraction.8"
The Supreme Court has since interpreted Whren to suggest that
an officer may stop a car to investigate possibilities of criminal activity
if the officer has reason to initially detain the vehicle and the seizure is
not prolonged." Maryland courts interpret Whren similarly. 82 How-
cion" was described in Teny as a lower standard than probable cause, requiring that the
police officer has a rational inference, based upon articulable and specific facts that rea-
sonably warrant a belief that criminal activity is afoot. 392 U.S. at 21.
72. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659.
73. Id. at 663.
74. 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIzuRE 366 (4th ed. 2006).
75. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
76. Id. at 813.
77. Id. at 808.
78. Id. at 808-09.
79. Id. at 810-11. A "pretextual stop" refers to the use of a traffic infraction to legally
detain the occupant of a vehicle in order to pursue other "investigatory agendas." Id. at
811.
80. Id. at 813. The Court rejected the defendant's argument that without stricter regu-
lation, a police officer could seek to catch any person in a traffic violation for the purpose
of investigating other criminal conduct. Id.
81. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38 (1996).
82. See, e.g., Pryor v. State, 122 Md. App. 671, 679, 716 A.2d 338, 342-43 (1998) (find-
ing it unnecessary to consider the officer's subjective intent in conducting a traffic stop);
Whitehead v. State, 116 Md. App. 497, 500, 698 A.2d 1115, 1116-17 (1997) (noting that a
police stop of a defendant who committed a traffic infraction was lawful even though the
officer's true intention was to investigate the defendant's involvement in drug trafficking).
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ever, while allowing broad flexibility in initiating a traffic stop, Mary-
land courts also caution officers to use careful discretion. For
example, in Charity v. State,83 the Court of Special Appeals stated that
police officers must exercise the discretion permitted by Whren with
self-control and temperance, warning that if it is ever abused, courts
may restrict such conduct.84 Thus, because Whren does not implicate
a pretextual or arbitrary traffic stop under the first prong of Terry,
courts have focused on the second prong of Terry-the stop must be
reasonably related to the initiating purpose-when balancing law en-
forcement needs and an individual's right to privacy.85
C. Terry's Second Prong: Reasonableness of the Scope of the Stop
In Florida v. Royer,8 6 the Supreme Court clarified the second re-
quirement in Terry, that the stop be reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances that justified the initial interference.87 The Royer Court
held that to satisfy the scope prong, a seizure must be no longer than
necessary to complete the purpose of the stop, and the investigation
should be the least intrusive means to confirm or dismiss the officer's
suspicion.88 In Royer, two narcotics detectives seized the defendant at
the Miami International Airport based on suspicions that he was a
drug courier.89 The detectives questioned the defendant, requested
his airline ticket and license, and subsequently moved him to an inter-
rogation room that was about forty feet away.9" During the seizure,
detectives received consent from the defendant to search his luggage,
where they found marijuana.9
The Royer Court affirmed the lower court's decision to suppress
the evidence, holding that the defendant's consent was tainted be-
cause it was given during the course of a seizure that was unreasonable
in scope.92 It explained that the detectives' conduct-in particular,
their questions and their decision to move the defendant to another
room-was more intrusive than necessary to effectuate the purpose of
83. 132 Md. App. 598, 753 A.2d 556 (2000).
84. Id. at 601-02, 753 A.2d at 558.
85. Cf State v. Ofori, 170 Md. App. 211, 235, 906 A.2d 1089, 1102 (2006) (noting that
while the law indulges such investigative opportunism, it is necessary to minimize the de-
gree of exploitation).
86. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
87. Id. at 500; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (setting forth scope limits).
88. Royer, 460 U.S. at 500.
89. Id. at 493.
90. Id. at 494.
91. Id. at 494-95.
92. Id. at 507-08.
2007] 1075
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
the stop." In doing so, the Court in Royer established two inquiries to
analyze the scope prong: (1) the nature of the officer's conduct; and
(2) the duration of the stop.94
A traffic stop that exceeds the scope of a permissible seizure,
whether due to an officer's excessive actions during the stop or due to
an unreasonably long duration, becomes a "second detention"95 that
is only permissible with independent justification.96 In Maryland, the
Court of Special Appeals first examined the notion of a "second de-
tention" in Snow v. State.97 In Snow, an officer stopped a driver for
speeding, yet continued to detain the driver after issuing a warning so
that he could conduct a canine scan.98 The Snow court explained that
because the purpose of the initial traffic stop was complete when the
officer scanned the vehicle, the driver was actually stopped twice: once
for speeding, and once to scan the vehicle.99 Therefore, the court
held that under Teny's second prong, if either the officer's actions or
the stop's length is excessive, a second seizure ensues as an additional
intrusion upon the driver's Fourth Amendment rights.100
1. The Nature of the Officer's Actions During a Traffic Stop
When a police officer stops an automobile because the driver vio-
lated a traffic law, the nature of the officer's actions during the result-
ing detention must be limited to the enforcement of that law.' 0 '
Accordingly, there are certain actions that a police officer is justified
in undertaking during the course of a traffic stop, as they are reasona-
bly related to the initial purpose of the stop.' °2 When the scope limit
93. Id. at 504-05.
94. Id. at 500.
95. See Pryor v. State, 122 Md. App. 671, 680-81, 716 A.2d 338, 343 (1998) (explaining
the concept of a second detention); see also State v. Green, 375 Md. 595, 610, 826 A.2d 486,
495 (2003) (stating that a second detention is permissible when the officer obtains the
driver's consent, thereby establishing an independent justification).
96. The independent justification necessary for a second detention must be different
from the justification that satisfied the initial detention, typically stemming from either
reasonable articulable suspicion or consent. See, e.g., Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 372-73,
735 A.2d 491, 499-500 (1999) (finding that a prolonged traffic stop was invalid absent
additional and independent justification). For an explanation of reasonable articulable
suspicion, see supra note 71.
97. 84 Md. App. 243, 578 A.2d 816 (1990).
98. Id. at 246-48, 578 A.2d at 817-18.
99. Id. at 267, 578 A.2d at 827.
100. Id., 578 A.2d at 827-28.
101. See, e.g., Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 372, 735 A.2d 491, 499 (1999) (restricting the
scope of a seizure to only the necessary elements required by the investigation of a traffic
infraction).
102. See infra Part I.C.l.a.
1076 [VOL. 66:1068
BYNDLOSS V. STATE
was first invoked, any expansion of the traffic stop to include investiga-
tion of other illegal activity was prohibited unless independently justi-
fied. 3 However, as Fourth Amendmentjurisprudence evolved in the
1990s, the scope limitation similarly expanded, and courts have been
more inclined to hold certain actions, seemingly outside the scope of
the stop, permissible.' °4 Thus, while there still exists a limit on the
nature of an officer's actions, over the past two decades a police of-
ficer has been given much more discretion in broadening the scope of
the stop.
a. The Limited Scope of Terry: Conduct Deemed Reasonably
Related to the Circumstances Justifying a Traffic Stop
During a typical traffic stop, a police officer has the authority to
complete license and registration checks on the driver of the vehicle,
ask a few customary questions, and issue a warning or traffic cita-
tion.10 5 In Prouse, the Supreme Court found that checking the driver's
license and registration is a reasonable action during a traffic stop.'0 6
The Court explained that the state has an interest in ensuring that
drivers are qualified and permitted to operate the car and that the
vehicle itself is safe for operation. 1 7 Thus, the Prouse Court held that
so long as the driver is legally detained for a traffic stop, the officer is
permitted to request a license and registration.' 8
Similarly, an officer may pose limited questions related to the
traffic infraction and the driver's travel plans. 0 9 Furthermore, an of-
ficer may choose to either issue a warning or a traffic citation based on
103. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (stating that the scope of the stop must
be related to the purpose of the initial intrusion).
104. See infra Part II.C.l.b-c.
105. United States v. Daniel, 804 F. Supp. 1330, 1334 (D. Nev. 1992).
106. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979); see also Wilkes v. State, 364 Md. 554,
578, 774 A.2d 420, 434 (2001) (holding license and registration checks permissible). Pro-
visions in the Maryland Transportation Code explicitly permit the police to demand pro-
duction of a driver's license or registration card. MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. §§ 13-409,
16-112 (LexisNexis 2006). However, a police officer is not typicallyjustified in demanding
identification from the passenger of an automobile at the outset of a traffic stop. See, e.g.,
State v. Rankin, 92 P.3d 202, 207 (Wash. 2004) (en banc) (explaining that under the state
constitution, an officer exceeds the permissible scope and the seizure is unlawful if he asks
a passenger for identification for the purpose of conducting a criminal investigation).
107. P/rouse, 440 U.S. at 658.
108. Id. at 663.
109. See, e.g., United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per
curiam) (stating that the permissibility of an officer's questions relating to the reason for
the traffic stop are "beyond dispute" and that these questions may also include inquiry into
the driver's travel plans).
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the initial reason for the stop." The above actions fall within the
scope limits of Tery because they are reasonably related to the circum-
stances that justified the traffic stop in the first place.'11
b. Expanding the Scope of Terry: Conduct That is Permissible
Even Though Not Reasonably Related to the Circumstances
Justifying the Traffic Stop
Courts have acknowledged that while specific conduct-such as
ordering a passenger out of the vehicle or requesting warrant and
criminal history checks-is unrelated to the purpose of the stop, it still
falls within the scope limits of the Fourth Amendment for the purpose
of officer safety. For example, in Maryland v. Wilson,1" 2 the Supreme
Court held that law enforcement officers may order the driver and
passengers out of the vehicle."' Likewise, many courts hold that war-
rant checks 1 4 and criminal history checks 1 5 are permissible.
11 6
Courts have justified this conduct as a general safety precaution for all
traffic stops."' 7
Similarly, while a canine sniff is not directly related to a traffic
infraction, the Supreme Court recently held it constitutionally permis-
sible." 8 In Illinois v. Caballes,"9 the Court ruled that canine sniffs of
110. Berkermer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 & n.26 (1984).
111. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968) (setting forth limitations regarding the
scope of the stop).
112. 519 U.S. 408 (1997).
113. In Wilson, a police officer asked a passenger to exit the vehicle while detaining the
driver for a speeding violation. Id. at 411. The Court reasoned that the inherent dangers
to an officer in conducting traffic stops outweigh the limited intrusion upon the passenger
to temporarily exit the vehicle. Id. at 414-15.
114. See Wilkes v. State, 364 Md. 554, 578, 774 A.2d 420, 434 (2001) (holding that a
warrant check is reasonable); United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2001)
(same). Courts have nevertheless found warrant checks impermissible when used as a fish-
ing expedition or delay tactic. See, e.g., People v. Cobb, 690 P.2d 848, 853 (Colo. 1984) (en
banc) (remanding to determine whether a prolonged detention was due to awaiting the
results of the warrant check, or if the detention was prolonged only for the purpose of
getting identification).
115. See Jones, 269 F.3d at 924 (stating that a criminal history check is permissible). But
see United States v. Finke, 85 F.3d 1275, 1280 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a bright-line rule
permitting criminal history checks because they often take longer than license and warrant
checks, potentially causing the scope of a stop to become unconstitutional).
116. See, e.g., United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1221-22 (10th Cir. 2001) (explaining
that by conducting criminal history and warrant checks, an officer is better prepared to
know whether the driver may engage in violent actions toward the officer); see also United
States v. Gonzalez, 763 F.2d 1127, 1130 (10th Cir. 1985) (allowing checks because they can
be completed quickly, with reasonable certainty).
117. Holt, 264 F.3d at 1221-22.
118. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (holding that a canine sniff is
reasonable).
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vehicles detained during lawful traffic stops are permissible because
they do not implicate the Fourth Amendment. 120 The Court relied
upon United States v. Place,12 1 which held that a canine sniff of luggage
was not a search that implicated the Fourth Amendment because it
did not infringe on the individual's constitutionally protected interest
in privacy. 122 Applying Place, the Court in Caballes found that a canine
sniff is not a search that violates the driver's reasonable expectation of
privacy because it is conducted in public and the nature of the intru-
sion and the type of information revealed is limited. 123
c. The Future Expansion of Terry: Conduct that is Potentially
Permissible Depending Upon the Jurisdiction, Even Though
Not Reasonably Related to the Circumstances
Justifying the Traffic Stop
While Supreme Court precedent allows an officer to pose ques-
tions to the driver that directly relate to the purpose of the stop, 1 24
federal circuit courts are split with regard to the permissibility of ques-
tions unrelated to the purpose of the stop. 125 Additionally, the Su-
preme Court has yet to directly rule on the issue of unrelated police
questioning. 26 Some courts have analyzed the acceptability of these
questions by solely focusing on the temporal element of the stop and
not interpreting the inquiries required by Royer-the nature of the
officer's actions and the duration of the stop-to include an analysis
of whether the questions related to the stop. 127
119. 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
120. Id. at 408-09.
121. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
122. Id. at 707. Place involved, in relevant part, whether a seizure of the defendant and
his luggage, followed by a canine sniff of the luggage, was reasonable where the officer had
reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the initial seizure. Id. at 697-98.
123. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408-09; see also Wilkes v. State, 364 Md. 554, 569, 774 A.2d 420,
429 (2001) (holding that a canine sniff that occurred during the scope of a traffic stop was
reasonable).
124. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498
(1983).
125. See United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 951-52, 954 (7th Cir. 2002) (recognizing
the split in federal circuit courts); 6 CirM. PRtc. GuIDE 15-16 (2005) (same).
126. See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 35-36 (1996) (declining to address the
permissibility of the police officer's questions); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435-36
(1991) (basing its ruling on whether questions constitute a seizure, not on whether unre-
lated questions asked during a seizure are permissible).
127. Specifically, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits focus on the duration of the stop rather
than the nature of the officer's questions. See, e.g., Childs, 277 F.3d at 953-54 (focusing
only on whether the duration of the stop was valid and rejecting other circuits' scope tests).
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For example, in United States v. Shabazz,128 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that questions unrelated to the
purpose of the traffic stop do not violate Terry's scope prong. In
Shabazz, an officer who pulled a car over for speeding questioned the
driver about his recent whereabouts while running a license and regis-
tration check.129 Simultaneously, another officer posed similar ques-
tions to the passenger. 130 The court reasoned that because the
questions were asked while awaiting the results of the checks, the
questions did not prolong the duration of the stop and therefore were
permissible. 3' Shabazz and its progeny take the position that the key
element to Terry's second prong is duration, and the nature of the
officer's actions are only considered if they delay the length of the
stop.13 2 Thus, under Shabazz, the Fifth Circuit views the duration of
the stop as the crux of the scope limitation.'33
In contrast, other courts interpret Terry as requiring an analysis of
the questions themselves and whether they reasonably relate to the
purpose of the stop.'3 4 These courts rule that certain questions
outside the scope of the stop may be impermissible even if conducted
before the original purpose of the stop is complete."3 5 For example,
128. 993 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1993).
129. Id. at 433.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 437.
132. Shabazz, 993 F.2d at 436-37. In rejecting the argument that the type of questions
asked by the officer were outside the scope, and concentrating on the duration of the stop,
the Shabazz court stated that the detention was reasonable because the purpose of the
stop-issuing a speeding ticket-was ongoing when the questions were asked. Id. at 437.
133. !d. at 436-37.
134. See, e.g., People v. Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d 260, 269 (Ill. 2003) (citing Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)) (citing Royer for the notion that if police were allowed to ques-
tion the driver on issues totally unrelated to the traffic stop, a balancing of the competing
interests would be moot, and thus the scope of questioning must be considered); Mitchell
v. United States, 746 A.2d 877, 888-89 & n.18 (D.C. 2000) (rejecting Shabazz and analyzing
both the duration and the nature of the officer's questions). For example, the Eighth,
Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have rejected Shabazz, holding instead that asking un-
related questions is off-limits because it exceeds the scope requirement. See infra note 139
and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1223 (D. Kan.
2004) (ruling that where the officer questioned the driver on unrelated issues, the scope
became impermissible, regardless of the fact that the duration of questioning did not ex-
tend the normal length of a traffic stop); State v. Syhavong, 661 N.W.2d 278, 281 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2003) (stating that a question regarding contraband was not related in scope to
the purpose of the traffic stop-a broken tail light-and thus the stop was unreasonable);
Maxwell v. State, 785 So. 2d 1277, 1279 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that an officer's
questions during a stop, which included whether he had drugs and weapons, and where he
worked, had nothing to do with the purpose of the stop and were most likely intended as a
fishing expedition).
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in United States v. Holt,136 the Tenth Circuit held that asking a motorist
if he had a weapon, when the officer stopped the motorist for failing
to wear his seatbelt, could only be justified if the officer had a legiti-
mate safety concern.13 7 According to the court in Holt, any other type
of question unrelated to the traffic stop would likely be outside the
scope of the seizure.'
3 8
Similarly, the Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that
questions unrelated to the purpose of the stop are impermissible with-
out independent justification.' 39 In United States v. Murillo,14 ° the
Ninth Circuit opined that the requirements of Terry demand that an
officer's questions be related in scope to the purposes of the traffic
stop.1 4 1 In Murillo, in addition to asking the defendant questions
about where he was going, the officer asked questions relating to
whether the defendant had alcohol, drugs, or weapons in the car.'4 2
The Ninth Circuit stated that such questions exceeded the scope of
the stop absent independent justification to expand the permissible
bounds of questioning. "'
In Maryland, the Court of Appeals has not acknowledged the fed-
eral circuit split on the issue of permissible police questioning; how-
ever, the Court of Special Appeals has held that an officer's unrelated
questions exceeded the scope limits.' 4 4 Specifically, in Charity, the
court held that a traffic stop was unreasonable in scope where the
officer engaged in a narcotics-related investigation that included ask-
ing questions unrelated to the purpose of the stop.1 4 5 The court ex-
plained that an officer's actions during the course of an ongoing stop
must be closely tied to the purpose of the stop; the stop should not be
136. 264 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam).
137. The Holt plurality rejected Shabazz and its reasoning. Id. at 1229.
138. Id. at 1230.
139. See, e.g., United State v. Murillo, 255 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that an
officer is only permitted to ask questions reasonably related in scope to the purpose for the
traffic stop); United States v. Pruitt, 174 F.3d 1215, 1221 (11th Cir. 1999) (same); United
States v. Ramos, 42 F.3d 1160, 1162-63 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding an officer's questions
regarding the presence of drugs or guns to be outside the scope of a traffic stop). But see
United States v. Boyce, 351 F.3d 1102, 1111 (11th Cir. 2003) (refusing to determine
whether the Fifth or Tenth Circuit test is controlling in the Eleventh Circuit).
140. 255 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2001).
141. Id. at 1174.
142. Id. at 1173.
143. Id. at 1174.
144. See Charity v. State, 132 Md. App. 598, 622-23, 753 A.2d 556, 569 (2000).
145. Id. at 618, 622, 629, 753 A.2d at 566-67, 569, 573. The Charity court also analyzed
the officer's state of mind and his intentions when considering whether his actions ex-
ceeded the scope of the stop. Id. at 622-23, 753 A.2d at 569.
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unreasonably attenuated.' 46 It reasoned that if the only limit placed
on the officer was time, he could justify any conduct imaginable so
long as he did so within the timeframe of a typical traffic stop, and
thus the Fourth Amendment would have no limits.' 47 Therefore, the
Charity court looked closely at the officer's actions, including the ques-
tions he asked to the motorist, 148 to determine whether they were
outside the scope of the stop.
149
2. The Permissible Duration of a Traffic Stop
As established in Florida v. Royer, in addition to limits on the na-
ture of the officer's conduct, the duration of a traffic stop must also be
constrained to satisfy the scope restrictions. 5 0 After Royer, however, in
United States v. Sharpe,151 the Supreme Court rejected an absolute time
limit for traffic stops. In Sharpe, an officer for the Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) on patrol in an area suspected of drug activity became
suspicious of a Pontiac and a pick-up truck, driving in tandem on the
highway.' 52 While the DEA agent pulled over the Pontiac, he radioed
to another police officer to pull over the pick-up truck. 5 ' The officer
detained the driver of the pick-up truck for twenty minutes while
awaiting the arrival of the DEA agent.
54
The Sharpe Court considered whether the twenty-minute seizure
of the driver of the pick-up truck exceeded the permissible dura-
tion. 1 55 The Court explained that although time itself is a factor when
evaluating the reasonableness of the duration of the detention, the
focus should be on whether the purpose of the stop is complete and if
the officer acted diligently in completing that purpose. 156 The Court
in Sharpe observed, however, that when evaluating diligence, a court
should not engage in second-guessing, but should instead consider
146. Id. at 614-15, 753 A.2d at 565.
147. Id. at 615-16, 753 A.2d at 565-66.
148. The Charity court maintained that the officer's questions had nothing to do with
enforcing the speed limit, but rather were asked to justify a narcotics investigation. Id. at
622, 753 A.2d at 569.
149. See id. at 622-23, 753 A.2d at 569 (stating that the officer's questions had nothing to
do with the purpose of the stop).
150. 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
151. 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
152. Id. at 677.
153. Id. at 677-78.
154. Id. at 678-79.
155. Id. at 683.
156. Id. at 686. Justice Brennan wrote a strong dissent decrying the outward expansion
of the brevity requirement for law enforcement needs, and insisting that the threshold
consideration must be the intrusiveness of the length of the stop. See id. at 703-04 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
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whether an officer acted unreasonably in failing to pursue alternative,
less intrusive means.1 5 7 The Court found that the DEA agent was dili-
gent, as he did not unreasonably fail to pursue less intrusive means; he
called other officers for assistance and proceeded to the pick-up truck
as expediently as possible-any extra delay was due almost entirely to
the evasive actions of the defendant.15 Additionally, the Court ex-
plained that it was reasonable for the officer to hold the defendant,
rather than release him before the arrival and consent of the DEA
agent.159 Therefore, the Sharpe Court held that the duration of the
stop was reasonable with regards to the scope limitation. 60
Maryland courts have followed Sharpe by evaluating the diligence
of an officer with respect to the durational limits of the stop. Specifi-
cally, Maryland courts determine whether the officer acted diligently
through the point at which the initial purpose of the stop con-
cluded.161 In Wilkes v. State,162 the Court of Appeals emphasized the
importance of analyzing the reasonable duration of each stop on a
case-by-case basis. 161 In Wilkes, an officer stopped a car for speeding
and while awaiting the results of a license, registration, and warrant
check, asked the driver background questions and conducted a ca-
nine sniff of the vehicle.164 The sniff of the vehicle occurred within
five minutes of when the officer initially stopped the vehicle and re-
sulted in the discovery of drugs.1 65 The court affirmed the introduc-
tion of evidence that resulted in the defendant's conviction, reasoning
that the officer did not delay the traffic stop to pursue the investiga-
tory canine search, but rather the search was complete before the of-
ficer received the results of the license and registration checks. 166
157. Id. at 687 (majority opinion).
158. Id. at 687-88. The fact that the defendant was the primary cause for the delay may
have been determinative in the Court's holding. See, e.g., United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d
1491, 1503 (10th Cir. 1996) (applying the exclusionary rule when a dispatcher's error re-
sulted in a Fourth Amendment violation).
159. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 687 n.5.
160. Id. at 688.
161. See, e.g., Wilkes v. State, 364 Md. 554, 576-77, 774 A.2d 420, 433 (2001) (rejecting
strict time limits and instead focusing on diligence and purpose); Charity v. State, 132 Md.
App. 598, 617, 753 A.2d 556, 566 (2000) (same).
162. 364 Md. 554, 774 A.2d 420 (2001).
163. Id. at 576, 774 A.2d at 433; see also Charity, 132 Md. App. at 617, 753 A.2d at 566
(requiring a case-by-case analysis of a traffic stop for Fourth Amendment purposes).
164. Wilkes, 364 Md. at 570, 572, 774 A.2d at 429, 431.
165. Id. at 573, 576, 774 A.2d at 431, 433.
166. Id. at 569, 582, 774 A.2d at 429, 437; cf Charity, 132 Md. App. at 620-21, 753 A.2d at
568 (holding that an officer who continued to investigate a vehicle for two hours before
issuing a traffic citation impermissibly delayed the termination of the stop to investigate
matters unrelated to the traffic infraction).
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The Wilkes court focused on the fact that the officer acted diligently to
complete the stop, and his investigatory measures did not prolong the
stop more than necessary to issue a traffic citation.'67 Thus, the court
held that the stop was in accordance with the scope limitations of the
Fourth Amendment. 168
Although Sharpe stated that the focus of the duration inquiry
should be the officer's diligence in completing the purpose of the
stop, it also acknowledged that time itself is an important factor. 169 As
such, to effectively evaluate an officer's diligence in completing the
purpose of the stop, Maryland courts also focus on the time an aver-
age traffic stop should take. 7 ' For example, in Pryor v. State, 7' the
Court of Special Appeals held a traffic stop to be unreasonable in du-
ration because it took longer than necessary for the officer to check
the status of the driver's license and registration and to issue a cita-
tion. Because the officer continued to detain the driver for twenty-five
minutes while awaiting the arrival of a canine unit, the court held that
the stop violated the Fourth Amendment.'72
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In Byndloss v. State, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment
of the Court of Special Appeals and held that the thirty-minute deten-
tion of Byndloss, a car passenger, during a traffic stop was reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.'73 The Byndloss court found that the
length of the detention was reasonable because the officer exercised
diligence in obtaining license, registration, and warrant information
from the malfunctioning computer system, and the purpose of the
initial stop was still ongoing when the canine sniff identified the pres-
ence of narcotics.174 Writing for the majority, Judge Cathell first ac-
knowledged that the stop and detention of Byndloss was a seizure that
implicated the protections of the Fourth Amendment.'75 However,
the court explained that because the initial stop was undisputedly
167. Wilkes, 364 Md. at 577, 582, 774 A.2d at 434, 437.
168. Id. at 576-77, 774 A.2d at 433-34.
169. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685-86 (1985).
170. See, e.g., Carter v. State, 143 Md. App. 670, 692, 795 A.2d 790, 803 (2002) (analyzing
the reasonable time a traffic stop should take); Wilkes, 364 Md. at 575, 774 A.2d at 432-33
(noting that a factor to consider is how long a traffic stop lasts).
171. 122 Md. App. 671, 716 A.2d 338 (1998).
172. Id. at 678, 716 A.2d at 342.
173. Byndloss, 391 Md. at 478-79, 893 A.2d at 1129-30.
174. Id. at 479, 893 A.2d 1129-30.
175. Id. at 479-80, 893 A.2d at 1130.
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valid, 176 the crux of the case rested upon whether the prolonged de-
tention of Byndloss was unreasonable, thereby tainting the subsequent
recovery of narcotics.
177
The court acknowledged the bright-line rule established in State
v. Green that once the purpose of the initial stop is accomplished, a
continued detention amounts to a second detention that is impermis-
sible unless the person consents or the officer has reasonable articul-
able suspicion for the second seizure. 178 However, the court
explained that here, the purpose of the initial stop was not completed
when the canine unit arrived and discovered narcotics, and thus a sec-
ond stop never ensued. 179 Therefore, the court found it unnecessary
to consider whether independent justification-such as consent or
reasonable articulable suspicion-existed to validate a second
detention. 80
In reaching its conclusion that there was not a second detention,
the court acknowledged the Supreme Court's refusal to impose rigid
time limits on traffic stops.8 1 The court observed that while time is
one factor to consider, courts should focus on whether the police dili-
gently pursued their investigation.'" 2 Relying on Wilkes v. State, the
court deemed it reasonable for an officer to conduct license, registra-
tion, and warrant checks while issuing a traffic citation.8 3 The court
further explained that although there was a delay in processing the
checks, the computer malfunction was the cause of the delay, not Ser-
geant Hughes."8 4 Rather, the majority found, Sergeant Hughes was
diligent in communicating with the police barracks and he did not
purposely prolong the stop to accommodate the arrival of the canine
unit.8 5 Therefore, the court held that the canine search was permissi-
176. Id. at 481,893 A.2d at 1130. The court explained that Sergeant Hughes had proba-
ble cause to stop the vehicle due to the plastic license plate cover. Id.
177. Id. at 482, 893 A.2d at 1131.
178. Id. at 483, 893 A.2d at 1132 (quoting State v. Green, 375 Md. 595, 610, 826 A.2d
486, 495 (2003)).
179. Id. at 484, 893 A.2d at 1132.
180. Id. at 478 & n.14, 893 A.2d at 1129 & n.14.
181. Id. at 484, 893 A.2d at 1132.
182. Id. at 485, 893 A.2d at 1133. The Byndloss court emphasized that courts should
explore whether the officer unreasonably failed to recognize or pursue less intrusive
means, rather than simply point out the existence of alternative or less intrusive means to
conducting a detention. Id. at 484, 893 A.2d at 1133.
183. Id. at 486-87 & n.20, 893 A.2d at 1133-34 & n.20 (quoting Wilkes v. State, 364 Md.
554, 578-79, 774 A.2d 420, 434-35 (2001)).
184. Id. at 489, 893 A.2d at 1136.
185. Id. at 491-92, 893 A.2d at 1136-37.
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ble because it occurred while Sergeant Hughes diligently pursued the
initial traffic stop.
1 6
ChiefJudge Bell, in a dissentjoined by Judge Greene, argued that
the prolonged seizure was unreasonable and violated Byndloss's
Fourth Amendment rights because Sergeant Hughes lacked both dili-
gence and a reasonable suspicion in conducting the stop."8 7 Chief
Judge Bell maintained that according to case law, Byndloss was de-
tained longer than it should reasonably take an officer to check the
license, registration, and warrant information. 8 Further, the dissent
emphasized that such checks are not even required when the com-
puter system is down. 8 9 Criticizing the majority for misinterpreting
precedent, Chief'Judge Bell contended that the court's decision jeop-
ardizes the balance of an individual's right to privacy with the state's
legitimate interests by validating delay as a technique to turn traffic
stops into drug investigations absent justification.190 He concluded
that Sergeant Hughes expanded the scope of the stop in time and
manner, and did not have sufficient reasonable articulable suspicion
tojustify a second stop.191 Thus, the dissent would have held that the
prolonged detention was unreasonable, and thus the narcotics that
were discovered should have been suppressed.
19 2
IV. ANALYSIS
In Byndloss v. State, the Court of Appeals held that the prolonged
detention of a passenger in a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation was
reasonable because the officer acted diligently in completing the pur-
pose of the stop despite a computer malfunction. 9 ' In its analysis of
the permissible scope of a traffic stop, the court departed from prece-
dent in two ways. First, the court neglected to consider whether the
officer's actions during the course of the stop were reasonably related
186. Id. at 492, 893 A.2d at 1137.
187. Id. at 493, 893 A.2d at 1138 (Bell, CJ., dissenting).
188. Id. at 495, 497, 893 A.2d at 1139-40.
189. Id. at 497, 893 A.2d at 1140.
190. Id. at 502-03, 893 A.2d at 1143-44.
191. Id. at 493, 501, 893 A.2d at 1138, 1143.
192. Id. at 504, 893 A.2d at 1144.
193. Id. at 469, 479, 893 A.2d at 1123, 1129-30 (majority opinion). There was no dis-
pute that the initial traffic stop was valid, as Sergeant Hughes had probable cause to believe
that Malone, the driver, committed a traffic infraction. Id. at 481, 893 A.2d at 1130; see also
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 655 (1979) (noting that an officer may validly detain a
driver if he has probable cause); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975)
(acknowledging that an officer, short of probable cause, may still be justified in detaining a
driver).
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to the circumstances initially justifying the detention. 194 Second, the
majority mischaracterized the duration of the stop by failing to con-
sider whether the officer deliberately caused a delay by his actions.19 5
In misevaluating the permissible scope of a traffic stop, the court
failed to identify the completion of the first stop and the initiation of a
second detention requiring independent justification.196 As a result,
the court set a confusing precedent and reduced an individual's right
to privacy and freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures
while unconstitutionally broadening the state's interests in law
enforcement.1
97
A. The Court Failed to Analyze Whether the Officer's Actions Were
Within the Scope of the Traffic Stop
The Byndloss court disregarded an essential element in its pur-
ported effort to apply Tery v. Ohio.t"' The court solely analyzed scope
by looking at whether the officer's actions delayed the completion of
the stop."9' Rather, the court should have considered whether the
officer's actions altered or departed from the nature of the stop at any
point during the detention.2"' If the court had properly analyzed this
element of the scope prong, it would have found that Sergeant
Hughes's questions were unrelated to the scope of the stop and there-
fore prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.2"'
The Byndloss court should have analyzed the actions of Sergeant
Hughes as mandated by the Supreme Court in Florida v. Royer. 2 In
194. See infra Part W.A.
195. See infra Part IV.B.
196. See infra Part IV.C.
197. See infra Part IV.C.
198. See People v. Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d 260, 268-69 (Ill. 2003) (refusing to disregard
the scope requirement as other courts have inappropriately done).
199. Compare United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682, 685 (1985) (eliminating the
bright-line test for duration, but continuing to require that an officer's actions be narrowly
tied to the purposes of the stop), with Byndloss, 391 Md. at 489, 893 A.2d at 1135 (conclud-
ing that the scope of the stop was sufficiently related to the initial intrusion because the
purpose of the stop was not yet fulfilled).
200. See, e.g., United States v. Pruitt, 174 F.3d 1215, 1221 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding that
an officer's questions departed from the purpose of the stop, which was based on a traffic
infraction); Gonzalez, 789 N.E.2d at 270 (evaluating an officer's actions and the questions
he asked in determining whether he exceeded the scope of a traffic stop).
201. Cf John F. Decker et al., Curbing Aggressive Police Tactics During Routine Traffic Stops
in Illinois, 36 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 819, 863-64 (2005) (explaining that in recent decisions,
Illinois appellate courts have narrowly construed questions asked during traffic stops and
found many of them to alter, and thus prolong the nature of the stop).
202. Compare Byndloss, 391 Md. at 489, 893 A.2d at 1135 (focusing on the duration of the
stop), with Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 504-06 (1983) (examining each action of the
officer to determine if the officer exceeded the scope of the stop at any point).
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Royer, the Court required that all aspects of the stop be reasonably
related to its underlying justification, analyzing each of the officer's
actions to determine whether he exceeded the justifiable scope.2 °8 In
Byndloss, on the other hand, the court only required that the officer's
conduct not delay the completion of the stop.20 4 Thus, it ignored the
officer's conduct throughout the thirty-minute detention, relying on
the fact that the computer malfunction caused the delayed issuance of
the citation.2 °5
The Byndloss court failed to recognize that scope, as explained in
Royer, pertains to not only the length of the detention, but also the
questioning that occurs throughout the stop.20 6 The Supreme Court
in Royer specifically identified the officer's actions and the duration of
the stop as two separate elements of the scope prong.2°7 Instead of
applying Royer, the Byndloss court inappropriately relied on the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Shabazz for the proposition that the scope of the
stop is reasonable so long as the police investigative tactic occurs
before the purpose of the stop is complete.20 8
In Byndloss, the Court of Appeals adopted the flawed reasoning of
United States v. Shabazz.2°9 Shabazz relied upon a statement in Florida v.
Bostick21° that "mere police questioning does not constitute a
seizure. '"21 However, Shabazz misinterpreted this statement to mean
that police questioning someone detained during a traffic stop is rea-
sonable because it is even less intrusive than questioning a random
203. 460 U.S. at 494-95, 500.
204. Byndloss, 391 Md. at 489, 893 A.2d at 1135.
205. For example, the court relied upon United States v. Shabazz for the notion that be-
cause the investigation occurred while the officer awaited the results of the computer
check, it was permissible police procedure. Byndloss, 391 Md. at 486-87 n.20, 893 A.2d at
1133-34 n.20.
206. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 500 (considering an officer's actions in addition to the dura-
tion of the stop). In discussing these requirements, the Royer Court separated scope and
detention, stating that the detention must be temporary and that the investigative methods
must be the "least intrusive means . . . to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion." Id. The
Court continued to say that the prosecution bears the burden to establish that the stop was
"limited in scope and duration." Id.
207. Amy L. Vazquez, Comment, "Do You Have Any Drugs, Weapons, or Dead Bodies in Your
Car?" What Questions Can a Police Officer Ask During a Traffic Stop?, 76 TtL. L. REv. 211, 226
(2001).
208. See Byndloss, 391 Md. at 486-87 n.20, 893 A.2d at 1133-34 n.20 (discussing the
Shabazz holding).
209. Id. But see, e.g., United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1229 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding
the reasoning employed by the Shabazz court "unpersuasive"); People v. Gonzalez, 789
N.E.2d 260, 268-69 (Ill. 2003) (disagreeing with the holding in Shabazz).
210. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
211. Id. at 434.
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pedestrian who is not considered "seized. ' 212 However, the Supreme
Court in Bostick-which analyzed whether the police could board a
bus and randomly ask questions to the passengers-did not attempt to
answer the question posed by Shabazz: whether police questioning that
is unrelated to the purpose of a traffic stop constitutes a violation of
the scope limitations of the Fourth Amendment.213 Bostick does not
control the issue of permissible police questioning of a seizure that is
already taking place, but rather applies to the questioning of a person
not already detained. 214 Thus, because traffic stops are custodial en-
counters, the scope of the stop must adhere to the limitations im-
posed by Teny and Royer.
2 15
Although the Court of Appeals of Maiyland has never directly
ruled on the permissibility of unrelated questions during the traffic
stop, applying the Shabazz standard disposes of an essential element of
Teny's scope prong.216 The court in Byndloss should have considered
persuasive authority interpreting Royer as requiring analysis of both
the duration of the stop and the permissibility of the officer's ac-
tions.2 1 7 Specifically, the Byndloss court should have followed the
Court of Special Appeals's approach in Charity v. State.2 1 The Charity
court aptly cautioned that without any restraints, a creative officer
could always find a reason to delay a stop and incorporate unrelated
investigative conduct before the stop is complete. 2 9 Thus, the court
212. See United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 1993). But see Holt, 264
F.3d at 1229 (discrediting the reasoning in Shabazz).
213. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435-36 (determining whether an officer's questions to pas-
sengers aboard a bus constitute a seizure); see also Holt, 264 F.3d at 1229 (stating that the
Supreme Court in Bostick did not rule on the permissibility of police questions during an
already valid seizure); Mitchell v. United States, 746 A.2d 877, 889 (D.C. 2000) (noting that
Bostick did not address the constitutionality of questions asked by an officer during a non-
consensual traffic stop). But see United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 951 (7th Cir. 2002)
(agreeing with the reasoning of Shabazz, and interpreting Bostick to permit questions dur-
ing the course of a traffic stop).
214. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435-36; Holt, 264 F.3d at 1229; Mitchell, 746 A.2d at 889.
215. See, e.g., Holt, 264 F.3d at 1229-30 (recognizing that the Supreme Court's frame-
work in Tery and Royer applies to traffic stops).
216. See Byndloss, 391 Md. at 486-87 n.20, 893 A.2d at 1133-34 n.20 (applying the
Shabazz standard); see also Holt, 264 F.3d at 1228 (explaining that to follow Shabazz would
mean to abandon the "scope" limitations of Teny).
217. See supra note 134 and accompanying text; see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,
500 (1983) (emphasizing that the prosecution bears the burden of proving a short dura-
tion and limited intrusiveness).
218. See 132 Md. App. 598, 615-16, 753 A.2d 556, 565-66 (2000) (requiring an analysis
of the officer's actions and the duration of the stop).
219. Id.
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in Charity properly limited police actions that deviate from the pur-
pose of the traffic stop.22°
If the Byndloss court had appropriately followed Royer's interpreta-
tion of the scope prong of Terry, it would have limited Sergeant
Hughes's questions to only those related to the original purpose of
the stop: an obstructed license plate.221 In United States v. Murillo, the
Ninth Circuit held the exact same questions that Sergeant Hughes
asked regarding alcohol, weapons, and drugs to be outside the scope
of the traffic stop.2 2' Likewise, the Byndloss court should have held
that Sergeant Hughes's questions regarding Malone's possession of
luggage, contraband, guns, and money were unrelated in scope to the
traffic infraction and thus required independent justification to be
permissible.223 However, in failing to find that Sergeant Hughes's ac-
tions exceeded the scope limits of the traffic stop, the Byndloss court
never considered whether Sergeant Hughes had justification to per-
missibly broaden the scope of the stop.224
B. The Court's Analysis of the Duration of the Stop Mischaracterized the
Sergeant's Actions as Diligent
Just as the nature of the officer's actions can violate the Fourth
Amendment, so too can an excessively long seizure. In addition to
ignoring the nature of Sergeant Hughes's actions and instead focus-
ing solely on the length of the stop, the court's evaluation of the dura-
tion was flawed.22 5 The Byndloss court mischaracterized Sergeant
Hughes's actions as diligent rather than deliberately delayed. 226
While noting that it should analyze the diligence of the officer, the
court failed to fully explore Sergeant Hughes's available alternatives,
220. Id. at 629, 753 A.2d at 573; see also State v. Rankin, 92 P.3d 202, 207 (Wash. 2004)
(en banc) (explaining that under the state constitution, an officer has exceeded the per-
missible scope and the seizure is unlawful if he asks a passenger for identification in order
to conduct a criminal investigation); People v. McGraughran, 601 P.2d 207, 213 (Cal.
1979) (en banc) (holding that a warrant check was not reasonably related to the purpose
of stop and therefore was unreasonable).
221. See supra notes 135-139 and accompanying text.
222. See 255 F.3d 1169, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that questions regarding drugs
and alcohol were impermissible unless the officer had reasonable suspicion that would
enable him to broaden the scope of the traffic stop).
223. See id.; see also supra notes 141-143 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 179-180 and accompanying text.
225. See infra Parts IV.B.1-3.
226. See Byndloss, 391 Md. at 479, 893 A.2d at 1129 (finding that Sergeant Hughes "exer-
cised reasonable diligence under the circumstances"); see also Whitehead v. State, 116 Md.
App. 497, 506-07, 698 A.2d 1115, 1119-20 (1997) (refusing to affirm the lower court's
decision that a stop was valid because, in part, the officer did not pursue the traffic stop
diligently).
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disregarded an analysis of the surrounding circumstances, and ne-
glected to consider the typical time that a traffic stop takes.
1. An Incomplete Evaluation of the Alternatives
The Byndloss court neglected to analyze whether Sergeant
Hughes acted unreasonably in failing to take other actions to prevent
the prolonged detention. The court conceded that although it
should not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing of the Sergeant's
actions, it should consider whether the officer acted unreasonably in
failing to recognize or pursue alternative methods to expedite the
stop.227 Despite recognizing this standard, however, the court failed
to actually implement it.228 In doing so, the court ignored the Su-
preme Court's decision in United States v. Sharpe, which considered the
diligence of the detaining officer who held a driver for fifteen minutes
while awaiting the arrival of an investigating DEA agent.2 29 In evaluat-
ing alternatives, the Sharpe Court examined whether it was unreasona-
ble that the officer did not release the driver before the delayed
arrival and consent of the DEA agent.2 0
In contrast to Sharpe, however, the Byndloss court failed to address
a similar available alternative: whether Sergeant Hughes should have
ended the stop after writing the warning, and allowed Malone and
Byndloss to leave. 31 While license, registration, warrant, and criminal
history checks are permissible, 232 there is no statutory or agency re-
quirement that a police officer conduct such checks during the course
of a traffic stop, let alone that the officer wait for the results of such
checks when the computer systems are not working properly. 233 If the
227. Byndloss, 391 Md. at 484, 893 A.2d at 1132-33.
228. See id. 491-92, 893 A.2d at 1137 (dismissing quickly Byndloss's argument that Ser-
geant Hughes should have called other barracks to inquire about the records check).
229. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 687-88 & n.5 (1985) (analyzing the rea-
sonableness of available alternatives). Similarly, in United States v. Alpert, the Fourth Circuit
analyzed alternatives. See 816 F.2d 958, 963 (4th Cir. 1987) (exploring whether it was un-
reasonable that an officer failed to pursue two potentially faster alternatives when he con-
ducted a canine scan).
230. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 687 n.5. The Sharpe Court concluded, however, that it was not
unreasonable for the officer to detain the driver while waiting for the DEA agent to arrive,
and additionally, that the delayed arrival was mostly attributable to the actions of the
driver. Id. at 687-88 & n.5.
231. See Byndloss, 391 Md. at 487, 893 A.2d at 1135 (noting that Sergeant Hughes was
informed that the Waterloo barrack was experiencing delays).
232. United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2001).
233. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., TRANsp. §§ 13-409, 16-112 (LexisNexis 2006) (permitting
an officer to request the driver's license and registration, but not requiring such checks);
MD. STATE POLICE, PATROL MANUAL, ch. 24, § 1, subsecs. F-C, & ch. 25, § IV, subsecs. A-C
(2d ed., rev. vol. 2000) (failing to set forth any requirements regarding license, registra-
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court had considered this point, it could have found that Sergeant
Hughes's decision to wait for the results, rather than conclude the
stop, was unreasonable because he did not know how long the delay
would be given that the system was down.2 34 Alternatively, the court
could have found that although the decision to wait for the results was
unreasonable, Sergeant Hughes had sufficient independent justifica-
tion, such as reasonable articulable suspicion or consent, to permissi-
bly prolong the stop into a second detention.235 However, the
Byndloss court neglected to analyze either of these possibilities. 236
The Byndloss court also failed to evaluate whether it was unreason-
able that Sergeant Hughes did not contact any other barracks for assis-
tance with the computer search. 23 7 During the stop, Sergeant Hughes
learned that the Waterloo barrack was experiencing delays and was
not told when he would receive results.238 The court should have as-
sessed Sergeant Hughes's reasons for not calling another barrack that
may have had immediate access to its computers, and whether failing
to act on that alternative was unreasonable.23 9
Additionally, the Byndloss court neglected to consider whether it
was unreasonable that Sergeant Hughes did not cancel the criminal
history check when he realized that the system was significantly
tion, warrant, or criminal history checks); see also Byndloss, 391 Md. at 497, 893 A.2d at 1140
(Bell, CJ., dissenting) ("It is worth noting that there is no requirement that a trooper must
complete a record check when the computer is down.").
234. See, e.g., United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1503 (10th Cir. 1996) (applying
the exclusionary rule when the dispatcher's error resulted in a Fourth Amendment viola-
tion); United States v. Gonzalez, 763 F.2d 1127, 1130 (10th Cir. 1985) (pointing out that
officers have instant access to computer checks when discussing their reasonable use dur-
ing traffic stops); People v. Cobb, 690 P.2d 848, 852-53 (Colo. 1984) (en banc) (remand-
ing for determination as to whether the prolonged detention was due to awaiting the
results of the warrant check, or if the detention was prolonged only to obtain identifica-
tion). Of additional importance in Byndloss is that the dispatcher never sent Sergeant
Hughes the results of Malone's license, registration, warrant, or criminal history check.
391 Md. at 487-88, 893 A.2d at 1135.
235. See, e.g., State v. Ofori, 170 Md. App. 211, 244-45, 906 A.2d 1089, 1108 (2006)
(holding that even though the prolonged traffic stop on its own violated the duration
limits of the scope prong, it was permissible because the officer developed reasonable ar-
ticulable suspicion to await the arrival of the canine unit).
236. See supra notes 179-180 and accompanying text.
237. See Byndloss, 391 Md. at 491-92, 893 A.2d at 1137 (addressing whether Sergeant
Hughes should have called another barrack when he first stopped the vehicle but not
analyzing whether it was unreasonable that he did not call another barrack at any point
during the thirty-minute seizure).
238. Id. at 487, 893 A.2d at 1135.
239. See id. at 491-92, 893 A.2d at 1137 (maintaining that Sergeant Hughes was diligent
because he called the Waterloo barrack twice to check on the status of the requested infor-
mation, but failing to address whether Sergeant Hughes should have pursued alternative
measures).
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delayed, as it was possible that the criminal history check was a further
cause of that delay.2"" Although most courts have found that a crimi-
nal history check is an acceptable element of a traffic stop, they ac-
knowledge that it has the potential to cause additional and
inexcusable delay.241' For example, in United States v. Purcell,24 2 the
Eleventh Circuit discussed the permissibility of conducting a criminal
history check on the detained driver of a traffic violation. 243 Refusing
to create a bright-line rule, the court held the stop permissible under
the circumstances, finding that the check did not add an additional
amount of time to the simultaneously requested license and registra-
tion checks.24 4 The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Purcell is not di-
rectly applicable to the facts in Byndloss;24 5 nevertheless, in failing to
address the question, the court ignored a possible alternative available
to Sergeant Hughes: the option of canceling the criminal history re-
quest in order to accelerate the stop.24 6 Thus, the court did not fully
analyze whether it was unreasonable for Sergeant Hughes to disregard
these alternatives.
2. A Failure to Account for the Surrounding Circumstances
The Byndloss court disregarded the surrounding circumstances
when analyzing Sergeant Hughes's diligence. Although Whren v.
United States clarified that a police officer's subjective intent in stop-
ping a vehicle is not relevant as to the permissibility of the initial
stop,247 intent should nevertheless be considered when determining
240. See, e.g., United States v. Finke, 85 F.3d 1275, 1280 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that the
results of criminal history checks normally take longer than the results of license and war-
rant checks); see also supra note 233 and accompanying text.
241. Wayne R. Lafave, The "Routine Traffic Stop" From Start to Finish: Too Much "Routine,"
Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843, 1880 (2004).
242. 236 F.3d 1274 (1lth Cir. 2001).
243. Id. at 1277.
244. Id. at 1279; see also Finke, 85 F.3d 1275, 1280 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining that there
may be circumstances where a criminal history request impermissibly delays the traffic
stop).
245. The holding in Purcell is not directly applicable to Byndloss because in Byndloss, the
results of the criminal history check were never reported, rendering the court unable to
discern whether the criminal history check was the cause of an additional delay. See Byn-
dloss, 391 Md. at 473, 893 A.2d at 1126 (noting that the dispatcher never returned the
results of the requested checks).
246. Cf id. at 489-90, 893 A.2d at 1136 (noting that license, registration, and warrant
checks are an integral part of the police stop).
247. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); see also Ohio v. Robinette, 519
U.S. 33, 38 (1996) (affirming Whren and stating that an officer's intentions are
unimportant).
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an officer's diligence throughout the stop.24 8 First, the court failed to
account for Sergeant Hughes's repeated assertions of Malone's ner-
vousness and his decision to call for the canine unit after initially talk-
ing to her and suspecting her anxiety. 249 Rather, the court should
have weighed more heavily the fact that the officer's suspicions may
have wrongly influenced his actions, as the Court of Special Appeals
recognized in Charity.25° Second, the court discounted Sergeant
Hughes's incentive to delay the stop to permit the lost canine unit to
arrive.251 Third, the court ignored Sergeant Hughes's testimony that
an officer's main objective is not only to conduct traffic enforcement,
but also to intercept other criminal activity. 25 2 Sergeant Hughes ex-
plained that to complete these objectives, he employs "aggressive,
proactive traffic enforcement."253  The Byndloss court, like Charity,
should have placed more emphasis on Sergeant Hughes's admittedly
pretextual purpose.254 Fourth, the court overlooked the fact that the
very first piece of information that the Waterloo barrack gave to Ser-
geant Hughes was Byndloss's criminal record-not a license or regis-
tration check.255
While these factors could potentially show that Sergeant Hughes
had reasonable articulable suspicion, the court chose not to focus on
this possibility.256 Thus, because the court relied solely on the traffic
infraction to substantiate the entire detention, the cumulative effect
248. See, e.g., Whitehead v. State, 116 Md. App. 497, 506-07, 698 A.2d 1115, 1120 (1997)
(noting that Whren did not intend for police officers to detain a driver on the pretext of
conducting a traffic stop, while actually exploring unrelated activities to justify a further
and independent investigation of criminal wrongdoing).
249. Cf Byndloss, 391 Md. at 470-71, 491-92, 893 A.2d at 1124-25, 1137 (describing how
Malone's panicked response sparked Sergeant Hughes's suspicions).
250. See Charity v. State, 132 Md. App. 598, 618, 753 A.2d 556, 567 (2000) (holding that
an officer was not diligent because his total focus shifted from the traffic infraction when
he smelled and saw air fresheners and became concerned with investigating potential drug
activity).
251. See Byndloss, 391 Md. at 473, 893 A.2d at 1126 (noting that due to the delay in
receiving the license, registration, and warrant information, the canine team was able to
arrive and conduct a scan of the vehicle). While a canine search is valid if conducted
during a permissible seizure, it may be impermissible if the officer intentionally delays the
completion of the seizure to allow the canine unit to arrive. See supra notes 120-123 and
accompanying text; cf State v. Ofori, 170 Md. App. 211, 243-45, 906 A.2d 1089, 1107-08
(2006) (noting that an officer's clear incentive to delay a stop while awaiting the arrival of a
canine unit affects the analysis of his diligence).
252. Byndloss, 391 Md. at 468 n.6, 893 A.2d at 1123 n.6.
253. Id.
254. See Charity, 132 Md. App. at 609-10, 753 A.2d at 562 (noting that the detaining
officer was assigned the special task of drug interdiction and was not a "highway patrolman
with any apparent interest in enforcing the traffic regulations per se").
255. Id. at 472-73, 893 A.2d at 1125-26.
256. See supra notes 179-180 and accompanying text.
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of these factors should be evaluated. If the court had considered the
totality of the surrounding circumstances when determining Sergeant
Hughes's diligence, it would have likely reached a different result.
3. A Disregard of the Time a Traffic Stop Should Take
While case law indicates that a traffic stop ends when its purpose
is complete, courts also analyze whether the officer's actions in com-
pleting that purpose were reasonable in duration.2 57 The Byndloss
court, however, failed to consider that the total duration of the stop
was longer than it should reasonably have taken.258 By ignoring this
consideration, the Byndloss court allowed Sergeant Hughes to pursue
an unrelated investigative activity-in particular, a canine search-be-
cause it occurred before he formally completed the purpose of the
stop.25
9
Byndloss should have followed the analysis in cases such as Carter
v. State,26° Pryor, and Wilkes. For example in Carter, the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals analyzed the reasonableness of a canine sniff that oc-
curred during a traffic stop and stated that once the reasonable time
for processing a traffic charge expires, the stop must end.261  The
court reasoned that while a canine sniff is valuable, it should not be
permitted solely because the officer found a way to delay the issuance
of the traffic citation, thereby conducting the scan before the formal
termination of the traffic stop.26 2 Similarly, in Pyor, the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals held that a traffic stop exceeded the reasonable time it
should take an officer to issue a citation, and thus the stop terminated
before the actual issuance of the citation.263 The Byndloss court's
opinion was also inconsistent with its own previous comments in
Wilkes, where it stated that a canine scan may be unreasonable if it
occurs while waiting for warrant information that is taking an exces-
sively long time. 264
257. See supra note 170 and accompanying text; see also Berkermer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.
420, 437 (1984) (noting that a motorist expects a traffic stop to last only a few minutes).
258. Compare Byndloss, 391 Md. at 489, 893 A.2d at 1135-36 (refusing to give weight to
the amount of time a typical traffic stop should take because the thirty-minute delay was
caused by technical difficulties), with supra note 170 (presenting cases that held detentions
invalid because they exceeded the reasonable time a traffic stop should take).
259. See Byndloss, 391 Md. at 491, 893 A.2d at 1136-37 (noting that the initial reason for
the search was ongoing when the canine scan took place).
260. 143 Md. App. 670, 795 A.2d 790 (2002).
261. Id. at 692-93, 795 A.2d at 802-03.
262. Id. at 692, 795 A.2d at 803.
263. 122 Md. App. 671, 682, 716 A.2d 338, 344 (1998).
264. Wilkes v. State, 364 Md. 554, 583-84 n.22, 774 A.2d 420, 438 n.22 (2001).
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In dismissing the reasoning of Carter, Pryor, and Wilkes, the Byn-
dloss court did not apportion weight to the fact that the stop took
longer than a reasonable traffic stop. If it had, the court would have
recognized that an officer is usually able to complete license and regis-
tration checks within a few minutes of the initial detention.2 6 5 Thus,
it would have found that the initial stop ended and a second deten-
tion began when a typical traffic stop ends-approximately when Ser-
geant Hughes completed the writing of the citation. 6 6 Specifically,
the Byndloss court would have found the scan impermissible, even
though it occurred while waiting for the results, because the checks
took an unreasonable period of time.2 67
4. The Court Failed to Identify the Initiation of a Second Detention
By improperly holding that the officer's actions and the duration
of the stop did not violate the scope limits of the Fourth Amend-
ment,268 the court in Byndloss failed to identify that there were two
separate stops. 269 If the court had correctly analyzed the scope limits
imposed on traffic stops, it would have found that the excessive nature
of both the officer's actions and the duration initiated a second deten-
tion. 27 ° In overlooking the second detention, as it previously ex-
plained in Snow v. State, the Byndloss court neglected to evaluate
whether the officer had independent justification to permissibly ex-
pand the scope of the initial detention into a second detention.
27 1
Although the Byndloss court may have found that Sergeant
Hughes had sufficient independent justification to expand the scope
of the stop,2 72 by setting a precedent that allows courts to avoid this
265. See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 697 (1985) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring) (agreeing that Teny's brevity requirement cannot be judged by a "stopwatch," but
acknowledging that the amount of time it takes to stop a person, ask questions, or check
identification is typically a few minutes); United States v. Gonzalez, 763 F.2d 1127, 1130
(10th Cir. 1985) (noting that an officer can issue a ticket and obtain all necessary informa-
tion within minutes when using modern technology); Wilkes, 364 Md. at 579, 774 A.2d at
435 (explaining that modern technology enables officers to quickly access information).
266. Byndloss, 391 Md. at 497, 893 A.2d at 1140 (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
267. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
268. See supra Parts IV.A-B.
269. See Byndloss, 391 Md. at 483-84, 893 k2d at 1132 (holding that there was only one
stop).
270. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (explaining that either the officer's ac-
tions or the duration can initiate a second detention).
271. See Snow v. State, 84 Md. App. 243, 267, 578 A.2d 816, 827-28 (1990) (evaluating
the permissibility of the second detention by determining whether an officer had indepen-
dent justification, such as reasonable articulable suspicion).
272. Compare Byndloss, 391 Md. at 478 n.14, 893 A.2d at 1129 n.14 (declining to analyze
reasonable articulable suspicion), with United States v. Murillo, 255 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th
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273evaluation entirely, the court unreasonably expanded police power.
In essence, Byndloss validated a traffic stop in which an officer can
investigate other criminal activity and delay the completion of the stop
while waiting for a canine unit.2 7 4 In condoning this behavior, and
admitting the seized drugs, the Court of Appeals lost sight of the con-
stitutional purpose of the exclusionary rule-to limit extreme police
intrusiveness and protect a citizen's interest in privacy.275
V. CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals in Byndloss v. State found that an unreasona-
bly long traffic stop was nevertheless permissible because the officer
was diligently awaiting the license, registration, warrant, and criminal
history checks. 276 However, the court misinterpreted the scope limita-
tions of a traffic stop by failing to evaluate the nature of the officer's
actions277 and improperly characterizing the duration of the stop as
reasonable v. 2 7  In doing so, the court mistakenly held that the initial
stop was ongoing when the canine unit arrived, thereby overlooking
the initiation of a second detention requiring independent justifica-
tion.279 As a result, the court's decision sets a confusing precedent for
lower courts, encourages police officers to use delay tactics to support
other investigative desires, and erodes the constitutionally protected
rights of individuals to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures.2 s 0
MELISsA L. BILCHIK
Cir. 2001) (holding that because an officer had reasonable articulable suspicion, the exces-
sive scope of the traffic stop was permissible).
273. See, e.g., United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 954 (7th Cir. 2002) (Cudahy, J.,
concurring) (noting that in refusing to determine whether the officer had reasonable ar-
ticulable suspicion, the majority permitted a range of questions that are not a per se viola-
tion of the scope limit).
274. See supra Parts IV.A-B.
275. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
276. Byndloss, 391 Md. at 478-79, 893 A.2d at 1129-30.
277. See supra Part IV.A.
278. See supra Part IV.B.
279. See supra Part IV.C.
280. See supra Part IV.C.
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BUTLER v. STATE: UPHOLDING THE RIGHT TO
A FAIR TRIAL AT ALL COSTS
In Butler v. State,' the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a
trial judge's statement to a deadlocked jury that one of the jurors
might be violating his oath by not disclosing his general distrust of
police was potentially coercive, and thus the defendants were poten-
tially deprived of their constitutional right to a fair trial. The court's
decision was justified because courts should avoid depriving individu-
als of their constitutional rights; the Butler court appropriately erred
on the side of caution since it was possible that a deprivation took
place.2 However, with its cursory review of the record in determining
whether prejudice actually occurred, the court failed to recognize that
its decision will impede judicial efficiency.' A better approach, as
demonstrated by precedent, would have been to (1) view the case by
the totality of the circumstances to determine if prejudice occurred;4
and (2) accord the trial judge greater discretion when deciding what
to do with a potentially untruthful juror.5 This approach would prop-
erly protect constitutional rights without causing judicial inefficiency.
I. THE CASE
In 2002, the Baltimore City Police Department conducted an un-
dercover operation called "Red-E-Rock" to arrest low-level drug deal-
ers.6 As part of the operation, police officers purchased drugs from
dealers but delayed arresting them until a later date to allow the of-
ficers to make multiple purchases in the same locations.7 While un-
dercover for Red-E-Rock, Detective Will Farrar met Donald Lowery,
who claimed to possess a particular drug.8 Detective Farrar and Low-
Copyright © 2007 by Matthew G. Jeweler.
1. 392 Md. 169, 896 A.2d 359 (2006).
2. See infra Part W.A.
3. See infra Part IV.B.
4. See infra Part IV.C.1.
5. See infra Part IV.C.2.
6. Butler, 392 Md. at 172, 896 A.2d at 361.
7. Id. One detective working on Red-E-Rock stated that similar projects usually run
from thirty to forty-five days or longer. Id. at 173, 896 A.2d at 362. The police did not
arrest the dealers right away so that they could return to the same locations without being
recognized. Id.
8. Id. at 172, 896 A.2d at 361. Lowery claimed to have "green tops," a drug that Detec-
tive Farrar thought was cocaine but actually turned out to be heroin. Id.
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ery then approached another individual, Anthony Butler, who sold
Farrar a small amount of heroin.'
After leaving the scene, Detective Farrar provided to Detective
David Clasing and Sergeant MarkJanicki a description of Lowery and
Butler.' o Detective Clasing and Sergeant Janicki then went to the
scene, found the two men, and asked them to produce photo identifi-
cation." During this exchange, Detective Farrar drove by and posi-
tively the men.' 2 No arrests were made at that time.' 3 Subsequently, a
grand jury issued indictments against Butler and Lowery (the defend-
ants), the court issued warrants for their arrest, and the two men were
arrested. "
The defendants' trial commenced on July 1, 2003, in the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City.1" Before jury selection, the trial judge asked
the prospective jurors whether any of them would automatically be-
lieve or disbelieve a police officer strictly because of the officer's occu-
pation.16 No individual who became ajuror responded that he or she
had such a predisposition.17
Approximately four-and-a-half hours after the judge sent out the
jury for deliberations, the jurors sent the judge a note saying that they
"can't agree or don't agree" on a verdict.'" The judge asked the pros-
ecution and defense counsel how they wished to proceed."9 Defense
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. 1d.
13. Id. at 172-73, 896 A.2d at 361. Detective Farrar explained that no arrests were
made at the time because after the police make the purchase and positively identify the
dealers, the police need to prepare a case folder and reports. Id. at 173, 896 A.2d at 361.
Then, after the project has ended, the police pass the case folders to the State's Attorney's
office, where the cases are prepared for indictment. Id. Finally, the case is read before a
grand jury, and if the grand jury finds sufficient evidence, it issues an indictment warrant.
Id.
14. The grand jury issued the indictments on March 7, 2002, and the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City issued the warrants on March 22, 2002. Id., 896 A.2d at 362. Lowery was
arrested on June 6, 2002, and Butler was arrested on August 9, 2002. Id.
15. Id. at 174, 896 A.2d at 362.
16. Id. This process, known as voir dire, provides counsel and the court the opportu-
nity to question prospective jurors to determine whether there is cause for disqualifying
them. Dingle v. State, 361 Md. 1, 9, 759 A.2d 819, 823 (2000). It is one of the mechanisms
that helps ensure a fair and impartial jury. Id.
17. Butler, 392 Md. at 174, 896 A.2d at 362. The State's evidence included the sub-
stance allegedly purchased from the defendants, a copy of the money used to buy the
drugs, and testimony from five witnesses, including four police officers and the police de-
partment's chemical analyst. Id. At the close of the State's case, the trial court denied the
defendants' motions for acquittal and the defense rested without calling any witnesses. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 175, 896 A.2d at 362-63.
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counsel requested a mistrial, while the State asked for an Allen
charge.2 ° The judge agreed with defense counsel that an Allen charge
was improper at that time.2 1 Given that it was 8:30 p.m., the judge
thought that the jury was tired and an Allen charge would be coer-
cive.22 Thejudge released the jury for the evening with instructions to
resume deliberations the next day.23
The next morning, the jury sent the judge a note requesting to
see videotape of closing arguments. 24 Defense counsel objected to
this request.25 While the judge researched whether he should allow
the jury to view the videotape, the jury sent him another note stating
that one juror distrusted the police. 26 After discussing the second
note with the attorneys on both sides, the judge decided that a second
viewing of the closing argument might "bring more harmony to the
jury in a non-coercive manner."27 Thus, rather than giving the jury an
Allen charge, the judge allowed the jurors to review the closing
arguments.
2
Before sending the jury to watch video of closing arguments and
continue deliberations, the judge addressed the jury, calling attention
to the jury's note regarding one juror's distrust of police.29 Thejudge
20. Id., 896 A.2d at 363. An Allen charge is a controversial jury instruction given by a
judge when the jury cannot reach a decision. Goodmuth v. State, 302 Md. 613, 616, 490
A.2d 682, 683 (1985). The charge, which originated in Allen v. United States, provides that a
juror who does not agree with the rest of the jurors should: (1) give proper deference to
the otherjurors' opinions; (2) listen to the other jurors with a disposition to be convinced;
and (3) consider whether his opinions, which are not shared by the other equally intelli-
gent jurors, are reasonable. 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896).
21. Butler, 392 Md. at 175, 896 A.2d at 363. An Allen charge has also been referred to as
the "dynamite" or "nitroglycerin" charge. Burnette v. State, 280 Md. 88, 92 n.2, 371 A.2d
663, 665 n.2 (1977) (quoting Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 1962)
(Brown, J., dissenting)).
22. Butler, 392 Md. at 175, 896 A.2d at 363.
23. Id. at 175-76, 896 A.2d at 363.
24. Id. at 176, 896 A.2d at 363.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 176-77, 896 A.2d at 363-64. The judge opined that if one juror did indeed
distrust the police no matter the circumstance, it meant that the juror had lied during voir
dire. Id. at 177, 896 A.2d at 364. Thejudge said he did not "wish to think ill" of his fellow
citizens, instead reasoning that any police mistrust was more likely a result of the jury being
exhausted and frustrated." Id. at 177, 896 A.2d at 364.
28. Id. Defense counsel objected on the record to the judge's decision to allow review
of closing arguments. Id. at 177-78, 896 A.2d at 364. Lowery's counsel argued that a
rehearing of the closing argument would lead the jury to make an improper decision
based on someone's statement, and not the evidence. Butler v. State, No. 1399, slip op. at
8 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. July 25, 2005). The judge noted that this request for review of
closing arguments was a case of first impression in Maryland. Butler, 392 Md. at 178, 896
A.2d at 364.
29. Butler, 392 Md. at 178, 896 A.2d at 364.
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stated that anybody who felt that way should have spoken up during
voir dire so a party could have challenged thatjuror's presence.30 The
judge added that "if anybody deliberates with that spirit now, I suggest
they might be violating their oath."'" Defense counsel objected to this
statement and moved for a mistrial, but the motion was denied.32
Lowery's lawyer told the judge that he thought that the judge's com-
ments "did nothing but put a chilling effect on that juror to be cor-
nered out," and that the juror's view on police might be a result of
what he saw during the trial rather than a preconceived belief.33
Ultimately, the judge allowed the jury to watch the videotape of
the closing arguments and resume deliberations.34 On July 3, 2003,
the jury found Butler guilty on conspiracy, distribution, and posses-
sion counts, and Lowery guilty on conspiracy counts.35 After their
convictions, the defendants filed a joint motion for a new trial, argu-
ing that (1) the trial judge's statement about the jury's note singled
out and coerced one member of the jury into switching his position;
and (2) the judge erred in permitting the jury to review the closing
arguments. 36 The trial court denied their joint motion.
The defendants appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Ma-
ryland, arguing that the trial judge's comments were clearly coercive
and warranted a mistrial. 8 In an unreported opinion, the Court of
Special Appeals affirmed. 39 The court reasoned that the decision to
grant a mistrial falls within the discretion of the trial court, and an
appellate court should not reverse unless the trial judge's denial was
an abuse of discretion.4" The court also found that the judge could
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Butler, No. 1399, slip op. at 10. Butler's counsel later objected to the statement as
well. Butler, 392 Md. at 179, 896 A.2d at 365.
33. Butler, 392 Md. at 178-79, 896 A.2d at 365.
34. Id. at 179, 896 A.2d at 365.
35. Id. The defendants were both convicted on the following charges: (1) conspiracy
to distribute a controlled dangerous substance; (2) conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute a controlled dangerous substance; and (3) conspiracy to possess a controlled
dangerous substance. Id. at 169, 896 A.2d at 359. Butler was additionally convicted of: (1)
distribution; (2) possession with intent to distribute; and (3) possession of a controlled
dangerous substance. Id.
36. Butler, No. 1399, slip op. at 10-11.
37. Id. at 11.
38. Id.
39. Butler, 392 Md. at 171, 896 A.2d at 361.
40. Butler, No. 1399, slip op. at 11 (quoting Stewart v. State, 334 Md. 213, 221, 638 A.2d
754, 757 (1994)). The Court of Special Appeals further noted that an appellate court will
not find an abuse of discretion unless it is obvious that there has been "egregious
prejudice" to the defendants. Id. at 11 (quoting Nero v. State, 144 Md. App. 333, 362, 798
A.2d 5, 22 (2002)).
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not have reasonably interpreted the note to mean that a juror had
formed an opinion of police distrust during the trial.4 1 Finally, the
court held, any contention that the comments were coercive was
purely speculative.42
The defendants subsequently filed a joint petition for a writ of
certiorari.4 On November 10, 2005, the Court of Appeals granted
certiorari to determine whether the trial judge improperly coerced a
guilty verdict by instructing the jury that any juror who distrusted po-
lice should have disclosed such a belief during voir dire, and indicat-
ing that anyone holding such a belief during deliberations might be
violating their oath.4 4
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Maryland appellate courts have adjudicated claims that a trial
judge has potentially coerced the jury and thus deprived an individual
of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial in a variety of contexts.
4 5
Courts have found the deprivation of the right to a fair trial in jury
instructions and errors in verdict sheets;4 6 judges' communications
with, and acts toward, defense counsel;4 7 and judges' interactions with
witnesses." In analyzing these claims, courts have reviewed the spe-
cific facts and circumstances of the cases to determine whether under
41. Id. at 12.
42. Id. The defendants also argued on appeal that the court's miscalculation as to the
length of the trial contributed to the unfair verdict and that the court erred in allowing the
jury to review videotape of the closing arguments. Id. at 12-14. The court quickly dis-
missed these arguments. Id. at 13-14. First, the court explained that estimating the length
of the trial is within the trial judge's discretion, and to say that the jury found a guilty
verdict as a result of its desire to end deliberations would be to "engage in the rawest of raw
speculation." Id. Second, the court found that the trial judge instructed the jury to not
consider closing arguments as evidence, and jurors are presumed to have followed the
court's instruction. Id. at 14-15.
43. Butler, 392 Md. at 171, 896 A.2d at 361.
44. Id. at 171-72, 896 A.2d at 361.
45. See infra Part II.A. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guaran-
tees the right to a fair trial. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. It provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartialjury... and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compul-
sory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence.
Id. The right to a fair trial is also found in Article 21 of Maryland's Declaration of Rights; it
states that "in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right ... to a speedy trial by an
impartial jury, without whose unanimous consent he ought not to be found guilty." MD.
CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 21.
46. See infra Part II.A.1.
47. See infra Part II.A.2.
48. See infra Part II.A.3.
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the totality of the circumstances any prejudice occurred.4" In addi-
tion, Maryland appellate courts generally grant discretion to trial
judges in deciding how to conduct matters in their courtrooms. 50
A. Maryland Trial Judges Have Potentially Coerced Juries and Thus
Possibly Deprived Defendants of Their Right to a Fair Trial in
a Variety of Contexts
Judges possess great power and influence over those in their
courtrooms-including juries-and thus they must maintain high
standards of conduct.5 Maryland trial judges have prejudiced de-
fendants' rights to a fair trial by potentially coercing juries in a variety
of ways, including jury instructions and errors in verdict sheets;52
judges' communications with, and actions toward, defense counsel;5 3
and judges' interactions and communications with witnesses.54
1. Jury Instructions and Communications
Appellate courts closely scrutinize jury instructions because these
instructions dictate the questions the jury shall decide.55 Likewise,
judges' communications with the jury or individual jurors are highly
scrutinized since a judge must remain impartial at all times.56
Maryland appellate courts generally uphold trial judges' use of
Allen charges57 when the charge complies with previously approved
standards. For example, the Court of Appeals upheld an Allen-type
charge in Leupen v. Lackey.5" In Leupen, the trial judge instructed a
deadlocked jury that absolute certainty is not expected, and that each
juror should come to his own conclusion while examining the ques-
tion with proper deference to the opinions of the others. 9 The judge
further told the jurors that they should "listen with a disposition to be
convinced to each others arguments," and that if their views are con-
trary to those of the majority they should consider whether those views
49. See infra Part I.B.
50. See infra Part II.C.
51. Johnson v. State, 352 Md. 374, 385, 722 A.2d 873, 878 (1999).
52. See infra Part II.A.1.
53. See infra Part II.A.2.
54. See infra Part II.A.3.
55. See infra notes 58-74 and accompanying text.
56. SeeState v. Hutchinson, 287 Md. 198, 206, 411 A.2d 1035, 1040 (1980) ("[T]he trial
judge must remain ever vigilant in order to avoid conveying any idea as to what he thinks
the jury's verdict should be or suggesting the slightest partiality.").
57. See supra note 20 (describing the content of an Allen charge).
58. 248 Md. 19, 234 A.2d 573 (1967).
59. Id. at 22, 234 A.2d at 574.
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"which make no impression on the minds of so many equally intelli-
gent jurors" are correct.60
The Leupen court acknowledged that while Allen charges are im-
properly coercive in some instances, they are proper if formulated
correctly.6' The court held that the charge was close enough to the
approved versions of the Allen charge.62 Further, the court held, the
trial judge chose his words with great care as to not improperly influ-
ence the jury, and thus the instruction was in accord with the ap-
proved language in Allen v. United States.63
More recently, though, Maryland appellate courts have struck
down as potentially coercive similarly worded Allen charges. In Bur-
nette v. State,64 the trial judge gave an Allen charge to a deadlocked jury
after the jury gave the judge a note stating that it could not decide on
one count.65 The most controversial aspect of the instruction stated
that "[i]f your views are contrary to those of the vast majority you
should consider whether your views, which make no impression on
the minds of so many equally intelligent jurors, are correct. ''66 The
Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial be-
cause the charge deviated too greatly from the American Bar Associa-
tion (ABA) standards and was prejudicial to the defendant.67
Particularly, the Burnette court noted, the instruction included the
"majority-minority" language, which it concluded was improper be-
60. Id.
61. Id. at 25, 234 A.2d at 576.
62. Id. at 26, 234 A.2d at 576. The court cited Lively v. Sexton, 35 I11. App. 417 (App. Ct.
1889), as an example of an improper judgejury communication. Leupen, 248 Md. at 26,
234 A.2d at 576. In Lively, the trial judge, after receiving a note from the jury that it was
deadlocked, told the jurors that if he found out that any juror tried to bring about disa-
greement so as to interfere with the judicial process, he would send him to jail for con-
tempt of court. Lively, 35 Ill. App. at 419. The Illinois Court of Appeals believed that the
jury's verdict was influenced by this statement, which the court referred to as a threat, and
therefore held that the case should be remanded, stating that a judge may not coerce a
single juror. Id. at 420. The Lively court also cautioned that if courts tolerate trial judges
threatening jurors, the uniformity of trial by jury disappears. Id.
63. Leupen, 248 Md. at 26, 234 A.2d at 576 (citing Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492
(1896)). In Allen, the judge's now famous jury instruction said, in part, that
if much the larger number were for conviction, a dissentingjuror should consider
whether his doubt was a reasonable one which made no impression upon the
minds of so many men, equally honest, equally intelligent with himself. If, upon
the other hand, the majority was for acquittal, the minority ought to ask them-
selves whether they might not reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment
which was not concurred in by the majority.
Allen, 164 U.S. at 501.
64. 280 Md. 88, 371 A.2d 663 (1977).
65. Id. at 90-91, 371 A.2d at 664.
66. Id. at 91, 371 A.2d at 664.
67. Id. at 99-100, 371 A.2d at 668-69.
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cause it singles out the minority as being the cause of the deadlock
and assumes the majority is correct.6" Thus, the Burnette court held
that the Allen charge used by the trial judge was potentially coercive
and deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial. 9
In 2002, the Court of Appeals in Thompson v. State"° again held an
Allen charge to be coercive and prejudicial. In Thompson, the trial
judge instructed the jury that their verdict would be the "final test of
the quality" of their service, not the opinions held as they retire.71
The Thompson court ordered a new trial, finding that this portion of
the instructions deviated too much from the ABA standards.72 Also,
the court reasoned, the concept of a final test implies that a good
juror should acquiesce in a verdict rather than trust his judgment. 73
The Thompson court determined that the final test language improp-
erly suggested a preference for collective judgment over autonomous
decisionmaking.
74
In addition, appellate courts in Maryland have adjudicated claims
of trial court prejudice in the context of erroneous verdict sheet in-
structions. In State v. Hutchinson,75 the trial judge instructed the jury
that it could return a verdict of guilty for rape in the first degree or
rape in the second degree, but failed to instruct the jury that it could
return a verdict of not guilty.76 Even though the verdict sheet itself
included a choice of "not guilty," the Court of Appeals held that the
judge's omission deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial. 7
The Hutchinson court stated that the "trial judge may influence the
jury by the inflection of his voice, his words, his conduct and his assess-
ment of the evidence, if revealed," and thus the judge must refrain
from conveying any opinion on the proper verdict. 78 The court fur-
ther noted that even though the judge did not intend to impair the
defendant's right to a fair trial, the omission in his instructions was
68. Id. at 100, 371 A.2d at 669. The court in Burnette also noted that while many courts
have approved the use of the Allen charge, it has faced increasing criticism that it is coer-
cive and intrudes upon the jury's role. Id. at 92-93, 371 A.2d at 665.
69. Id. at 100, 371 A.2d at 669.
70. 371 Md. 473, 810 A.2d 435 (2002).
71. Id. at 485, 810 A.2d at 443.
72. Id. at 486, 810 A.2d at 443.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 487, 810 A.2d at 443-44.
75. 287 Md. 198, 411 A.2d 1035 (1980).
76. Id. at 201, 411 A.2d at 1037.
77. Id. at 206, 411 A.2d at 1040.
78. Id.
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material to the defendant's rights. 79 Thus, the court found that this
constituted plain error and the defendant was entitled to a new trial.8 0
2. judges' Communications With, and Acts Toward, Defense Counsel
A trial judge's actions towards and communications with defense
counsel can also prejudice the defendant in a criminal trial. In Suggs
v. State,8 1 the trial judge stated in front of the jury that the defense
lawyer was being inappropriate, and commanded the sheriff to physi-
cally restrain him.8 2 The Court of Special Appeals ordered a new trial,
reasoning that the judge's comments portrayed defense counsel in
such a prejudicial way as to deny the defendant of his right to a fair
trial.83
Likewise, the Court of Appeals granted a new trial based on simi-
lar circumstances in Johnson v. State. 4 In Johnson, numerous inappro-
priate incidents occurred between the judge and defense counsel
throughout the trial, including interruptions and insults.8 5 On ap-
peal, the Court of Appeals noted that ajudge's conduct during a trial
has a large impact on a defendant's chances of receiving a fair trial
because the judge's opinions often significantly impact the jury's ver-
dict.8 6 The court reasoned that a new trial was necessary because the
exchanges between the judge and counsel were not limited to a few
instances, but rather were extensive and prejudiced the defendant's
right to a fair trial.s 7 As evidenced by Suggs and Johnson, Maryland
appellate courts do not hesitate to order a new trial for a criminal
defendant if it appears that a trial judge's actions toward, and interac-
tions with, the defense counsel were possibly prejudicial to the
defendant.
79. Id. at 208, 411 A.2d at 1040-41.
80. Id., 411 A.2d at 1041. The court in Hutchinson also pointed out that it had no way
of knowing what effect the judge's omission had upon the jury, but it did know that the
judge has a profound influence on the jury. Id.
81. 87 Md. App. 250, 589 A.2d 551 (1991).
82. Id. at 253-54, 589 A.2d at 553. The judge also asked the jury to "disregard the
sideshow" and stated that the attorney was "ten miles out of limit." Id. at 256, 589 A.2d at
554.
83. Id. at 256-57, 589 A.2d at 555.
84. 352 Md. 374, 722 A.2d 873 (1999).
85. Id. at 378, 722 A.2d at 875. Examples of the inappropriate actions included: threat-
ening counsel with contempt of court, arresting counsel in front of the jury, and accusing
counsel of stealing a marker from the courtroom. Id. at 377-82, 722 A.2d at 874-77.
86. Id. at 385, 722 A.2d at 878.
87. Id. at 387, 722 A.2d at 879.
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3. Judges' Interactions with Witnesses
Finally, jury coercion and the deprivation of an individual's right
to a fair trial can result from a trial judge's interactions with wit-
nesses.88 In Vandegift v. State, 9 the trial judge questioned a witness in
such a way as to indicate his disbelief in the witness's testimony.9" The
Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction and ordered a
new trial on the grounds that such questioning suggested the judge's
suspicion that the witness was lying and thus prejudiced the defen-
dant's case. 9 Furthermore, the Vandegrift court reasoned, such ques-
tioning is presumed to have influenced the jury and "was beyond the
line of impartiality over which a judge must not step.'"92
Similarly, in Elmer v. State,93 the trial judge declared in front of
the jury that a witness was hostile.94 The Court of Appeals stated that
since the outcome of the case depended almost entirely on the credi-
bility of the witnesses, this declaration of hostility clearly prejudiced
the defendant.95 The Elmer court also emphasized that the judge was
not wrong in concluding that the witness was hostile, but rather he
was wrong in declaring the witness's hostility in the presence of the
jury.96 As a result, the court reversed the conviction and granted a
new trial.97
B. The Totality of the Circumstances Approach
When adjudicating a claim that a defendant has been deprived of
his right to a fair trial, Maryland appellate courts carefully examine
the totality of the circumstances in the trial court to determine if any
prejudice occurred. This approach entails looking at all the facts and
circumstances of each case to determine if the defendant was actually
prejudiced. The Court of Appeals reviewed a potential impartial jury
case by the totality of the circumstances in Apple v. State.98 There, the
88. See infra notes 90-96. A witness' interactions with ajuror can also affect the impar-
tiality of the jury, thus depriving an individual of his right to a fair trial. SeeJenkins v. State,
375 Md. 284, 825 A.2d 1008 (2003) (holding that a defendant had been deprived of an
impartial jury when ajuror became friendly with a witness outside of the courtroom during
the trial).
89. 237 Md. 305, 206 A.2d 250 (1965).
90. Id. at 310, 206 A.2d at 253.
91. Id., 206 A.2d at 253-54.
92. Id. at 311, 206 A.2d at 254.
93. 239 Md. 1, 209 A.2d 776 (1965).
94. Id. at 4, 209 A.2d at 778.
95. Id. at 10, 209 A.2d at 781.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 11, 209 A.2d at 782.
98. 190 Md. 661, 59 A.2d 509 (1948).
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defendant claimed that during his trial the judge acted in a way that
indicated he had a prejudice against the defendant, and this affected
the jury's decision to convict him.99 The court noted that a judge
should be impartial at all times, but the court will not reverse a convic-
tion unless the defendant can clearly show that the judge's conduct
adversely influenced the jury.0 0 The court affirmed the conviction,
explaining that it was "unable to find upon the whole record that the
[defendant] was prejudiced by any conduct of the judge."' '
Likewise, in Johnson, several inappropriate incidents occurred be-
tween the trial judge and defense counsel.1 0 2 In reversing the defen-
dant's convictions and ordering a new trial, the court reasoned that if
the conduct in the case were limited to a few moderate exchanges, it
might conclude that no prejudice occurred. 10 3 However, the court
stated, the judge's conduct was more than just a few mere incidents of
harsh gestures, and under the totality of the circumstances, the multi-
tude of incidents violated the defendant's right to a fair trial. 0 4
The Court of Special Appeals has also employed a totality of the
circumstances approach to evaluate potential prejudice. In Suggs, the
trial judge scolded defense counsel in front of the jury for asking on
cross-examination what the judge thought were inappropriate ques-
tions.'0 5 On appeal, the defendant claimed that his right to a fair trial
was deprived because the judge was not impartial and it influenced
the jury.10 6 The Court of Special Appeals agreed, holding that
"[u]nder the totality of the[ ] circumstances,.., the trial judge's com-
ments painted such a prejudicial portrait of the defense counsel as to
deny [the defendant] his right to a fair trial." 10 7
C. Trial Judges' Discretion in Conducting Their Trials
The Court of Appeals generally grants deference to trial court
judges as to how they conduct matters in their courtrooms." 8 With
99. Id. at 669, 59 A.2d at 513. Specifically, the judge asked a witness a question, the
defendant and his attorney answered it, and the judge replied to them: "Now you keep
quiet. I don't want any help from you." Id.
100. Id. at 670, 59 A.2d at 513.
101. Id. (emphasis added).
102. 352 Md. 374, 722 A.2d 873 (1999); see also supra note 85 (describing the inappropri-
ate conduct).
103. Johnson, 352 Md. at 387, 722 A.2d at 879.
104. Id.
105. 87 Md. App. 250, 254-55, 589 A.2d 551, 553 (1991).
106. Id. at 257, 589 A.2d at 554.
107. Id., 589 A.2d at 555.
108. See, e.g., Newman v. State, 384 Md. 285, 328, 863 A.2d 321, 346 (2004) (noting that
generally appellate courts should not second-guess trial judges' decisions).
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this discretion, an appellate court should strike down only actions that
are so erroneous or prejudicial as to fall outside the trial judge's realm
of discretion.109
For example, in Bryant v. State," ° a defendant convicted of mur-
der appealed his conviction, claiming that the trial judge prejudiced
the jury against him and therefore deprived him of a fair and impar-
tial jury.111 Specifically, the defendant claimed, the judge displayed
an antagonistic attitude toward him and his attorney, stating in front
of the jury that defense counsel was not cooperating with the judge
and offended him." 2 The Court of Appeals noted that "[t]he degree
of severity of a trial judge's rebukes of an attorney, when the occasions
require them, is left to the discretion of the judge so long as they do
not prevent a fair and impartial trial."' 1 3 The court found that there
was no "clear showing that the judge's statements influenced the jury
against the defendant," and thus a reversal was not warranted." 4
The Court of Appeals acknowledged a trial judge's discretion to
use Allen charges in Kelly v. State." 5 In Kelly, the trial judge instructed
the jury that if they do not agree with the majority, they should main-
tain their positions, but not do so out of stubbornness." 6 Addition-
ally, the judge told the jury that there "must be some give and take
between you" and it "makes no difference whether you originally start
out in the minority or the majority.""' 7 The Kelly court upheld the
instruction, noting that the trial judge is in the best position to deter-
mine what is appropriate in a given case, and has the discretion to
decide when to use, and what words to use in, an Allen charge." 8
The Court of Appeals has also recognized a trial judge's discre-
tion in claims of prejudice in jury polling. In Lattisaw v. State," 9 the
trial judge convicted the defendant notwithstanding a juror's ambigu-
109. Kelly v. State, 270 Md. 139, 143, 310 A.2d 538, 541 (1973); see also Malin v.
Mininberg, 153 Md. App. 358, 414-15, 837 A.2d 178, 211 (2003) (stating that when an
appellate court gives proper discretion to the trial court, it will affirm its decision even if it
would have a reached a different result itself).
110. 207 Md. 565, 115 A.2d 502 (1955).
111. Id. at 583-84, 115 A.2d at 510.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 585, 115 A.2d at 511.
114. Id.
115. 270 Md. 139, 310 A.2d 538 (1973).
116. Id. at 145, 310 A.2d at 542.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 143, 310 A.2d at 541.
119. 329 Md. 339, 619 A.2d 548 (1993).
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ous response during post-verdict jury polling. 120 The Court of Ap-
peals reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, but in so doing
noted that the decision as to whether the response was ambiguous is
within the trial judge's discretion since he is in a unique position to
observe the juror's behavior in responding to the poll. 121
The court again recognized a trial judge's discretion in the jury
polling context in Bishop v. State.12 2 In Bishop, as in Lattisaw, the Court
of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision to convict notwithstand-
ing ajuror's ambiguous response during jury polling. 123 After the ju-
ror gave his ambiguous response, the judge held a bench conference
and, over defense counsel's objection that re-polling would be coer-
cive towards the ambiguous juror, instructed the clerk to re-poll the
jury.124 The Court of Appeals held that the judge's actions made it
very possible that the reluctant juror felt pressure to give an unequivo-
cal response, and there must be a new trial because it was unclear
whether the second juror response "was a product of compulsion or
represented the requisite unanimity. "125 The Bishop court acknowl-
edged that a trial court ordinarily has discretion when determining if
a juror's response is ambiguous, but found that in the case at hand,
the response was clearly ambiguous. 26 Therefore, the court held that
the trial court abused its discretion.' 27
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In Butler v. State, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
Court of Special Appeals and remanded for a new trial, holding that
the right to a fair trial guaranteed by the United States Constitution
and Maryland Declaration of Rights prohibits judges from making
comments that could improperly influence the jury.128 Writing for
the court, Judge Cathell began by noting the general right to a jury
120. Id. at 341-43, 619 A.2d at 549-50. The trial judge in Lallisaw asked the jurors if all
of their verdicts were the same as the verdict of the jury; one juror responded, "[y]es, with
reluctance." Id. at 341, 619 A.2d at 549.
121. Id. at 346, 619 A.2d at 551.
122. 341 Md. 288, 670 A.2d 452 (1996).
123. Id. at 294, 670 A.2d at 456. The juror's response in this case to the question of
whether his verdict was the same as the jury's was "uhh, reluctantly, yes." Id. at 289, 670
A.2d at 453.
124. Id. at 289-90, 670 A.2d at 453-54.
125. Id. at 294, 670 A.2d at 455-56.
126. Id. at 293, 670 A.2d at 455.
127. Id.
128. Butler, 392 Md. at 192, 896 A.2d at 373; see also supra note 45 (providing the text of
the Sixth Amendment and article 21 of the Declaration of Rights).
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trial under the Maryland Constitution. 129 The court then stated that
one of the key elements to a jury trial is a unanimous verdict, noting
that unanimity is "indispensable" to a proper verdict.t30
Next, the court emphasized that ajudge's role during ajury trial
makes his comments subject to a high level of scrutiny, because the
court must guard against situations in which juries are improperly in-
fluenced."' The court noted that the important policy behind such
scrutiny is to avoid suspicion and distrust by the public of the jury
system.' 32 In addition, the court noted that the trial judge can easily
influence the jury, even by little things such as the "inflection of his
voice, his words, his conduct and his assessment of the evidence."' 33
Thus, the Butler court stated, judges must avoid conveying to the jury
any idea as to their opinion of the case.13  Further, the court rea-
soned, a judge's actions need not be intentional to inappropriately
influence the jury."3 5
The court then applied this backdrop to the case, finding that
even though the judge may have thought his comment to the jury was
simply a non-coercive mention of the jurors' oath, it might have had a
large impact on the jurors.1 36 Also, the Butler court reasoned, if the
juror rethought his legal obligation, as the judge wanted, it may have
led the juror to put aside his distrust of police and vote with the
majority. 13 7
The court then stated that it is beyond the power of the trial
judge to suggest while the jury is deliberating that an opinion of po-
lice distrust is impermissible.13 The court reasoned that even though
129. Butler, 392 Md. at 180, 896 A.2d at 365. The court pointed to several articles of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights that contain the right to ajury trial, including articles 5, 21,
23 and 24. Id., 896 A.2d at 366 (quoting Stokes v. State, 379 Md. 618, 625-26, 843 A.2d 64,
68-69 (2004)).
130. Id. at 181, 896 A.2d at 366.
131. Id.
132. Id. (quotingJenkins v. State, 375 Md. 284, 340, 825 A.2d 1008, 1041 (2003) ("Any
lesser degree of vigilance would foster suspicion and distrust and risk erosion of the pub-
lic's confidence in the integrity of our jury system.")).
133. Id. at 182, 896 A.2d at 367 (quoting State v. Hutchinson, 287 Md. 198, 206, 411
A.2d 1035, 1047 (1980)).
134. Id. (quoting Hutchinson, 287 Md. at 206, 411 A.2d at 1047).
135. Id. As an example of unintentional jury influence, the court cited Hutchinson, 287
Md. at 208, 411 A.2d at 1041. According to the Butler court, the trial judge in Hutchinson
erred by failing to instruct the jury that it could find the defendant not guilty although
such an option was available. Butler, 392 Md. at 182, 896 A.2d at 367 (citing Hutchinson,
287 Md. at 208, 411 A.2d at 1041).
136. Butler, 392 Md. at 182, 896 A.2d at 367.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 183, 896 A.2d at 367.
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the judge might have been correct that the juror was violating his oath
and that a mistrial would have followed, he did not have the power at
that stage to warn the juror about his views. 13 9
Subsequently, the court pointed out that "[t] rial judges can im-
properly influence the jury at different times throughout the trial."1 4 0
Because, the court noted, it had never previously adjudicated a case
with the same facts, the court analogized the case to precedent involv-
ing Allen charges. 4 '
Although the court ultimately rejected the defendants' argument
that the judge's statement was similar to an Allen charge, it decided
that the coercive nature of the judge's statement "amounted to a clear
deviation from the allowed communications between judge and jury
during deliberations."'4 2 The court stated that the court's normal
course of action when confronted with a possibly biased juror is to
declare a mistrial.' 
4 3
Next, the court reasoned that it was possible for a juror to infer
from the judge's comments that he must put aside his beliefs about
the police or risk violating his oath and facing the consequences. 144
Further, the court noted, it is difficult to imagine that the juror in the
present case was not placed in some discomfort and possibly felt com-
pelled to change his position.' 4 5 As a result, the Butler court stated, it
is impossible to determine whether the guilty verdicts against the de-
139. Id.
140. Id. The Butler court mentioned various times throughout the trial when a judge
may improperly influence the jury. First, the judge "may prejudice the jury during the
presentation of either party's case through his or her interactions with counsel and wit-
nesses." Id. (citingJohnson v. State, 352 Md. 374, 722 A.2d 873 (1999); Vandegrift v. State,
237 Md. 305, 206 A.2d 250 (1965)). Second, the judge may influence the jury through
improper jury instructions, thus giving an advantage to either party. Id., 896 A.2d at 368
(citing Thompson v. State, 371 Md. 473, 810 A.2d 435 (2002); State v. Hutchinson, 287 Md.
198, 411 A.2d 1035 (1980); Burnette v. State, 280 Md. 88, 371 A.2d 663 (1977)). Lastly, the
judge may influence the jury during the post-verdict polling process. Id. (citing Bishop v.
State, 341 Md. 288, 670 A.2d 452 (1996); Lattisaw v. State, 329 Md. 339, 619 A.2d 548
(1993)).
141. Id. at 183-84, 896 A.2d at 368.
142. Id. at 184, 896 A.2d at 368 (emphasis in original).
143. Id. at 184-85, 896 A.2d at 368.
144. Id. at 186, 896 A.2d at 369. The court analogized the present case to Thompson, in
which the Court of Appeals held that ajury instruction was coercive since it implied that a
juror should acquiesce in a verdict rather than hold his or her beliefs. Id. at 185-86, 896
A.2d at 369 (citing Thompson, 371 Md. at 486, 810 A.2d at 443). The Butler court noted that
a judge's safest course of action when using an Allen charge is to adhere to the Maryland
Pattern Jury Instruction, MPJI-Cr 2:01, otherwise known as the "duty to deliberate" instruc-
tion. Id. at 186, 896 A.2d at 369.
145. Id. at 186-87, 896 A.2d at 370.
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fendants were the result of compulsion or were the product of honest,
uninfluenced deliberation.'4 6
The court then noted that in these situations the judge has a lim-
ited number of options. 4 7 According to the court, the judge may ei-
ther send out the jury for further deliberations with the instruction
that its verdict must be unanimous, or alternatively, the judge may
question the juror directly. 4 ' The court determined that in the pre-
sent case, however, the judge made no attempt to verify the allega-
tions against the juror, nor did he send the jury out with a unanimity
instruction. 149 Instead, the court maintained, the judge improperly
opted to comment on the juror's beliefs and inappropriately intended
to influence the juror. 150
The court concluded its analysis by restating that the U.S. Consti-
tution and Maryland's Declaration of Rights guarantee the right to a
fair trial, and that right requires that judges refrain from making po-
tentially influential statements to the jury. 5 ' The Butler court found
that the trial judge's comment was potentially coercive and, as a result,
the defendants may have been denied their constitutional right to a
fair trial.'5 2 Therefore, the Court of Appeals reversed the Court of
Special Appeals's decision and remanded the case for a new trial., 5 3
IV. ANALYSIS
In Butler v. State, the Court of Appeals held that a trial judge's
comment to a deadlocked jury-that ajuror who distrusted police but
failed to state so earlier possibly violated his oath-was potentially co-
ercive and deprived the defendants of their constitutional right to a
fair trial. ' 4 The Butler court properly erred on the side of caution, as
both the U.S. Constitution and Maryland Declaration of Rights guar-
antee an individual's right to a fair trial, and courts cannot deprive
146. Id. at 188-89, 896 A.2d at 371.
147. Id. at 189, 896 A.2d at 371.
148. Id. (quoting Lattisaw v. State, 329 Md. 339, 347, 619 A.2d 548, 552 (1993)).
149. Id.
150. Id. The court analogized the present case to another case in which the trial judge
warned the jury in a coercive manner: Lively v. Sexton, 35 Il. App. 417 (App. Ct. 1889).
Butler, 392 Md. at 190, 896 A.2d at 372. The Butler court opined that the comment in the
present case generated a similarly coercive effect. Id. at 191, 896 A.2d at 372. The court
also noted that while the judge in the present case did not per se threaten the jury, his
strong message generated a similarly coercive effect. Id. at 192, 896 A.2d at 373.
151. Butler, 392 Md. at 192, 896 A.2d at 373.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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such a right except in limited circumstances.1 55 However, the court's
decision will likely counter judicial efficiency, as its low standard for
obtaining a new trial based on prejudice will encourage more appeals
and, accordingly, more new trials. 1 6 A better approach would have
been to view the case by the totality of its circumstances to determine
if any actual prejudice occurred. 157 Moreover, the court should have
granted deference to the trial judge's decision to warn the jury. 1 58
A. The Butler Court Reached the Proper Outcome by Ensuring the
Defendants' Right to a Fair Trial
The But ler court properly ordered a new trial since the trial judge
likely deprived the defendants of their constitutional right to a fair
trial by coercing the holdoutjuror. A court cannot deprive an individ-
ual of his constitutional right to a fair trial and therefore courts
should err on the side of caution when faced with such claims.1 59 Fur-
thermore, it is possible that a decision to grant a new trial will not
have a long term effect since the end result after a new trial could
simply be the same as it was in the trial court: conviction.
The Butler court's decision to grant a new trial is justified because
of the fundamental rights implicated by the case. In Butler, the jury
deliberated for several hours before sending the judge a note stating
that ajuror does not trust the police under any circumstances. 160 Fol-
lowing the judge's comment that this juror might be violating his
oath, the jury's viewing the videotape of closing arguments, and con-
tinued deliberations, the juror who supposedly distrusted police ap-
parently had a change of heart, as the jury convicted thereafter. 6'
This juror's decision to change his verdict to guilty is a strong
indication of the coercive nature of the trial judge's comment.1 62
155. See infra Part W.A.
156. See infra Part LV.B.
157. See infra Part 1V.C.1.
158. See infra Part W.C.2.
159. E.g.,Jenkins v. State, 375 Md. 284, 319, 825 A.2d 1008, 1028-29 (2003) (noting that
a "right as fundamental as the right to an impartial jury cannot be compromised by even
the hint" of potential prejudice). This is not to say, however, that courts need to always
defer to the defendant when evaluating claims involving the right to a fair trial. For exam-
ple, if the circumstances show that it is likely that no prejudice occurred, courts should not
feel compelled to err on the side of upholding the right just because that claim was raised.
160. Butler, 392 Md. at 174-76, 896 A.2d at 362-63.
161. Id. at 179, 896 A.2d at 365. It was unclear from the record how long it took for the
jury to reach a verdict after it resumed deliberations following the judge's comment. Id. at
179 n.1, 896 A.2d at 365 n.1.
162. Cf State v. Hutchinson, 287 Md. 198, 206, 411 A.2d 1035, 1040 (1980) (noting that
the trial judge can influence the jury in a variety of ways, including with his words).
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Since the jurors had deliberated for several hours over the course of
two days and the holdout juror still stood firmly in his belief of inno-
cence, "' it is quite likely that the judge's comment in some way per-
suaded this juror to change his mind and go along with the other
jurors.
Given the realistic possibility that some of the jurors may have
been coerced to reach the verdict, the Butler court properly erred on
the side of caution in granting a new trial.' 64 The Butler court ruled in
accordance with the majority of its prior trial prejudice cases by not
risking the possibility that a trial judge deprived an individual's consti-
tutional rights.'65 Although the court should have followed precedent
that dictated the correct type of review and amount of discretion to be
used in trial prejudice cases, 16 6 the facts of Butler strongly indicate that
the defendants were in fact prejudiced, and thus the court correctly
protected the defendants' rights by ordering a new trial.
B. The Butler Court's Decision Will Cause Judicial Inefficiency, as it
Promotes a Low Prejudice Threshold and Fails to Accord
Discretion to the Trial Judge
Even though the Butler court's decision appropriately protected
two individuals' constitutional rights to a fair trial, it may result in judi-
cial inefficiency by prompting countless appeals and new trials. The
Butler court's decision could have this effect because more criminal
defendants-given the easy standard for finding prejudice and lack of
discretion given to the trial judge-will appeal their convictions on
the grounds of prejudice during trial.' 6 7 In addition, with the in-
163. Butler, 392 Md. at 174-76, 896 A.2d at 362-63.
164. See 75B Am. Jur. 2d, Trial § 1563 ("A coerced verdict does not represent the true
unanimous concurrence of the jury and, in a criminal case, deprives the accused of a fair
trial in violation of constitutional guaranties."); see also Burnette v. State, 280 Md. 88, 100,
371 A.2d 663, 669 (1977) (granting the defendants a new trial due to the coercive nature
of the Allen charge that the trial judge gave to the jury); Elmer v. State, 239 Md. 1, 10-11,
209 A.2d 776, 781-82 (1965) (holding that the trial judge's declaration in front of the jury
that a witness was hostile prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair trial and required a new
trial).
165. See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 371 Md. 473, 486-87, 810 A.2d 435, 443-44 (2002)
(ordering a new trial due to the possibly coercive Allen charge given in the trial court); see
also Vandegrift v. State, 237 Md. 305, 310, 206 A.2d 250, 253 (1965) (granting a new trial
based on the trial judge's potentially influential style of questioning a witness). But see
Leupen v. Lackey, 248 Md. 19, 26, 234 A.2d 573, 576 (1967) (upholding a possibly coercive
Allen charge because it adhered to approved versions of the charge).
166. See infra Parts IV.C.1-2.
167. Cf David J. Lowenstein &Jack Achiezer Guggenheim, Vetting the Appellate Standard
of Review: What was, What is, and What Should be the Standard of Review Employed by the United
States Court of Appeals for Veteran Claims, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 755, 776-77 (2006) (noting
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creased frequency of appeals and the low standard through which
such appeals are analyzed, appellate courts will in turn grant more
new trials.
Judicial efficiency and the quick resolution of disputes are impor-
tant policies to the functioning of the Maryland judiciary, 16' and the
Butler court's decision contravenes this policy because it will result in-
crease appeals and new trials in Maryland. 16' The Butler court's cur-
sory review of the case and its focus on a single incident in the course
of an entire trial will likely make it easier for individuals to establish a
claim of trial court prejudice.'7 ° This hasty review will, in turn, pro-
mote an increase in appeals by claimants claiming prejudice because
the claimant in essence gets another chance for a court to declare
prejudice.171 Furthermore, the lack of deference shown to the trial
judge in Butler will likely result in an increase in new trials granted by
appellate courts because they will simply make their own decisions
with less concern for how the trial judges handled matters before
them. 17
2
Therefore, the Butler court's decision will undermine the impor-
tant principle that courts should strive to promote efficiency.' 73 In-
deed, the Butler court's decision requires a minimal showing of
prejudice 174 and suggests that an appellate court should review a trial
court's actions with little if any deference. 175 As a result, more unsuc-
that if a court adopts a de novo standard of review, it could be overwhelmed with appeals
because claimants would appeal so they could have another opportunity for the court to
review the facts).
168. See William H. Edmonson, Note, A "New"No-Contact Rule: Proposing an Addition to the
Non-Contact Rule to Address Questioning of Suspects After Unreasonable Charging Delays, 80 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1773, 1789 (2005) ('judicial efficiency is politically popular, and is admittedly an
important policy motivation.").
169. See supra note 167.
170. See Butler, 392 Md. at 182, 896 A.2d at 367 (noting simply that the trial judge's
statement to the jury "could" have influenced the juror's opinion).
171. Lowenstein & Guggenheim, supra note 167, at 777 (noting statistics showing that
there are substantially more appeals to a court that reviews matters de novo than to one
that does not).
172. See Sally Baumler, Note, Appellate Review Under the Bail Reform Act, 1992 U. ILL. L.
REv. 483, 491 ("A further reason for deferring to the lower court judge is that appellate
courts already have too much work to do, and engaging in independent review would
unbearably backlog their dockets.").
173. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
174. See infra Part IV.C.1.
175. See infra Part IV.C.2.
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cessful defendants at trial will appeal and, more importantly, will be
successful in their appeal, thus resulting in more new trials. 1
76
C. A Better Approach for the Butler Court Would Have Been to Review
the Totality of the Circumstances for Possible Prejudice and to
Grant Discretion to the Trial Judge
The Butler court should have reviewed the totality of the circum-
stances of the case to determine if any actual coercion or prejudice
occurred that deprived the defendants of their right to a fair trial.
177
Moreover, the Butler court should have given the trial judge discretion
since he was in the best position to determine if the defendants were
prejudiced.1 78
1. The Butler Court Should Have Assessed the Totality of the
Circumstances to Determine if any Actual Prejudice Occurred
The Butler court would have done a more complete analysis of the
record had it reviewed the totality of the circumstances when deciding
if the trial judge prejudiced the defendants. Unlike in Johnson v. State,
the Butler court did not truly review the record to determine if the jury
was impermissibly coerced, nor did it require a clear showing of such
coercion. 179 Rather, the court in Butler merely concluded that given
the judge's persuasive role in a trial, his comments may have coerced
the holdout juror to change his mind. 8 °
Applying a totality of the circumstances approach could have re-
vealed that the judge's comment did not in fact prejudice the defend-
ants. 81 In Johnson, the Court of Appeals reviewed the case under a
totality of the circumstances approach. 82 The Johnson court pointed
out that had the possibly prejudicial conduct been limited to a few
176. Cf Lowenstein & Guggenheim, supra note 167, at 777 ("The substantial increase in
caseload that could occur as a result of a de novo standard of review... would create a
strain on the court and possibly swamp its resources.").
177. See infra Part IV.C.1.
178. See infra Part IV.C.2.
179. SeeJohnson v. State, 352 Md. 374, 387, 722 A.2d 873, 879 (1999).
180. See Butler, 392 Md. at 182, 896 A.2d at 367 ("As gentle as the admonishment may
have appeared to the judge, it may have carried great weight in the minds of the jurors
(especially the mind of the juror who allegedly held certain views about police officers)
who may be very susceptible to a judge's words and instructions.").
181. See 75B Am. Jur., supra note 164, at § 1563 (" [E]ven where coercion of the jury has
occurred, it is not reversible error in the absence of a prejudicial effect").
182. Johnson, 352 Md. at 393-94, 722 A.2d at 882; see also Suggs v. State, 87 Md. App. 250,
257, 589 A.2d 551, 555 (1991) (reviewing the trial circumstances in their totality to deter-
mine if prejudice occurred).
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instances, it might have concluded that no prejudice occurred. 18 "
However, the court reasoned, the numerous incidents that occurred
in that case taken together clearly violated the criminal defendant's
right to a fair trial.' 84 The Butler court should have followed this same
approach and considered whether the judge's comment to the jury
was presumptively prejudicial in light of the totality of the circum-
stances. 18 5 Given the Johnson court's statement that courts may de-
clare possibly prejudicial conduct non-prejudicial if the conduct is
limited to only a few instances, 86 it is possible that the Court of Ap-
peals would declare the judge's comment in Butler87 non-prejudicial,
as it was the only possibly prejudicial occurrence.18 As a result, the
Butler court might have upheld the defendants' convictions due to the
overall lack of prejudice when taking into consideration all the
circumstances. 18
9
In sum, the Butler court should have followed precedent that pro-
posed the proper approach for analyzing a claim of prejudice during
trial. Under such an approach, the court would review the case under
the totality of its circumstances to determine if any actual prejudice
occurred. 9 ° The benefit of a deliberate review of the totality of the
circumstances is that more of the court's decisions to grant new trials
will be based on the likelihood of real prejudice, rather than the emo-
tional effect on the appellate judges that a trial judge's unusual com-
ment may have. Although the Butler court might have reached the
same result had it reviewed the record as a whole, it improperly skip-
ped an analysis of the totality of the circumstances.
2. The Butler Court Should Have Granted the Trial Judge Deference
in Deciding how to Conduct his Trial
Even though an appellate court should grant deference to a trial
judge's actions, the court in Butler exhibited no such discretion. In-
deed, the court cited Kelly v. State as authority in its decision but failed
183. Johnson, 352 Md. at 387, 722 A.2d at 879.
184. Id. at 393-94, 722 A.2d at 882.
185. See id. at 387, 722 A.2d at 879 (noting that an appellate court should look at all of
the circumstances during trial to determine if the defendant was prejudiced).
186. Id.
187. The trial judge in Butler stated that "if anybody deliberates with that spirit now, I
suggest they might be violating their oath." Butler, 392 Md. at 178, 896 A.2d at 364.
188. See Apple v. State, 190 Md. 661, 670, 59 A.2d 509, 513 (1948) (affirming a convic-
tion even though a few of the trial judge's statements in front of the jury might have exhib-
ited his annoyance with defense counsel because the record as a whole did not show that
appellant was prejudiced); see also supra notes 98-101.
189. I do not suggest that a different result was likely; only that it was possible.
190. See supra Part 1I.B.
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to apply the deference that Kelly espoused.' 9 ' In Kelly, the court em-
phasized that the words a judge chooses when giving an Allen charge
are left to the discretion of the trial judge. 192 However, the court in
Butler, even while acknowledging Kelly as a similar case involving al-
leged prejudice, failed to extend to the trial judge the discretion it
dictated an appellate court shall give.' 93
The Butler court also overlooked precedent from other prejudice
contexts that stressed that a trial judge has discretion in deciding how
to handle situations that may arise during the course of trial. 19 4 In
Bryant v. State, the court stated that trial judges have discretion to com-
ment on attorneys' conduct as long as they do not deny an individual
his right to a fair and impartial jury.t9 5 Likewise, in Lattisaw v. State,
the court maintained that the trial court has discretion to decide
whether to move forward with a verdict after a juror gives an ambigu-
ous response during jury polling, since it is in a "unique position to
observe the juror's demeanor and tone of voice in responding to the
poll."' 96 However, the Butler court made no mention of any discretion
accorded to the trial judge, and instead applied its own independent
judgment as if the trial judge's determination was irrelevant.
The court in Butler should have granted some level of deference
to the trial judge's decision to make the comment to the jury. While
the court cited and relied upon its own prior cases, it did not grant
the deference those cases required 9 7 and instead substituted its own
judgment. The Butler court's review of the case without any deference
to the trial court's decision is problematic because the proper defer-
ential review might have produced a different result.'9 8 Under such a
limitation, it is possible that the Butler court would have held that the
judge did not abuse his discretion and upheld the convictions. The
benefit to this approach, in addition to improving judicial efficiency,
would be that decisions about how a trial will proceed are left to those
191. See Butler, 392 Md. at 185, 896 A.2d at 369 (citing Kelly in its discussion of when trial
judges can use Allen charges).
192. 270 Md. 139, 143, 310 A.2d 538, 541 (1973). The Kelly court also noted that each
jury is unique and thus the trial judge is in the best position to make ajudgment on giving
an Allen charge. Id.
193. Butler, 392 Md. at 185, 896 A.2d at 369.
194. See Bishop v. State, 341 Md. 288, 293, 670 A.2d 452, 455 (1996) (noting a trial
court's discretion in deciding whether a juror's response during polling is ambiguous).
195. 207 Md. 565, 585, 115 A.2d 502, 511 (1955).
196. 329 Md. 339, 346, 619 A.2d 548, 551 (1993).
197. See supra notes 108-127 and accompanying text.
198. See, e.g., Malin v. Mininberg, 153 Md. App. 358, 414-15, 837 A.2d 178, 211 (2003)
(stating that with proper discretion given to the trial court, an appellate court will affirm its
decision even if it would have a reached a different result originally).
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individuals in the best position to make them-trial judges-and
judges could be confident that their decisions will not always be sec-
ond-guessed.' 9
V. CONCLUSION
In Butler v. State,20 the Court of Appeals held that a trial judge's
comment to the jury during deliberations-that one of the jurors
might be violating his oath if he hid his distrust of police-was poten-
tially coercive and thus deprived the defendants of their right to a fair
trial. The Butler court's decision to order a new trial was proper be-
cause courts must take all precautions to make sure trial judges do not
deprive individuals of their constitutional right to a fair trial.2 1 Not-
withstanding its correct conclusion, in its hasty review the court failed
to consider that its decision could result in an increase in appeals and
new trials, thus undermining Maryland's policy of promoting judicial
efficiency. 20 2 A better approach for the court would have been to view
the situation by the totality of its circumstances to determine if any
actual prejudice occurred. u 3 Moreover, the court should have
granted discretion to the trial judge rather than substitute its own
judgment, since the trial judge was in the best position to determine
the proper course of action in the case. 20 4
MATTHEW G. JEWELER
199. See Newman v. State, 384 Md. 285, 328, 863 A.2d 321, 346 (2004) (noting that only
in the rarest of instances should an appellate court second-guess a trial judge's decision as
to whether an error requires the granting of a mistrial).
200. Butler, 392 Md. at 192, 896 A.2d at 373.
201. See supra Part LV.A.
202. See supra Part JV.B.
203. See supra Part IV.C.1.
204. See supra Part IV.C.2.
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STATE v. WILKINS: FAULTY REASONING JEOPARDIZES
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS' RIGHT TO
SENTENCING DISCRETION
In State v. Wilkins,' the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered
the effect of a sentencing judge's failure to recognize his right to exer-
cise sentencing discretion and whether a motion to correct an illegal
sentence was the appropriate vehicle to raise this issue.2 The court
held that a sentence is not rendered illegal by a sentencing judge's
failure to recognize discretion, and thus a motion to correct an illegal
sentence is an improper means by which to raise a challenge.3 Al-
though the court reached the proper outcome in this case by denying
Wilkins's motion to correct an illegal sentence, it did so by relying on
faulty reasoning that departed from precedent.4 Specifically, the
court erred by treating the judge's failure to recognize discretion as a
procedural, rather than a substantive, error. The court should have
held that this failure is a substantive error, and if made manifest on
the record, renders the sentence illegal as a matter of substantive law.6
Accordingly, the court should have recognized that in such circum-
stances, a motion to correct an illegal sentence is a fitting vehicle to
remedy the illegal sentence.7
I. THE CASE
In December 1971, Ralph Edward Wilkins was tried before a jury
and convicted of first-degree murder in the Circuit Court for Prince
George's County.8 Wilkins was sentenced to life imprisonment in Jan-
uary 1972.' The Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed both the
judgment and the life sentence on direct appeal in 1973.1°
At his sentencing, Wilkins argued that Maryland law gave a sen-
tencingjudge the discretion to impose a sentence of less than life im-
Copyright © 2007 by Ryan D. Stottmann.
1. 393 Md. 269, 900 A.2d 765 (2006).
2. Id. at 272, 900 A.2d at 767.
3. Id. at 272, 284, 900 A.2d at 767, 774.
4. See infta Part IV.
5. See infra Part IV.A.1.
6. See infra Part IV.A.2.
7. See infra Part I.B.
8. Wilkins, 393 Md. at 271, 900 A.2d at 766.
9. Id.
10. Wilkins v. State, 16 Md. App. 587, 610, 300 A.2d 411, 423 (1973).
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prisonment for first-degree murder." Wilkins asked the judge to
exercise discretion and impose a lesser sentence based on several miti-
gating factors.1 2 During the hearing, Wilkins's attorney and the sen-
tencing judge engaged in an extensive colloquy about the judge's
authority to use discretion and impose a lesser sentence.' 3 Ultimately,
the sentencing judge declined to lessen the sentence and imposed a
life sentence, prompting Wilkins's eventual claim for failure to recog-
nize discretion.14
In June 2003, more than thirty years after his conviction, Wilkins
sought post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court for Prince George's
County. 5 Wilkins claimed that the sentencing judge's failure to rec-
ognize his authority to suspend part of Wilkins's sentence constituted
an abuse of discretion. 6 In May 2004, Wilkins filed a motion in the
circuit court to correct an illegal sentence; when the court denied that
motion, Wilkins appealed the decision to the Court of Special
Appeals. 7
The Court of Special Appeals vacated Wilkins's sentence as illegal
and remanded the case to the circuit court.'" The court determined
that a sentencing judge has the discretion to suspend any portion of a
life sentence and that a refusal to exercise this discretion is error.'9
The court distinguished State v. Chaney, in which the Court of Appeals
found no error in a sentence because the record did not sufficiently
show that the sentencing judge failed to exercise his discretion.2 ° Un-
like in Chaney, the Court of Special Appeals found that the Wilkins
record clearly showed that the trial court was unaware of its discretion
11. Wilkins v. State, 162 Md. App. 512, 516, 875 A.2d 231, 234 (2005).
12. Id. Among the mitigating factors were that Wilkins had turned himself in to the
police voluntarily, had been a "tier representative" and a calming influence at the county
jail, and had "endured an abusive childhood and troubled upbringing." Id. at 516-17, 875
A.2d at 234.
13. Id. at 517-19, 875 A.2d at 234-36.
14. Id. at 519, 875 A.2d at 236. The sentencing judge concluded that:
[E]ven though [Wilkins's] counsel has argued that the court could give some-
thing else than life imprisonment, we don't agree with this. On the other hand,
let the record clearly show we will assume that we do have a right to give some-
thing less than the death penalty, but in this case we see no reason in the world
why there should be anything other than the life imprisonment in this case be-
cause it is just not warranted under the facts of what happened.
Id.
15. Wilkins, 393 Md. at 271, 900 A.2d at 767.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 272, 900 A.2d at 767.
18. Id.
19. Wilkins, 162 Md. App. at 525, 875 A.2d at 239.
20. Id. at 522-23, 875 A.2d at 237-38 (discussing State v. Chaney, 375 Md. 168, 825 A.2d
452 (2003)).
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and misstated the law.2 ' The court concluded that the sentencing
judge's failure to recognize his right to consider suspending part of
Wilkins's sentence rendered the sentence illegal. 22 The Court of Spe-
cial Appeals then remanded the case to the trial court for re-
sentencing.23
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to determine whether a
sentencing judge's failure to recognize the right to exercise discretion
in the imposition of a sentence renders the sentence illegal under
Maryland law, and whether a motion to correct an illegal sentence is
an appropriate procedural vehicle to resolve this question.24
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In Maryland, the right of a sentencing judge to use discretion in
imposing a lesser sentence has not always been absolute, and has
evolved and expanded over time.25 The use ofjudicial discretion, spe-
cifically sentencing discretion, has broadened over the past three de-
cades, as have the consequences of a sentencing judge's failure to
recognize or exercise discretion. 26 Recently, Maryland courts have be-
gun to use Maryland Rule 4-345 as a procedural vehicle to challenge a
failure to recognize sentencing discretion.
27
A. Sentencing Discretion for First-Degree Murder Convictions in
Maryland
Prior to 1970, sentencing courts in Maryland were bound under
Article 27, section 413 to issue one of two sentences for first-degree
murder: death or life imprisonment. 28 In 1963, the Court of Appeals
confirmed that sentencing discretion in first-degree murder cases was
limited to a choice between "two alternative penalties" of death or life
imprisonment and the court would not consider any other option.29
21. Id.
22. Id. at 525, 875 A.2d at 239.
23. Id.
24. Wilkins, 393 Md. at 272, 900 A.2d at 767.
25. See infra Part II.A.
26. See infra Part 1I.B.
27. See infra Part HI.C.
28. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413 (1957), repealed and reenacted without substantive
change as MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 2-202, 2-303, 2-304 (LexisNexis 2002) ("Every per-
son convicted of murder in the first degree . .. shall suffer death, or undergo a confine-
ment in the penitentiary of the State for the period of their natural life ...."); see also
White v. State, 227 Md. 615, 620, 177 A.2d 877, 879 (1962), overruled on other grounds by
White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (per curiam) (describing the options under section
413 as "the two alternative penalties").
29. White, 227 Md. at 620, 177 A.2d at 879.
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Seven years later, the Court of Special Appeals also described first-
degree murder as "punishable in the discretion of the judge, by death
or life imprisonment," with no indication that a judge could discre-
tionarily impose a sentence of less than life.3" These descriptions sig-
nify that, prior to 1970, sentencing judges considered themselves
limited to imposing only life imprisonment or death for first-degree
murder, with no discretion under section 413 to impose anything
less.31
Technically, this lack of sentencing discretion changed on July 1,
1970, when the Maryland General Assembly enacted Article 27, sec-
tion 641A, which gave a sentencing court the power to use discretion
to suspend or impose a lesser sentence in cases of its jurisdiction.3 2
However, even after the passage of section 641A, sentencing courts
failed to realize that the statute gave them discretion to lessen
sentences for life imprisonment.33 For example, two years after the
passage of section 641A, the Court of Special Appeals stated that first-
degree murder carried only the alternative penalties of life imprison-
ment or death, indicating judicial uncertainty about the scope and
applicability of reducing sentences under section 641A. 4
In 1976, the Court of Appeals addressed this uncertainty and clar-
ified the scope of section 641A in State v. Wooten.35 In that case, defen-
dant Wooten was sentenced to life imprisonment for first-degree
murder, but the sentencing court suspended all but the first eight
years of the sentence.36 The Court of Appeals upheld the suspension
of the sentence, stating that section 641A gives sentencing courts the
30. Gray v. State, 6 Md. App. 677, 684, 253 A.2d 395, 399 (1969).
31. See also Veney v. State, 251 Md. 182, 188, 246 A.2d 568, 571 (1968) (commenting
that "there have been many convictions in Maryland of murder in the first degree
where ... the sentence has been to life imprisonment rather than death").
32. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 641A (1970), repealed and reenacted without substantive
change as MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 6-221 to -222(a) (LexisNexis 2001). The statute
provided, in relevant part: "Upon entering a judgment of conviction, the court having
jurisdiction, may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant
on probation upon such terms and conditions as the courts deem proper." Id.
33. See Pollard v. State, 394 Md. 40, 51-52, 904 A.2d 500, 507 (2006) (Raker, J., concur-
ring) (noting that "the issue of whether § 641A permitted a trial judge to suspend a por-
tion of a life sentence was far from settled" in the early 1970s).
34. Dodson v. State, 14 Md. App. 483, 486, 287 A.2d 324, 325 (1972) (describing the
life imprisonment statute after the passage of section 641A as allowing "two alternative
penalties, each fixed by the Legislature itself, without committing to the trial judge any
discretion except a choice between the two"); see also Chandler v. Maryland, 360 F. Supp.
305, 310 (D. Md. 1972) (stating that, under Maryland law, a verdict of first-degree murder
"carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment") (emphasis added).
35. 277 Md. 114, 352 A.2d 829 (1976).
36. Id. at 115, 352 A.2d at 830.
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clear and unqualified right to suspend any sentence.37 Accordingly,
the Wooten court clarified that section 641A provides sentencing
judges the discretion to reduce a sentence of life imprisonment fol-
lowing a conviction for first degree murder.38
B. The Presumption of Judicial Knowledge of Sentencing Discretion
After clarifying the scope of section 641A in Wooten, the Court of
Appeals considered the effects of a sentencing judge's failure to com-
ply with section 641A. Three years after Wooten, in Williamson v.
State,39 the sentencing judge explicitly refused to recognize his discre-
tion to suspend a sentence.4" The Court of Appeals found that the
judge's refusal to consider whether to suspend any portion of the life
sentence denied the defendant her right to a proper exercise of judi-
cial discretion.4' The court ordered a new sentencing hearing and
instructed the judge to use discretion to consider suspending the sen-
tence.4" Williamson thus marked the first time that a court found sub-
stantive error due to a judge's failure to recognize sentencing
discretion.
Next, the Court of Appeals went a step further by establishing
that when a trial court has the discretion to act, it must exercise that
discretion." In Maus v. State,44 the court applied this general princi-
ple to sentencing cases.45 In Maus, the sentencing court failed to rec-
ognize discretion because it did not believe it had the ability to take
into account time already served by the defendant when determining
the appropriate sentence.46 The court held that a failure to exercise
37. Id. at 117, 352 A.2d at 831. The Wooten court stated that "in clear, unambiguous
and unqualified language, [section 641A] bestows upon courts the power to suspend com-
pletely or partially any and all sentences over which they have jurisdiction." Id.
38. See id. at 117-18, 352 A.2d at 832 (noting that there is nothing in the statute that
exempted life sentences from the reach of section 641A).
39. 284 Md. 212, 395 A.2d 496 (1979).
40. Id. at 214, 395 A.2d at 497. The sentencing judge stated: "I completely disagree
with Judge Raine and the Court of Appeals. I think the Legislature said when a person kills
somebody else or causes them to be killed, it's life. So as far as I am concerned, the sen-
tence on the murder charge is life. Id.
41. Id. at 215, 395 A.2d at 497.
42. Id.
43. See Colter v. State, 297 Md. 423, 426, 466 A.2d 1286, 1288 (1983) (noting the gen-
eral principle that a court must exercise discretion when given it).
44. 311 Md. 85, 532 A.2d 1066 (1987).
45. See id. at 108, 532 A.2d 1077-78 (citing Colter v. State with approval and applying it
to a case involving sentencing discretion).
46. Id.
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discretion in sentencing amounts to error and ordinarily requires
reversal.47
Although a court is required to exercise sentencing discretion,
the Court of Appeals has held that ajudge need not state with particu-
larity each time he is exercising discretion because there is a presump-
tion that the trial judge knows the law.48 For example, in State v.
Chaney,49 the sentencing judge stated that he was using discretion in
refusing to lessen a life sentence, but failed to expressly acknowledge
that section 641A allowed him to do so.5 ° The Chaney court found
that the failure to expressly acknowledge section 641A does not mean
the judge was unaware of the law.5' The Court of Appeals has since
bolstered Chaney's holding by presuming that, in the absence of any
"misstatement of law or conduct inconsistent with the law," a trial
court knows and properly applies the law.52 Thus, although ajudge is
required to recognize and exercise discretion, the Court of Appeals
has ensured that the fact that it is not done expressly in the record
does not reflect a lack of recognition and does not constitute error.
47. Id.
48. See State v. Chaney, 375 Md. 168, 181, 825 A.2d 452, 459 (2003) ("The presumption
that trial judges know the law and apply it properly is of long standing. . . ."). But see
Gunning v. State, 347 Md. 332, 351, 701 A.2d 374, 383 (1997) ("It is well settled that a trial
judge who encounters a matter that falls within the realm ofjudicial discretion must exer-
cise his or her discretion in ruling on the matter .... That exercise of discretion must be
clear from the record."); Nelson v. State, 315 Md. 62, 70, 553 A.2d 667, 671 (1989) ("If the
judge has discretion, he must use it and the record must show that he used it.").
49. 375 Md. 168, 825 A.2d 452 (2003).
50. Id. at 178-79, 825 A.2d at 458.
51. Id. at 179, 825 A.2d at 458. The court stated:
The issue before us, therefore, is whether the sentencing judge's failure expressly
and consecutively to acknowledge the existence of a second statute permitting a
suspension of that sentence, [section 641A], is sufficient to infer that he was una-
ware of its potential application to the sentence he imposed in the case subjudice.
We conclude that it is not.
52. Id. Medley v. State, 386 Md. 3, 7, 870 A.2d 1218, 1220 (2005) (quoting Chaney, 375
Md. at 179, 825 A.2d at 459); see also Med. Mut. Liab. Ins. Soc'y v. Evans, 330 Md. 1, 34, 622
A.2d 103, 119 (1993) (noting that judges are "presumed to know the law and lawfully and
correctly to apply it"); Beales v. State, 329 Md. 263, 273, 619 A.2d 105, 110 (1993) (recog-
nizing a "strong presumption thatjudges properly perform their duties" and observing that
"trial judges are not obliged to spell out in words every thought and step of logic"); State v.
Dopkowski, 325 Md. 671, 683, 602 A.2d 1185, 1191 (1992) (finding no abuse of discretion
when ajudge reimposed a sentence, after an adjudication of violation of probation, with-
out explicitly stating that he exercised his discretion).
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C. Maryland Rule 4-345 and Sentencing Errors
Maryland Rule 4-345(a) provides that a "court may correct an ille-
gal sentence at any time.""S In a series of cases, the Court of Appeals
has emphasized that a trial court has both the authority and the re-
sponsibility to correct an illegal sentence using Rule 4-345 and that a
failure to do so can be raised by a defendant at any time, not just on
direct review.54 As the court explained in Walczak v. State,55 because
the illegal sentence can be corrected at any time, a failure to immedi-
ately raise the issue does not waive the defendant's right to challenge
the sentence." One year later, in Corcoran v. State,57 the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals addressed the Walczak decision, emphasizing that the ex-
ception to the waiver doctrine applies only to substantive, not
procedural, law. 5' The court explained that a flaw in the sentencing
procedure is not enough to render a sentence illegal; an illegal sen-
tence is only caused by a substantive error, such as the imposition of a
sentence that exceeds the statutorily granted authority of the judge.59
The Corcoran decision indicated that Maryland Rule 4-345 is appli-
cable only when there is a substantive error in the sentence, as op-
posed to a procedural flaw in the sentencing proceedings.60 The
Court of Appeals confirmed in Evans v. State6 that there must be
"some illegality in the sentence itself" for the error to be substantive
and a motion to correct an illegal sentence to be appropriate. 2 For
example, in Ridgeway v. State,63 the Court of Appeals held that mistak-
53. MD. R. 4-345(a). The Court of Appeals has defined an illegal sentence as one "not
permitted by law." Walczak v. State, 302 Md. 422, 427, 488 A.2d 949, 951 (1985); see also
Holmes v. State, 362 Md. 190, 195-96, 763 A.2d 737, 740 (2000) ("A sentence that is not
permitted by statute is an illegal sentence.").
54. See, e.g., Mateen v. Saar, 376 Md. 385, 397, 829 A.2d 1007, 1014 (2003); State v.
Kanaras, 357 Md. 170, 180, 742 A.2d 508, 514 (1999); Coles v. State, 290 Md. 296, 303, 429
A.2d 1029, 1032 (1981).
55. 302 Md. 422, 488 A.2d 949 (1985).
56. Id. at 427, 488 A.2d at 951.
57. 67 Md. App. 252, 507 A.2d 200 (1986).
58. Id. at 255, 507 A.2d at 202.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 255-56, 507 A.2d at 202.
61. 382 Md. 248, 855 A.2d 291 (2004).
62. Id. at 278, 855 A.2d at 309; see also Baker v. State, 389 Md. 127, 133, 883 A.2d 916,
919 (2005) ("[A] motion to correct an illegal sentence historically was entertained only
where the alleged illegality was in the sentence itself or the sentence never should have
been imposed.").
63. 369 Md. 165, 797 A.2d 1287 (2002).
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enly sentencing a defendant for crimes of which he had actually been
acquitted is a substantive error that results in an illegal sentence.64
Similarly, in Moosavi v. State,65 the court found substantive error
when a lower court mistakenly charged and convicted a defendant
under the wrong statute, resulting in the imposition of an illegal sen-
tence.6 6 In Jones v. State,67 the court held that a sentence is illegal if it
is based upon a guilty verdict in a jury trial that was not orally an-
nounced in court. Because these errors are substantive and make the
sentences themselves illegal, such errors are appropriate for review
under Rule 4-345.
On the other hand, procedural errors during the sentencing pro-
ceeding do not render the sentence illegal under Maryland Rule 4-345
when the resulting sentence is itself lawful.68 For example, in Randall
Book Corp. v. State,69 the existence of improper motivation by the sen-
tencingjudge was held to be a procedural error that did not result in
an illegal sentence. Similarly, in Teasley v. State,7° the court found no
substantive error when a sentencing judge mistakenly applied im-
proper sentencing guidelines during the sentencing proceedings. 71
The Supreme Court of the United States has also weighed in on this
issue, holding that the procedural error that resulted when a defen-
dant was prevented from introducing mitigating evidence during sen-
tencing proceedings did not make the sentence illegal by definition.72
Thus, when the sentence itself is lawful and the only errors are proce-
64. This is substantive error because the court's action in reviewing the sentence "was
not to correct a mistake, but rather, it was to correct this illegal sentence." Id. at 171, 797
A.2d at 1290.
65. 355 Md. 651, 736 A.2d 285 (1999).
66. Id. at 662-63, 736 A.2d at 291.
67. 384 Md. 669, 866 A.2d 151 (2005).
68. See Evans v. State, 382 Md. 248, 278, 855 A.2d 291, 309 (2004) ("[A]s a general rule,
a Rule 4-345(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence is not appropriate where the alleged
illegality did not inhere in the defendant's sentence." (quoting State v. Kanaras, 357 Md.
170, 185, 742 A.2d 508, 517 (1999)) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)).
69. 316 Md. 315, 323, 558 A.2d 715, 719 (1989).
70. 298 Md. 364, 470 A.2d 337 (1984).
71. 1& at 371, 470 A.2d at 340. The sentencing judge mistakenly applied a consecutive
sentence rather than a concurrent sentence. Id. at 369-70, 470 A.2d at 339-40. The court
found the sentence legal because it "constituted the end result of a good faith exercise of
the trial judge's discretion." Id. at 371, 470 A.2d at 340.
72. See Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 430 (1962) ("The sentence in this case was
not illegal. The punishment meted out was not in excess of that prescribed by the relevant
statutes, multiple terms were not imposed for the same offense, nor were the terms of the
sentence itself legally or constitutionally invalid in any other respect.").
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dural, a Rule 4-345 motion to correct an illegal sentence is not the
proper vehicle to correct a sentence. v3
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In State v. Wilkins, the Court of Appeals held that a sentencing
judge's failure to recognize his right to exercise discretion is a proce-
dural error that does not render a sentence illegal, and thus a motion
to correct an illegal sentence is an improper tool to raise this ques-
tion.7 1 Writing for the majority, Judge Greene first examined the le-
gality of a sentence when a judge fails to recognize his right to
exercise discretion in sentencing.7 5 The court acknowledged the stat-
utory right of a court to correct an illegal sentence at any time, but
noted that a motion to correct an illegal sentence is appropriate only
where there is a substantive error in the sentence itself.7 6 The court
observed that procedural errors do not render a sentence illegal when
the resulting sentence is itself lawful.7v The majority emphasized that
the concept of an illegal sentence exclusively involves substantive law,
not procedural law.78
Turning to Wilkins's sentence, the court concluded that, because
life imprisonment for first-degree murder is a sentence technically
permitted by law-because the sentencing statute provided for life im-
prisonment as a penalty for first-degree murder-any alleged error
was procedural and did not inhere in the sentence itself.7 9 The court
concluded that even if the trial court refused to exercise discretion,
the sentence actually imposed was within the sentencing requirements
and was therefore lawful.8 0
The court next distinguished Williamson v. State, a case that was
factually analogous but resulted in a different outcome.8 ' In William-
son, the court explained, the judge's express refusal to exercise discre-
tion was raised on direct appeal, whereas in Wilkins's case, the judge's
alleged refusal was raised in a collateral attack on the sentence. 2 The
73. See Baker v. State, 389 Md. 127, 134, 883 A.2d 916, 920 (2005) (finding a Rule 4-
345(a) motion inappropriate where the sentence was itself lawful).
74. Wilkins, 393 Md. at 272, 284, 900 A.2d at 767, 774.
75. Id. at 273, 900 A.2d at 767-68. The majority noted that the court has defined an
illegal sentence as one not permitted by statute. Id., 900 A.2d at 767.
76. Id., 900 A.2d at 767-68.
77. Id. at 275, 900 A.2d at 769.
78. Id. at 273, 900 A.2d at 768 (citing Corcoran v. State, 67 Md. App. 252, 255, 507 A.2d
200, 202 (1986)).
79. Id. at 278, 900 A.2d at 770.
80. Id., 900 A.2d at 771.
81. Id. at 281-82, 900 A.2d at 773.
82. Id. at 282, 900 A.2d at 773.
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court noted that direct appeal would have been a proper time to raise
the issue, but Wilkins failed to do so.83
The Wilkins court then relied upon State v. Chaney to support its
conclusion that a sentencing judge is presumed to know the law and
that his failure to specifically acknowledge his discretion does not
mean that he is unaware of the right to use this discretion. 4 Recog-
nizing that Chaney and Williamson were not entirely on point, the court
ended its analysis by invoking the underlying principles of those cases
to find that a motion to correct an illegal sentence is an improper
vehicle to raise this particular issue.8 5
Judge Harrell filed a partial dissent in which he stated that,
though he reached a similar result as the majority, he disagreed with
the majority's reasoning. 6 He argued that a sentencing judge's fail-
ure to recognize his discretion in sentencing is a substantive error that
inheres in the sentence itself, thus making the sentence illegal if the
failure to recognize discretion was clearly on the record. 7 In this
case, however, Judge Harrell maintained that the record did not estab-
lish a failure to recognize discretion.8 8
Judge Harrell then criticized the majority's conclusion that a sen-
tence was legal so long as it was within the statutorily permitted sen-
tencing limits as both novel and unsupported by precedent."9 He
claimed that the cases relied upon by the majority were distinguisha-
ble from this case because such cases concerned procedural errors,
not the violation of substantive statutory authority that Wilkins
alleged."°
Judge Harrell also recognized the principles expressed in William-
son and Wooten that courts have the statutory authority to suspend any
or all sentences and that a sentencing judge is in error if he refuses to
83. Id. at 280, 900 A.2d at 772.
84. Id. at 282-84, 900 A.2d at 773-74.
85. Id. at 284, 900 A.2d at 774.
86. Id. at 285, 900 A.2d at 775 (Harrell, J., concurring and dissenting). Chief Judge
Bell also joined in Judge Harrell's opinion. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 286, 900 A.2d at 775.
90. Id. Specifically, Judge Harrell distinguished Randall Book Corp. v. State, 316 Md.
315, 558 A.2d 715 (1989), which involved ajudge's improper consideration of extraneous
circumstances during the sentencing hearing. Wilkins, 393 Md. at 286-87, 900 A.2d at
775-76 (Harrell, J., concurring and dissenting). As Judge Harrell explained, the Randall
Book court ultimately determined that even though the trial court committed an error
during the sentencing proceeding, the sentence itself was still legal. Id. Judge Harrell
categorized this as a procedural defect and thus distinguishable from the substantive statu-
tory defect of Wilkins's case. Id.
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acknowledge his discretion to suspend a sentence." He reasoned that
if a judge refuses to recognize his power of discretion, any resulting
sentence is illegal since the judge imposed a sentence in violation of a
statute requiring him to exercise discretion.92 According to Judge
Harrell, imposing a sentence in a manner that violates a statute is an
error that inheres in the sentence itself, resulting in an illegal
sentence. 3
Finally, Judge Harrell emphasized that any alleged error in a
judge's refusal to recognize discretion must be made manifest on the
record.94 In Wilkins's case, he found that the record did not show
that the sentencing judge refused to recognize his power to suspend
the sentence.95 He distinguished the facts from Williamson, where
there was an explicit refusal to recognize discretion by the sentencing
judge.96 In the present case, Judge Harrell maintained, there was no
indication on the record that would lead the court to reasonably con-
clude that the judge refused to recognize his discretionary power to
reduce a sentence.97 Accordingly, Judge Harrell found no merit in
Wilkins's appeal and would have reversed and remanded the case to
the Court of Special Appeals with instructions to affirm the circuit
court decision.98
IV. ANALYSIS
In State v. Wilkins, the Court of Appeals held that a sentencing
judge's failure to recognize discretion does not render a sentence sub-
stantively illegal and that a motion to correct an illegal sentence is an
improper mechanism to address this issue. 99 The court reached the
proper result in denying Wilkins's motion to correct an illegal sen-
tence, but in doing so, relied upon faulty reasoning that departed
from precedent. t00 The court erroneously found that a sentencing
91. Id. at 288, 900 A.2d at 776.
92. Id. Judge Harrell contended that, because section 641A gives ajudge a clear statu-
tory mandate to use discretion, and because Williamson and Wooten stated that a refusal to
acknowledge this discretion is error, a judge violates a statutory mandate if he fails to ac-
knowledge his discretion. Id. Essentially, this results in the imposition of a sentence in
violation of a statute. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 285, 900 A.2d at 775.
95. Id. at 288, 900 A.2d at 777.
96. Id. at 289, 900 A.2d at 777.
97. Id. Judge Harrell found that the judge was aware of his power and exercised it
accordingly, even if he chose not to suspend any part of the sentence. Id.
98. Id. at 290, 900 A.2d at 777.
99. Id. at 272, 900 A.2d at 767 (majority opinion).
100. See infta Part IV.A.
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judge's failure to recognize discretion is a procedural error and not a
substantive error that results in an illegal sentence.'' Instead, the
court should have recognized that in cases where a sentencing judge
expressly refuses to recognize his discretion, the sentence itself is ren-
dered illegal by this substantive error.'0 2 Accordingly, the court
should have also held that a motion to correct an illegal sentence is a
proper vehicle to remedy this error.'0 3
A. The Court of Appeals Departed from Precedent in Finding that a
Refusal to Recognize Discretion Is a Procedural Error
The Wilkins court misinterpreted precedent by holding that a
sentencing judge's failure to recognize discretion is a procedural flaw,
not a substantive error.10 4 The court should have held that a failure
to recognize discretion results in a substantive error that renders a
sentence illegal.'0 5 For the sentence to be illegal, however, the
judge's failure must be clear in the record.'0 6
1. A Failure to Recognize the Right to Exercise Discretion Renders a
Sentence Substantively Illegal
The Wilkins court should have held that a sentencing judge's fail-
ure to recognize discretion constitutes a substantive error that makes a
sentence illegal.'0o The Court of Appeals has long interpreted section
641A as giving sentencing courts the discretionary power to suspend
sentences and has held that a trial court must exercise discretion
when given it.' Accordingly, the Wilkins court should have held that
101. See infra Part IV.A.1.
102. See infra Part IV.A.2.
103. See infra Part IV.B.
104. See Wilkins, 393 Md. at 286, 900 A.2d at 775 (Harrell,J., concurring and dissenting)
(stating that the Court of Appeals has "never held so until now" that a sentence is not
illegal so long as it "falls within the statutorily permitted sentencing limits for the crime").
105. See id. (stating that a failure to recognize discretion that is clear in the trial record
results in a substantive error that makes the sentence itself unlawful).
106. Id.
107. See id. (arguing that "a sentencing judge's failure to recognize his or her discretion
in sentencing a defendant, if made manifest on the record, is a deficiency that inheres in
the sentence itself").
108. E.g., State v. Chaney, 375 Md. 168, 176 n.4, 825 A.2d 452, 456 n.4 (2003); William-
son v. State, 284 Md. 212, 214, 395 A.2d 496, 497 (1979); State v. Wooten, 277 Md. 114,
117, 352 A.2d 829, 831 (1976); see also Colter v. State, 297 Md. 423, 426, 466 A.2d 1286,
1288 (1983) ("[W]e observe that when a court has discretion to act, it must exercise that
discretion as that is one of its functions.").
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a failure to comply with section 641A's discretionary mandate
amounts to substantive error requiring reversal. 0 9
The Wilkins court erred by finding that ajudge's failure to recog-
nize discretion is a procedural, not a substantive, error because such a
failure amounts to a violation of section 641A's statutorily imposed
sentencing discretion. 1 0 Criminal defendants have a statutory right
to a proper exercise of discretion by the sentencing judge when decid-
ing whether to sentence them to death, life imprisonment, or less
than life imprisonment."1 1  Ajudge commits a statutory violation if he
does not recognize and exercise the discretion given to him in section
641A.11 2 Because an illegal sentence is defined as one not permitted
by statute, a judge's failure to exercise his statutory mandate to recog-
nize and exercise discretion logically results in the imposition of an
illegal sentence."'
In Wilkins, if the sentencing judge did not recognize his statuto-
rily mandated authority to suspend Wilkins's sentence, he would have
effectively converted the sentence into an "illegal 'mandatory' life sen-
tence."'1 4 Both logic and precedent suggest that a judge's refusal to
recognize his right to exercise discretion, in clear violation of a statu-
tory mandate, is a substantive error that inheres in the sentence, ren-
dering the sentence illegal." 5
The Wilkins court declined to adopt this definition of an illegal
sentence, however, and instead held that a sentence is legal so long as
109. See Maus v. State, 311 Md. 85, 108, 532 A.2d 1066, 1077-78 (1987) ("When a court
must exercise discretion, failure to do so is error, and ordinarily requires reversal.").
110. See Wilkins, 393 Md. at 287, 900 A.2d at 776 (Harrell,J., concurring and dissenting)
(stating that the error at issue in this case is a violation of statutory authority, not a viola-
tion of procedure). Section 641A gives ajudge the "clear, unambiguous and unqualified"
statutory right to exercise sentencing discretion. Wooten, 277 Md. at 117, 352 A.2d at 831.
111. See Williamson, 284 Md. at 215, 395 A.2d at 497 (stating that ajudge denies a defen-
dant his right to an exercise of discretion if the judge does not consider whether to sus-
pend any part of the life sentence).
112. See Wilkins, 393 Md. at 287, 900 A.2d at 776 (Harrell, J., concurring and dissenting)
(noting that a judge's failure to recognize discretion is a violation of his statutory
authority).
113. See Holmes v. State, 362 Md. 190, 195-96, 763 A.2d 737, 740 (2000) ("A sentence
that is not permitted by statute is an illegal sentence.").
114. Wilkins, 393 Md. at 275, 900 A.2d at 769 (majority opinion) (contrasting Wilkins's
argument that the judge's refusal to recognize discretion resulted in an illegal sentence
with the State's argument that the sentence imposed was legal because it was within statu-
tory requirements).
115. See id. at 288, 900 A.2d at 776 (Harrell,J., concurring and dissenting) (finding that
a refusal to recognize discretion is an error that inheres in the sentence itself); see also
Williamson, 284 Md. at 215, 395 A.2d at 497 (holding that a judge's failure to recognize
discretion denied the defendant's "right to a proper exercise of the discretion vested in
him").
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it falls within the statutorily based sentencing limits for the particular
crime.' 16 The cases relied upon by the court to conclude that a fail-
ure to exercise discretion results in procedural error do not suffi-
ciently support its narrow conclusion.' 17 Those cases involve clear
procedural errors, such as a trial judge considering extraneous cir-
cumstances or preventing a defendant from introducing mitigating
evidence during sentencing proceedings;1 8 none of the cases involve
the imposition of a sentence in violation of a statute. The Wilkins
court thus erred by relying on cases that fail to address the central
issue in this case: the violation of a statutory mandate requiring an
exercise of sentencing discretion.119
2. For a Sentence to be Rendered Illegal Because of a Sentencing
Judge's Refusal to Recognize Discretion, the Refusal Must be
Clear in the Record
Although the Wilkins court should have held that a sentencing
judge's failure to recognize discretion is substantive error resulting in
an illegal sentence, it should have also clarified that such a finding
requires that the failure be clearly stated in the trial record. Judges
are presumed to know the law and are not required to state with par-
ticularity every time they exercise discretion.1 2 1 In fact, "absent a mis-
116. Wilkins, 393 Md. at 286, 900 A.2d at 775. According to the majority, since, at the
time of Wilkins's sentencing in 1972, the law permitted a life sentence for first-degree
murder, the sentence itself was statutorily permitted. Id. at 276, 900 A.2d at 769. The
court misleadingly analogized Wilkins's sentence to being sentenced thirty years for
second-degree murder or twenty years for armed robbery, stating that "[a]ll of the above
sentences are within the statutory limits for the crimes committed. None of the sentences
could properly be characterized as an illegal sentence if the sentencing judge failed to
suspend all or any portion of the sentences imposed." Id. at 278, 900 A.2d at 770-71.
117. See id. at 286, 900 A.2d at 775 (Harrell, J., concurring and dissenting) ("The princi-
pal authorities relied upon by the Majority to support its conclusion do not provide the
necessary analyses or bases to reach the Majority's conclusion here.").
118. See, e.g., Randall Book Corp. v. State, 316 Md. 315, 322-23, 558 A.2d 715, 719
(1989) (holding that improper motivation by the trial judge is an error in the process of
imposing a sentence that does not render a sentence substantively illegal); Hill v. United
States, 368 U.S. 424, 430 (1962) (holding that preventing a defendant from presenting
mitigating evidence at sentencing was an error occurring during proceedings that did not
transform the sentence imposed into an illegal one).
119. See Wilkins, 393 Md. at 287, 900 A.2d at 776 (Harrell,J., concurring and dissenting)
("In contrast to the rules of criminal procedure at issue in Hill and Randall Book Corpora-
tion, the error at issue here is an asserted violation of statutory authority (sentencing discre-
tion) vested in the sentencing court.").
120. See Wilkins v. State, 162 Md. App. 512, 520, 875 A.2d 231, 236-37 (2005) (describ-
ing the presumption given to trial judges); see alsoJohn 0. v. Jane 0., 90 Md. App. 406,
429, 601 A.2d 149, 160 (1992) (noting that there is a presumption that the judge knows
and applies the law correctly unless the record clearly shows that the judge neither knew or
followed the law).
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statement of law or conduct inconsistent with the law," a judge is
presumed to understand and correctly apply the law.' 21 The fact that
a judge does not expressly acknowledge the existence of a statute al-
lowing the exercise of discretion is not a sufficient basis to assume that
the judge was unaware of the requirement to utilize discretion.' 22
Because of this presumption, Maryland courts have required that
any failure to recognize discretion must be absolutely clear in the re-
cord. 123 In Williamson v. State, one of the very few cases where a sen-
tencing judge's refusal to recognize discretion rendered a sentence
illegal, the sentencing judge explicitly refused to follow Wooten's man-
date that he exercise sentencing discretion. 24 This refusal to recog-
nize discretion was so clear that the Court of Appeals unanimously
reversed the sentence.125 However, in State v. Chaney, the court found
no substantive error because the refusal to recognize discretion was
not made express in the record, at least not to the degree in William-
son.12 6 Together, Williamson and Chaney establish the importance of
the sentencing judge's specific language in determining whether a re-
fusal to recognize discretion renders a sentence substantively
illegal. ' 2
7
In Wilktns, there was no substantive error resulting in an illegal
sentence because the sentencing judge did not expressly refuse to rec-
121. Medley v. State, 386 Md. 3, 7, 870 A.2d 1218, 1220 (2005).
122. See State v. Chaney, 375 Md. 168, 179, 825 A.2d 452, 458 (2003) (recognizing that a
sentencing judge's failure to acknowledge his power to suspend a sentence does not imply
that the judge was unaware of the existence of the statute allowing for the suspension of
sentences). Two months after the decision in Wilkins, the Court of Appeals handed down
Pollard v. State, 394 Md. 40, 42, 904 A.2d 500, 501 (2006), a case nearly identical to Wilkins
both factually and in its outcome. In Pollard, the court denied the defendant's motion to
correct an illegal sentence, finding that the trial judge's failure to recognize discretion did
not result in an illegal sentence and, therefore, a motion to correct an illegal sentence was
improper. Id. at 42, 904 A.2d at 501. Relying on the rationale of Wilkins, the Pollard court
ultimately concluded that a motion to correct an illegal sentence was an improper method
of obtaining appellate review of procedural errors in sentencing. Id. at 47, 904 A.2d at 504.
123. See John 0., 90 Md. App. at 429, 601 A.2d at 160 (noting the presumption that the
judge knows and applies the law correctly unless it is made clear in the record that the
judge does not know the law).
124. Williamson v. State, 284 Md. 212, 215, 395 A.2d 496, 497 (1979). The sentencing
judge in Williamson stated that he completely disagreed with the Court of Appeals and that,
as far as he was concerned, the sentence must be for life imprisonment. Id.
125. Id.
126. State v. Chaney, 375 Md. 168, 178, 825 A.2d 452, 457 (2003). The sentencingjudge
in Chaney noted that the "law provides a single penalty and no other penalty and so the
sentence in the discretion of the Court in this case is limited to the imposition of that
penalty." Id.
127. See Wilkins, 393 Md. at 288-90, 900 A.2d at 777 (Harrell,J., concurring and dissent-
ing) (contrasting the Williamson judge's language with that of the Wilkins judge to con-
clude that the record in Wilkins was insufficient to find a lack of discretion).
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ognize his power to exercise sentencing discretion.1 2' The present
facts are clearly distinguishable from the extreme refusal by the Wil-
liamsonjudge and are comparable to the facts in Chaney, because there
was no indication in the trial record that the sentencing judge refused
to recognize discretion. 129 In fact, the sentencing judge recognized
his discretion by stating on the record that he would "assume that we
do have a right to give something less than the death penalty." 3 ' Ac-
cordingly, Wilkins's sentence was not rendered illegal by the actions
of the sentencing judge.
B. Because a Judge's Failure to Recognize Discretion Should be
Substantive Error when Clear on the Record, a Motion to
Correct an Illegal Sentence Is the Proper Mechanism to
Remedy the Error
Had the Wilkins court properly held that a sentence is illegal if a
judge expressly refuses to recognize his statutorily mandated discre-
tion, a motion to correct an illegal sentence would have been the
proper tool to fix the error.131 By failing to so hold, the Wilkins court
severely limited the rights of criminal defendants by restricting their
ability to correct substantively illegal sentences.
Appellate review of sentences is very narrow in Maryland. 32 By
holding that a failure to recognize sentencing discretion is an error
that does not result in an illegal sentence, the Wilkins court limits an
already restrictive field of options for defendants seeking to remedy
sentencing error.1 33 Rule 4-345(a) plays a crucial role in remedying
such error because it allows for the correction of an illegal sentence at
any time.'3 4 By classifying a failure to recognize discretion as a proce-
dural error that does not result in an illegal sentence, however, the
128. Id. at 289-90, 900 A.2d at 777.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Evans v. State, 382 Md. 248, 278-79, 855 A.2d 291, 309 (2004) (stating that a
motion to correct an illegal sentence can be granted when the sentence itself is illegal).
132. See Teasley v. State, 298 Md. 364, 370, 470 A.2d 337, 340 (1984) (noting that appel-
late review of sentences is limited to three circumstances: (1) whether the sentence violates
a constitutional requirement; (2) whether the sentencing judge was motivated by imper-
missible considerations; and (3) whether the sentence itself was within statutory limits).
133. See Wilkins, 393 Md. at 276, 900 A.2d at 769 ("We note at the outset that the allega-
tion of error, in the present case, does not inhere in the sentence itself. The imposition of
a life sentence for first-degree murder is a sentence permitted by law."). By finding Wil-
kins's sentence substantively legal, the Wilkins court removed it from the purview of a Rule
4-345 motion, leaving Wilkins with only three options for appellate review of his sentence.
See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
134. See MD. R. 4-345(a) ("The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time.").
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Wilkins court has prevented petitioners from using Rule 4-345 and
consequently has removed an important opportunity for petitioners to
remedy substantively illegal sentences.
Though Rule 4-345 is not the only post-conviction vehicle to rem-
edy sentencing error, it is arguably the most significant and effective
because it allows for the correction of an illegal sentence at any
time.' 3 5 Sentencing error also can be alleged in a post-conviction pe-
tition under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act, but petitioners re-
questing such relief have only a ten-year period before their right to
file expires and are limited to only one petition. 1 3  If a petitioner's
counsel for his first post-conviction petition fails to allege the sentenc-
ing judge's failure to exercise discretion, he has potentially lost his
only chance to have his sentencing error remedied.1 37 Thus, Rule 4-
345 is the most important remedy to a criminal defendant seeking
review of sentencing error. By removing sentencing discretion cases
from the Rule's scope, the Wilkins court nullified an extremely impor-
tant safeguard protecting criminal defendants from serving illegal
sentences. The court could have prevented this harm to defendants
had it properly held that a refusal to recognize discretion is a substan-
tive error that can result in an illegal sentence and can be remedied
by a Rule 4-345 motion to correct an illegal sentence.
V. CONCLUSION
In State v. Wilkins, the Court of Appeals denied a criminal defen-
dant's motion to correct an illegal sentence, holding that a sentencing
judge's failure to recognize sentencing discretion does not render the
sentence illegal.' 3 8 In so doing, the court reached the proper out-
come in the case, but relied upon faulty reasoning that is inconsistent
135. Id.
136. MD. CODE ANN., CEUM. PROC. § 7-103 (LexisNexis 2006). This section reads, in per-
tinent part:
(a) For each trial or sentence, a person may file only one petition for relief under
this title.
(b) (1) Unless extraordinary cause is shown, in a case in which a sentence of death
has not been imposed, a petition under this subtitle may not be filed more than
10 years after the sentence was imposed.
Id. Although petitioners are only permitted to file one petition, under section 7-104, a
court may reopen a concluded post-conviction proceeding if determined to be "in the
interests of justice." Id § 7-104.
137. Petitions are rarely reopened under section 7-104. See Gray v. State, 388 Md. 366,
383, 879 A.2d 1064, 1073 (2005) (noting that the decision to reopen is discretionary and
only granted if the sentencing court has abused its discretion and issued a decision "well
removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of
what that court deems minimally acceptable").
138. Wilkins, 393 Md. at 272, 900 A.2d at 767.
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with precedent. 1 9 The court ignored the fact that a sentence can be
rendered illegal when a sentencing judge fails to recognize his statu-
tory mandate to exercise discretion.14 ° If this failure to recognize dis-
cretion is made manifest on the record, it results in the imposition of
a substantively illegal sentence. 14' Accordingly, a motion to correct an
illegal sentence is an appropriate vehicle to remedy a sentence ren-
dered illegal in this manner. 142
RYAN D. STOTTMANN
139. See supra Part IV.
140. See supra Part [V.A. 1.
141. See supra Part V.A.2.
142. See supra Part IV.B.
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DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES v. HELLER:
WHITTLING AWAY AT MARYLAND'S
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS
In Department of Natural Resources v. Heller,' the Court of Appeals
of Maryland narrowed the protections of the Maryland Whistleblower
Law in the Executive Branch of State Government (Maryland
Whistleblower Law) when it ruled that an employee is not protected
from employer retaliation unless the employee reported the alleged
wrongdoing to someone with actual authority to fix the problem. The
court erred because its decision undercut the legislative intent of the
Maryland Whistleblower Law by discouraging potential whistleblowers
from reporting wrongdoing.2 The court could have decided the case
without narrowing whistleblower protections.3 Furthermore, the
court had no justification for its decision because it misinterpreted the
cases on which it purported to rely.4  Instead of restricting
whistleblower protections, the Heller court should have adopted an in-
tent-based rule that protects all whistleblowers from employer retalia-
tion if they possess a reasonable belief that their report is true and the
intent to disclose the problem to someone who remedy it.5 An intent-
based rule furthers the purpose of the Maryland Whistleblower Law by
encouraging potential whistleblowers to disclose government
impropriety.6
I. THE CASE
James Heller worked for the Department of Natural Resources
(DNR) as the manager of the Somers Cover Marina (the Marina)
from October 1998 until April 2001.' As part of hisjob requirements,
Copyright © 2007 by Nina H. Schichor.
1. 391 Md. 148, 892 A.2d 497 (2006).
2. See infra Part IV.A.
3. See infra Part IV.B.
4. See infra Part IV.C.
5. See infra Part 1V.D.
6. See infra Part IV.D. Consider a government lab worker who blows the whistle be-
cause he reasonably believes that a drug slated to be approved for distribution to the gen-
eral public causes a dangerously high risk of stroke in women over forty. Assume this
technician found several studies to support his allegation, but unbeknownst to the em-
ployee, the studies are flawed. Under an intent-based whistleblower rule, the lab worker
would be protected as long as he possesses a reasonable belief that his allegations are true.
Nevertheless, under Heller, the court would not protect this lab worker from employer
retaliation because his belief is technically incorrect. See infta Part IV.D.2
7. Helle, 391 Md. at 152-53, 892 A.2d at 499-500.
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Heller was instructed to investigate why the Marina was running a
$197,000 deficit.8 During his investigation, Heller discovered certain
fiscal practices that he believed caused the Marina's deficit and vio-
lated state law.9 Heller reported his concerns to his supervisor, Joseph
Ward, and Ward's direct report, Daryl DeCesare, but both supervisors
dismissed Heller's claim.'
After Heller's allegations were dismissed, Superintendent Colo-
nel Rick Barton demoted Heller and transferred him to Pocomoke
River State Park."l Barton asserted that he demoted Heller due to the
finding of an Equal Opportunity Employment Officer (EOEO) that
Heller may have engaged in gender discrimination.' 2 Heller con-
tended, however, that his supervisors manufactured the discrimina-
tion complaint to silence his allegations of fiscal impropriety."l
Heller subsequently appealed to the DNR Secretary to reconsider
Barton's decision to demote him, but the DNR Secretary upheld Bar-
ton's action.' 4 Heller then filed a second appeal, during which he
negotiated a settlement with the DNR.t5 Simultaneously, Heller filed
8. Heller v. Dep't of Natural Res., 161 Md. App. 299, 305, 868 A.2d 925, 928 (2005).
9. Id. Specifically, Heller discovered that $80,000 in revenue had not been timely
credited to the Marina's budget and marina-appropriated funds were diverted to non-ma-
rina uses and encumbered for non-marina purchases. Id. at 306-07, 868 A.2d at 929.
Heller believed that reallocating funds designated for the Marina violated Natural Re-
sources Article, section 5-908.1, which stated, "[a]ny money obtained by the [Natural Re-
sources] Department from Somers Cover Marina shall be credited to the Somers Cove
Marina Improvement Fund." Id. at 304, 868 A.2d at 928 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., NAT.
RES. § 5-908.1 (LexisNexis 1973 & Supp. 2004)). Soon after Heller initiated legal proceed-
ings, this statute was amended to read: "Any money obtained by the [Natural Resources]
Department from Somers Cove Marina shall be credited to the [Somers Cove] Fund....
Any investment earnings of the Fund may not be transferred or revert to the General Fund
of the State, but shall remain in the [Somers Cove] Fund." Id. at 304 n.1, 868 A.2d at 928
n.1 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., NAT. REs. § 5-908.1 (LexisNexis 1981 & Supp. 2005)).
10. Id. at 307, 868 A.2d at 929-30.
11. Id. at 310-11, 868 A.2d at 931.
12. Id. at 311-12, 868 A.2d at 932.
13. Id. at 310, 868 A.2d at 931. Immediately after Heller's transfer and demotion, the
woman who brought the gender discrimination claim, Mary Taylor, received an "unusual
five grade promotion and raise, retroactive for one year." Id. Taylor had worked as Hel-
ler's office manager before Barton demoted Heller. Id. at 309, 868 A.2d at 930.
Previously, Heller alleged that Taylor made inappropriate attempts to "romanticize"
their professional relationship, and he sent a memorandum to Ward and DeCesare fore-
warning that Taylor was taking steps to set up a hostile work environment lawsuit. Id., 868
A.2d at 930. Neither Ward nor DeCesare responded to Heller's alert. Id. at 330, 868 A.2d
at 943. However, when Taylor later alleged that Heller's actions toward her bordered on
sexual harassment, DeCesare promptly demoted Heller and referred Taylor's sexual har-
assment claim to the DNR's EOEO. Id. at 310, 868 A.2d at 931.
14. Id. at 311, 868 A.2d at 931-32.
15. Id., 868 A.2d at 932. As part of the settlement, the DNR removed the written repri-
mand from Heller's record and reinstated Heller to his prior rank. Id.
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a separate whistleblower claim with the Secretary of the Department
of Management and Budget (DMB). 16 In Heller's settlement with the
DNR regarding the gender discrimination allegation, Heller reserved
his right to pursue the whistleblower claim. 7
The DMB rejected Heller's whistleblower claim, and Heller ap-
pealed, requesting an administrative hearing.'" The Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) denied Heller relief on the grounds that Heller
failed to establish that he made a protected disclosure under the Ma-
ryland Whistleblower statute.' 9 In particular, the ALJ found that Hel-
ler did not factually establish the disclosure, and did not disclose
information to an agent with actual authority to handle the prob-
lem.2 ° Heller petitioned for judicial review and the Circuit Court for
Somerset County affirmed the ALJ's ruling.2
Following the circuit court decision, Heller appealed to the Court
of Special Appeals, which reversed and remanded the case for further
administrative proceedings.22 The Court of Special Appeals found
that a memorandum written by Heller and sent to Barton qualified as
a protected disclosure under the Maryland Whistleblower Act because
Heller disclosed information to someone with actual authority to rem-
edy the problem.2" The court further determined that Heller merely
needed to establish that he possessed an objectively reasonable belief
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 320, 868 A.2d at 937. The ALJ rejected Heller's whistleblower claim for two
additional reasons. First, according to the ALJ, Heller failed to prove that Barton trans-
ferred him in reprisal for his disclosures about the allegedly improper fund diversions.
Heller, 391 Md. at 162, 892 A.2d at 505. Second, the ALJ determined that Heller's "allega-
tions of fiscal impropriety were meritless." Id.
During the administrative hearing, Heller attempted to challenge Barton's testimony
that Barton demoted Heller solely based on the EOEO's findings by presenting evidence
that Taylor's gender discrimination claim was a pretext and that Barton's real motive was
to silence Heller's whistleblowing efforts. Heller, 161 Md. App. at 311-12, 868 A.2d at 932.
The ALJ, however, refused to allow any evidence or testimony about the merits of that
complaint, stating that Heller waived his right to challenge the gender harassment case by
settling with the DNR. Id. at 312, 868 A.2d at 932.
20. Heller, 391 Md. at 162, 892 A.2d at 505.
21. Heller, 161 Md. App. at 313, 868 A.2d at 933.
22. Id. Heller raised several issues for review, including whether he made a protected
disclosure under the Whistleblower statute and whether the ALJ erred by not allowing
Heller to offer evidence that might show that the EOEO finding was used as a pretext to
remove and demote Heller. Id.
23. Id. at 320, 868 A.2d at 937. The court also stated that Heller's memorandum quali-
fied as a protected disclosure because Heller did not need to specify the location to which
the funds were diverted because any diversion of Marina funds is illegal under Natural
Resources Article, section 5-908.1. Id. (referencing MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. § 5-908.1
(LexisNexis 1981 & Supp. 2005)).
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that his allegations were true, and that Heller satisfied that
requirement. 24
At the DNR's request, the Court of Appeals granted certiorari to
consider: (1) whether the Court of Special Appeals exceeded its scope
of review when it found that Heller reasonably believed that he was
alleging actual illegal acts; and (2) whether the Court of Special Ap-
peals intruded upon the ALJ's role when it decided that the ALJ
should have permitted Heller to introduce evidence challenging the
merits of Taylor's sexual harassment allegations.25
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In 1996, the Maryland legislature enacted the Maryland
Whistleblower Law to encourage government employees to report
government improprieties and protect such employees from employer
retaliation. 26 The Maryland legislature modeled the law after the Fed-
eral Whistleblower Protection Act and created a statute with a similar
purpose and almost identical language. 7 Under the Maryland
Whistleblower Law, an employee must satisfy three elements to state a
claim for employer retaliation, the most difficult of which is to demon-
strate that the employee made a "protected disclosure." 2' To qualify
as protected, the employee's disclosure must include particular infor-
mation;21 the employee must reasonably believe that she is disclosing
true information;"° and the employee must possess an intent to alert a
higher authority who is in a position to correct the alleged
wrongdoing.3'
24. Id. at 325-27, 868 A.2d at 940-41. The court also found that the ALJ erred by not
permitting Heller to offer evidence regarding the merits of the gender discrimination
claim. Id. at 327-29, 868 A.2d at 941-42. The Court of Special Appeals held that Heller
could cross-examine Barton to challenge his testimony about his motive for demoting and
transferring Heller, and that Heller could use the merits of the gender harassment case to
do so. Id. at 329-30, 868 A.2d at 942-43. For example, Heller could ask Barton why
Barton ignored Heller's complaints but immediately acted on Taylor's allegations. Id. at
330, 868 A.2d at 943.
25. Heller, 391 Md. at 164 n.4, 892 A.2d at 506-07 n.4.
26. See infra Part II.A.
27. See infra Part II.B.
28. See infra Part II.C.
29. See infra Part II.C.1.
30. See infra Part II.C.2.
31. See infra Part II.C.3.
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A. Maryland's Whistleblower Law for Public Employees
The Maryland legislature enacted the Maryland Whistleblower
Law32 to prohibit Maryland authorities from retaliating against em-
ployees who report illegal government activities.33 Specifically, the
legislature intended to protect employees who report government
cost overruns and legitimate health risks, as well as employees who call
attention to government delays in setting industry standards that ben-
efit private business while hurting the public.34
B. Maryland Courts Rely on Federal Whistleblower Protection Law to
Interpret the Maryland Whistleblower Law
Generally, Maryland courts find federal court interpretations of
analogous statutes highly persuasive.35 In fact, Maryland courts fre-
quently recite that "when the purpose and language of a federal stat-
ute are substantially the same" as a Maryland statute, federal
interpretations are persuasive.3 6 Maryland courts have applied this
32. MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS. & PENS. § 5-305 (LexisNexis 1993). The pertinent
section of the Maryland Whistleblower Law is titled "Reprisals prohibited" and provides:
[A] supervisor, appointing authority, or the head of a principal unit may not take
or refuse to take any personnel action as a reprisal against an employee who:
(1) discloses information that the employee reasonably believes evidences:
(i) an abuse of authority, gross mismanagement, or gross waste of money;
[or]
(ii) a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety; or
(iii) a violation of law; or
(2) following a disclosure under item (1) of this section seeks a remedy provided
under this subtitle or any other law or policy governing the employee's unit.
Id.
33. The Maryland legislature clarified its intent in the preamble to the Maryland
Whistleblower Law: "The purpose of this subtitle is to prohibit any State appointing author-
ity from using a personnel action as a retaliatory measure against an employee or applicant
for State employment who has made a disclosure of illegality or impropriety." Act of May
27, 1980, ch. 850, 1980 Md. Laws 2998-99.
34. When the Senate Constitutional and Public Law Committee considered the precur-
sor to section 5-305, Delegate Joan Pitkin, one of the bill's sponsors, identified the three
scenarios listed above as examples where employers retaliated against their employees who
acted in the public interest. Hearing on HB 616 before the Senate Constitutional and Public Law
Committee, 1980 Leg., 396th Sess. (Md. 1980) (statement of Delegate Joan B. Pitkin); see also
Montgomery v. E. Corr. Inst., 377 Md. 615, 626-27 n.7, 835 A.2d 169, 176 n.7 (2003)
(discussing the three situations Delegate Pitkin sought to prevent by supporting a prior
version of section 5-305).
35. Fioretti v. Maryland State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 351 Md. 66, 76, 716 A.2d 258, 263
(1998) (applying Federal Freedom of Information Act precedent to questions regarding
the Maryland Public Information Act because the two statutes have virtually identical lan-
guage and similar historical developments).
36. Id.
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concept to rules of civil procedure," tax statutes,38 and contract
laws.3 9 Because the language and purpose of the federal and Mary-
land whistleblower statutes are nearly identical,4" Maryland courts
tend to apply federal court interpretations of the Federal
Whistleblower Protection Act to aspects of the Maryland
Whistleblower Law.41
C. Elements of a Retaliation Claim for Whistleblowing
To state a prima facie case for unlawful employer retaliation
under federal and state law, the Maryland Court of Appeals requires
37. East v. Gilchrist, 293 Md. 453, 459, 445 A.2d 343, 345 (1982) (stating that Maryland
courts find federal decisions that construe certain Federal Rules of Civil Procedure espe-
cially persuasive because the Maryland rules are modeled after the federal rules); Biro v.
Schombert, 285 Md. 290, 295, 402 A.2d 71, 74 (1979) (stating that federal court interpreta-
tions of Federal Rule 54(b) are highly persuasive to Maryland courts because the Maryland
rule was modeled after the federal rule and uses "substantially the same language"); Diener
Enter. v. Miller, 266 Md. 551, 554, 295 A.2d 470, 472 (1972) (same); Edmonds v. Lupton,
253 Md. 93, 99, 252 A.2d 71, 74 (1969) (applying the aforementioned concept to Maryland
Rule 314 al).
38. See Villa Nova Night Club, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 256 Md. 381,
386-87, 260 A.2d 307, 309-10 (1970) (stating that decisions under the federal tax code are
instructive to Maryland courts because the state statute and the federal statute are similarly
structured).
39. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ. v. Glassman Constr. Co., 245 Md. 192, 202-03,
225 A.2d 448, 454-55 (1967) (applying a federal court's interpretation of the Miller Act to
a state law contract dispute because the federal statute is similar to the Maryland statute at
issue).
40. The Maryland Whistleblower Law is modeled after the Federal Whistleblower Pro-
tection Act, which states that a supervisor shall not:
(8) take or fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take, a personnel action with
respect to any employee or applicant for employment because of
(A) any disclosure of information by an employee or applicant which the em-
ployee or applicant reasonably believes evidences-
(i) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or
(ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a
substantial and specific danger to public health or safety[.]
5 U.S.C. § 2302 (1978), amended by 5 U.S.C. § 2303 (1989); see also Montgomery v. E.
Corr. Inst., 377 Md. 615, 627, 835 A.2d 169, 176-77 (2003) (stating that the Maryland
legislature derived the Maryland Whistleblower Law from the Federal Whistleblower Pro-
tection Act and that the two laws have the same purpose); Ford v. Dep't of Pub. Safety &
Corr. Servs., 149 Md. App. 488, 501, 817 A.2d 264, 272 (2003) ("Maryland's Whistleblower
Statute was patterned after the federal Whistleblower Protection Act."); Frazier v. Merit Sys.
Prot. Bd., 672 F.2d 150, 154 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (detailing the federal statute's history).
Neither the federal nor the Maryland whistleblower statute protects whistleblowers in
the private sector. Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 370 Md. 38, 57 & n.1 1, 803 A.2d 482, 492-93
& 493 n.11 (2002) (noting that the Maryland legislature provided statutory protection for
government employees who report government improprieties, but did not grant the same
protections to private-sector employees who report illegal actions in private businesses).
41. See infra Part II.C.1.
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an employee to plead and prove three elements. 4 2 The employee
must: (1) make a protected disclosure; (2) show that the employer
took an adverse employment action against the employee; and (3)
demonstrate the existence of a causal connection between the pro-
tected activity and the adverse action." Once the employee estab-
lishes a prima facie case, the employer may rebut the allegations by
providing non-retaliatory justifications for its allegedly discriminatory
actions.44 Next, the burden of proof shifts back to the plaintiff to
show that the employer's articulated reasons were a mere pretext and
that the employer was actually motivated by discrimination.45
The most frequently litigated element of the test is whether the
employee made a "protected disclosure." 46 Under Maryland law, a
protected disclosure must address a government impropriety and the
employee must reasonably believe that the disclosure is true as well as
have the intent to report to a superior or colleague with the authority
to fix the problem.4 7
1. First Requirement for a Protected Disclosure: Content
For a disclosure to be protected in Maryland, an employee must
disclose evidence of an abuse of authority, gross mismanagement, or
illegal activities.48 In Montgomery v. Eastern Correctional Institution,4 9 the
Court of Appeals adopted federal definitions of abuse of authority
and gross mismanagement. 5° The Montgomery court defined "abuse of
authority" as "the arbitrary or capricious exercise of power by a Fed-
eral official or employee that adversely affects the rights of any person
or that results in personal gain or advantage to himself or to preferred
other persons. "5 1 Moreover, the same court defined "gross misman-
42. Manikhi v. Mass Transit Admin., 360 Md. 333, 349, 758 A.2d 95, 103-04 (2000);
Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 460 (4th Cir. 1994).
43. Manikhi, 360 Md. at 349, 758 A.2d at 103-04; Carter, 33 F.3d at 460.
44. Carter, 33 F.3d at 460.
45. Id.
46. The other two elements are litigated less often; employees almost always satisfy the
second element because typically the employer fires the employee, and the threshold to
establish a causal connection is quite low. 135 CONG. REc. S2779-81 (daily ed. Mar. 16,
1989) (statement of Sen. Levin) (explaining that any weight given to the protected disclo-
sure, either alone or even in combination with other factors, can satisfy the "contributing
factor" test to establish a causal connection).
47. MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS. & PENS. § 5-305 (LexisNexis 2004); Hooven-Lewis v.
Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 276 (4th Cir. 2001); see also infra Parts I1.C.1-3.
48. Montgomery v. E. Corr. Inst., 377 Md. 615, 625, 835 A.2d 169, 175 (2003).
49. 377 Md. 615, 835 A.2d 169 (2003).
50. Id. at 639, 835 A.2d at 184.
51. Id. at 640, 835 A.2d at 184 (quoting McCollum v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 75
M.S.P.R. 449, 455-56 (1997)). For example, misuse of government equipment is consid-
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agement" as a manager's "action or inaction that creates a substantial
risk of significant adverse impact upon the agency's ability to accom-
plish its mission. " "
2. Second Requirement for a Protected Disclosure: Reasonable Belief
An employee must also have a reasonable belief that the disclosed
information actually demonstrates an abuse of authority, gross mis-
management, or violation of law for the disclosure to qualify as pro-
tected.53 The reasonable belief standard is objective, inquiring
whether a reasonable person in the employee's position would believe
that the disclosure evidenced a violation.54 Additionally, at least one
Fourth Circuit case interpreting Maryland law explicitly stated that as
long as a person reasonably believes that she is reporting a govern-
ment impropriety, that person should be protected from employer re-
taliation-even if disclosure does not contain an actual violation.55
3. Third Requirement for a Protected Disclosure: Intent to Alert
Authority in Position to Change Alleged Wrongdoing
The Maryland Whistleblower Protection Law does not identify to
whom an employee must disclose information.56  The Federal
Whistleblower Protection Act contains the same omission; however, at
least three federal cases used an intent-based test to interpret the Fed-
eral Whistleblower Protection Act, meaning that the courts required
the discloser to possess an intent to alert someone with authority to fix
the problem.57
First, in Willis v. Department of Agriculture,58 the court evaluated an
employee's words and actions and determined that criticizing the
ered an abuse of authority. Id. A blatantly rude boss, however, is not necessarily an abuse
of authority because the statute does not cover relatively minor misconduct, only "real
wrongdoing" such as diverting government funds. Id. at 641, 835 A.2d at 185.
52. Id. at 639, 835 A.2d at 184 (quoting Embree v. Dep't of Treasury, 70 M.S.P.R. 79, 85
(1996)). For an action to rise to the level of gross mismanagement, a manager must do
something manifestly wrong, not merely make a questionable decision. Id.
53. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) (8) (A) (2003); MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS. & PENS. § 5-305
(LexisNexis 2004); Montgomery, 377 Md. at 641, 835 A.2d at 185 (citing Ramos v. Dep't of
Treasury, 72 M.S.P.R. 235, 240 (1996)).
54. Montgomery, 377 Md. at 641, 835 A.2d at 185 (citing Ramos, 72 M.S.P.R. at 240).
55. See Horton v. Dep't of Navy, 66 F.3d 279, 283 (4th Cir. 1995) ("The statute requires
only that the whistleblower had a reasonable belief that, for example, a rule or regulation
had been violated, in order for the disclosure of such violations to be protected."). The
Court of Appeals has not made a similarly explicit statement.
56. See supra notes 32, 40 and accompanying text.
57. The term intent-based test will be used to identify the federal court requirement that
a discloser possess the intent to alert someone with authority to fix the problem.
58. 141 F.3d 1139 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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wrongdoer does not evidence the proper intent for a whistleblower
claim. In Willis, a federal employee reviewed whether farms in Iowa
violated federal conservation standards.59 The employee reported to
his supervisor, Erwin Aust, that sixteen of seventy-seven farms were not
in compliance.6" Seven farms appealed the decision to Aust, who sub-
sequently granted six of the seven appeals.6" The employee com-
plained to Aust that the reversals were unfounded,62 and then
brought a claim under the Federal Whistleblower Protection Act, ar-
guing that he was forced to retire after he complained to his supervi-
sor.6" The Willis court held that the employee did not possess the
proper intent and thus failed to make a protected disclosure.64 After
evaluating the employee's actions, the court stated that merely criticiz-
ing a wrongdoer does not demonstrate an intent to tell someone who
can fix the problem.65
Second, in Carr v. Social Security Administration,66 the court sug-
gested that an employee should be protected under the Federal
Whistleblower Protection Act even if she reports a government impro-
priety to someone without authority to fix the problem, as long as she
possessed the intent to tell someone who could remedy it.67 In Cat,
an ALJ who worked for the Social Security Administration alleged that
she was fired in response to her whistleblowing activities. 68 The em-
ployee had reported conduct that she believed violated various stat-
utes to the appropriate authorities, but she also undisputedly engaged
in disruptive behavior and inappropriate conduct.69 The Carr court
confirmed that the Federal Whistleblower Protection Act did shield
the judge from retaliation for her disclosures, but it did not inoculate
59. Id. at 1140-41.
60. Id. at 1141.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1143.
63. Id. at 1141-42.
64. Id. at 1143.
65. Id. ("Willis's disclosures ... did not evidence an intent to raise the issue with higher
authorities who were in a position to correct the alleged wrongdoing."). Willis did alert
other authorities about his supervisor's alleged wrongdoing, however, the Willis court held
that those disclosures could not qualify under the Federal Whistleblower Protection Act
because Willis made them after he quit his job. Id. Presumably, the federal employee
could have received protection from retaliation if he had alerted someone other than his
supervisor, because his supervisor was the alleged wrongdoer.
66. 185 F.2d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
67. Id. at 1326.
68. Id. at 1322.
69. Id. at 1320.
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her from the repercussions of her own wrongdoings; thus, the court
upheld her termination as lawful.7"
Third and finally, in Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera,7' the court explicitly
stated that a discloser must have the intent to raise the problem with
someone who can remedy it.72 In Hooven-Lewis, a former government
employee alleged that the Army terminated her in violation of the
Federal Whistleblower Protection Act because she reported her supe-
rior for hiding important lab errors. 7' The employee made her report
to the lab supervisor, who was also the wrongdoer.7 ' The court did
not grant the lab technician protection because the court found that
she lacked an intent to report the alleged wrongdoing to someone
who could fix the problem-she merely reported the violation to the
actual wrongdoer. 75
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In Department of Natural Resources v. Heller, the Court of Appeals
held that an ALJ correctly determined that a state employee failed to
make a protected disclosure. 76 The court created a rule that required
employees to disclose wrongdoing to someone with actual authority to
ameliorate it in order to qualify for protection from employer retalia-
tion under the Maryland Whistleblower Law.77 Further, the court
70. Id. at 1322, 1326. The Carr court upheld the employee's termination because it
determined that she was fired for inappropriate behavior, not for reporting government
wrongdoing, ruling that a misbehaving employee does not enjoy permanent job security
merely because she reported government impropriety. Id. at 1326.
71. 249 F.3d 259 (4th Cir. 2001).
72. Id. at 276.
73. Id. at 262, 264, 274.
74. Id. at 262-63.
75. Id. at 276. The court explained that "[c]riticism directed at the wrongdoer .. .is
not whistleblowing." Id. Similar to the employee in Willis, the federal employee in Hooven-
Lewis could have likely received protection from retaliation if she had alerted someone
other than her supervisor, because he was the source of the alleged problem.
76. 391 Md. at 164-65, 892 A.2d at 507. Interestingly, the Court of Appeals altered the
question presented by the DNR's petition for certiorari. Id. at 177-78, 892 A.2d at 514-15
(Raker, J., dissenting). The Hellercourt phrased the DNR's question as: "Did the ALJ erro-
neously determine that [Heller] did not make protected disclosures as defined by Mary-
land's Whistleblower Statute?" Id. at 178, 892 A.2d at 514. In its petition, however, the
DNR asked:
Where the ALJ specifically found that Mr. Heller lied under oath and that he was
not a credible witness, did the Court of Special Appeals exceed its scope of review
when it found, as a matter of fact, that, at the times Mr. Heller purportedly raised
allegations that Somers Cove revenues were being unlawfully diverted by DNR,
Mr. Heller reasonably believed that he was alleging actual violations of law?
Id. at 177, 892 A.2d at 514.
77. Id. at 172, 892 A.2d at 511 (majority opinion).
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held that the ALJ correctly excluded evidence that Heller proffered to
challenge the merits of his underlying harassment allegations.78
Writing for the court, Judge Battaglia began by noting that Mary-
land courts use interpretations of the Federal Whistleblower Protec-
tion Act to help interpret the Maryland Whistleblower Law because
the two statutes have substantially similar purposes and language.7 9
The court also identified the elements for an employer retaliation
claim under the Maryland Whistleblower Law.8 ' Next, the court
stated that the appropriate standard of review for this case is limited to
the substantial evidence test." Applying the substantial evidence test,
the Heller court found reasonable evidence to uphold the ALJ's con-
clusion that Heller's disclosure was not protected under the Maryland
Whistleblower Law because Heller did not disclose to a person with
78. Id. at 165, 892 A.2d at 507.
79. Id. at 169-70, 892 A.2d at 510.
80. Id. at 170, 892 A.2d at 510. According to the Heller majority, the elements required
for an employee to qualify for protections under the Maryland Whistleblower Law are: (1)
the disclosure must contain information that the employee reasonably believes reveals an
abuse of authority; (2) the employee must "prove a causal connection between the disclo-
sure and the personnel action"; and (3) the employee must show "by a preponderance of.
the evidence that the protected disclosure was a contributing factor in the decision to take
the personnel action" against the employee. Id. at 170-71, 892 A.2d at 510 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
The second element contains an aspect of controversy because the Heller court stated
the law in two different ways. See id. at 170, 172, 892 A.2d at 510, 511. Both times, the
Heller court cited to federal cases for support. First, the majority characterized the law as
requiring that an employee disclosing information must have the intent to alert someone
with authority to solve the situation. Id. at 170, 892 A.2d at 510 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Second, the majority revisited the second element of a protected disclosure and said
that an employee must have disclosed the information to someone with actual authority to
correct the reported wrongdoing. Id. at 172, 892 A.2d at 511 (stating that for "allegations
to be considered protected disclosures under the law, [Heller] must make his disclosures
to individuals in a position to remedy the wrongful actions"). Oddly, the court prefaced its
second description of the rule with the phrase "[a]s previously stated," although the spe-
cific language was never previously stated. The court's second articulation of the second
element for a protected disclosure is a more rigorous test because the employee must know
who has authority to remedy his alleged problem, and be correct in his belief that a prob-
lem exists, in order to obtain protection from employer retaliation. See infra Part IV.D.
81. Heller, 391 Md. at 165-66, 892 A.2d at 507-08. Under the substantial evidence test,
the court is required to uphold an agency's decision if the record contains substantial
evidence that supports the agency's factual findings and the agency's decision is not based
on an incorrect conclusion of law. Id., 892 A.2d at 507. In Heller, the court upheld the
ALJ's decision because her first ruling was factually supported by substantial evidence and
not premised on an error of law. Id. at 172-73, 892 A.2d at 511.
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actual authority to fix the alleged problem. 2 The majority opinion
did not consider Heller's intent.
In a dissenting opinionJudge Raker,joined by Judge Harrell and
Chief Judge Bell, argued that the majority made a mistake of law when
it concluded that the Maryland Whistdeblower Law requires an em-
ployee to disclose information to a person with authority to remedy
the alleged wrongdoing.8 3 Rather, Judge Raker argued, the statute
only requires that the employee possess an intent to disclose to a per-
son with authority to fix the problem. 4 Judge Raker also maintained
that the majority's new requirement is unsupported by Maryland or
federal precedent.8 5 Additionally, Judge Raker contended that the
majority's new rule incorrectly narrows Maryland whistleblower pro-
tections to exclude all employees who reasonably-but erroneously-
allege wrongdoing.8 6
IV. ANALYSIS
In Department of Natural Resources v. Heller, the Court of Appeals
ruled that an employee is not protected from employer retaliation un-
less the employee reports an alleged wrongdoing to someone with au-
thority to fix the problem.87 The Heller court erred because its rule
discourages potential whistleblowers from reporting wrongdoing, thus
narrowing the protections and undercutting the purpose of the Mary-
land Whistleblower Law.88 In addition, the court lacked justification
for its decision because the court could have decided the case without
82. Id. at 173, 892 A.2d at 512. The Heller court stated that "a reasoning mind reasona-
bly could have reached the factual conclusion that Mr. Ward and Mr. DeCesare were not
individuals who could correct the alleged wrongdoing." Id.
83. Id. at 176-77, 892 A.2d at 514 (Raker, J., dissenting).
84. Id. Judge Raker also argued that the majority made a procedural mistake by chang-
ing the first issues submitted for certiorari under the veil of reformulating the question. Id.
at 176-80, 892 A.2d at 514-16. See supra note 76 for the precise wording of the issues in
the DNR's petition for certiorari and the court's reformulation of the DNR's questions.
Furthermore, Judge Raker alleged that the majority's decision violated Maryland Rule
§ 8-131 by addressing an issue that the petitioner did not raise in the certiorari petition in a
non-extraordinary situation. Heller, 391 Md. at 178-81, 892 A.2d at 515-16; see also MD. R.
8-131 (1957), amended by MD. R. 8-131 (2005) (stating that "the Court of Appeals ordinarily
will consider only an issue that has been raised in the petition for certiorari").
85. Heller, 391 Md. at 181, 892 A.2d at 516-17 (Raker, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 183, 892 A.2d at 517-18. Judge Raker argued that the majority's new law
excludes such individuals, as they could never make a qualified disclosure because nobody
has the authority to remedy a situation with no actual wrongdoing. Id.
87. Id. at 172, 892 A.2d at 511 (majority opinion).
88. See infra Part IV.A. The court narrowed whistleblower protections because its deci-
sion denied protection to employees who report government improprieties if the em-
ployee reports to someone who lacks authority to fix the problem, even if the person
appears to have authority, or if the employee's belief of wrongdoing is reasonable but
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restricting whistleblower protections.89 Moreover, the court had scant
legal basis for its ruling and misconstrued the cases on which it pur-
ported to rely."0 Instead of whittling away at whistleblower protection,
the court should have adopted the implicit rule from the federal
cases-an intent-based rule.9 In other words, as Judge Raker argued
in dissent, whistleblowers should be protected as long as they report a
government wrongdoing and have a reasonable belief that their re-
port is true. 2 An intent-based rule also furthers the purpose of the
Maryland Whistleblower Law: to encourage more whistleblowers to
disclose government impropriety so that the government will function
more efficiently.93
A. The Heller Court's Decision Undercuts the Legislative Intent of the
Maryland Whistleblower Law
The Heller court's decision to limit whistleblower protections
weakens the statutory intent of the Maryland Whistleblower Law be-
cause it denies protection to the very individuals the legislature specif-
ically intended to protect. When passing the Maryland Whistleblower
Law, the Maryland legislature stated that the statute's purpose was to
encourage employees to disclose government impropriety,9 4 and to
prohibit retaliatory measures against employees who have made pro-
tected disclosures.9 5 The statutory language supports an inclusive in-
terpretation because it only requires that an employee reasonably
believes that her disclosure evidences an abuse of authority, a danger
to public health, or an illegal act; the statute does not require that an
employee know for certain that the impropriety occurred or that the
employee must report the impropriety to a particular person. 6 Thus,
wrong. See infra note 140 for examples of employees who might be denied protection
under the Heller decision. See also infra Part IV.D for related information.
89. See infra Part IV.B.
90. See infra Part V.C.
91. See supra note 57 and accompanying text for a definition of intent-based rule.
92. Heller, 391 Md. at 182-83, 892 A.2d at 517-18 (Raker, J., dissenting).
93. See infra Part IV.D.
94. Act of May 27, 1980, ch. 850, 1980 Md. Laws 2998 (stating that in order to accom-
plish the goals of the Maryland Whistleblower Law, "it is essential that classified State em-
ployees be free to disclose impropriety").
95. Id. (stating that the purpose of the Maryland Whistleblower Law is "to prohibit any
State appointing authority from using a personnel action as a retaliatory measure against
an employee or applicant for State employment who has made a disclosure of illegality or
impropriety").
96. MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS. & PENS. § 5-305 (LexisNexis 1993). The statute pro-
tects the employee who "discloses information that the employee reasonably believes evi-
dences ... an abuse of authority... a substantial and specific danger to public health...
[or] a violation of law." Id.
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a plain reading of the statutory language yields no indication that the
statute mandates the additional requirement imposed by the Heller
court: that an employee must report to someone with actual authority
to resolve the problem to gain whistdeblower protections.97 Instead,
the statute's language suggests that employees should be protected
even if they have incorrect information or they report to someone
with apparent but not actual authority, as long as the employee in-
tends to disclose an objectively reasonable and subjectively true allega-
tion of government impropriety.98
The Heller court's new requirement also cuts against the statutory
intent of the Federal Whistleblower Protection Act. 9 Although the
statutory purpose of the federal law is not controlling, Maryland
courts should find it highly persuasive because the Maryland statute is
modeled after the federal one,100 and Maryland courts have con-
firmed that the two statutes have the same purpose."0 ' The United
States Congress intended the Federal Whistleblower Protection Act to
"send a strong, clear signal to whistleblowers" that Congress intends
"to protect them from any retaliation related to their whistleblow-
ing."10 2  In other words, Congress meant to encourage
whistleblowers-all types of whistleblowers-to disclose the wrongdo-
ing that they observed, regardless of whether the whistleblowers were
correct in their allegations and regardless of to whom the
whistleblowers reported. 10 3  The purpose of the Federal
Whistleblower Protection Act is best served by an inclusive intent-
based rule.
97. Id. § 5-305; Heller, 391 Md. at 172, 892 A.2d at 511.
98. Heller, 391 Md. at 182-83, 892 A.2d at 517 (Raker, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Maryland
Whistleblower Law was intended to protect employees from reprisals for allegations of
wrongdoing that, although reasonably believed to be correct by the employee, are none-
theless mistaken."); see also Horton v. Dep't of Navy, 66 F.3d 279, 283 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(interpreting the Federal Whistleblower Protection Act to require only that the
whisdeblower had a reasonable belief of wrongdoing).
99. See supra Part II.B.
100. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
101. See supra Part II.B.
102. 135 CONG. REC. S2779-01 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1989) (statement of Sen. Levin).
103. Id.; see also Marano v. Dep't of Justice, 2 F.3d 1137, 1142 (Fed. Cir. 1993), which
states that the Federal Whistleblower Protection Act should be broadly construed because:
As long as employees fear being subjected to adverse actions for having disclosed
improper governmental practices, an obvious disincentive exists to discourage
such disclosures. A principal office of the [Federal Whistleblower Protection Act]
is to eliminate that disincentive and freely encourage employees to disclose that
which is wrong with our government. How a protected disclosure is made, or by
whom, matters not to the achievement of the [Federal Whistleblower Protection
Act's] goal.
Marano, 2 F.3d at 1142 (footnote omitted).
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Most importantly, the Heller decision de-prioritizes the central
policy consideration of whistleblower protections: that shielding
whistleblowers is in society's best interest not just because
whistleblowers promote the public good,' but also because they
often risk their jobs and livelihoods for the greater good. 0 5 In recog-
nition of the sacrifice that whistleblowers make, there is a national
trend towards interpreting statutes to protect whistleblowers to en-
courage all potential whistleblowers to disclose government wrongdo-
ing."' After all, legislatures embrace whistleblower protections and
anti-retaliatory measures to discover and deter government impropri-
ety.' v Legislatures would have difficulty accomplishing either goal if
whistleblower statutes did not adequately assure employees that they
could report government wrongdoing and be protected from em-
ployer retaliation. 0 8  Thus, the purpose of the Maryland
104. See Marano, 2 F.3d at 1142 (viewing the Federal Whistleblower Protection Act as a
beneficial government statute). Some commentators suggest that whistleblowers deserve
special treatment because they act as watchdogs on behalf of the American taxpayer. See
Bruce D. Fisher, The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989: A False Hope for Whistleblowers, 43
RUTGERS L. REV. 355, 357 (1991) ("Whistleblowers can save the federal government-and
federal taxpayers-billions of dollars."); Mark Green, Op-Ed., Fraud Busting Begins at Home,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, at 9 (stating that since 1986, "federal whistleblower lawsuits have
recovered $17 billion and saved billions more by deterring corrupt practices").
105. Many whistleblowers lose their jobs even though retaliation is illegal because em-
ployers successfully obscure the connection between termination and their whistleblowing.
C. FRED ALFORD, WHISTLEBLOWERS: BROKEN LIVES AND ORGANIZATIONAL POWER 18-19
(2001). Furthermore, after blowing the whistle, many whistleblowers lose their families
and homes and are alienated from their colleagues and professional organizations. Id. at
19-20. Employer retaliation for raising ethical issues usually terminates the whistleblower's
current job and often ends the whistleblower's career in the field. Cindy A. Schipani et al.,
Women and the New Corporate Governance: Pathways for Obtaining Positions of Corporate Leader-
ship, 65 MD. L. REV. 504, 535 (2006). Furthermore, the psychological harm to the
whistleblower and her family is often greater than the loss of income. Billie Pirner Garde,
You Can't Do That To Me, I'm a Whistleblower!, 52 PRAc. LAW. 39, 39 (2006).
106. According to some scholars, the "overall trend of the courts is to interpret
[whistleblower] statutes in a manner protective of whistleblowers." Elletta Sangrey Calla-
han & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of State Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. Bus. L.J.
99, 130 (2000). Generally, the objective of whistleblower statutes is to expose, deter, and
curtail wrongdoing, and all of these objectives are furthered by interpreting whistleblower
statutes inclusively. Id. at 130-31.
107. Id. at 108.
108. Potential whistleblowers often only report government fraud and abuse when they
are confident that their jobs are protected against possible employer retaliation. 147
CONG. REc. S5970 (daily ed. June 7, 2001) (statement of Sen. Akaka); see also Marci Al-
boher Nusbaum, Blowing the Whistle: Not for the Fainthearted, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2002, at
3-10 (offering a statement by Tom Devine, legal director of the Government Accountabil-
ity Project, who explained that current safeguards for whistleblowers are instIfficient be-
cause "[a]lmost any whistle-blower who relies on these rights and fights to the bitter end
will spend many years and dollars on legal fees and be virtually guaranteed to get a formal
legal ruling that he or she deserved whatever retaliation was received").
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Whistleblower Protection Law would be furthered by an inclusive in-
terpretation of the statute, and the Heller court should have adopted
such an interpretation.
B. The Heller Court's Requirement that an Employee Must Report to a
Person with Actual Authority to Fix the Problem was
Unnecessary
The court's decision to grant employees whistleblower protec-
tions only if they disclosed to a person with actual authority to fix the
problem was unnecessary. The text of the statute is silent regarding
the person to whom an employee must disclose an alleged wrongdo-
ing. Moreover, the court could have reached the same outcome on
alternate grounds under the substantial evidence test without limiting
whistleblower protections.'0 9 Lastly, as Judge Raker recognized in her
dissent, the court could have avoided the question entirely because
the DNR did not raise a question in its certiorari petition regarding to
whom an employee must report.'1 0 By creating a new requirement
for whistleblower protection, the Heller court answered a question that
it had not been asked and did not need to address.
First, the Heller court's decision is not supported by the statutory
language of the Maryland Whistleblower Law.1 1' Notably, the statute
does not specify the individual to whom an employee must report a
violation. Rather, the statute merely prohibits reprisals against an em-
ployee who "discloses information that the employee reasonably be-
lieves evidences . ..an abuse of authority, gross mismanagement[,]
... [or] a violation of law."' 2 Thus, the Heller court did not need to
create a rule limiting the scope of the statute to employees who report
to someone with actual authority.
Second, not only is the rule not required by the statute and ar-
guably inconsistent with it, the court's new prerequisite is not central
to its result. The Heller court could have arrived at the same outcome
without creating a new requirement for whistleblower protections. 13
Under the substantial evidence test, the Court of Appeals could have
upheld the ALJ's decision that Heller did not make a protected disclo-
109. See supra note 81 and accompanying text; see also infra note 114.
110. Heler, 391 Md. at 178, 892 A.2d at 514-15 (Raker, J., dissenting).
111. See generally MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS. & PENS. § 5-305 (LexisNexis 1993).
112. Id.
113. The court could have upheld the lower court's ruling on either theory because the
substantial evidence test allows a court to uphold an agency decision so long as the record
contains substantial evidence that supports the agency's factual findings and the agency
decision is not based on an incorrect conclusion of law. See supra note 81.
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sure based on the fact that the ALJ did not believe Heller was a credi-
ble witness."' Instead, the court based its holding on the fact that
Heller did not report the wrongdoings to someone with authority to
remedy the issue." 5 But the Court of Appeals could have decided the
appeal based on the ALJ's determination of Heller's credibility be-
cause appellate courts generally defer to the fact-finding of govern-
ment agencies,"' as government agencies have more expertise in fact-
finding."' Additionally, the judicial system is more efficient overall
when appellate courts rely on administrative agencies for factual
determinations.1 1 8
Lastly, the Court of Appeals erred by adding a requirement to the
Maryland Whistleblower Law because the DNR's petition for certiorari
did not request review of the type of person to whom a whistleblower
must report.1' 9 As Judge Raker contended in her dissent, the DNR's
petition did not ask whether the Court of Special Appeals erred when
it set aside the ALJ's finding that Heller failed to make a protected
disclosure because he did not report his allegations to someone in a
position to fix the problem-the DNR merely asked if "the Court of
Special Appeals erred by making factual findings at the appellate
level."1 2 ° The Hellermajority, however, substantially altered the DNR's
question and then proceeded to answer its reformulation instead of
the question posed by the DNR's petition for certiorari.'2 1 The
court's reformulation weakens its holding because the court ad-
dressed an issue not included in the certiorari petition.' 2 2 The Heller
114. Heller, 391 Md. at 173, 892 A.2d at 511-12.
115. See id. at 172, 892 A.2d at 511 ("Therefore, we find that ALJ Fraiser's determination
that [Heller] did not make his disclosures to individuals in a position to correct the wrong-
doing is not premised on an error of law.").
116. Id. at 173, 892 A.2d at 512; Schwartz v. Md. Dep't of Natural Res., 385 Md. 534, 554,
870 A.2d 168, 180 (2005).
117. See Bd. of Physician Quality Assurance v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 69, 729 A.2d 376, 381
(1999) (stating that the court must respect the expertise of government agencies regarding
statutory interpretation).
118. See Bulluck v. Pelham Wood Apts., 283 Md. 505, 513, 390 A.2d 1119, 1124 (1978)
(stating that an appellate court should not "substitute its judgment for the expertise of
those persons who constitute the administrative agency").
119. Heller, 391 Md. at 178, 892 A.2d at 515 (Raker, J., dissenting). The Court of Ap-
peals does not normally consider issues that were not raised in a petition for certiorari.
MD. R. 8-131(b) (1957), amended by MD. R. 8-131(b) (2005); see, e.g., Renbaum v. Custom
Holding, Inc., 386 Md. 28, 33 n.2, 871 A.2d 554, 557 n.2 (2005).
120. Heller, 391 Md. at 178, 892 A.2d at 515 (Raker, J., dissenting).
121. Id.; see supra note 76 for the Court of Appeals's reformulation of the DNR's petition
for certiorari.
122. In fact, as Judge Raker aptly noted, the court may have violated Rule 8-131 because
the court addressed an issue not raised in the certiorari petition in a non-extraordinary
circumstance. MD. R. 8-131 (stating that "the Court of Appeals ordinarily will consider
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court could have prevented this problem entirely by avoiding the
question of who an employee must report to in order to obtain "pro-
tected disclosure" status.
C. The Heller Court Lacked Support for its New Requirement
In addition to adding an unnecessary requirement, the Heller
court lacked legal support for its new rule because it misinterpreted
the three federal cases on which it purported to rely. 23 The majority
relied upon three federal cases to support its premise that under the
Federal Whistleblower Protection Act, an employee must disclose to a
person who has authority to remedy the alleged wrongdoing.124 The
Heller court then applied the legal theory drawn from these cases to
the Maryland Whistleblower Law.125 The federal cases, however, did
not support the majority's conclusion.' 26 Rather, each case used an
intent-based test and explicitly stated that the Federal Whistleblower
Protection Act requires that a discloser possess an intent to raise an
issue with a higher authority but does not require that a discloser re-
port to someone with actual authority.'27 Thus, the Heller court's deci-
sion to limit whistleblower protections lacks substantive support
because the cases cited by the Heller court do not support the court's
conclusion.
In Willis, the Federal Circuit clarified that the purpose of the Fed-
eral Whistleblower Protection Act was to encourage whistleblowers to
report wrongdoing to people who may be in a position to fix the prob-
lem.'28 Although the court noted that Willis did not report his al-
leged abuse to a person with actual authority to correct it, the court
used that fact as evidence to show that Willis lacked the proper in-
tent. "'29 The Heller court departed from Willis because it did not ana-
only an issue that has been raised in the petition for certiorari"); see also Heller, 391 Md. at
178-79, 892 A.2d at 515 (Raker, J., dissenting) (quoting and applying the statutory lan-
guage from Rule 8-131). Furthermore, the Court of Appeals has interpreted Rule 8-131 to
be limited to extraordinary circumstances. Heller, 391 Md. at 179-80, 892 A.2d at 515-16;
Wynn v. State, 351 Md. 307, 322-23, 718 A.2d 588, 596 (1998).
123. See supra note 80.
124. See Heller, 391 Md. at 170, 892 A.2d at 510 (citing Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera, 249 F.3d
259 (4th Cir. 2001); Carrv. Soc. Sec. Admin., 185 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Willis v. Dep't
of Agric., 141 F.3d 1139 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
125. Id.
126. See id. at 181, 892 A.2d at 516-17 (Raker, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority
misconstrued the three federal circuit cases).
127. Hooven-Lewis, 249 F.3d at 276; Carr, 185 F.3d at 1326; Willis, 141 F.3d at 1143.
128. Willis, 141 F.3d at 1143.
129. Id.
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lyze Heller's intent. 3 ' Instead, the Heller court ruled against Heller
based entirely on his actions, not his intentions.13 1 If the Heller court
had properly applied the Willis framework, the court would have used
Heller's actions as an aid to evaluate his intent. An intent-based test
would have been a better measure of whether Heller deserved protec-
tion under the Maryland Whistleblower Law.
t 32
The Willis court was not the only federal court that applied an
intent-based test to determine whether an employee should receive
whistleblower protections. 33 In Carr v. Social Security Administration,
the Federal Circuit emphasized that the Federal Whistleblower Protec-
tion Act required only that an employee disclose information to some-
one who may be in a position to fix the problem.'3 4 The court did not
say that employees must report to someone who has actual authority
to remedy the wrongdoing. Unlike the court in Carr, the Heller court
faulted Heller for not reporting to someone with actual authority in-
stead of considering whether the reportee may have been in a position
to fix the alleged financial improprieties.135 Moreover, Heller's ac-
tions may have satisfied the Carr test because at least according to the
dissenting judges, Heller's report to Barton qualified as a protected
disclosure because Barton may have had the power to remedy the
situation. 1
3 6
In the three federal cases cited by the Heller court, the courts eval-
uated the intent of the whistleblower-not merely the whistleblower's
actions-to determine if the whistleblower deserved protections from
employer retaliation under the Federal Whistleblower Protection
Act.137 Thus, the court in Heller erred when it misinterpreted the fed-
130. Heller, 391 Md. at 172, 892 A.2d at 511.
131. Id. Specifically, the court upheld the ALJ's ruling, which provided that Heller's
disclosures were not protected under law because he did not disclose "to individuals in a
position to remedy the wrongful actions." Id.
132. Id. at 182-83, 892 A.2d at 517-18 (Raker, J., dissenting). The Heller majority did
not need to ignore Heller's conduct, rather, the court could have considered Heller's ac-
tion as evidence of his intent instead of as a proxy for his intent. Id.
133. See infra notes 136, 144 and accompanying text. The Heller court also relied upon
Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 276 (4th Cir. 2001), in which the Fourth Circuit
found that a lab technician's actions did not evidence an intent to disclose the improprie-
ties to someone with the ability to remedy them because she merely complained to the
wrongdoer. Heller, 391 Md. at 172, 892 A.2d at 511 (majority opinion).
134. 185 F.3d 1318, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
135. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
136. Heller, 391 Md. at 186, 892 A.2d at 519 (Raker, J., dissenting); see also infta note 142
and accompanying text for a discussion of the Heller court's debate regarding whether
Heller reported to an individual with authority to fix his alleged problem.
137. Heller, 391 Md. at 180-81, 892 A.2d at 517.
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eral court cases and consequently failed to apply an intent-based
rule. 138
D. The Court of Appeals Should Have Adopted an Intent-Based Rule
The Heller court improperly denied protection to employees who
report government improprieties in two situations: where the em-
ployee reports to someone who has apparent but not actual authority
to fix the problem, or, where the employee's belief of wrongdoing is
reasonable but correct.1"' The intent-based test espoused in the fed-
eral case law would protect employees in both scenarios.'4
1. An Intent-Based Rule Would Protect Well-Meaning Employees who
Report Improprieties to the "Wrong" Person
Requiring Maryland government employees to report to some-
one with authority to ameliorate a specific government impropriety is
unrealistic because at least some employees are unlikely to know who
possesses the proper authority. 14  For example, in Heller, the Court of
Special Appeals and the Court of Appeals disagreed over whether
Daryl DeCesare, Heller's supervisor's boss, had authority to fix Hel-
ler's alleged improprieties. 142 If Maryland judges-who are charged
with analyzing these types of statutes all day, every day-could not
agree as to whether Heller reported to someone with the proper au-
thority, it seems reasonable that the employees themselves might not
138. Id. at 182, 892 A.2d at 517-18.
139. In both situations, employees must possess a reasonable belief that the government
wrongdoings they reported are true. See supra notes 32, 40 for the specific statutory
language.
140. For an illustrative example, see supra note 7. See also supra note 57 and accompa-
nying text for the definition of an intent-based rule.
141. In Maryland, there are twenty different agencies: nineteen executive branch agen-
cies and over twenty independent agencies. Each agency has several managers; for exam-
ple, in the Education Department, there are twelve different managers. Maryland State
Archives, Maryland Manual On-line, http://www.mdarchives.state.md.us/msa/mdmanual/
13sdoe/pdf/13sdoe.pdf.
142. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ALJ's decision that Heller did not report to an
official with authority to fix his problem, Heller, 391 Md. at 172, 892 A.2d at 511, while the
Court of Special Appeals and the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals reached the
opposite conclusion. Id. at 186, 892 A.2d at 519 (Raker, J., dissenting). Other courts also
disagree on which parties have authority to fix a problem. See Callahan et al., Whistleblow-
ing: Australian, U.K., and U.S. Approaches to Disclosure in the Public Interest, 44 VA. J. I rr'L L.
879, 889-90 (2004) (stating that the question of the proper reportee implicates inter-orga-
nizational channels, government agencies, government officials, judicial representatives,
union representatives, non-governmental organizations, and journalists, and therefore has
generated considerable statutory variation).
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always ferret out the proper person. 4 ' Nevertheless, under the Court
of Appeals's new requirement, if an employee misjudges and discloses
an impropriety to someone with only apparent authority, that em-
ployee is not shielded from employer retaliation.' 44 Therefore, it is
likely that employees will refrain from disclosing at all because telling
the wrong person could leave the employee without ajob and without
legal recourse. 1 5 Thus, the Heller court decision discourages employ-
ees from reporting government wrongdoing.
Alternatively, an intent-based rule encourages whistleblowers to
report wrongdoing because they will be protected from employer re-
taliation regardless of whether they can pinpoint the exact bureaucrat
who can fix the problem, as long as they have the intent to alert some-
one with authority to fix their problem.' 46 The Heller court should
have adopted an intent-based rule because it would further the pur-
pose of the Maryland Whistleblower Law by encouraging employees to
freely disclose impropriety.1
4 7
2. An Intent-Based Rule Protects Well-Intentioned but Factually
Incorrect Whistleblowers
The Heller court's new requirement precludes protection for an
employee who makes a reasonable but incorrect allegation of govern-
ment impropriety, because if no wrongdoing exists, there is nobody
with the proper authority to remedy it. 148 Thus, these well-inten-
143. See Heller, 391 Md. at 186, 892 A.2d at 519 (Raker, J., dissenting); see also id. at 178,
892 A.2d at 520.
144. Id. at 182-83, 892 A.2d at 517-18.
145. The Heller majority's rule may also prevent employees from reporting alleged
wrongdoing when the employee is not 100% sure that the wrongdoing took place. See id.
at 183 n.1, 892 A.2d at 518 n.1 (stating that the majority's rule heavily burdens employees
who plan to disclose wrongdoing because it forces these employees to determine if their
allegations are correct when the employee may have difficulty assessing the necessary infor-
mation); Callahan et al., supra note 142, at 882 (stating that the "premise behind most
whistleblowing legislation is that people of conscience ... would disclose observed wrong-
doing and important errors, but for fear of losing theirjobs or other forms of retaliation").
Thus, protection from retaliation encourages whistleblowing by ridding employees of these
fears.
146. The employee must also possess a reasonable belief that the alleged wrongdoing is
true. See supra note 139.
147. Act of May 27, 1980, ch. 850, 1980 Md. Laws 2998 ("The General Assembly finds
that ... it is essential that classified State employees be free to disclose impropriety[.]").
148. See Heller, 391 Md. at 183, 892 A.2d at 517-18 (Raker, J., dissenting) (stating that
employees who make reasonable but incorrect allegations of wrongdoing will not be pro-
tected under the majority's ruling "because there is no actual wrong to remedy").
It is also possible that the Court of Appeals would interpret the whistleblower statute
to grant protection to an employee with a reasonable but incorrect belief of wrongdoing if
she told someone who would have authority to remedy the problem if the problem actually
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tioned employees may never receive protection from retaliation be-
cause nobody has actual authority to fix a non-existent problem. 149
Because the Maryland Whistleblower Law is intended to en-
courage employees to report government impropriety if they have a
reasonable belief that their allegations are true, the additional re-
quirement in Heller contradicts the statutory purpose by refusing to
grant protection to some employees who possess the requisite reason-
able belief.' 0 In addition, the Heller court's new requirement is likely
to chill government whistleblowing because many people are not will-
ing to risk their jobs to report government wrongdoing. 151 Instead,
the Court of Appeals should have adopted an intent-based rule and
avoid forcing employees to choose between their jobs and their civic
responsibility-the employees' job would be protected as long as they
have a reasonable belief that the reported improprieties are true.
V. CONCLUSION
In Department of Natural Resources v. Heller, the Court of Appeals
narrowed the Maryland Whistleblower Law to exclude employees who
hold a reasonable but inaccurate belief of wrongdoing and employees
who possess a correct belief of government impropriety but report
that belief to someone who lacks the authority to fix the problem. 152
The court erred because its decision undercut the legislative intent of
the Maryland Whistleblower Law by discouraging potential
whistleblowers from reporting wrongdoing. 153  Furthermore, the
court could have decided the case without narrowing whistleblower
protections, 154 and the court had little justification for its conclusion
because it relied on misinterpreted federal case law to reach its deci-
sion. 5 5 The Heller court should have adopted the rule used by the
existed. This situation has never arisen in Maryland courts, but this result seems unlikely
given the court's narrow interpretation of the statute.
149. Id.
150. Act of May 27, 1980, ch. 850, 1980 Md. Laws 2998 (stating that in order to accom-
plish the goals of the Maryland Whistleblower Law, state employees must be able to report
government impropriety); MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS. & PENS. § 5-305 (LexisNexis 1993)
(stating that a supervisor may not take retaliatory actions against an employee who dis-
closes information that the employee reasonably believes evidences an abuse of authority,
gross mismanagement, or gross waste of money by the government).
151. See Callahan et al., supra note 142, at 882 (stating that the concept of whistleblower
laws is to have moral people reporting government impropriety without worrying about
retaliation).
152. See supra Part IV.A.
153. See supra Part W.A.
154. See supra Part IV.B.
155. See supra Part W.C.
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federal courts-an intent-based rule-that grants protection to all
whistleblowers with the intent to report wrongdoing to an authority
who can fix the problem even if the whistleblower's belief is reasona-
ble but incorrect or the whistleblower reports to someone with appar-
ent but not actual authority to remedy the problem.'56 An intent-
based rule furthers the purpose of the Maryland Whistleblower Law by
broadly encouraging whistleblowers with reasonable beliefs that they
witnessed government impropriety to improve society by blowing the
whistle.
NINA H. SCHICHOR
156. See supra Part IV.D.
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KELLY v. STATE: LIMITING TRIAL COURTS' BROAD
DISCRETION TO MAKE EVIDENTIARY DECISIONS AND
MANAGE TRIALS
In Kelly v. State,' the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered
whether a trialjudge violated a criminal defendant's right to present a
defense by excluding the defendant's present witnesses based on de-
fense counsel's proffers.2 While the Court of Appeals held that the
exclusion violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to present
a defense,' the court failed to assess whether the excluded testimony
was admissible.4 Thus, the court departed from prior cases conclud-
ing that a defendant must show that the excluded testimony is both
admissible and favorable to demonstrate a violation of her Sixth
Amendment rights.5 The court's decision grants criminal defendants
a broad right to present witnesses who are present in the courtroom,
regardless of whether they have admissible testimony to offer.6 More-
over, the court's decision limits the trial court's broad discretion to
control trials,7 which may impact the trial court's ability to preserve
other interests in the trial court setting.8
I. THE CASE
On October 31, 2002, three individuals were riding on a public
transit bus in Montgomery County, Maryland, when they got into a
verbal altercation with Francesco Kelly.9 The three people then got
off the bus before Kelly, entered a local convenience store, returned
to the same bus stop, and awaited another bus.10 After approximately
ten minutes, a gunman shot at the three individuals, wounding two of
them; two of the three victims identified Kelly as the shooter.'" Kelly
Copyright © 2007 by Jennifer L. Katz.
1. 392 Md. 511, 898 A.2d 419 (2006).
2. Id. at 517, 898 A.2d at 422.
3. Id. at 543, 898 A.2d at 438.
4. See infra Part [V.A.
5. See infra Part [V.A.
6. See infra Part IV.B.
7. See infra Part IV.C.
8. See infra Part LV.D.
9. Kelly v. State, 162 Md. App. 122, 127-28, 873 A.2d 434, 436-37 (2005).
10. Id., 873 A.2d at 437.
11. Id. at 128-29, 873 A.2d at 437.
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was arrested and charged with various criminal offenses associated
with the shooting. 2
During Kelly's jury trial, the State presented twelve witnesses with-
out the court requiring a prior proffer of each witness's testimony.13
Defense counsel attempted to call two witnesses, both of whom were
present in the courtroom and available to testify. 4 The trial court
required defense counsel to proffer both witnesses' testimony in the
State's presence, overruling defense counsel's objections. 5
The defense proffered that it planned to call the first witness, a
police officer who investigated the crime, to testify that there was no
corroboration of the bus incident.'6 The defense also proffered that
it planned to call the second witness to testify about her personal
knowledge of one of the victim's habit of loitering and reputation in
the community where the crime occurred."7 The trial court excluded
both witnesses based on defense counsel's proffers.'"
On May 22, 2003, a jury convicted Kelly of two counts of at-
tempted first-degree murder, two counts of attempted second-degree
murder, two counts of first-degree assault, and two counts of use of a
handgun in the commission of a felony or a crime of violence. 9 Kelly
was sentenced to forty years imprisonment.2 1
Kelly appealed his convictions in part on the grounds that the
trial court violated his fundamental Sixth Amendment right to pre-
sent a defense by not permitting the two witnesses to testify.2 ' The
Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed the convictions, conclud-
ing that the trial court neither abused its discretion by requiring the
12. Id. at 126-29, 873 A.2d at 436-37.
13. Kelly, 392 Md. at 519, 898 A.2d at 423. Proffered evidence is "offered to the court
to obtain a ruling on its admissibility." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 598 (8th ed. 2004).
14. Kelly, 392 Md. at 521-22, 527, 898 A.2d at 425, 428.
15. Id. at 527, 898 A.2d at 428.
16. Id. at 522, 898 A.2d at 425. Defense counsel also sought to question the police
officer about the bus schedule that he used to investigate the crime to highlight inconsis-
tencies in the victims' testimony about the timing of the incidents on the night of the
shootings. Id. at 523, 898 A.2d at 426.
17. Id. at 528, 898 A.2d at 428. Defense counsel noted that the testimony could lead to
the inference that people other than Kelly would have known that the victim was standing
at the particular bus stop on the night of the shootings. Id. at 529, 898 A.2d at 429.
18. Id. at 526, 528-29, 898 A.2d at 428-29. The court excluded the police officer from
testifying after determining that nothing defense counsel proffered to the court would be
admissible through the officer. Id. at 526, 898 A.2d at 428. The court excluded the other
defense witness after concluding that the jury could not reasonably infer from the witness's
testimony that someone else would have set out to shoot the victim at that location on the
night in question. Id. at 528-29, 898 A.2d at 429.
19. Id. at 515, 898 A.2d at 421.
20. Id. at 515-16, 898 A.2d at 421.
21. Kelly v. State, 162 Md. App. 122, 138, 873 A.2d 434, 443 (2005).
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proffers, nor erred in precluding the defense from calling the two
witnesses based on the proffers.2 The court noted that excluding the
witnesses was within the trial court's broad discretion and control over
trial proceedings, 23 and emphasized that trial court rulings on the rel-
evance and admissibility of evidence are entitled to deference and will
not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.24
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to determine whether
the trial court violated Kelly's right to present a defense by requiring
defense counsel, in the State's presence, to proffer its available wit-
nesses' testimony as a predicate to allowing the witnesses to take the
stand. 5
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Criminal defendants have a constitutional right under the Sixth
Amendment to present a defense, which incorporates the fundamen-
tal right to present witnesses.26 However, the ability to call witnesses is
not absolute.27 Trial judges have broad discretion under the Federal
and Maryland Rules of Evidence to exclude inadmissible evidence, in-
cluding witness testimony.2" An abuse of discretion occurs when a
trial judge acts in an arbitrary or capricious manner, and consequently
denies a defendant the right to a fair trial.29
A. Defendant's Sixth Amendment Right to Present a Defense
The United States Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant
the fundamental right to present a complete defense.3" The Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution enumerates particular rights of an
accused, including compulsory process for obtaining favorable wit-
22. Id. at 142-43, 873 A.2d at 445-46.
23. Id. at 141, 873 A.2d at 445.
24. Id. at 143, 873 A.2d at 446.
25. Kelly, 392 Md. at 516-17, 898 A.2d at 422. The Court of Appeals also considered
whether Kelly's right to be present at every stage of the criminal proceedings was violated
when Kelly was excluded from an evidentiary hearing. Id.
26. See infra Part I1.A.
27. See infra Part II.B.
28. See infra Part II.C.1.
29. See infta Part II.C.2.
30. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (citing California v. Trombetta,
467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)).
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nesses." The Maryland Declaration of Rights also protects a criminal
defendant's right to examine witnesses for and against him.32
The Supreme Court of the United States has emphasized that the
right to offer the testimony of witnesses is the essence of the right to
present a defense, as it allows the defendant to present his version of
the facts to the jury. 3 In Washington v. Texas,3" the Court considered
whether state statutes disallowing principals, accomplices, or accesso-
ries in the same crime to testify for each other denied a defendant his
Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process.35 The defendant in
Washington was on trial for murder, and the witness-an accomplice in
the crime-planned to testify that the defendant ran from the scene
before the murder took place.36 The Court held that the state statute
in question was unconstitutional, as it denied the defendant from call-
ing a competent witness in his defense whose testimony would have
been relevant and material. 37
Several years later in Chambers v. Mississippi,38 the Supreme Court
reiterated the fundamental nature of an accused's right to present wit-
nesses in his own defense, and concluded that an evidentiary rule
could not be applied mechanistically if it infringed on this right.3 " In
Chambers, the trial court excluded testimony of three defense witnesses
because the testimony-evidence of a third-party's oral confession-
violated Mississippi's hearsay rule." The Court noted that in exercis-
ing the right to present witnesses, the accused must abide by well-
settled rules of procedure and evidence designed to guarantee fair-
ness and reliability in the trial process."1 Despite this obligation, the
Court declared that the hearsay rule cannot be applied so rigidly as to
deprive the defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial."2 The
Chambers Court concluded that the trial court erred because the ex-
cluded testimony was both critical to the accused's defense and suffi-
31. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Sixth Amendment rights are applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967).
The Court of Appeals has recognized this holding in a number of cases. E.g., Wilson v.
State, 345 Md. 437, 445, 693 A.2d 344, 348 (1997); Redditt v. State, 337 Md. 621, 634-35,
655 A.2d 390, 396 (1995); Void v. State, 325 Md. 386, 390-91, 601 A.2d 124, 126 (1992).
32. MD. CONsr. DECL. OF RTs. art. 21.
33. Washington, 388 U.S. at 19.
34. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
35. Id. at 14-15.
36. Id. at 15-16.
37. Id. at 23.
38. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
39. Id. at 302.
40. Id. at 292-93.
41. Id. at 302.
42. Id.
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ciently reliable to be admitted, and thus the exclusion of the
testimony deprived the defendant of a fair trial.43
A decade later, the Court of Appeals applied the Supreme
Court's ruling in Chambers to excluded testimony in Foster v. State.4 In
Foster, a defendant on trial for murder sought to call a friend of the
victim who would testify that the victim told her that the defendant's
husband had threatened to kill the victim. 45 The trial court excluded
the testimony as hearsay.46 The Court of Appeals reversed and held
that the excluded testimony was both critical to the accused's defense
and sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted.47 Thus, the court found
that the trial court's application of the hearsay rule to exclude this
critical testimony deprived the defendant of a fair trial.4"
B. The Right to Present Witnesses Is Fundamental but not Absolute
The defendant's fundamental right to present witnesses' testi-
mony is not without limits.49 The Supreme Court has restricted this
right by approving limits on a criminal defendant's ability to offer un-
reliable, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible testimony.5" Such limi-
tations enable trial courts to preclude the defense from presenting
particular witnesses, and such exclusions do not automatically violate
compulsory process rights.5"
In United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal,52 the Supreme Court estab-
lished that a defendant must make a plausible showing that excluded
testimony would have been both "material and favorable" to the de-
fense to prove a violation of the Compulsory Process Clause.53 In
Valenzuela-Bernal, the defendant claimed he was denied his constitu-
tional right to compulsory process because the federal government
deported passengers of the automobile he was driving at the time of
his arrest, thus depriving him of his right to present the passengers'
testimony.5 4 The Court noted that the mere absence of testimony
43. Id. at 302-03.
44. 297 Md. 191, 464 A.2d 986 (1983).
45. Id. at 200, 464 A.2d at 991.
46. Id. at 201, 464 A.2d at 992.
47. Id. at 211-12, 464 A.2d at 997.
48. Id.
49. Wilson v. State, 345 Md. 437, 448, 693 A.2d 344, 349 (1997).
50. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988).
51. See id. at 418 (affirming the trial court's exclusion of a defense witness as a sanction
for violating a discovery request).
52. 458 U.S. 858 (1982).
53. Id. at 867. The Compulsory Process Clause provides a criminal defendant the right
"to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
54. Valenzuela-Berna4 458 U.S. at 861.
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does not establish a violation of compulsory process, because the Sixth
Amendment does not grant an accused the right to secure the testi-
mony of any and all witnesses. Thus, the Court held that absent a
demonstration by the defendant that the testimony would have been
both favorable and material to his defense, the Government's deporta-
tion of the witnesses did not deprive the accused of a fair trial. 6
Six years later, in Taylor v. Illinois,5 7 the Supreme Court estab-
lished that the Compulsory Process Clause does not automatically bar
a trial court from excluding a defense witness as a sanction for violat-
ing a pretrial discovery request. 58 In Taylor, defense counsel in an at-
tempted murder trial failed to identify a potential witness in his
answer to the prosecution's discovery motion requesting a list of wit-
nesses.5 '9 As a sanction for violating the discovery request, the trial
judge refused to allow the witness to testify.6" The Court affirmed the
trial court's ruling, reasoning that there is a meaningful distinction
between a defendant's right to compulsory process and other Sixth
Amendment rights, such as a trial by jury and assistance of counsel, in
that the availability of compulsory process depends fully on the defen-
dant's initiative. 6' The Taylor Court asserted that effective use of the
compulsory process right requires "deliberate planning and affirma-
tive conduct" on the part of defense counsel.62 Thus, the Compulsory
Process Clause did not bar the exclusion of a defense witness as a sanc-
tion for defense counsel's failure to comply with discovery rules.63
C. The Trial Court's Broad Discretion Pursuant to the Rules of
Evidence
Trial court judges have considerable discretion to manage trials
under the Federal and Maryland Rules of Evidence, including making
evidentiary determinations.64 But this discretion is not unlimited, and
an abuse of discretion occurs when a trial judge exercises discretion in
an arbitrary or capricious manner or when the judge acts beyond the
55. Id. at 867.
56. Id. at 874.
57. 484 U.S. 400 (1988).
58. Id. at 401-02.
59. Id. at 403-05.
60. Id. at 405.
61. Id. at 410 & n.14.
62. Id. The Taylor Court noted that other Sixth Amendment rights, such as the right to
confront adverse witnesses, are triggered automatically at the start of the adversary process
and apply without any affirmative action by the defendant. Id.
63. Id. at 418.
64. See infra Part Il.C.1.
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letter or reason of the law. 65 The Court of Appeals has considered the
trial court's discretion in allowing or requiring a witness to testify in
cases where witnesses were either missing from the courtroom 66 or
present and available to testify.67
1. The Trial Court's Discretion to Manage Trials Through
Evidentiary Decisions
The state's interest in the orderly administration of criminal pro-
ceedings justifies the implementation of rules that limit a party's abil-
ity to control the time and content of witness testimony.68 As such,
both the Federal and Maryland Rules of Evidence provide trial judges
with considerable discretion to manage trials.69 Such discretion ex-
tends to decisions regarding the admissibility of evidence, 70 and per-
mits trial courts to determine if legitimate interests in the
administration of criminal proceedings outweigh a defendant's inter-
est in presenting relevant evidence.71
For example, the Federal and Maryland Rules of Evidence estab-
lish that trial judges may exclude relevant evidence if "its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury."72 Further, the Su-
preme Court has observed that the Constitution permits judges to ex-
clude evidence that is cumulative, only slightly relevant, or poses an
inappropriate risk of harassment.73 The rules also permit judges to
conduct these evidentiary proceedings out of earshot of the jury. 4
These evidentiary rules do not infringe upon an accused's right
to present a defense as long as the rules are not out of balance with
65. See infra Part II.C.2.
66. See infra Part II.C.3.a.
67. See infra Part II.C.3.b.
68. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 411.
69. Federal Rule of Evidence 611 and Maryland Rule 5-611 both provide: "The court
shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of... presenting evidence so as
to (1) make the . . . presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid
needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue em-
barrassment." FED. R. EVID. 611(a); MD. R. 5-611(a).
70. FED. R. EVID. 104(a); MD. R. 5-104(a).
71. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998).
72. FED. R EVID. 403; MD. R. 5-403.
73. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 689-90 (1986).
74. MD. R. 5-104(c). Maryland Rule 5-103 provides that "[p]roceedings shall be con-
ducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being sug-
gested to a jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof or asking
questions within the hearing of the jury." MD. R. 5-103(c).
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the purposes they serve. 75 For example, both the Federal and Mary-
land Rules of Evidence exclude the admission of hearsay evidence,
unless the evidence falls within a recognized exception. 76 The rule
seeks to eliminate the risk that juries will have difficulty assessing the
credibility of hearsay because jurors cannot observe the declarant
under oath and subject to cross examination. 77 These concerns un-
derlie the policy against admitting hearsay, as excluding this type of
testimony reduces the danger that evidence will lack reliability.
78
Pursuant to the Federal and Maryland Rules of Evidence, trial
judges make most evidentiary determinations based on party mo-
tions.79 Under the Federal Rules, trial courts also have authority to
take notice of plain error without any action on behalf of a party.80
Further, federal and Maryland trial courts have discretion to call their
own witnesses and to question the parties' witnesses.8' Moreover, trial
judges may have a responsibility to make sua sponte determinations to
ensure a fair trial outcome.82
For example, in Bernadyn v. State,"3 the Court of Appeals held that
a trial court erred by admitting hearsay evidence that did not fall
75. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308. Compare Holmes v. South Carolina, 126 S. Ct. 1727,
1734-35 (2006) (reversing the trial court's decision to exclude evidence that a third party
may have committed the crime), Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56 (1987) (striking down a
per se rule excluding all hypnotically refreshed testimony), and Washington v. Texas, 388
U.S. 14, 22 (1967) (striking down a rule precluding accomplice testimony), with Clark v.
Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2732-37 (2006) (upholding a rule restricting a defendant's ability
to introduce testimony regarding mental disease or diminished capacity in insanity pleas),
and Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 316-17 (upholding the exclusion of polygraph evidence).
76. FED. R. Evln. 801-804; MD. R. 5-801 to -804. Exceptions under both the Federal
and Maryland Rules of Evidence include statements of present sense impression, excited
utterances, records of regularly conducted activity, and public records and reports. FED. R.
EvD. 803(1), (2), (6) & (8); MD. R. 5-803(1), (2), (6) & (8).
77. 1 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 802.02[3] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2006).
78. Id.
79. FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(1); MD. R. 5-103(a)(1).
80. FED. R. EVID. 103(d); WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 77, § 103.02[1].
81. FED. R. EVID. 614(a)-(b); MD. R. 5-614(a)-(b).
82. See Bernadyn v. State, 390 Md. 1, 15 n.5, 887 A.2d 602, 610 n.5 (2005) (noting that
the trial court probably should have given the jury a limiting instruction sua sponte regard-
ing admitted evidence); see also Weaver v. United States, 374 F.2d 878, 882 (5th Cir. 1967)
("It is not only the trial judge's right but his duty to see that only proper and relevant
evidence [is] admitted."); United States v. Clarke, 390 F. Supp. 2d 131, 135 (D. Conn.
2005) (explaining that a party's objection is not a necessary precondition to the exclusion
of evidence); People v. Sturm, 129 P.3d 10, 23 (Cal. 2006) (recognizing that the trial judge
may exclude irrelevant evidence sua sponte); Barber v. State Highway Comm'n, 342 P.2d
723, 727 (Wyo. 1959) (observing that the trial judge has a duty to control the conduct of
the trial, and can rule sua sponte on the admissibility of evidence to enable the discovery of
the true facts of a case).
83. 390 Md. 1, 887 A.2d 602 (2005).
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within any exception to the hearsay rule. The court rejected the
State's alternative contention that the evidence was admissible for a
limited purpose, and noted that the trial court should make clear
when evidence is admitted for a limited purpose to put the defense
counsel on notice to request a limiting jury instruction. 4 In the alter-
native, the Bernadyn court maintained that the trial court sua sponte
should have provided the jury with instructions regarding the limited
use of the evidence.85
2. Abuse of Discretion Standard of Review for Evidentiary
Determinations
Although the trial judge "runs the court," the right of an accused
to a fair trial is of paramount concern under both the Federal and
Maryland Constitutions.86 The Court of Appeals has observed that an
impartial and disinterested judge is fundamental to a defendant's
right to a fair trial.8 7 An abuse of discretion "occurs when a trial judge
exercises discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner or when [the
judge] acts beyond the letter or reason of the law."8
In Hopkins v. State,"9 the Court of Appeals upheld a trial court's
decision to admit evidence in the form of a voice exemplar given by
the defendant. °° The court noted that appellate courts extend a sig-
nificant amount of deference to trial court determinations of the ad-
missibility of evidence, and reverse only where the court abused its
discretion." The court reasoned that the specific type of evidence
was relevant and that its probative value was not outweighed by any
prejudice to the defendant. 2 Thus, the court in Hopkins held that the
trial judge did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence.93
84. Id. at 15, 887 A.2d at 610.
85. Id. at 15 n.5, 887 A.2d at 610 n.5.
86. Crawford v. State, 285 Md. 431, 451-52 & n.3, 404 A.2d 244, 254 & n.3 (1979)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
87. Jackson v. State, 364 Md. 192, 206, 772 A.2d 273, 281 (2001) (citing Jefferson-El v.
State, 330 Md. 99, 105, 622 A.2d 737, 740 (1993)).
88. Cooley v. State, 385 Md. 165, 175, 867 A.2d 1065, 1071 (2005) (citing Jenkins v.
State, 375 Md. 284, 295-96, 825 A.2d 1008, 1015 (2003)).
89. 352 Md. 146, 721 A.2d 231 (1998).
90. Id. at 167, 721 A.2d at 241. A voice exemplar is " [a] sample of a person's voice used
for the purpose of comparing it with a recorded voice to determine whether the speaker is
the same person." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 1604.
91. Hopkins, 352 Md. at 158, 721 A.2d at 237.
92. Id. at 163-67, 721 A.2d at 239-41.
93. Id. at 167, 721 A.2d at 241.
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Seven years later in Cooley v. State,94 the Court of Appeals consid-
ered whether a trial judge abused his discretion by abrogating the au-
thority to make decisions regarding courtroom security.95  In
discussing the abuse of discretion standard of review, the court noted
that trial judges must exercise sound discretion that is reflected in the
record,96 and that the conduct of the trial must rest largely in the
control of the trialjudge.97 The court concluded that determinations
about courtroom security rest entirely in the discretion of the trial
judge and generally may not be delegated to law enforcement.9"
One notable exception to the deferential standard applied in ap-
pellate review of evidentiary decisions is the admissibility of hearsay
evidence.99 Hearsay evidence that does not fall within an exception to
the hearsay rule is almost always excluded.'00 Thus, a trial court has
no discretion to admit hearsay evidence where there is no provision
providing for its admissibility. 1 Consequently, appellate review of
decisions regarding the admissibility of hearsay evidence is de novo,
rather than the deferential standard of review used in other eviden-
tiary decisions. 10 2
3. Trial Court's Abuse of Discretion When Excluding or Failing to
Secure Witnesses
The Court of Appeals has considered the trial court's discretion
in allowing or requiring a witness to testify in two distinct types of
cases: (1) when the witness is not in the courtroom at the appropriate
time, 103 and (2) when the witness is present in the courtroom but pre-
cluded from testifying. 4
94. 385 Md. 165, 867 A.2d 1065 (2005).
95. Id. at 183, 867 A.2d at 1075.
96. Id. at 175, 867 A.2d at 1071 (citingJenkins v. State, 375 Md. 274, 295-96, 825 A.2d
1008, 1015 (2003)).
97. Id. at 176, 867 A.2d at 1071 (citing Wilhelm v. State, 272 Md. 404, 413, 326 A.2d
707, 714-15 (1974)).
98. Id. at 169, 184, 867 A.2d at 1067, 1076. The court vacated the Court of Special
Appeals's affirmation of the trial court, but did not determine whether there was an abuse
of discretion as the lower appellate court had not fully addressed the abrogation issue. Id.
at 184, 867 A.2d at 1076.
99. Bernadyn v. State, 390 Md. 1, 8, 887 A.2d 602, 606 (2005).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 7-8, 887 A.2d at 606.
103. See infra Part III.C.3.a.
104. See infta Part III.C.3.b.
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a. Securing Unavailable Witnesses
Trial courts have a significant amount of discretion to grant a
continuance to locate, subpoena, or apprehend a missing witness.1
0 5
A court's refusal to grant a subpoena or a continuance to locate a
missing witness does not violate the right of compulsory process, un-
less the accused can show that the testimony would be admissible and
favorable to the defense.'1 6 In Wilson v. State,1 ° 7 the Court of Appeals
reviewed a trial court's decision denying a defendant a continuance or
assistance in securing a missing defense witness.'0 8 The Wilson court
concluded that the witness's testimony-personal knowledge of the
events that occurred during the defendant's arrest-would have been
both admissible and favorable to the defense.10 9 Thus, the court held
that the trial court abused its discretion and violated the defendant's
state and federal constitutional right to compulsory process when it
failed to help secure the defense witness." 0
Trial courts also have discretion to quash subpoenas for defense
witnesses, but must have a sufficient basis from which to exercise that
discretion. In Void v. State,"' the Court of Appeals found reversible
error where a trial court quashed subpoenas served on witnesses
called to testify as character witnesses against the State's key witness."
12
The Void court emphasized that the trial judge had a limited basis for
this decision given that he refused to hear from the subpoenaed wit-
nesses, and that their affidavits were of no help to assess the admissi-
bility of their testimony." 3  Rather than barring the witnesses'
testimony before learning of its reliability and relevance, the court
concluded that the appropriate time for the judge to determine the
admissibility of the witnesses' testimony was during their examination
105. Wilson v. State, 345 Md. 437, 451, 693 A.2d 344, 351 (1997).
106. Id. at 448, 693 A.2d at 349.
107. 345 Md. 437, 693 A.2d 344 (1997).
108. Id. at 440, 693 A.2d at 345.
109. Id. at 451, 693 A.2d at 351.
110. Id. at 452-53, 693 A.2d at 351-52.
111. 325 Md. 386, 601 A.2d 124 (1992).
112. Id. at 392-93, 601 A.2d at 126-27. The State's key witness was a former police
officer who was the alleged victim of the crime, and the Void court noted that the potential
conviction of the defendant hinged on the credibility of this witness. Id. at 387, 601 A.2d at
124. The defense witnesses were three police officers who had previously investigated the
former officer for perjury and testified against him at his trial for perjury. Id. at 387-89,
601 A.2d at 124-25. The trial court granted the State's motion to quash the subpoenas of
the witnesses, based largely on the fact that the police officer had been acquitted of the
perjury charge. Id. at 389, 601 A.2d at 125.
113. Id. at 393, 601 A.2d at 127.
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under oath.' 1 4 Thus, the court held that the trial court's decision to
quash the subpoenas violated the defendant's common law and statu-
tory rights to attack the credibility of a witness against him.1" 5
b. Excluding Present and Available Witnesses
A trial court does not have the discretion to exclude a defense
witness for violating nonexistent courtroom rules. In McCray v.
State,1 1 6 the Court of Appeals found reversible error where a trial
court excluded a defense witness because she was present in the court-
room during the trial, despite not having issued a sequestration order
for the witness.' 1 7 The court reasoned that because the sequestration
rule applies mechanically to sequester any and all witnesses, it fol-
lowed that there must be an order of sequestration before a judge can
exclude a witness." 8 Thus, in the absence of such an order, the trial
court's exclusion of the witness was erroneous. 19
Ten years later in Redditt v. State,120 the Court of Appeals found
reversible error where a trial court excluded a defense witness for
committing a minor violation of a sequestration order. 2  The court
noted that although the trial judge has the discretion to impose a
sanction when a sequestration violation occurs, a per se rule of exclu-
sion is inappropriate. 12 2 The Redditt court reasoned that when an ar-
guable decision to exclude a witness confronts a defendant's
compulsory process rights, trial courts should err on the side of the
defendant's constitutional rights. 1 23 Moreover, the court observed,
the excluded testimony constituted either impeachment of the State's
key witness by prior inconsistent statement or by proof of improper
motive or bias. 124 Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial
judge abused its discretion by imposing a sanction to exclude the de-
fense witness's testimony.'
25
114. Id. at 392-94, 601 A.2d at 126-27.
115. Id. at 391-92, 394, 601 A.2d at 126, 128.
116. 305 Md. 126, 501 A.2d 856 (1985).
117. Id. at 137, 501 A.2d at 861.
118. Id. at 134, 501 A.2d at 860.
119. Id. The court refused to consider whether the proffered testimony was inadmissi-
ble, and thus properly excluded, because the issue was not raised by the State at trial, nor
in a cross-petition for certiorari. Id. at 135-37, 501 A.2d at 860-61.
120. 337 Md. 621, 655 A.2d 390 (1995).
121. Id. at 637, 640, 655 A.2d at 398, 399.
122. Id. at 629, 655 A.2d at 394.
123. Id. at 635, 655 A.2d at 397.
124. Id. at 636, 655 A.2d at 397.
125. Id. at 637, 655 A.2d at 398.
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III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In Kelly v. State, the Court of Appeals overturned the conviction of
Francesco Kelly, holding that the trial court abused its discretion and
denied the defendant his constitutional right to present a defense by
requiring the defense to proffer the content of present witnesses' testi-
mony and refusing to allow the defendant to present those wit-
nesses.' 2 6 Writing for the majority, Judge Cathell focused on the
defendant's rights to compulsory process guaranteed by both the Fed-
eral and Maryland Constitutions. 2 7 The court reasoned that the right
to present witnesses is a fundamental right essential to due process,
128
and that proffers-while helpful-are not an adequate substitute for
available witness testimony. 29 Thus, the majority determined that the
trial court's rulings effectively denied the defendant "the only defense
available to him-the witnesses he hoped would provide favorable
testimony." 1
30
Next, the court noted that the trial court's reversible error was
not in ruling that the evidence was hearsay, but in the trial court's
method of determining that the testimony would be hearsay.1 3 ' The
court reasoned that while the trial judge may deny defense witness
testimony upon proper objection by the prosecution, the defendant
still has the right to present favorable witnesses in the first place.1
3 2
The majority found the trial court's exclusion of the testimony prema-
ture, and emphasized that a judge should wait for an in-court exami-
nation before ruling on the admissibility of testimony. 133 The Kelly
court further explained that even if the testimony was hearsay, only an
objection by the State would bar it, and the trial court's sua sponte
decision to exclude the evidence improperly interfered with the ad-
versarial process. '31
The majority acknowledged a limitation of the defendant's funda-
mental right to present witnesses in that the accused does not have a
right to offer testimony that is inadmissible under standard rules of
evidence. 135 The court focused on its analysis in Wilson v. State, which
interpreted Supreme Court precedent as requiring the defendant to
126. 392 Md. at 543, 898 A.2d at 438.
127. Id. at 532-33, 898 A.2d at 431.
128. Id. at 534, 898 A.2d at 432.
129. Id. at 532, 898 A.2d at 431.
130. Id. at 533, 898 A.2d at 432.
131. Id. at 532, 898 A.2d at 431.
132. Id. at 535, 898 A.2d at 433.
133. Id. at 538-39, 898 A.2d at 434-35.
134. Id. at 532, 543, 898 A.2d at 431, 437.
135. Id. at 536-37, 898 A.2d at 434.
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make some plausible showing of how the testimony would be admissi-
ble, favorable, and material to his defense in order to use it at trial. 136
The court reasoned that Kelly made the required showing, because
after hearing the proffers, the witnesses' testimony seemed presuma-
bly favorable. 
1 7
Finally, the court asserted that the trial judge went beyond his
role as an impartial officer in dismissing the witnesses' testimony,'38
particularly because only the defense counsel had to provide detailed
proffers of witness testimony.1 39 The majority reasoned that the de-
fendant's right to a fair trial is at risk when the court assumes the role
of a party by ruling on the admissibility of evidence in the absence of
appropriate objections. 140 As a result of the trial court's abuse of dis-
cretion, the Kelly court reversed the convictions and remanded the
case for a new trial.
14 1
In her dissent, Judge Raker criticized the majority for focusing
solely on the trial court's procedure in excluding the testimony,
rather than discussing the actual relevance of the proposed testi-
mony.'42 The dissent emphasized the majority's failure to analyze the
admissibility of the proffered testimony, and its effective concession
that the testimony was inadmissible hearsay.' 43
Pointing to the Maryland Rules of Evidence, the dissent con-
tended that the trial judge's discretion over trial proceedings includes
the authority to exclude inadmissible evidence sua sponte, and that
such evidence need not be presented to the jury.14 The dissent fur-
ther opined that Maryland evidentiary rules allow, and at times re-
quire, a trial court judge to rule on the admissibility of evidence
outside the presence of the jury.14 5 Thus, the dissent argued that the
trial judge could legitimately exclude the witnesses' testimony on the
136. Id. at 537, 898 A.2d at 434 (citing Wilson v. State, 345 Md. 437, 448, 693 A.2d 344,
349-50 (1997)).
137. Id. at 538, 898 A.2d at 434.
138. Id. at 541, 898 A.2d at 436.
139. Id. at 542, 898 A.2d at 437.
140. Id. at 541, 898 A.2d at 436.
141. Id. at 543, 898 A.2d at 438.
142. Id. at 545, 898 A.2d at 438-39 (Raker, J., dissenting). Judge Raker's dissent was
joined by Judge Harrell. Id. at 544, 898 A.2d at 438.
143. Id. at 545, 898 A.2d at 439.
144. Id. at 546-47, 898 A.2d at 439-40. Judge Raker cited Maryland Rules 5-103, 5-104,
and 5-602, which together suggest an inference that admissibility hearings can be con-
ducted outside the presence of the jury. Id. at 547, 898 A.2d at 440.
145. Id. at 547, 898 A.2d at 440.
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basis of a proffer, and such action was not an abuse of discretion, but
rather a cost-saving, efficient procedure.
1 46
Consequently, the dissent contended that the real question
before the court was whether the trial court improperly excluded the
witnesses' testimony based on its substance. 4 7 Judge Raker main-
tained that because the evidence was hearsay, and no exception was
put forward, the testimony was inadmissible and Kelly was not de-
prived of his right to present a defense. 4 ' The dissent, therefore,
would have affirmed Kelly's conviction in all respects. 149
IV. ANALYSIS
In Kelly v. State, the Court of Appeals held that a trial court
abused its discretion by excluding a defendant's present witnesses
based on proffers, and that the abuse of discretion violated the defen-
dant's Sixth Amendment right to present a defense.15 The court's
analysis departed from precedent by failing to address whether the
excluded testimony was actually admissible. 5 ' The majority's failure
to assess the admissibility of the testimony suggests that trial judges
should allow defendants to call witnesses who are present in the court-
room regardless of whether the witnesses have any admissible testi-
mony to offer. 152 The court also created new law by limiting a trial
court's discretion to exclude sua sponte certain witnesses and inadmis-
sible evidence, which cuts against the traditional flexibility of trial
judges to manage trials and balance the various interests within the
trial setting.' As a result, problems may arise when the presentment
of a defendant's witnesses intersects with other interests at stake in the
trial setting. '54
146. Id. at 560, 898 A.2d at 448.
147. Id. at 549, 898 A.2d at 441.
148. Id. at 550, 898 A.2d at 442. The dissent further asserted that even if the trial judge
had committed error in excluding the testimony, Maryland precedent requires reversible
error to be both wrong and injurious. Id. The dissent argued that the majority overturned
the conviction based on the risk of denying Kelly a fair trial. Id. at 551, 898 A.2d at 442.
Thus, the dissent concluded that the majority abandoned Maryland precedent by employ-
ing a standard focused on risk of harm rather than actual harm. Id.
149. Id. at 560, 898 A.2d at 447.
150. Id. at 517, 543, 898 A.2d at 422, 438 (majority opinion).
151. See infra Part IV.A.
152. See infra Part IV.B.
153. See infra Part IV.C.
154. See infra Part IV.D.
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A. The Court Departed from Precedent by Failing to Demonstrate the
Admissibility of the Excluded Testimony
The Kelly court failed to adhere to the rule it established in Wil-
son, that the trial court violates a criminal defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment compulsory process rights by excluding testimony only where
the defendant can demonstrate that the testimony is both favorable
and admissible.' 5 5 Although the majority in Kelly thoroughly dis-
cussed the legal precedent establishing a criminal defendant's funda-
mental right to present witness testimony, 15 6 the court only briefly
analyzed the substantive quality of the excluded testimony. 1 57 The
court's cursory analysis of this point rested on the fact that the witness
testimony might have been favorable to Kelly, without addressing the
admissibility of the testimony at all. 158 The Kelly court's method of
analysis deviated from the court's analysis in prior cases where only
missing admissible testimony denied the defendants their constitu-
tional rights. 1
59
Both the Supreme Court in Taylor v. Illinois and the Court of Ap-
peals in Wilson v. State clarified that a defendant's right to compulsory
process does not confer a right to present inadmissible evidence. 60
This limitation formed the basis for the Wilson court's decision that a
trial judge does not violate the Sixth Amendment by failing to help
secure a witness unless the witness's testimony would be both admissi-
ble and helpful to the defense.' 6 ' The Kelly court's failure to assess
the admissibility of the excluded testimony departs from the Wilson
standard, as the court considered only the potential favorability of the
evidence. 1
62
155. Wilson v. State, 345 Md. 437, 448, 693 A.2d 344, 349 (1997).
156. See Kelly, 392 Md. at 532-38, 898 A.2d at 431-34 (laying out Supreme Court and
Court of Appeals precedent regarding a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
compulsory process).
157. See id. at 538, 898 A.2d at 434 (discussing the witnesses' testimony in one
paragraph).
158. Id.; see also id. at 545, 898 A.2d at 439 (Raker, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
majority never analyzed the admissibility of the testimony).
159. See Wilson, 345 Md. at 451, 693 A.2d at 351 (emphasizing that the missing witness's
testimony was admissible in reversing the defendant's conviction); Foster v. State, 297 Md.
191, 212, 464 A.2d 986, 997 (1983) (reversing the defendant's conviction because the trial
court excluded hearsay testimony that was trustworthy and likely admissible); see also Void
v. State, 325 Md. 386, 392, 601 A.2d 124, 126 (1992) (concluding that the trial court erred
in quashing witness subpoenas where the testimony was admissible character evidence).
160. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988); Wilson, 345 Md. at 448, 693 A.2d at 349.
161. Wilson, 345 Md. at 448, 693 A.2d at 349.
162. Kelly, 392 Md. at 538, 898 A.2d at 434 (assessing only the potential favorability and
not the admissibility of the excluded evidence).
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Not only did the Kelly court fail to indicate how the excluded tes-
timony would have been admissible, but the majority also did not re-
ject the trial court ruling that the excluded evidence was hearsay.1 63
The Maryland Rules of Evidence clearly establish that hearsay testi-
mony is not admissible unless it falls within an enumerated excep-
tion.16 4 Without this critical finding, the majority's determination of
reversible error rested on grounds that do not satisfy these well-
established rules.' 65 Thus, as Judge Raker contended in her dissent,
Kelly was not deprived of any constitutional right when the trial court
excluded the hearsay testimony.
166
Further, unlike its decision in Foster v. State, the Court of Appeals
in Kelly did not find that the trial court rigidly applied the hearsay rule
to exclude testimony that was both critical to the defense and bore
reliable indicia of trustworthiness. 67 In Foster, the trial court's appli-
cation of the hearsay rule implicated the defendant's constitutional
rights because of the nature of the testimony that was excluded-relia-
ble testimony that someone other than the defendant threatened to
kill the victim.16 8 In contrast, the Kelly court made no such finding
that the excluded testimony was trustworthy or critical to the defense,
which, based on Foster, indicates that the trial court's application of
the hearsay rule to the proffered testimony was proper.' 69
The decision in Kelly also deviates from the Supreme Court's rule
in Valenzuela-Bernal that excluded testimony violates a defendant's
compulsory process rights only where the evidence is both favorable
and material. 7 ° Consequently, the majority deviated from its prior
163. See id. at 531-32, 898 A.2d at 431 (leaving the trial court's ruling that the evidence
was hearsay undisturbed, but finding error in the trial court's method of determining that
the testimony was hearsay).
164. MD. R. 5-801 to -804.
165. See Bernadyn v. State, 390 Md. 1, 7-8, 887 A.2d 602, 606 (2005) (noting that trial
court judges have no discretion to admit hearsay evidence that does not fall within an
exception to the hearsay rule); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973)
(explaining that the hearsay rule stems from the notion that untrustworthy evidence
should not be presented to triers of fact).
166. Kelly, 392 Md. at 550, 898 A-2d at 442 (Raker, J., dissenting). But see Chambers, 410
U.S. at 302 (finding an erroneous application of the hearsay rule where the trial court
mechanically applied the rule to exclude critical, trustworthy evidence that directly af-
fected the ascertainment of guilt, thus implicating the defendant's constitutional rights).
167. See Foster v. State, 297 Md. 191, 212, 464 A.2d 986, 997 (1983) (granting the defen-
dant a new trial because the trial court's strict application of the hearsay rule excluded
admissible testimony that implicated the ascertainment of guilt).
168. Id. at 211-12, 464 A.2d at 997.
169. See Kelly, 392 Md. at 545, 898 A.2d at 439 (Raker, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that
the majority failed to address the admissibility of the hearsay evidence).
170. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982).
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cases and from Supreme Court precedent by finding that the trial
court deprived Kelly of his constitutional rights by excluding the wit-
nesses' testimony-the excluded testimony was inadmissible hearsay,
and the Court of Appeals did not deem the testimony to be material
to the outcome, critical to the defense, or bearing reliable indicia of
trustworthiness.
B. The Court Unnecessarily Expands Sixth Amendment Rights of
Criminal Defendants Whose Witnesses Are Present in the
Courtroom
The Kelly court focused almost entirely on the trial court's proce-
dure, indicating that the procedure itself violated the defendant's
constitutional rights and required a new trial. 1 ' Unlike prior cases
where the court appeared to accept the use of proffers to assess the
admissibility of evidence,' 72 the Kelly court established that the use of
proffers to discern how witnesses will testify is ill-advised where the
witnesses are present in the courtroom and able to testify.17 Thus, as
Judge Raker noted in her dissent, the majority appeared to create a
per se rule requiring trial courtjudges to allow defendants to call pre-
sent witnesses regardless of whether these witnesses have any admissi-
ble testimony.' 74 This rule strays from Wilson's two-prong analysis of
favorability and admissibility for missing witnesses. 175 Consequently,
the Kelly court's rule creates an arbitrary distinction between the Sixth
Amendment rights of criminal defendants whose witnesses fail to ap-
pear and those whose witnesses come to court.176 The protection of a
right so significant to be deemed fundamental should not turn solely
171. Compare Kelly, 392 Md. at 531-32, 898 A.2d at 431 (emphasizing that its decision
turned on the limits of the trial court's discretion to exclude defense witnesses, rather than
the substantive admissibility of hearsay evidence), with Void v. State, 325 Md. 386, 392-93,
601 A.2d 124, 126-27 (1992) (focusing review on both the trial judge's procedural discre-
tion and the admissibility of the excluded testimony).
172. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 345 Md. 437, 448, 693 A.2d at 344, 349-50 (1997) (main-
taining that a defendant must be able to establish that missing testimony is admissible,
material, and favorable to the defense to establish a compulsory process right to receive
court assistance in locating a missing witness).
173. See Kelly, 392 Md. at 532, 898 A.2d at 431.
174. Id. at 546 n.1, 898 A.2d at 439 n.1 (Raker, J., dissenting).
175. See Wilson, 345 Md. at 448, 693 A.2d at 349.
176. Compare id. (requiring criminal defendants to demonstrate the admissibility and
favorability of proposed testimony to establish a compulsory process right to the court's
assistance in locating a missing witness), with Kelly, 392 Md. at 538, 898 A.2d at 434 (major-
ity opinion) (concluding that the defendant established his right to question a present
witness where he demonstrated merely that the testimony was presumably favorable).
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on whether a defendant's witnesses are available when called to
testify. 
177
By granting a broader compulsory process right, the Court of Ap-
peals strayed from the Supreme Court's decision in Taylor that the
effectiveness of a defendant's compulsory process rights depends on
the "deliberate planning and affirmative conduct" of defense coun-
sel. 178 During Kelly's trial, the trial judge gave defense counsel ade-
quate opportunity to proffer grounds for admissibility, yet the
attorney was unable to do so.179 By emphasizing that trial judges can
exclude evidence only upon objection, the Kelly court held the trial
judge accountable for excluding inadmissible testimony sua sponte
rather than placing the burden on the defense to present admissible
testimony.180 Thus, ironically, the court sidestepped defense coun-
sel's failure to present admissible evidence by focusing on the prose-
cution's potential failure to object to inadmissible evidence.
C. The Removal of Discretion from Trial Courts Cuts Against Judges'
Inherent Flexibility to Manage Trials
Despite quoting large excerpts of the defense counsel's proffers
and the trial judge's rulings,1 8 1 the Kelly court did not assess the legiti-
macy of the trial judge's rulings on the admissibility of the evidence.
Rather, the majority obviated the need to discuss whether the testi-
mony was admissible by focusing on how the judge determined that
the testimony was inadmissible. 182 To support this rationale, the court
relied heavily on its conclusion in Void that the appropriate time for
the judge to determine the admissibility of the excluded witnesses'
testimony was during their in-court examination.' 8 3 In Void, however,
177. See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) ("Few rights are more
fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense.").
178. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988).
179. See Kelly, 392 Md. at 520-30, 898 A.2d at 424-30 (quoting numerous instances in
the trial court transcript where defense counsel was given the opportunity to find a hearsay
exception for the testimony).
180. Compare Kelly, 392 Md. at 541, 898 A.2d at 436 (finding that the trial judge's sua
sponte exclusion of inadmissible witness testimony jeopardized the defendant's right to a
fair trial because the judge had effectively become a party to the proceeding), with Taylor,
484 U.S. at 401-02, 410 (upholding the trial judge's exclusion of a defense witness as a
sanction for violating a discovery order because compulsory process rights depend fully on
the defendant's initiative).
181. Kelly, 392 Md. at 520-30, 898 A.2d at 424-30.
182. See id. at 532, 898 A.2d at 431 ("[T]he court's error was not in the nature of the
evidence as hearsay, but instead in how it determined that the testimony would be
hearsay.").
183. Id. at 538-39, 898 A.2d at 434-35 (citing Void v. State, 325 Md. 386, 392-94, 601
A.2d 124, 126-28 (1992)).
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the court determined that the judge's exclusion of the witnesses with-
out hearing their testimony was erroneous because the judge had an
insufficient basis for exercising his discretion.' 8 4 But finding an insuf-
ficient basis does not mean that ajudge lacks the discretion altogether
to exclude witnesses without hearing their testimony.'
In contrast to the Kelly opinion, the Void court emphasized the
materiality of the excluded testimony-character evidence directed at
the State's key witness-and maintained that it was highly unlikely
that the jury would convict unless it believed that the witness was cred-
ible.'" 6 Moreover, the Void court premised its decision on the notion
that the trial judge could not have made an accurate decision of
whether the evidence was admissible without hearing the witnesses'
testimony."17 In Kelly, however, the Court of Appeals's decision was
not based on a sufficiency determination, but rather on the trial
judge's discretion to even make the evidentiary decision.' The Kelly
court went substantially beyond Void by effectively removing a trial
court's discretion to exclude present witnesses based on proffers, in-
stead of questioning whether the judge had a sufficient basis for ex-
cluding the witnesses in light of the information elicited by the
proffers. '89
The Court of Appeals also created new law by establishing that
trial courts cannot exclude evidence sua sponte, splitting from a num-
ber of courts that have considered the question. 9 ' In Kelly, the trial
court sought to exclude testimony under the hearsay rule, 9 1 a rule
intended to exclude unreliable evidence.' 2 Thus, following the Kelly
court's logic, a trial court must refrain from excluding inadmissible,
unreliable, and even prejudicial hearsay evidence if the opposing
184. Void, 325 Md. at 393-94, 601 A.2d at 127.
185. See id. (noting that additional indicia such as barebones affidavits and confidential
investigations led to the need for a courtroom examination).
186. Id. at 387, 392, 601 A.2d at 124, 126.
187. Id. at 393-94, 601 A.2d at 127.
188. See Kelly, 392 Md. at 532, 898 A.2d at 431.
189. Id. at 535, 543, 898 A.2d at 433, 438.
190. See cases cited supra note 82 (discussing the role of the trial court to act as the
evidence gatekeeper, which includes making sua sponte determinations about the admissi-
bility of evidence).
191. See Kelly, 392 Md. at 526, 898 A.2d at 428.
192. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973) (explaining that the hearsay
rule stems from the view that out-of-court statements should not be presented to the jury
because they often lack certain indicia of trustworthiness: the declarant is not under oath,
the declarant is not subject to cross-examination, and the jury cannot assess the declarant's
demeanor and credibility); WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 77, § 802.02[3] ("The hearsay
rule seeks to eliminate the danger that evidence will lack reliability because faults in the
perception, memory, or narration of the declarant will not be exposed.").
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party does not object.19 Such a result is at odds with the requirement
that trial courts must exclude hearsay as evidence at trial, unless it falls
within an exception to the general rule. 194 Moreover, the rule con-
trasts with the Court of Appeals's admonition in Bernadyn that the trial
judge should have instructed the jury sua sponte as to the limited
scope of admitted evidence to preserve the fairness of the trial,'95 not-
withstanding Maryland Rule 5-105 providing that the court shall in-
struct the jury about the limited scope of admitted evidence upon
request.' 96 In contrast to the Bernadyn court's suggestion that trial
judges have discretion to make evidentiary decisions sua sponte to
maintain fairness, the Kelly court's decision finds that because the trial
court has no discretion to make evidentiary decisions on its own, fair-
ness does not even enter the equation. 19 7
The Court of Appeals's limitation on the trial judge's ability to
exclude a present witness and evidence sua sponte runs counter to the
generally broad discretion given to trial judges to manage their court-
rooms.198 The trial judge's broad discretion derives from the inher-
ent flexibility of the evidentiary rules, which are designed to enable
judges to balance the various interests at stake in the trial setting.' 99
In Taylor v. Illinois, the Supreme Court emphasized that the mere in-
vocation of the defendant's right to call witnesses does not automati-
cally outweigh countervailing interests, including the integrity of the
193. See Kelly, 392 Md. at 540, 898 A.2d at 435-36 (concluding that the trial judge left his
role as impartial arbiter by excluding testimony to which the prosecution had not properly
objected).
194. MD. R. 5-802; see also Bernadyn v. State, 390 Md. 1, 8, 887 A.2d 602, 606 (2005)
(noting that appellate review of hearsay testimony is de novo because trial courts do not
have discretionary authority to admit hearsay evidence absent an exception).
195. Bernadyn, 390 Md. at 15 n.5, 887 A.2d at 610 n.5.
196. MD. R. 5-105.
197. See Kelly, 392 Md. at 541, 898 A.2d at 436 (maintaining that a trial court abandons
its role of impartial arbiter and becomes a party to the proceeding where it makes a deci-
sion regarding the admissibility of evidence sua sponte).
198. See, e.g., Cooley v. State, 385 Md. 165, 175-76, 867 A.2d 1065, 1071 (2005) (empha-
sizing the broad discretion afforded trial judges to control trial proceedings); Hopkins v.
State, 352 Md. 146, 158, 721 A.2d 231, 237 (1998) (maintaining that appellate courts ex-
tend significant deference to trial court decisions regarding evidence determinations, re-
versing only upon an abuse of discretion); see also FED. R. EvID. 104(a), 611 (a) (outlining
the role of the trial court in making evidentiary decisions and controlling the order of the
trial); MD. R. 5-104(a), 5-611(a) (same).
199. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 77, §§ 102.02[1], 102.03 (suggesting that the
multiple goals of the rules of evidence-such as fairness in administration, elimination of
unjustifiable expense and delay, the ascertainment of truth, and justly determined pro-
ceedings-mandate trial court flexibility, and that the balancing of the goals forces courts
to proceed on a case-by-case basis).
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adversarial process, which relies on the presentation of reliable evi-
dence and the exclusion of unreliable evidence.2 °°
D. The Court's Limitations on Trial Court Flexibility Poses Risks Where
the Presentment of Defense Evidence Intersects with Other
Critical Trial Interests
In determining that the trial court denied Kelly his constitutional
right to present a defense, the majority failed to indicate whether its
rule extends only to situations like Kelly's, where a defendant is com-
pletely prevented from calling witnesses who are present in the court-
room, or whether excluding any present defense witnesses at all
results in a constitutional violation.2"' The court's language implies
the latter because the court did not qualify the defendant's right to
put present witnesses on the stand.20 2 Given this interpretation, the
rule has broad implications for impacting the trial court's discretion
to consider time and convenience of the jury in making evidentiary
decisions,20 3 particularly considering continued increases in the crimi-
nal dockets of Maryland circuit courts204 and the lack of a correspond-
ing growth in the number of trial court judges.20 5
Moreover, the Kelly rule may raise problems where presentment
of defense witnesses intersects with the rights of other parties. For
example, it is questionable whose interests should prevail when the
defense's only witness violates a sequestration order, and the violation
poses serious risks of prejudicing the prosecution. 20 6 Further, if the
200. 484 U.S. 400, 414-15 (1988).
201. See Kelly, 392 Md. at 535, 898 A.2d at 433 (discussing the right of defendants to call
witnesses who are present in the courtroom).
202. Id.
203. See Wilson v. State, 345 Md. 437, 452, 693 A.2d 344, 351 (1997) (noting that trial
courts have the discretion to consider the convenience of the jury and risk of delay in
searching for a subpoenaed witness).
204. The number of criminal cases filed in Maryland circuit courts increased from
78,028 in fiscal year 2001 to 80,953 in fiscal year 2006. COURT RESEARCH AND DEV., MD.
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, MARYLAND JUDICIARY: 2005-2006 ANNUAL STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT, tbl.CC-1 (2007), http://www.courts.state.md.us/publications/annualreport/re-
ports/2006/2006_annual-report.pdf.
205. Despite having a certified need for thirty-three new judgeships for fiscal year 2006,
the Maryland judiciary received only thirteen new judgeships, the first increase in judge-
ships since 1998. COURT INFO. OFFICE, MARYLAND JUDICIARY. 2004-2005 HIGHLIGHTS 4
(2006), http://www.courts.state.md.us/publications/annualreport/reports/2005/areport
04-05.pdf.
206. The Court of Appeals has addressed situations where defense witnesses were ex-
cluded for minor violations of the rule on witnesses. In Redditt v. State, the Court of Ap-
peals found reversible error where the trial court excluded a defense witness for violating a
sequestration order when the violation was minor. 337 Md. 621, 637, 655 A.2d 390, 398
(1995). In McCray v. State, the Court of Appeals found reversible error where the trial
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Kelly rule applies to all present witnesses, trial judges may have less
discretion under the Maryland Rules of Evidence to limit the number
of witnesses that the defendant can present to prevent unnecessary
accumulation of evidence, jury inconvenience, or unnecessary ex-
pense and delay.2 °7
In addition, the Kelly court's pronouncement that judges may not
exclude evidence sua sponte208 also raises problems where an oppos-
ing party fails to object to testimony that prejudices the trial. For ex-
ample, under the Kelly rule, it is questionable whether a trial judge
may exclude sua sponte inadmissible evidence of a rape victim's prior
history2 9 during a proffer session, despite a trial judge's broad discre-
tion to make preliminary rulings on the admissibility of evidence. 210
Such a rule sends a mixed message to trial judges who, pursuant to
the evidentiary rules, bear the responsibility of ensuring that trials are
fair and promote the interests ofjustice 11 Moreover, the Kelly court's
limitations on trial court discretion contrast with trial judges' consid-
erable flexibility to make decisions on a case-by-case basis rather than
following a rigid adherence to the evidentiary rules.212 Such flexibility
typically enables judges to tailor their rulings to the fair administra-
tion of individual trials.213
V. CONCLUSION
In Kelly, the Court of Appeals reversed a trial court's exclusion of
a criminal defendant's present witnesses, finding that the exclusion
violated the defendant's constitutional rights. 214 By failing to assess
court excluded a defense witness for violating a nonexistent sequestration order. 305 Md.
126, 137, 501 A.2d 856, 861 (1985).
207. See, e.g., MD. R. 5-102 (providing trial judges the discretion to construe evidentiary
rules so as to promote fairness and reduce unnecessary expense and delay); MD. R. 5-403
(permitting trial courts to exclude relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumu-
lative evidence"); MD. R. 5-611 (granting the trial court control over witness interrogation
to make the issues clear for juror determination and to avoid unnecessary waste ofjudicial
resources).
208. Kelly, 392 Md. at 540, 898 A.2d at 435-36.
209. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-319(b) (LexisNexis 2002) (listing the require-
ments for introducing evidence of specific instances of a rape victim's sexual history).
210. See MD. R. 104(a) ("Preliminary questions concerning . . . the admissibility of evi-
dence shall be determined by the court.").
211. See supra note 207.
212. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 77, § 102.03.
213. Id.
214. Kelly, 392 Md. at 543, 898 A.2d at 438.
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whether the excluded testimony was admissible,2t5 the court appeared
to create a broad right for criminal defendants to call present wit-
nesses, regardless of whether the witnesses have any admissible testi-
mony to offer.2 1  Moreover, the court's decision restricted the trial
court's broad discretion to manage trials. 2 17 As a consequence, trial
judges have less flexibility to resolve issues that arise when the present-
ment of a defendant's witnesses intersects with other interests of
justice.2 18
JENNIFER L. KATZ
215. See supra Part W.A.
216. See supra Part W.B.
217. See supra Part V.C.
218. See supra Part IV.D.
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IN RE BLESSEN H.: LOWER WAIVER STANDARD IN CINA
PROCEEDINGS SATISFIES DUE PROCESS AND LEAVES
POLICY ISSUE TO LEGISLATURE
In In re Blessen H.,' the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered
whether the waiver of a mother's right to a contested Child in Need of
Assistance (CINA)2 adjudicatory hearing' requires the court to con-
duct a personal colloquy with a parent to establish her voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent waiver.4 The court held that this stricter
waiver standard-requiring a personal waiver and first articulated in
Johnson v. ZerbstS -is not required in CINA proceedings.6 In so hold-
ing, the court rightfully recognized that personal waivers are only nec-
essary when the right to be waived is fundamental and the
proceedings could result in incarceration, whereas CINA proceedings
are civil in nature and cannot result in physical confinement. 7 In ad-
dition, the court's decision properly reinforced the boundary between
CINA proceedings and those with a greater potential for the depriva-
tion of liberty, such as cases with the potential for incarceration.8 The
lower waiver requirement is also consistent with judicial standards in
other jurisdictions.9 Finally, in declining to require a personal waiver,
the court properly deferred to the legislature to address the waiver
issue in the future."l
I. THE CASE
In July 2002, the Montgomery County Department of Health and
Human Services (MDHHS) filed a CINA petition on behalf of Blessen
Copyright © 2007 by Elizabeth S. Crook.
1. 392 Md. 684, 898 A.2d 980 (2006).
2. A CINA is "a child who requires court intervention because: (1) [tlhe child has
been abused, has been neglected, has a developmental disability, or has a mental disorder;
and (2) [t]he child's parents, guardian, or custodian are unable or unwilling to give
proper care and attention to the child and the child's needs." MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD.
PROC. § 3-801(f) (LexisNexis 2006).
3. An adjudicatory hearing is held in CINA cases to judge the veracity of all of the
allegations in the CINA petition except the claim that the child requires the court's inter-
vention. Id. § 3-801(c). The hearing is held after a CINA petition is filed. Id. § 3-817(a).
4. In re Blessen H., 392 Md. at 686, 898 A.2d at 981.
5. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
6. In re Blessen H., 392 Md. at 708, 898 A.2d at 995.
7. See infra Part V.A.
8. See infta Part IV.A.
9. See infra Part IV.B.
10. See infta Part V.C.
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H., the daughter of Sheldon A. and Tynetta H." MDHHS dismissed
the petition after learning that Blessen H. and her siblings were living
with Tynetta H. in Pennsylvania and receiving assistance from the
Philadelphia Child Protective Services (PCPS). 1 The PCPS eventually
removed the children from their mother's care and sent Blessen H. to
live with her father in Montgomery County.' " Blessen H. then moved
again, this time to live with her paternal grandmother in NewJersey.14
Soon after, Tynetta H. and her mother, Rose G., arrived in NewJersey
and took the child using an expired document granting temporary
custody to Rose G. 1"
MDHHS filed another petition asserting that Blessen H. was a
CINA on July 29, 2003.16 After a shelter care hearing,17 the court is-
sued ajuvenile warrant for Blessen H.; two days later she was found in
Georgia with her mother."8 On September 2, 2003, the Circuit Court
for Montgomery County held a combined adjudicatory and disposi-
tion hearing. 9 Counsel for MDHHS informed the judge that, al-
though Tynetta H. "was not of a mind.., to reach an agreement," she
was willing to participate in mediation.2 1
Through mediation that afternoon, the parties were able to
amend the CINA petition and reach an agreement.2 1 The court re-
viewed the amended petition with the parties, clarified certain facts,
suggested changes, and confirmed that the amended petition would
serve as the basis for the court's determination that Blessen H. was a
CINA.2 2 The agreement provided that Blessen H. would remain in
foster care until the completion of a home study of her paternal
grandmother's home.2 3 Blessen H. would then live with her paternal
11. In re Blessen H., 163 Md. App. 1, 6-7, 877 A.2d 161, 164 (2005). MDHHS also filed
the CINA petitions on behalf of Blessen's two siblings. Id, at 7, 877 A.2d at 164.
12. Id. at 7-8, 877 A.2d at 164-65.
13. Id. at 8, 877 A.2d at 165.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. In re Blessen H., 392 Md. at 686, 898 A.2d at 981.
17. A shelter care hearing is held to establish whether the child needs to be tempora-
rily placed outside of the home. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 3-801 (x) (LexisNexis
2006).
18. In re Blessen H., 163 Md. App. at 8, 877 A.2d at 165.
19. In re Blessen H., 392 Md. at 686-87, 898 A.2d at 981-82. A disposition hearing is
held to establish whether a child needs help and, if so, the type of court action that will
.protect the child's health, safety, and well-being." MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 3-
801(m).
20. In re Blessen H., 163 Md. App. at 8, 877 A.2d at 165 (alteration in original).
21. Id. at 9, 877 A.2d at 165.
22. Id.
23. In re Blessen H., 392 Md. at 689, 898 A.2d at 983.
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grandmother, have weekly supervised visits with Sheldon A. and have
monthly supervised visits with Tynetta H.24
The proceedings continued as the parties discussed the circum-
stances surrounding Tynetta H. and Rose G.'s removal of Blessen H.
from her paternal grandmother's home in New Jersey.25 Tynetta H.
objected to the "no contact" order that the court had previously im-
posed on Rose G. after the New Jersey incident. 26 The court decided
to continue the order against Rose G., at least temporarily. 27 When
both Tynetta H. and her lawyer declined to raise any further issues,
the court rendered its disposition reflecting the parties' agreement. 2
At the conclusion of the proceedings, Tynetta H. requested an
opportunity to explain the circumstances from her perspective; specif-
ically, she winted the court to know more about her character and the
reason why Blessen H. lacked a stable home.29 However, the court
responded that it had been listening to her attorney and that the pro-
ceedings were finished. On September 5, 2003, the court filed a
combined adjudication and disposition order declaring Blessen H. a
CINA. 1
Tynetta H. subsequently appealed to the Court of Special Ap-
peals, arguing that the trial court should have required a personal
colloquy on the record to waive her right to an adjudicatory hearing. 32
The court rejected this contention, focusing instead on the differ-
ences between CINA proceedings, which aim to safeguard the best
interest of the child, and criminal trials or proceedings that are puni-
tive and carry the possibility of incarceration.33 The court also distin-
guished CINA adjudications from termination of parental rights
(TPR) proceedings, noting that the former do not seek to sever the
parent-child relationship while the latter may result in a parent losing
custody of her child permanently.34 The court noted that in a TPR
case, a parent may consent to the termination of parental rights with-
24. Id.
25. In re Blessen H., 163 Md. App. at 9, 877 A.2d at 165-66.
26. Id. Because Rose G. had been involved in removing Blessen from her father's cus-
tody, the court issued an order on August 11, 2003 barring her from having contact with
Blessen. Id. at 8, 877 A.2d at 165.
27. Id. at 9, 877 A.2d at 166.
28. Id. at 10, 877 A.2d at 166.
29. In re Blessen H., 392 Md. at 689, 898 A.2d at 983.
30. Id. at 690, 898 A.2d at 983.
31. Id. at 713-14, 898 A.2d at 998.
32. In re Blessen H., 163 Md. App. at 7, 877 A.2d at 164.
33. Id. at 15, 877 A.2d at 169.
34. Id. at 16-17, 877 A.2d at 169-71. The court stated that the process due at a CINA
hearing is less than that required at TPR proceedings, noting that TPR proceedings re-
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out offending due process by failing to file a timely objection." Given
that a personal waiver is not even required in TPR proceedings, the
court concluded, it certainly should not be required at CINA hear-
ings. 6 The court deemed due process satisfied where ajudicial deter-
mination that a parent wishes to waive her right to a contested
hearing was based on the totality of the circumstances.37 It further
concluded that a personal waiver is not necessary unless the waived
right is fundamental and the proceeding could result in
incarceration.38
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to decide whether a par-
ent may only waive the right to a contested adjudicatory hearing in a
CINA proceeding by a "personal, knowing, intelligent and voluntary
waiver."3 9
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
During both criminal and civil proceedings, a party may waive a
number of fundamental rights as long as the waiver comports with
due process requirements.4" The Supreme Court of the United States
and the Court of Appeals of Maryland have determined that a par-
ent's right to raise a child is a fundamental right that deserves a high
level of due process protection." Under Maryland law, a party must
only make a personal waiver when a fundamental right is at stake and
the proceedings could result in confinement.4 2 In analogous cases in
other jurisdictions, courts have similarly declined to require a per-
quire a clear and convincing standard of proof for termination of a parent's rights, while
the lesser preponderance of the evidence standard applies in CINA adjudications. Id.
35. Id. at 17, 877 A.2d at 170; see also In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 93321055, 344
Md. 458, 494, 687 A.2d 681, 698 (1997) (holding that a failure to file a timely objection in
a TPR case can constitute a parent's consent without violating that parent's due process
right).
36. In re Blessen H., 163 Md. App. at 17, 877 A.2d at 170. The Court of Special Appeals
also applied Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), to determine that due process did not
require a personal waiver under the circumstances. In re Blessen H., 163 Md. App. at 19-21,
877 A.2d at 171-72. Mathews requires a court to examine three factors to determine what
process is due: (1) the private interest at stake; (2) the risk of a wrongful deprivation of
that interest based on the procedures and the potential value of other safeguards; and, (3)
the government interest involved, including the burdens that the additional procedural
requirement would impose. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
37. In re Blessen H., 163 Md. App. at 20, 877 A.2d at 172.
38. Id. at 13-14, 877 A.2d at 168.
39. In re Blessen H., 392 Md. at 686, 898 A.2d at 981.
40. See infta Part IL.A.
41. See infra Part II.A.
42. See infra Part HI.B.
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sonal waiver except by mandate of the legislature.4" Provided the min-
imum requirements for due process are satisfied, legislatures have
traditionally been the proper forum to decide public policy matters
such as whether to require a more stringent waiver standard.44
A. Waiver Standards for Fundamental Rights
As the Supreme Court has noted, "waiver" is an ambiguous term
that is used for myriad purposes in the law.45 Accordingly, the Court
has defined waivers based on the various rights that a party can waive
and the procedures for each.46 Both the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals have permitted a party to waive fundamental rights
provided the waiver is consistent with due process requirements.47
Both courts have also steadfastly recognized that the right to parent is
fundamental and cannot be denied without clear justification."
1. Differing Waiver Standards
In its broadest sense, the term "waiver" could describe most of an
attorney's tactical decisions, or even inaction by an attorney.49 How-
ever, the Supreme Court has not accepted this broad definition, ex-
pressly distinguishing a waiver from a forfeiture by noting that a
forfeiture is a failure to assert a right in a timely manner.5" In 1937,
the Court stated in two separate decisions that courts must "indulge
every reasonable presumption" against the waiver of a fundamental
right,5" and not presume that a party has acquiesced in losing funda-
mental rights.52 In neither decision, however, did the Court articulate
what constituted a waiver.
In 1938, the Supreme Court established a heightened waiver stan-
dard in Johnson v. Zerbst.5" The Zerbst definition of a waiver as the "in-
tentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right" is now
43. See infra Part II.C.
44. See infra Part II.D.
45. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191 (1957).
46. See infra Part II.A.1.
47. See infra Part II.A.1.
48. See infra Part II.A.2.
49. Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 147-48, 395 A.2d 464, 473 (1978) (observing that
whenever an attorney makes a strategic decision during a trial, one could say that he has
waived the alternate choice).
50. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993).
51. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy ex reL Bogash, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937).
52. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937).
53. 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
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the generally accepted definition.5 4 In Zerbst, a defendant who was
tried, convicted, and sentenced for possessing and passing counterfeit
money without the aid of a lawyer complained that he had been de-
nied his constitutional right to counsel.55 The Court determined that
the trial judge is responsible for establishing whether the defendant
has made an "intelligent and competent waiver," and that this deter-
mination should appear on the record.56 However, if the defendant is
unrepresented and does not intelligently and competently waive a
fundamental right, the Court emphasized, the Sixth Amendment will
bar the defendant's conviction.57 The Zerbst Court also clarified that a
court's decision as to whether the defendant has made an intelligent
waiver must depend on the circumstances of the case, including the
defendant's background, experience, and behavior.58
Courts do not always require this heightened waiver standard,
recognizing that some situations where individuals neglect to raise
constitutional protections do not call for a knowing and intelligent
waiver.59 For example, in Jones v. State,6" the Court of Appeals rejected
the use of the Zerbst waiver standard in a civil contempt hearing.6"
The Jones court decided that the trial judge need not describe the pro-
ceedings, the potential defenses, or the possible results of a finding of
contempt when the party is represented by a lawyer and is aware that
incarceration is a potential consequence. 62  Moreover, courts have
also accepted that a party's counsel may waive certain fundamental
rights without violating the party's due process rights.6" Finally, courts
have allowed the waiver of a fundamental right by inaction in certain
54. See, e.g., Olano, 507 U.S. at 733 (quoting Zerbst for the definition of waiver); Smith v.
State, 375 Md. 365, 379-80, 825 A.2d 1055, 1064 (2003) (defining waiver according to the
Zerbst standard).
55. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 459-60.
56. Id. at 465.
57. Id. at 468.
58. Id. at 464.
59. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) ("Our cases do not
reflect an uncritical demand for a knowing and intelligent waiver in every situation where a
person has failed to invoke a constitutional protection.").
60. 351 Md. 264, 718 A.2d 222 (1998).
61. Id. at 275-77, 718 A.2d at 228-29.
62. Id. at 277, 718 A.2d at 229. The Jones court pointed out that a finding of contempt
does not present imminent danger of incarceration; rather, Maryland law specifies a set of
procedural and substantive measures before imprisonment. Id. at 275-76, 718 A.2d at 228.
63. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 215-17, 438 A.2d 1301, 1308 (1981) (per-
mitting a lawyer to waive a criminal defendant's right to be present at a bench conference,
a right deemed fundamental by Maryland courts).
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circumstances, such as when a parent waives her right to a TPR hear-
ing by failing to file a timely notice of objection.64
2. Recognition of the Fundamental Right to Parent
A parent's interest in raising her own children is so strong that
courts have recognized it as a constitutionally protected right under
the Fourteenth Amendment. As early as 1923, in Meyer v. Nebraska,65
the Supreme Court implicitly recognized that a parent's right to raise
children is fundamental by deeming the right essential to the pursuit
of happiness.66 Nearly six decades later, in Santosky v. Kramer,67 the
Court explicitly recognized the right to parent as a fundamental lib-
erty interest.6" The Santosky Court held that due process requires that
a state support its allegations in TPR proceedings by clear and con-
vincing evidence.69 In reaching its conclusion, the Court specifically
observed that a parent has a fundamental interest in the "care, cus-
tody, and management of their child" that does not simply dissolve
when the parent has lost custody. 70
The Court of Appeals has also expressly declared that a parent's
interest in raising her child is a fundamental right that courts cannot
strip without clear justification.71 In In re Adoption/Guardianship No.
93321055,72 the Court of Appeals considered five cases challenging
Maryland's statutory scheme, under which the failure to file a timely
objection in a TPR case is deemed irrevocable consent to the State's
petition.7 ' The court recognized three basic principles in the Su-
preme Court decisions acknowledging a fundamental right to par-
ent.7 4  First, a parent's interest in the "care, custody, and
64. E.g., In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 93321055, 344 Md. 458, 494, 687 A.2d 681,
698 (1997).
65. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
66. Id. at 399.
67. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
68. Id. at 753.
69. Id. at 769.
70. Id. at 753. Similarly, in Troxel v. Granville, the Court again emphasized that the
Fourteenth Amendment protects a parent's fundamental right "to make decisions con-
cerning the care, custody, and control of their children." 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality
opinion). Writing for the plurality, Justice O'Connor asserted that there is a "presumption
that fit parents act in the best interests of their children." Id, at 68.
71. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 112, 642 A.2d 201, 208
(1994).
72. 344 Md. 458, 687 A.2d 681 (1997).
73. Id. at 464-65, 687 A.2d at 684.
74. Id. at 491, 687 A.2d at 697. In Wolinski v. Browneller, the Court of Special Appeals
similarly recognized the Supreme Court's history of providing protection to parents in the
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management" of her child is fundamental.7 5 Second, the State must
provide parents with "fundamentally fair procedures" when it acts to
terminate that interest.76 Third, the process owed to parents depends
on the balancing of the three Mathews v. Eldridge factors.77
Although the Court of Appeals has recognized a fundamental lib-
erty interest in the right to parent, it has also cautioned that the right
is not absolute.78 Under the doctrine of parens patriae, 9 the State is
the guardian for citizens who are unable to take care of themselves,
including minors.8 ° Therefore, in a custody, visitation, or adoption
dispute, the best interests of the child may trump the parent's right.8 '
In cases with evidence of abuse or neglect, including CINA proceed-
ings, the court's role is more proactive than usual; the court must be
particularly vigilant in protecting the child's safety and well-being.
82
Specifically, the court must provide for the child's mental and physical
development and hold the parents accountable for resolving any is-
sues that required judicial intervention.83
B. The Correlation of Waiver Standards to the Potential Deprivation of
Liberty
Both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have consist-
ently upheld the right to waive fundamental rights in criminal and
civil proceedings, as long as the waiver is consistent with due process
requirements.8 4 In criminal proceedings, for example, the potential
for incarceration has led courts to require a stricter waiver standard
when both a fundamental right and the immediate threat of incarcer-
areas of child rearing and family life. 115 Md. App. 285, 299-300, 693 A.2d 30, 36-37
(1997), overruled on other grounds by Koshko v. Haining, 398 Md. 404, 921 A.2d 171 (2007).
75. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 93321055, 344 Md. at 491, 687 A.2d at 697.
76. Id.
77. Id.; see also supra note 36 (describing the Mathews factors for evaluating whether
procedural due process is satisfied).
78. In re Mark M., 365 Md. 687, 705, 782 A.2d 332, 342-43 (2001).
79. In disputes over children, the State's aim "is to protect the child's best interests as
parens patriae--a derivation of the State's interest in protecting the health, safety, and wel-
fare of its citizenry." Wolinski, 115 Md. App. at 300, 693 A.2d at 37. Equity courts are given
full parens patriae power to grant minors any necessary relief to protect their best interests.
Wagner v. Wagner, 109 Md. App. 1, 41, 674 A.2d 1, 20 (1996).
80. In re Mark M., 365 Md. at 705, 782 A.2d at 343.
81. Boswell v. Boswell, 352 Md. 204, 219, 721 A.2d 662, 669 (1998); see also In re Adop-
tion/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 113, 642 A.2d 201, 208 (1994) (stressing that
the most important consideration in adoption and custody disputes is the best interest of
the child, not the parent's interest in raising the child).
82. In rejustin D., 357 Md. 431, 448, 745 A.2d 408, 417-18 (2000).
83. Id. at 449, 745 A.2d at 418; see also MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-
802(a) (1)-(4) (LexisNexis 2006).
84. See infra Part II.B.1-3.
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ation are at stake.8 5 However, courts have accepted a lower waiver
standard when these two elements are absent, such as in TPR cases
carrying no criminal punishment.
8 6
1. Waiver Requirements in Criminal Proceedings
In the criminal context, courts have consistently noted that a
waiver indicates an intelligent, knowing relinquishment of a funda-
mental right.8" Accordingly, the strict waiver standard of Johnson v.
Zerbst has been applied to a broad range of criminal cases, particularly
those involving fundamental rights that are essential to ensure a fair
trial.88 For example, courts have required this higher standard when
defendants offer to waive the Sixth Amendment right to counsel89 and
the right to trial by jury.90 Courts also require a higher waiver stan-
dard when defendants waive their right to trial by entering a guilty
plea, which in itself constitutes a waiver of the fundamental rights to a
jury trial, to confront one's accusers, and to remain silent. 1
Not all criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings, however, require
application of the higher waiver standard.92 Rather, courts have lim-
ited the requirement of the stricter waiver standard to cases involving
fundamental rights that may result in confinement.93 As the Court of
Appeals has recognized, the realities of modern litigation necessitate a
rule in certain circumstances that the actions of counsel will bind a
party if such actions are taken with the party's knowledge and acquies-
cence.94 For example, in New York v. Hill,95 the Supreme Court held
that a defendant waived his right to trial within 180 days under the
85. See infra Part II.B.1.
86. See infra Part II.B.2-3.
87. See, e.g., Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 147-48, 395 A.2d 464, 473 (1978) (distinguish-
ing waivers from tactical decisions by defining a waiver in a criminal case as "the knowing
and intelligent relinquishment of certain basic constitutional rights").
88. Cf Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 237-38 (1973) (cataloging the appli-
cation of the knowing and intelligent waiver standard, and its predominance in cases in-
volving the right to a fair trial).
89. E.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
90. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968) ("[W]e hold no constitu-
tional doubts about the practices, common in both federal and state courts, of accepting
waivers ofjury trial .... ).
91. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969) (holding that the record
must show that the defendant entered his guilty plea voluntarily and with full
understanding).
92. See Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 216, 438 A.2d 1301, 1308 (1981).
93. See, e.g., Zetty v. Piatt, 365 Md. 141, 158, 776 A.2d 631, 641 (2001) (emphasizing the
injustice of incarcerating an unrepresented defendant who did not make a knowing and
intelligent waiver).
94. Williams, 292 Md. at 218, 438 A.2d at 1309.
95. 528 U.S. 110 (2000).
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Interstate Agreement on Detainers when his attorney agreed to a trial
date outside that time period. Likewise, in Williams v. State,96 the
Court of Appeals noted that the justice system must operate under the
understanding that it is chiefly the lawyer's job to assert or waive the
majority of the defendant's rights.97
Finally, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,9" the Supreme Court de-
clined to apply the Johnson v. Zerbst standard to the Fourth Amend-
ment right to be free from unreasonable search or seizure.99 In so
doing, the Court noted that the knowing and intelligent waiver stan-
dard has almost always been applied exclusively to constitutional
rights preserving a fair trial. 00 The Schneckloth Court distinguished
between the rights that protect a fair criminal trial, such as the right to
counsel-without which the defendant may be convicted simply be-
cause he lacks legal knowledge-and Fourth Amendment protections,
which guard individual privacy against arbitrary police invasion.1"'
2. Waiver Standards in Civil Proceedings
Waivers are often applied in civil proceedings as well, although
the standards required to comport with due process differ from crimi-
nal cases.' 0 2 For example, a party to a civil proceeding that could re-
sult in incarceration must meet the strict Johnson v. Zerbst standard to
waive fundamental rights, including the right to a contested probation
revocation hearing"0 3 and the right to counsel at a contested construc-
tive civil contempt hearing.'0 4 When a lower waiver standard is suffi-
cient, however, a party in a civil proceeding may waive certain rights
by inaction. 10
5
Courts have required a Zerbst-type waiver in civil cases only when
the proceedings involve the waiver of a fundamental right and pose an
immediate threat of incarceration. In Hersch v. State,' °6 the Court of
Appeals noted that the simple fact that probation violation proceed-
ings are civil is not determinative when deciding which waiver stan-
96. 292 Md. 201, 438 A.2d 1301 (1981).
97. Id. at 218, 438 A.2d at 1309.
98. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
99. Id. at 235, 241-42.
100. Id. at 237.
101. Id. at 241-45.
102. Cf United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (noting that the procedures
required for a waiver depend on the importance of the right at stake).
103. Hersch v. State, 317 Md. 200, 208-09, 562 A.2d 1254, 1258 (1989).
104. Zetty v. Piatt, 365 Md. 141, 158-60, 776 A.2d 631, 641-42 (2001).
105. In reAdoption/Guardianship No. 6Z000045, 372 Md. 104, 117-18, 812 A.2d 271,
278-79 (2002).
106. 317 Md. 200, 562 A.2d 1254 (1989).
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dard applies.' Rather, the court held that probation revocation
proceedings often result directly in the deprivation of liberty, and thus
a Johnson v. Zerbst standard must apply to the probationer's waiver of
her right "to put the State to its proof."' 1°
Similarly, in Zetty v. Piatt,'09 the Courtof Appeals required a per-
sonal waiver of the right to counsel for constructive civil contempt
proceedings with a penalty of incarceration."' The Zetty court con-
cluded that the defendant's incarceration, which followed a proceed-
ing at which he did not knowingly and intelligently waive the right to
counsel, was unjust, and the court emphasized that the possibility of
confinement was crucial."' Along the same vein, the Court of Ap-
peals held in Jones v. State1 2 that a stricter waiver standard was not
required to waive a defendant's right to a contested constructive civil
contempt hearing with no immediate threat of incarceration. Rather,
the Jones court concluded that a lower waiver standard was sufficient
and the trial judge did not need to obtain a personal waiver on the
record."'
3. Waiver Requirements for TPR Proceedings and the
Characterization of CINA Proceedings in Maryland
As in other civil cases, a parent can also waive her rights in TPR
cases. Maryland courts have accepted a less stringent waiver standard
in TPR proceedings. With respect to CINA proceedings, courts have
noted that their purpose differs from TPR cases.
Although TPR proceedings seek to permanently sever the par-
ent's right to care for her child," 4 Maryland courts do not require a
personal waiver in TPR cases. As discussed earlier, in In re Adoption!
Guardianship No. 93321055,"5 the Court of Appeals determined that
lower courts may infer that a parent has waived her right to contest
termination of her parental rights if she fails to file a timely notice of
objection. The court concluded that this practice did not violate due
process."' The Court of Appeals has also clarified that in TPR pro-
ceedings, a court may decide that a parent has waived the right to
107. Id. at 206-07, 562 A.2d at 1257.
108. Id. at 207-09, 562 A.2d at 1257-58.
109. 365 Md. 141, 776 A.2d 631 (2001).
110. Id. at 158-60, 776 A.2d at 641-42.
111. Id. at 158, 776 A.2d at 641.
112. 351 Md. 264, 718 A.2d 222 (1998).
113. Id. at 277, 718 A.2d at 229.
114. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982).
115. 344 Md. 458, 687 A.2d 681 (1997).
116. Id. at 494, 687 A.2d at 698.
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notice in a guardianship case if reasonable good faith efforts to serve a
show cause order on the parent have been unsuccessful."
7
CINA proceedings arise when a local Department of Social Ser-
vices files a petition alleging that a child is in need of assistance be-
cause of abuse or neglect." 8 After a CINA petition is filed, the courts
hold an adjudicatory hearing to determine whether the allegations in
the petition are accurate and if the court must intervene.' 9 The goal
of CINA proceedings is to protect the child and act in the child's best
interest, not to penalize the parent. 2 ° Thus, Maryland courts seek to
avoid removing a child from her home or attempt to return her to her
home whenever possible.' 2 1
In In reJohn p.,122 the Court of Appeals considered whether hold-
ing a second CINA hearing would violate double jeopardy, and specifi-
cally labeled them as civil proceedings.' 23  After the trial court
concluded that the children were not in need of assistance, counsel
for the children filed a motion for reconsideration.' 24 At a subse-
quent hearing, the trial court determined that it lacked authority to
reconsider the merits of its earlier dismissal.1 25 The Court of Appeals
held that the double jeopardy prohibition did not apply because the
proceedings were not a criminal action against the parent, and the
state had not sought criminal sanctions. 26
C. Waiver Standards in Other States
Maryland is not alone in addressing the required waiver stan-
dards for criminal and civil proceedings. Analogous decisions from
other jurisdictions demonstrate that courts have generally declined to
require personal waivers in abuse or neglect cases involving interfer-
ence with parental rights without the possibility of physical confine-
ment. In In re Kerry O.,"7 for example, a California intermediate
117. In reAdoption/Guardianship No. Z000045, 372 Md. 104, 118, 812 A.2d 271, 279
(2002).
118. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JuD. PROC. §§ 3-809, 3-811 (LexisNexis 2006).
119. Id. § 3-817(a).
120. In reJohn P., 311 Md. 700, 709, 537 A.2d 263, 268 (1988).
121. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-525(d)(1) (LexisNexis 2006).
122. 311 Md. 700, 537 A.2d 263 (1988).
123. Id. at 706-07, 537 A.2d at 266-67.
124. Id. at 704, 537 A.2d at 265. The children's attorney relied on Maryland Rule 916
(current version at Maryland Rule 11-116(a) (2007)), which provides that a court may
modify or vacate an order "if the court finds that action to be in the best interest of the
child or the public." Id. at 703-04, 537 A.2d at 264-65.
125. Id. at 704, 537 A.2d at 265.
126. Id. at 708, 710, 537 A.2d at 267-68.
127. 258 Cal. Rptr. 448 (Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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appellate court held that the parents' attorneys could stipulate to the
use of the child's prior testimony in a dependency proceeding without
the parents' personal waiver. 2 ' The court declined to extend the rule
that waivers of constitutional rights must be made expressly to depen-
dency proceedings, and noted that the attorney had the right to dic-
tate trial strategy, including calling witnesses and introducing
evidence. 1
29
Along with California, the Appeals Court of Massachusetts has
recognized that parents can effectively waive their parental rights in
juvenile care and protection proceedings by failing to exercise those
rights. In Care & Protection of Leo, 130 the court held that the father
waived his right to complain of the admission of hearsay when his
attorney turned down the chance to call those sources to testify. Like-
wise, the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin has held that a parent may
waive the right to counsel in TPR cases if the court determines that
the waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily."' Finally, in In re Wel-
fare of G.L.H.,'3 2 the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that although
a parent's waiver of her right to counsel in TPR proceedings must be
voluntary and intelligent, a court need not follow the strictures of
waivers required for criminal cases and may examine the circum-
stances of the case.
1 3 3
D. The Legislature as Arbiter of Public Policy
When addressing matters of public policy, courts traditionally
give great deference to the legislature. In Harrison v. Montgomery
County Board of Education,13 4 the Court of Appeals expressed reluc-
tance to modify a long-established common law rule, instead explain-
ing that the General Assembly is normally responsible for declaring
Maryland's public policy. 13 1 In upholding the doctrine of contribu-
tory negligence, the Harrison court noted that Article 5 of the Mary-
land Declaration of Rights expressly grants the General Assembly the
128. Id. at 452-53.
129. Id.
130. 646 N.E.2d 1086 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995).
131. In re K.K_, 469 N.W.2d 881, 886 n.10 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
132. 614 N.W.2d 718 (Minn. 2000).
133. The court found that the mother (though unrepresented) understood the nature
of the TPR proceedings because of her questions posed to witnesses at the hearing, and
thus deemed her waiver valid. Id. at 724.
134. 295 Md. 442, 456 A.2d 894 (1983).
135. Id. at 460, 456 A.2d at 903; see also Felder v. Butler, 292 Md. 174, 183, 438 A.2d 494,
499 (1981) (observing that, although courts are "empowered to change common law rules
in light of changed conditions, [the Court of Appeals] has always recognized that declara-
tion of public policy is normally the function of the legislative branch of government").
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authority to amend the common law of Maryland through
legislation. 1
36
The Court of Appeals has frequently deferred to the legislature to
decide public policy issues. For example, in Baynor v. State,13 7 the
court found that without legislative action, it would be inappropriate
to require the tape-recording of all statements taken while a person is
in custody. While admitting that such a rule would be practical, the
court in Baynor declared that legislation is the proper way to establish
rules to enhance citizens' due process rights. 13  Similarly, in Frye v.
Frye,13 the Court of Appeals designated the legislature as the most
suitable body to address the scope of the parent-child immunity rule
because of the important public policy considerations involved.140 Ac-
cordingly, the Frye court declined to exclude motor torts from the
parent-child immunity doctrine. 4 Significantly, in 2001, the legisla-
ture created precisely such an exception by statute. 14 2 Cases like Bay-
nor and Frye demonstrate that Maryland courts historically favor the
resolution of public policy concerns by legislative action rather than
judicial mandate, and further show how the legislature will often re-
spond accordingly. 1
4 3
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In In re Blessen H., the Court of Appeals affirmed the Court of
Special Appeals and held that a lawyer's acceptance of the facts in a
CINA petition for a mother, Tynetta H., was sufficient to waive the
mother's right to a contested adjudicatory hearing.144 Writing for the
majority, Judge Battaglia began by acknowledging Maryland's histori-
cal recognition of a parental interest in raising children with limited
state involvement as a fundamental right protected by the Constitu-
136. Harrison, 295 Md. at 460, 463, 456 A.2d at 903, 905. The Supreme Court has simi-
larly expressed deference to the legislature on public policy matters, noting that the
Court's responsibility is to interpret and uphold the Constitution and existing laws, not to
create social policy. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 447 (1970).
137. 355 Md. 726, 736 A.2d 325 (1999).
138. Id. at 740, 736 A.2d at 332.
139. 305 Md. 542, 505 A.2d 826 (1986).
140. Id. at 567, 505 A.2d at 839.
141. Id.
142. See Act of April 20, 2001, ch. 199, § 2, 2001 Md. Laws 1747, 1748 (codified as
amended at MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 5-806(b) (LexisNexis 2006)) (statutorily
excluding motor vehicle accidents from the parent-child immunity doctrine).
143. But see Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 273, 275, 462 A.2d 506, 521-22 (1983) (abro-
gating the interspousal immunity rule in negligence cases as "a vestige of the past").
144. In re Blessen H., 392 Md. at 686, 898 A.2d at 981.
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tion.145 Nevertheless, the court rejected Tynetta H.'s argument that
CINA proceedings require heightened due process protection be-
cause the proceedings represent the first step toward the termination
of a parent's fundamental right to raise her children. 46 Rather, the
majority determined, the right to parent is not absolute and the best
interests of the child may prevail over the parent's interest in custody
disputes.'
47
Next, Judge Battaglia addressed whether the agreement by coun-
sel for Tynetta H. containing the stipulated facts represented a valid
waiver of Tynetta H.'s right to an adjudicatory hearing.14 The major-
ity noted that the term "waiver" is extremely vague and can be applied
in a variety of circumstances. 49 Based on the many opportunities that
arise to waive important rights, the In re Blessen H. court explained, the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court have only required "per-
sonal" waivers-in which the judge addresses a party on the record-
in certain limited situations. 150 Judge Battaglia then clarified that the
personal waiver from Johnson v. Zerbst is necessary only when a funda-
mental right is at stake, and incarceration is a potential consequence
of the proceedings.' 5 ' The majority reasoned that the similarities be-
tween CINA proceedings and criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings
are irrelevant "because neither the Supreme Court nor [the Court of
Appeals] has ever required a personal waiver of fundamental rights in
proceedings that could not result in confinement."' 52
Finally, the In re Blessen H. court found that a personal waiver is
required only when the possibility of incarceration exists; the require-
ment does not depend upon any other characterization of the pro-
ceedings. 5  The majority further emphasized that a CINA
proceeding is civil in nature and that the State had not sought crimi-
nal sanctions against Tynetta H.'5 4 Therefore, the court concluded,
there was a valid waiver of a contested adjudicatory hearing when
Tynetta H.'s attorney agreed to the stipulated facts.' 55
145. Id. at 693, 898 A.2d at 985.
146. Id. at 690-91, 898 A.2d at 984.
147. Id. at 694, 898 A.2d at 986 (citing In re Mark M., 365 Md. 687, 705-06, 782 A.2d
332, 343 (2001)).
148. Id. at 698, 898 A.2d at 988.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 699, 898 A.2d at 989.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 702, 898 A.2d at 991.
153. Id. at 705, 898 A.2d at 993.
154. Id. at 706-07, 898 A.2d at 994.
155. Id. at 708, 898 A.2d at 995.
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Chief Judge Bell dissented, arguing that the true issue in the case,
which the majority ignored, was whether Tynetta H. withdrew her con-
sent to the mediation agreement after it was entered on the record. 156
He noted that where a judge indicates either verbally or in writing
that a written order will follow, a final judgment occurs only when that
written order is signed and filed.157 Because the trial judge had indi-
cated at the September 2, 2003 hearing that a later written order
would encapsulate the oral agreement, Chief Judge Bell asserted that
the order did not become final until it was filed with the clerk on
September 5, 2003.158 Chief Judge Bell further observed that if
Tynetta H.'s statements adequately demonstrated her intent to with-
draw consent, her withdrawal would have happened before the final
judgment was issued.'1 9
The dissent concluded that Tynetta H.'s statements in court sug-
gested that she did not fully comprehend the proceedings or the me-
diation agreement, and may have been expressing her wish to
withdraw her consent to the stipulated facts.' 6 ° Under these circum-
stances, in Chief Judge Bell's view, the trial judge had an affirmative
obligation to draw out the meaning of Tynetta H.'s statement. 6'
Therefore, Chief Judge Bell would have reversed the decision of the
Court of Special Appeals and remanded for further proceedings to
clarify whether Tynetta H. continued to agree with the facts in the
CINA petition.
16 2
IV. ANAi.YSIS
In In re Blessen H., the Court of Appeals held that an attorney's
agreement to the stipulated facts in a CINA petition served as an ade-
quate waiver of the client's right to a contested adjudicatory hear-
ing. 63 The court appropriately rejected the argument that the waiver
of such a right is proper only where the record reflects the parent's
"personal" waiver of the right16 4 for three reasons. First, the holding
156. Id. at 709, 898 A.2d at 995 (Bell, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Bell indicated that
the court has discretion to review issues not expressly discussed in the petition for certio-
rari under Maryland Rule 8-131(b). Id. at 709 n.1, 898 A.2d at 995 n.1.
157. Id. at 717, 898 A.2d at 1000.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 720, 898 A.2d at 1002.
160. Id. at 723, 898 A.2d at 1003.
161. Id. at 718, 898 A.2d at 1001.
162. Id. at 723, 898 A.2d at 1003.
163. Id. at 686, 898 A.2d at 981 (majority opinion).
164. See id. at 692, 708, 898 A.2d at 984-85, 995 (presenting Tynetta H.'s argument that
a personal waiver is necessary to forgo a contested CINA adjudicatory hearing).
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followed precedent dictating that due process requires personal waiv-
ers only when a fundamental right is at stake and the possibility of
incarceration exists. 165 Second, the court's acceptance of a more leni-
ent waiver standard is consistent with analogous cases from otherjuris-
dictions. 6 6 Finally, the court's decision that the lower standard
satisfies due process properly affords the legislature an opportunity to
require a higher standard as a matter of public policy.167
A. The Court's Decision to Allow a Lower Waiver Standard Adheres to
Precedent Involving Fundamental Rights Without the Possibility
of Incarceration
The In re Blessen H. court properly followed precedent by distin-
guishing the due process requirements at CINA hearings from those
in cases carrying the possibility of imprisonment. 168 The court's hold-
ing was also consistent with case law that permitted a lower waiver
standard in proceedings that could not result in confinement. 1 69 Fi-
nally, the In re Blessen H. court's decision appropriately recognized
that the due process requirements in CINA proceedings should cer-
tainly not be stricter than the requirements in TPR cases.17 °
1. The Court's Rejection of theJohnson v. Zerbst Standard Is
Consistent with the Due Process Distinctions Between
Proceedings with Potential for Confinement and Cases
Not Involving Incarceration
The Court of Appeals's decision to accept a lower waiver standard
is consistent with precedent holding that a party's interests in a pro-
ceeding that could result in incarceration demand a higher level of
protection to satisfy due process. In declining to extend the require-
ment for a Johnson v. Zerbst-type personal waiver to cases waiving funda-
mental rights with no immediate possibility of physical confinement,
the Court of Appeals carefully examined previous Supreme Court and
Court of Appeals decisions and appropriately concluded that prece-
dent would not support such an extension.1 7  Courts require a
stricter waiver standard in criminal cases because of the fundamental
165. See infra Part IV.A.
166. See infra Part IV.B.
167. See infra Part IV.C.
168. See infra Part IV.A.1.
169. See infra Part IV.A.1.
170. See infra Part IV.A.2.
171. See In re Blessen H., 392 Md. at 698-708, 898 A.2d at 988-95 (engaging in a compre-
hensive review of Supreme Court and Maryland cases involving waiver and deeming the
potential for incarceration as the determinative criteria for personal waivers).
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concern of protecting the defendant's right to a fair trial. 172 In re Bles-
sen H., however, involved only the fundamental right of a parent to
raise her own child and carried no possibility of incarceration because
the State had not attempted to bring criminal sanctions against
Tynetta H. 1
73
The In re Blessen H. court appropriately recognized that the po-
tential loss of physical liberty deserved a greater level of due process
protection than the temporary loss of custody of one's child. 174
Courts must make a critical determination about the due process re-
quirements in a particular case based on the liberty interests in-
volved. 17' The Supreme Court has recognized that the consequences
for a defendant facing death or imprisonment demand courts' high-
est concern and attention to make sure that the defendant fully un-
derstands the meaning and effects of a waiver. 176 While a parent's
interest is constitutionally protected, it is also limited by the doctrine
of parens patriae, under which the best interests of the child may take
precedence over the parent's interest in raising the child.' 7 7 Accord-
ingly, in In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, the Court of Appeals
emphasized that the biological parent's right to raise the child is not
the controlling factor in adoption and custody cases; rather, the deter-
minative inquiry is what is in the best interest of the child.1 78 Given
the critical difference in the liberty interests at issue in these two types
of proceedings, the Court of Appeals was justified in requiring a lower
waiver standard concerning a CINA hearing where the state did not
seek criminal sanctions.
The Court of Appeals's decision that due process does not re-
quire a personal waiver because there was no immediate possibility of
incarceration is also consistent with analogous cases accepting a lower
172. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (noting that previous
cases have not demanded a Zerbst-type personal waiver in every circumstance where an
individual has declined to assert constitutional rights).
173. In re Blessen H., 392 Md. at 693, 707, 898 A.2d at 985, 994; see also In reJohn P., 311
Md. 700, 707, 537 A.2d 263, 267 (1988) (characterizing CINA proceedings as civil matters).
174. See In re Blessen H., 392 Md. at 702, 898 A.2d at 991 (distinguishing CINA proceed-
ings from those with the potential for physical confinement).
175. See supra Part II.B.
176. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44 (1969) (applying the strict waiver stan-
dard and rationale to defendants offering guilty pleas).
177. Boswell v. Boswell, 352 Md. 204, 219, 721 A.2d 662, 669 (1998); see also In re Mark
M., 365 Md. 687, 705-06, 782 A.2d 332, 342-43 (2001) (emphasizing that the right to
parent is not absolute); In reJustin D., 357 Md. 431, 448-49, 745 A.2d 408, 417-18 (2000)
(stating that courts have greater responsibility to assure a child's safety and well-being in
cases showing evidence of neglect or abuse).
178. 335 Md. 99, 113, 642 A.2d 201, 208 (1994).
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waiver standard. 79 When dealing with two cases involving a defen-
dant's waiver of the right to counsel at a contested constructive civil
contempt hearing,' 8 0 the Court of Appeals expressly stated that the
determinative factor in deciding whether to require a heightened
waiver standard is "the fact of incarceration."'8 ' In Zetty v. Piatt, there-
fore, the court required a personal waiver because the defendant was
found to be in contempt and sentenced to 179 days of incarcera-
tion. 18 2 Furthermore, in declining to require a stricter waiver stan-
dard in Schenckloth v. Bustamonte, the Supreme Court recognized that
courts do not require the Zerbst standard in every circumstance where
an individual has not invoked a constitutional protection."18 Rather,
the higher standard has been limited almost exclusively to constitu-
tional rights guaranteed to criminal defendants to ensure a fair
trial.184 Because the constitutional concerns with a fair criminal trial
are not implicated in civil cases, the In re Blessen H. court was correct
in holding that due process does not require a parent to personally
waive her right to a contested adjudicatory hearing.
The In re Blessen H. holding also appropriately reflects the conclu-
sion that action by counsel is sufficient to waive a client's rights in
certain cases because the attorney must have full authority to manage
the proceedings.' To hold otherwise would not only detract from
the attorney's role in the courtroom, but would also impose a burden
on the courts to ensure that parties agree with counsel's tactical deci-
sions.'86 In In re Blessen H., Tynetta H. was present and protested only
at the very end of the proceedings about the no contact order against
Ms. G. and the court's failure to ask about her character and situa-
179. See, e.g., NewYorkv. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114-15 (2000) (allowing defense counsel to
waive certain trial time limits, rather than requiring a personal waiver from the defendant);
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 241-42 (1973) (rejecting the necessity of a per-
sonal waiver in the Fourth Amendment context).
180. Zetty v. Piatt, 365 Md. 141, 144, 155, 158, 776 A.2d 631, 633, 639, 641 (2001) (hold-
ing that incarceration resulting from a hearing at which the defendant did not knowingly
and intelligently waive the right to counsel is fundamentally unfair);Jones v. State, 351 Md.
264, 268, 272-77, 718 A.2d 222, 224, 226-29 (1998) (declining to apply the Johnson v. Zerbst
standard because a finding of civil contempt does not involve the immediate possibility of
incarceration).
181. Zetty, 365 Md. at 158, 776 A.2d at 641; see also Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 135,
150-51, 395 A.2d 464, 466, 474-75 (1978) (requiring the Zerbst standard for waiver of the
right to effective representation of counsel at murder trial).
182. Zetty, 365 Md. at 155, 158, 776 A.2d at 639, 641.
183. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 235.
184. Id. at 237.
185. New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114-15 (2000).
186. See Hersch v. State, 317 Md. 200, 208, 562 A.2d 1254, 1257 (1989) (explaining that
the demands of modem litigation necessitate binding clients to the choices of their
lawyers).
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tion. 117 Tynetta H. did not raise any concerns about the facts support-
ing the determination that Blessen was a CINA,188 so it was entirely
proper for the court to infer that she agreed with her attorney's repre-
sentation that the facts were not contested.
2. The Court Appropriately Recognized that Due Process Requirements
in CINA Proceedings Should Not Be Stricter Than Those in
TPR Cases
In In re Blessen H., the Court of Appeals explored the relationship
between TPR and CINA proceedings and properly concluded that a
personal waiver on the record is not required at a CINA hearing be-
cause such a requirement does not exist for TPR cases.' 89 Specifically,
the court reasoned that imposing a personal waiver requirement for
CINA cases would be inconsistent with In re Adoption/Guardianship No.
93321055, in which the court concluded that a parental waiver of the
right to contested TPR hearings by failing to file a timely notice of
objection was not violative of due process. 9 ' The In re Blessen H. court
suitably concluded that if allowing a waiver through inaction did not
violate due process in that case, a parent's rights are certainly not vio-
lated by accepting a waiver by counsel in a less threatening CINA adju-
dicatory hearing. 9 '
The court's decision that due process requirements in CINA pro-
ceedings should not be more stringent than those in TPR proceedings
appropriately reflects the critical distinction that must be made be-
tween the two types of cases.1 9 2 On the surface, CINA and TPR cases
are similar in that both could infringe upon a parent's right to raise
her child by removing the child from the parent's custody.'9 3 Al-
though Tynetta H. argued that a CINA hearing represents "the first
step towards termination of a parent's right to raise his or her chil-
dren," 94 the goals of the two proceedings differ, as do the ultimate
consequences. Accordingly, the evidentiary standards of each di-
verge-whereas TPR proceedings require a clear and convincing stan-
187. In re Blessen H., 163 Md. App. 1, 21, 877 A.2d 161, 172 (2005).
188. Id.; see also Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 218, 438 A.2d 1301, 1309 (1981) (stating
that it is the lawyer's responsibility to assert or waive most of the defendant's rights unless
the defendant speaks out in court).
189. In re Blessen H., 392 Md. at 708, 898 A.2d at 994.
190. Id. at 707-08, 898 A.2d at 994; In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 93321055, 344
Md. 458, 494, 687 A.2d 681, 698 (1997).
191. In re Blessen H., 392 Md. at 708, 898 A.2d at 994.
192. See In re Blessen H., 163 Md. App. at 16-18, 877 A.2d at 169-71 (contrasting the
goals and due process requirements in CINA and TPR proceedings).
193. Id. at 15, 877 A.2d at 169.
194. In re Blessen H., 392 Md. at 690, 898 A.2d at 984.
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dard of proof before the parent-child relationship can be
permanently terminated, CINA adjudications are only conducted
under the more lenient preponderance of the evidence standard. 195
This distinction bolsters the In re Blessen H. court's conclusion that
due process requirements for a valid waiver in CINA cases must ac-
cordingly be lower than the waiver requirements in TPR cases; 19 6 any
other result would simply be illogical.
The Court of Appeals's decision to accept a lower waiver standard
also reflects the importance of considering the safeguards that the leg-
islature imposes in CINA cases before permanently removing a child
from parental custody.'9 7 Specifically, the trial court temporarily
placed Blessen H. in foster care before she would be sent to live with
her paternal grandmother, and included monthly visitation rights for
her mother.198 Furthermore, under Maryland law, the court must
hold a hearing to establish a permanency plan for a child no later
than eleven months after the child is removed from her home, or
"[w]ithin 30 days after the court finds that reasonable efforts to re-
unify a child with the child's parent or guardian are not required." '99
A court must then hold a review hearing every six months until the
commitment or voluntary placement is terminated, or every twelve
months after the child is placed with a permanent caregiver. 200 Given
the existence of these review processes before parental rights are ter-
minated altogether, the process owed to Tynetta H. must be less than
the process owed to a parent facing permanent termination of paren-
tal rights. Thus, the majority was justified in comparing CINA hear-
ings to TPR proceedings and concluding that, if due process rights are
not violated when a parent does not personally waive her rights in
TPR proceedings, such rights are not violated in CINA cases where
fewer parental rights are at stake.2°'
B. The Court's Decision to Adopt a Lower Waiver Standard in
Proceedings that Lack a Possibility of Incarceration Corresponds
with the Views of Other Jurisdictions
The In re Blessen H. court's decision was also in accordance with a
number of other states that have reached similar conclusions about
195. In re Blessen H., 163 Md. App. at 16, 877 A.2d at 169-70.
196. In re Blessen H., 392 Md. at 708, 898 A.2d at 994.
197. See In re Blessen H., 163 Md. App. at 18, 877 A.2d at 170-71.
198. In re Blessen H., 392 Md. at 689, 898 A.2d at 983.
199. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 3-823(b) (1) (LexisNexis 2006).
200. Id. § 3-823(h) (1).
201. See In re Blessen H., 392 Md. at 708, 898 A.2d at 994.
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waiver standards. States like California, Massachusetts, and Minnesota
have declined to require a personal, Johnson v. Zerbst-type waiver in
cases involving the right to parent, even when a parent was faced with
the permanent termination of her parental rights.2 °2 For example,
the California Second District Court of Appeal's decision in In re Keny
0. is analogous to In re Blessen H. in that both courts relied on the
attorneys to speak for their clients-the parents-and both pointed to
the differences between civil and criminal proceedings in declining to
require a personal waiver on the record.20 3 The In re Keny 0. decision
demonstrates that other jurisdictions recognize that due process re-
quirements must be stricter in cases involving incarceration. 20 4 In ad-
dition, California's emphasis on the role of counsel also supports the
In re Blessen H. court's determination that Tynetta H.'s attorney's
agreement with the stipulated facts constituted a valid waiver of
Tynetta H.'s right to a contested adjudicatory hearing.20 5
Moreover, the circumstances strongly suggest that Tynetta H.'s
waiver comported with due process. The In re Blessen H. court ob-
served that Tynetta H.'s waiver was sufficient to waive her right to a
contested adjudicatory hearing.20 6 In In re Welfare of G.L.H., the Su-
preme Court of Minnesota held that the validity of a parent's waiver of
the right to counsel in TPR proceedings can be assessed by examining
the circumstances of the case. 207 The In re G.L.H. court determined
that due process was satisfied when the mother's statements indicated
that she understood the nature and consequences of the TPR pro-
ceeding.208 Like the court in In re G.L.H., the In re Blessen H. court
reasonably concluded that the totality of the circumstances demon-
strated that Tynetta H.'s waiver was sufficient to satisfy due process.209
The record also indicated that Tynetta H.'s attorney assented when
the judge asked if all of the parties agreed "that these facts should be
202. See supra Part II.C.
203. In re Kerry 0., 258 Cal. Rptr. 448, 453 (Ct. App. 1989); In re Blessen H., 392 Md. at
689-90, 702-05, 898 A.2d at 983, 991-92.
204. See In re Keny 0., 258 Cal. Rptr. at 451-52 (discussing the differences between de-
pendency and criminal proceedings).
205. See id. at 453 (stressing the lawyer's ability to control litigation strategy); see also
Care & Protection of Leo, 646 N.E.2d 1086, 1090 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995) (binding the father
to the actions of his attorney when the attorney refused to call witnesses to testify).
206. In re Blessen H., 392 Md. at 708, 898 A.2d at 995.
207. 614 N.W.2d 718, 723 (Minn. 2000).
208. Id. at 724.
209. See In re Blessen H., 163 Md. App. 1, 21, 877 A.2d 161, 172-73 (2005) (observing
that the trial court properly presumed that Tynetta H.'s silence meant that she agreed with
her counsel's statement that the stipulated facts were agreeable).
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sustained and form the basis for a finding of CINA[.]" 21 ° Tynetta H.
made no objection when the judge stated that Blessen would be de-
clared a CINA based on the parties' agreement.211 When asked if she
wished to object to anything besides the no contact order against Rose
G., neither Tynetta H. nor her attorney raised any concerns.
2 12
Therefore, a comparison to cases involving similar circumstances in
other jurisdictions supports the Court of Appeals's decision in In re
Blessen H. that the mother's waiver was sufficient absent a personal
colloquy on the record.
C. The Court's Decision Is Sound Because Requiring a Stricter Waiver
Standard Is a Public Policy Determination Best Made by the
Legislature
The Court of Appeals properly accepted a lower waiver standard
in CINA proceedings because the decision to require a personal
waiver likely qualifies as a public policy issue that should be decided
by the legislature. After determining that due process did not de-
mand a Johnson v. Zerbst personal waiver, the court prudently declined
to impose a stricter standard absent an indication from the legislature
that it should do so. In previous decisions, including Harrison v. Mont-
gomery County Board of Education,1 3 Baynor v. State," 4 and Frye v. Fye,215
the Court of Appeals has demonstrated its strong preference to defer
to the legislature on matters of public policy. The proper role of the
court when a longstanding rule has been left unchanged by the legis-
lature is to interpret and enforce existing law, not to dictate social
policy.2 1
6
Although the court's decision to limit application of the Johnson
v. Zerbst standard may seem problematic to those concerned that pa-
rental rights are not adequately protected, such a decision was neces-
sary absent legislative action.2 1 7 Even when courts recognize the
potential benefit of a particular policy decision, to implement those
210. In re Blessen H., 392 Md. at 688, 898 A.2d at 983.
211. Id. at 689, 898 A.2d at 983.
212. In re Blessen H., 163 Md. App. at 9, 877 A.2d at 166.
213. 295 Md. 442, 463, 456 A.2d 894, 905 (1983) (declining to impose comparative neg-
ligence on parties without the imprimatur of the General Assembly).
214. 355 Md. 726, 740, 736 A.2d 325, 332 (1999) (stating that legislation is the preferred
method of promulgating rules to enhance citizens' due process rights).
215. 305 Md. 542, 567, 505 A.2d 826, 839 (1986) (emphasizing that the legislature is the
proper body to address whether the parent-child immunity rule should be abrogated).
216. See Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 447 (1970); Harrison, 295 Md. at 460, 456 A.2d at
903.
217. See Baynor, 355 Md. at 740, 736 A.2d at 332 (acknowledging the value of a rule
requiring tape-recording of all statements taken of a person in custody but noting that
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policy changes would be to usurp the role of the legislature. 218 There-
fore, in rejecting persuasive precedent upon which Tynetta H. relied,
the court noted that such cases were based on statutory schemes man-
dating a personal waiver that are nonexistent in Maryland. 2 19 Further-
more, the Maryland legislature has acted to define the procedures by
which a CINA receives court intervention, 22 0 and to require a con-
tested adjudicatory hearing to determine the veracity of the allega-
tions in the CINA petition ,221 indicating that future decisions about
CINA requirements should be made by the General Assembly. Unlike
the judiciary, which is limited to the record in the case at bar, the
legislature has much greater access to relevant information about
these important public policy determinations.222 Therefore, the In re
Blessen H. court's decision appropriately leaves room for the legisla-
ture to define the standard required to waive the right to an adjudica-
tory hearing if it so decides.
V. CONCLUSION
In In re Blessen H., the Court of Appeals held that the waiver of a
parent's right to a contested CINA adjudicatory hearing does not re-
quire the court to conduct a personal colloquy to establish the par-
ent's voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver. 223 Rather, the court
clarified that a personal waiver is only necessary when the right at
stake is fundamental and the proceedings could result in incarcera-
tion.224 The court's holding was appropriate because it was consistent
with precedent recognizing that a personal waiver is unnecessary
when the proceedings could not result in physical confinement. 225
Furthermore, the majority's decision to accept a lower waiver standard
was consistent with other states' waiver requirements in analogous
cases. 226 Finally, the In re Blessen H. court's holding properly declined
legislation is the most appropriate means to establish rules that enhance due process
rights).
218. See Fye, 305 Md. at 567, 505 A.2d at 839 (stating that it would be improper to create
an exclusion from a common law rule by judicial action because such action would be
legislative without electoral accountability).
219. In re Blessen H., 392 Md. at 706 n.16, 898 A.2d at 993 n.16.
220. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-801(f) (LexisNexis 2006).
221. Id. §§ 3-801(c), 3-817(a).
222. Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 254, 462 A.2d 506, 512 (1983).
223. In re Blessen H., 392 Md. at 686, 898 A.2d at 981.
224. Id. at 699, 898 A.2d at 989.
225. See supra Part W.A.
226. See supra Part IV.B.
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to extend the stricter requirement absent legislative intervention to
decide this public policy matter.227
ELIZABETH S. CROOK
227. See supra Part V.C.
TREMBOW v. SCHONFELD: DENYING EQUAL PROTECTION TO
DISABLED ADULTS BORN OUT OF WEDLOCK
In Trembow v. Schonfeld,' the Court of Appeals of Maryland consid-
ered whether the mother of a destitute adult child2 could collect child
support from the alleged father.3 The court held that the mother's
action was barred because she had not established the alleged father's
paternity prior to the child's eighteenth birthday.4 In so doing, the
court interpreted section 5-1006 of the Family Law Article as creating
an eighteen-year statute of limitations on all paternity actions-even
those involving destitute adult children.5 The Trembow court improp-
erly based its holding on the state's interest in providing the defen-
dant with repose and punishing the plaintiff for sleeping on her
rights.6 The court failed to recognize that although this state interest
supports limitation periods on certain actions, it does not support a
limitation period on paternity actions.7 The state's interest in provid-
ing repose conflicts with the state's objectives in promulgating pater-
nity laws.8 As advocated by Judge Raker in her dissent, the Trembow
court should have applied the two-pronged test that the Supreme
Court of the United States established in Mills v. HabluetzeP to deter-
mine that placing an eighteen-year statute of limitations on the pater-
nity actions of destitute adult children violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.l °
Copyright © 2007 by Kelly T. Moore.
1. 393 Md. 327, 901 A.2d 825 (2006).
2. Section 13-101 of the Family Law Article defines "destitute adult child" as "an adult
child who: (1) has no means of subsistence; and (2) cannot be self-supporting, due to
mental or physical infirmity." MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 13-101(b) (LexisNexis 2006).
3. Trembow, 393 Md. at 329, 901 A.2d at 826.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 336-37, 901 A.2d at 830-31. In February 2007, the Maryland House of Dele-
gates introduced House Bill 536 which, if enacted, would permit a parent to establish the
paternity of a destitute adult child anytime before or after the child's eighteenth birthday.
H.B. 536, 2007 Leg., 422nd Sess. (Md. 2007).
6. See infra Part IV.A.
7. See infra Part IV.A.
8. See infra Part V.A.
9. 456 U.S. 91 (1982).
10. See infra Part IV.B-C.
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I. THE CASE
In March of 1983, Victoria Trembow gave birth to a son, Ivan."
At that time, Trembow was unmarried. 12 Through correspondence,
Alan Schonfeld purportedly acknowledged himself to be Ivan's father,
but he refused to pay child support.13 In 1996, when Ivan was thir-
teen, he was diagnosed with a genetic degenerative bone disorder. 14
Ivan was permanently disabled by the time he reached eighteen.' 5
The disability left Ivan unable to provide financially for himself.16
Prior to Ivan's eighteenth birthday, Trembow had never sought to es-
tablish Schonfeld's paternity or to collect child support from him. 7
In August 2003, when Ivan was twenty years old, Trembow filed a com-
plaint in the Circuit Court for Frederick County seeking child support
from Schonfeld.18 She argued that Schonfeld was obligated to pay
child support because Maryland law19 required parents to financially
support their destitute adult children.2 °
Trembow brought the complaint individually and did not offer a
reason why Ivan could not pursue his own action.2' Schonfeld moved
to dismiss Trembow's complaint, 22 and in June 2004 the court did
SO.
2 3
In July 2004, Trembow filed an amended two-count complaint to
both establish paternity and collect child support.24 Schonfeld filed
another motion to dismiss,25 which the court granted.26 Trembow
11. Trembow, 393 Md. at 330, 901 A.2d at 827.
12. Id. Six months after Ivan's birth, Trembow married a man named John O'Brien,
and Ivan was raised as Ivan O'Brien. Id. After Ivan turned eighteen and the couple di-
vorced, Ivan changed his name to Ivan Trembow. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 13-102(b) (LexisNexis 2006) (requiring parents of
sufficient means to financially support their destitute adult children).
20. Trembow, 393 Md. at 330, 901 A.2d at 827.
21. Id. at 330-31, 901 A.2d at 827.
22. Id. at 331, 901 A.2d at 827. Schonfeld moved to dismiss on several grounds, includ-
ing: Trembow lacked standing, the complaint was not filed on time and did not state a
claim upon which relief was available, and Trembow was estopped from bringing the claim.
Id.
23. Id. The court did not indicate upon what grounds it dismissed the complaint. Id.
The court did, however, grant Trembow leave to file an amended complaint. Id.
24. Id., 901 A.2d at 827-28.
25. Id., 901 A.2d at 828. In this motion to dismiss, Schonfeld repeated his earlier con-
tentions concerning Trembow's complaint. Id.
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filed a motion to alter or amend the order of dismissal,27 which the
court also denied. 28 Trembow appealed, but before the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals could begin proceedings, the Court of Appeals granted
certiorari29 to determine whether the mother of a destitute adult child
born out of wedlock is entitled to pursue a paternity action against
and collect child support from the man she claims is the father after
the child's eighteenth birthday.3"
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court of the United States reviews classifications
based on nonmarital child status with a heightened level of scrutiny.
In 1984, Maryland rewrote its paternity statute so as to allow an indi-
vidual to bring a paternity action for child support any time before the
child's eighteenth birthday.3 2 The provision had little effect on the
child support rights of nonmarital minor children, but minors are not
the only class entitled to child support under Maryland law.33 Mary-
land law requires that parents with sufficient means provide financial
support for their destitute adult children.34 Thus, in Maryland, a des-
titute adult child born out of wedlock can only collect financial sup-
port from his or her father if someone initiated a paternity
proceeding before the child turned eighteen.35 The Supreme Court,
however, has developed a two-pronged test to determine whether a
statute of limitations on paternity actions, such as the one imposed in
Maryland, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.3 6
26. Id. The trial court indicated that the complaint was dismissed because the pater-
nity action was barred by a corresponding statute of limitations. Id,
27. Id. at 331-32, 901 A.2d at 828.
28. Id. at 332, 901 A.2d at 828. In her motion, Trembow attached correspondence in
which Schonfeld allegedly acknowledged himself to be Ivan's father. Id. In denying her
motion, however, the trial court struck the correspondence from the record. Id.
29. Trembow v. Schonfeld, 388 Md. 673, 882 A.2d 286 (2005).
30. Trembow, 393 Md. at 332, 901 A.2d at 828. The court declined to adopt Trembow's
framing of the issue as "whether an adult disabled child may initiate proceedings for pater-
nity and child support after his eighteenth birthday," because it was Trembow, not Ivan,
who initiated the paternity and child support proceedings. Id. According to the court, the
true issue presented by the case was whether a mother may individually pursue a paternity
action after her disabled child's eighteenth birthday. Id.
31. See infra Part II.A.
32. See infta Part II.B.
33. See infra Part II.C.
34. See infra Part II.C.
35. See infra Parts II.B-C.
36. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); see
also infra Part II.D.
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A. The Supreme Court's Intermediate Scrutiny of Classifications Based
on Nonmarital Child Status
Today the Supreme Court requires that a statutory classification
based on nonmarital child status be substantially related to an impor-
tant government interest,3 7 but historically the Court has not always
been consistent when scrutinizing such classifications. In 1968, in
Levy v. Louisiana,8 the Court held for the first time that children born
to unwed parents were "persons" under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause.3 9 The Supreme Court held that Louisiana
was prohibited under the Equal Protection Clause from denying re-
covery to nonmarital children for the wrongful death of their
mother.4 ° The Court stated that it was "invidious to discriminate
against them" because the fact that the children were born out of wed-
lock was completely unrelated to the mother's wrongful death.4 1 In
Levy's internally conflicted opinion, Justice Douglas appeared to si-
multaneously endorse rational basis review and heightened scrutiny.
He stated, "the test.., is whether the line drawn is a rational one," but
then cited Brown v. Board of Education4 2 to support the proposition that
the Court has been willing to disregard tradition and history when
addressing invidious classifications.4 3
In 1973, in Gomez v. Perez,44 the Supreme Court held that under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state
could never deny a child the right to financial support from his natu-
ral father solely because his father was not married to his mother.
Again, the Court labeled the disparate treatment of nonmarital chil-
dren as "invidious discrimination.
Just three years later, the Supreme Court wavered from the
heightened scrutiny standard it had impliedly adopted in Levy and
37. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
38. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
39. At common law, a nonmarital child was neither entitled to financial support, nor
entitled to inherit, from his or her biological parents because a nonmarital child was the
child of no one. See Cooley v. Dewey, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 93, 94 (1827) (stating that at
common law a "bastard" was filius nullius). The courts punished innocent children for the
"odious illicit commerce" between their parents, because they thought it "wise to prohibit
[the children] from tracing their birth to a source which [wa]s deemed criminal by law
and by religion." Id.
40. Levy, 391 U.S. at 72.
41. Id.
42. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
43. Levy, 391 U.S. at 71.
44. 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (per curiam).
45. Id. at 538.
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Gomez. In Mathews v. Lucas,4 6  the Court explicitly stated that
nonmarital children were not a suspect class.47 The Court refused to
review classifications based on legitimacy with heightened scrutiny,
but it insisted that its level of scrutiny was "not a toothless one."48
When the Court decided Trimble v. Gordon49 in 1977, it delivered
on its promise that its scrutiny of legitimacy classifications would not
be toothless. In a 5-4 decision, the Court applied heightened scrutiny
and struck down an Illinois statute permitting marital children to in-
herit from both parents while allowing nonmarital children to inherit
by intestate succession only from their mothers.5 0 The Court rejected
the State's assertion that the probate statute served a legitimate state
interest by promoting legitimate family relationships.5 The Court
found that the state's desire to discourage extramarital sexual rela-
tions was not sufficiently related to the sanctions placed on
nonmarital children. 52 Although it acknowledged that the state had a
legitimate interest in maintaining an accurate and efficient method of
property distribution that avoided the difficulties of proving pater-
nity,53 the Court nonetheless struck down the statute because its blan-
ket prohibition was over-inclusive and thus not sufficiently related to
that interest.54
46. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
47. Id. at 506. The Mathews Court held that before disbursing Social Security insurance
benefits, the government could require nonmarital children to provide proof of depen-
dency on a wage earner without requiring marital children to do so. Id. at 516. The Court
explained that the country had an interest in only providing Social Security insurance ben-
efits to those children who were dependent on the wage earner at the time of his death.
Id. at 507. Thus, the Court concluded that Congress was justified in placing additional
requirements on nonmarital children, who unlike their marital counterparts could not be
presumed, in the interest of administrative convenience, to be dependent on the wage
earner at the time of his death. Id. at 509.
48. Id. at 510.
49. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
50. Id. at 776.
51. Id. at 768-69. Writing for the majority, Justice Powell noted that the Court had
consistently rejczted the contention that "a State may attempt to influence the actions of
men and women by imposing sanctions on the children born of their illegitimate relation-
ships." Id. at 769.
52. Id. at 769-70 (citing Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173, 175
(1972)).
53. See id. at 770.
54. See id. at 771. Although the Court has historically wavered when scrutinizing classi-
fications based on nonmarital child status, the Court has been consistent in applying inter-
mediate scrutiny to statutes of limitations placed on paternity actions for child support. See
Clark v.Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (noting that the Court generally applies intermedi-
ate scrutiny to discriminatory classifications based on "sex or illegitimacy"); Pickett v.
Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 8 (1983) (observing that the Court employs a heightened scrutiny stan-
dard to review statutory classifications based on illegitimacy); cf Mills v. Habluetzel, 456
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In sum, historically the Court was not consistent in its analysis of
equal protection cases involving nonmarital children. In the last two
decades, however, the Court has consistently applied a heightened
scrutiny standard when reviewing discrimination based on nonmarital
child status.
B. Maryland's Implementation of an Eighteen-Year Statute of
Limitations on Paternity Actions
The eighteen-year statute of limitations on paternity actions is a
recent development in Maryland family law. Originally, under Mary-
land's old "Bastardy and Fornication" laws, the act of fathering a child
out of wedlock was a misdemeanor, the prosecution of which had a
one-year statute of limitations.55 In 1912, the legislature extended the
statute of limitations to two years from birth or "from the last payment
by the accused for the maintenance and support of the said bastard
child."56 In 1963, the legislature repealed the old "Bastardy and For-
nication" laws and made paternity actions civil in nature.57 Unlike the
punitive purpose of the old laws, the purpose of the new paternity law
was to promote the general welfare and the best interests of
nonmarital children, and to impose parental responsibilities on bio-
logical fathers.58 Although the legislature's repeal in 1963 altered the
nature of the paternity law, it left the two-year statute of limitations on
paternity actions intact.59
In 1979, the Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the
two-year statute of limitations in Thompson v. Thompson.6" The Thomp-
son court concluded that the state had a legitimate interest in prevent-
ing fraudulent or stale claims, and the legislature was reasonable in
U.S. 91, 99-100 (1982) (stating that any limitation period placed on the paternity actions
of nonmarital children to assert their right to child support must be "substantially related
to the State's interest in avoiding litigation of stale or fraudulent claims"). Nowhere in
Mills or in any Supreme Court case following it, does the Court recognize repose-the
state's interest in relieving its citizens from the threat of untimely litigation-as an impor-
tant state interest to which a statute of limitations on paternity actions can be substantially
related. On the contrary, the only important state interest the Court has recognized in this
line of cases is the prevention of fraudulent and stale claims. See Clark, 486 U.S. at 462, 464;
Pickett, 462 U.S. at 13; Mills, 456 U.S. at 99-100.
55. Thompson v. Thompson, 285 Md. 488, 491, 404 A.2d 269, 271 (1979), overruled by
Frick v. Maldonado, 296 Md. 304, 462 A.2d 1206 (1983).
56. Act of Apr. 4, 1912, ch. 163, § 11, 1912 Md. Laws 319, 323; see also MD. ANN. CODE
art. 12, § 15 (1951).
57. Act of Apr. 30, 1963, ch. 722, § 1, 1963 Md. Laws 1497, 1497-98.
58. Id., 1963 Md. Laws at 1499. A third purpose of the 1963 paternity law was to sim-
plify procedures. Id.
59, Id., 1963 Md. Laws at 1498-99.
60. 285 Md. 488, 404 A.2d at 269 (1979).
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concluding that this interest outweighed "the potential harm to illegit-
imate children who may have their right to paternal support forfeited
by their mother's inaction."" The court stressed that memories fade
with the passage of time and witnesses become increasingly difficult to
contact.62 Moreover, the court in Thompson refused to take judicial
notice that blood testing was an alternative means of preventing fraud-
ulent or stale claims.63
Four years later, in Frick v. Maldonado,64 the Court of Appeals
overturned its Thompson ruling in response to the Supreme Court's
decision in Pickett v. Brown.65 In Erick, the Court of Appeals held that
Maryland's two-year statute of limitations was unconstitutional, as it
was nearly identical to the unconstitutional statute of limitations in
Pickett.
66
In 1984, Congress passed the Child Support Enforcement
Amendments (CSEA) .67 The CSEA provided financial incentives to
states that, among other things, permitted a paternity action at any
time before the child's eighteenth birthday.68 In response to both the
Erick decision and the CSEA, the General Assembly redrafted the Fam-
ily Law Article to repeal the statute of limitations applicable to pater-
61. Id. at 496, 404 A.2d at 273 (quoting Thompson v. Thompson, 40 Md. App. 256,
266, 390 A.2d 1139, 1145 (1978)).
62. Id. at 493, 404 A.2d at 272.
63. Id. at 496-97, 404 A.2d at 274. Five years later, in 1984, Congress passed the Child
Support Enforcement Amendments after concluding that blood testing did serve to pre-
vent the litigation of fraudulent or stale claims. See infta note 67.
64. 296 Md. 304, 462 A.2d 1206 (1983).
65. Id. at 309, 462 A.2d at 1208. In Pickett v. Brown, the Supreme Court found that a
Tennessee statute placing a two-year limitations period on paternity actions restricted
nonmarital children's right to child support but left marital children's identical rights un-
restricted. 462 U.S. 1, 12 (1983). After finding that the state's interest in preventing the
litigation of fraudulent or stale claims did not justify the disparate treatment, the Court
held that the statute of limitations was unconstitutional. Id. at 18; see also infra Part II.D.
66. 296 Md. at 309, 462 A.2d at 1208. The Frick court relied on the equal protection
interests of nonmarital children in rejecting the statutory restriction. Id.
67. Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat.
1305 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 666-667 (2000)). Congress passed the CSEA after recogniz-
ing that advances in genetic testing had eliminated states' reasons for placing "arbitrary"
limitation periods on paternity actions. H.R. RP. No. 98-527, at 38 (1983). Technology,
even in 1983, had rendered paternity testing more than 99% accurate. Id. Thus, because
paternity proceedings no longer depended on the fading memory of the parties, the
House Ways and Means Committee opined that the states' interest in preventing fraudu-
lent or stale claims no longer provided a justification for short statutes of limitations on
paternity proceedings. Id.
68. § 3, 98 Stat. at 1306-07.
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nity actions altogether.69 For the next ten years, section 5-1006 merely
stated that a paternity proceeding may be initiated during preg-
nancy.7v Then, in 1995, the General Assembly rewrote section 5-1006
to require that a proceeding to establish paternity be started at any
point before the child turns eighteen.7 1 Thus, today, Maryland law
may bar paternity actions for child support when the child has at-
tained the age of eighteen.72
C. Parents' Affirmative Duty to Support their Destitute Adult Children
under Maryland Law
Section 13-102 of the Family Law Article requires parents of suffi-
cient means to support their destitute adult children. 3 Maryland did
not always impose this duty on parents.7 ' Traditionally, parents had a
duty to support only those children still in their minority.
75
In the early twentieth century, however, courts began to expand
the common law and impose a legal duty upon parents to support
their destitute adult children. This started a national trend.76 In
Borchert v. Borchert,77 the Court of Appeals declined to follow this
trend, refusing to impose upon a divorced father any duty to finan-
cially support his destitute adult son.7' The court concluded that
without legislation criminalizing a parent's failure to support his desti-
tute adult child, the court had no way of enforcing such a duty under
the divorce and general equity statutes, which only imposed on par-
ents a duty to support minor children. 79
In the 1947 term-its first term after the court issued the Borchert
decision-the Maryland General Assembly enacted a statute criminal-
izing a parent's failure to support his or her destitute adult child.8s
69. Act of May 21, 1985, ch. 451, 1985 Md. Laws 2440-41 (referencing both Pickett v.
Brown and Frick v. Maldonado and completely eliminating any statute of limitations on pa-
ternity actions).
70. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-1006 (LexisNexis 1991).
71. Act of May 9, 1995, ch. 248, 1995 Md. Laws 2071-72.
72. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-1006.
73. Id, § 13-102(b).
74. See Borchert v. Borchert, 185 Md. 586, 590, 45 A.2d 463, 465 (1946) (noting that
the common law placed no obligation on parents to support incompetent adult children).
75. Id. at 591, 45 A.2d at 465 (stating that since 1896, a Maryland statute has criminal-
ized "the nonsupport of minor children," but "no such similar statute" has criminalized the
nonsupport of destitute adult children).
76. Id. at 592, 45 A.2d at 465.
77. 185 Md. 586, 45 A.2d 463 (1946).
78. Id. at 595, 45 A.2d at 466-67.
79. Id.
80. Smith v. Smith, 227 Md. 355, 360, 176 A.2d 862, 865 (1962); see also MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 97 (1957).
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Then, in Smith v. Smith,8" the court again considered whether a non-
custodial father must financially support his destitute adult son. 2 The
Smith court interpreted the General Assembly's quick action after
Borchert as "a clear indication of legislative intent to place failure to
support an incapacitated adult child on equal footing with failure to
support a minor child." 3 Thus the court in Smith held that under
Article 27, section 97, the father was properly ordered to pay child
support for his destitute adult son.8 4
In Sininger v. Sininger,85 the cotrt reaffirmed its holding in Smith
that Article 27, section 97 placed destitute adult children "on equal
footing" with minors.8s The Sininger court held that a divorced father
had a legal duty to support his twenty-three-year-old mentally chal-
lenged daughter, even though his daughter did not become mentally
challenged until after reaching the age of majority. 7 The court stated
that the term "child" had been statutorily enlarged to include desti-
tute adults in addition to minors.8 8
In 1984, the General Assembly repealed Article 27, section 97,
and reenacted its provisions in two different sections of the Family
Law Article: section 13-101 (b), which defines a "destitute adult child,"
and sections 13-102(b) and (c), which set forth the parents' duty to
support such a child.8 9 Today, parents' obligation to support destitute
adult children is still codified in sections 13-101 and 13-102 of the
Family Law Article.9 ° In sum, Maryland currently imposes a statutory
duty upon parents to financially support destitute adult children.
81. 227 Md. 355, 176 A.2d 862 (1962).
82. Id. at 359-60, 176 A.2d at 864-65.
83. Id. at 360, 176 A.2d at 865.
84. Id.
85. 300 Md. 604, 479 A.2d 1354 (1984).
86. Id. at 610, 479 A.2d at 1357.
87. Id. at 617-18, 479 A.2d at 1361.
88. Id. at 612-13, 479 A.2d at 1358-59. Siningerfurther established that a parent's duty
to support his or her destitute adult child was enforceable, not only in a criminal proceed-
ing, but also under the general equity jurisdiction of the circuit court through section 3-
602(a) of the Courts andJudicial Proceedings Article. Id. at 618, 479 A.2d at 1361. Section
3-602(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article is now codified at section 1-201 (b)
of the Family Law Article. Presley v. Presley, 65 Md. App. 265, 276 n.3, 500 A.2d 322, 327
n.3 (1985).
89. Act of May 15, 1984, ch. 256, 1984 Md. Laws 1849, 2180-81; see Presley, 65 Md. App.
at 277 n.4, 500 A.2d at 327 n.4. In reenacting the provisions of Article 27 in sections 13-101
and 1-102 of the Family Law Article, the legislature made subtle language changes. Id.
The General Assembly replaced "destitute of means" with "has no means of subsistence."
Id. The Revisor's Note to 13-102 clarified that the section "is new language derived without
substantive change from former Art. 27, §§ 97 and 104." Id.
90. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw §§ 13-101 to -102 (LexisNexis 2006).
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D. The Supreme Court's Articulation and Application of the Mills Test
In Mills v. Habluetzel,9 the Supreme Court set forth a two-
pronged test to determine whether a statute of limitations on pater-
nity actions was sufficiently long so as not to violate the equal protec-
tion rights of nonmarital children.92 First, the period for asserting the
right to support must be sufficiently long to permit those who nor-
mally have an interest in such children to bring an action on their
behalf.93 Second, any limitation period must be substantially related
to the state's interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent
claims. 94
The following year, the Court applied the Mills test in Pickett v.
Brown95 to strike down a Tennessee statute placing a two-year limita-
tions period on paternity suits.9 6 The Pickett Court first found that the
two-year limitations period did not provide illegitimate children with
an adequate opportunity to obtain support because the mother may
face obstacles during the two years following the child's birth.97 Ac-
cording to the Court, such obstacles may include fear of disapproval
from the community, confusion, emotional strain, harbored affection
for the child's father, loss of income, and debt from increased ex-
penses.98 Second, the Court found that the two-year limitations pe-
riod was not substantially related to the state's interest in preventing
fraudulent or stale claims.99 The Court noted that the two-year limita-
tions period was no more substantially related to this interest than the
one-year limitation period at issue in Mills.1°° Furthermore, the Court
91. 456 U.S. 91 (1982).
92. Id. at 99-100. In Mills, the Court struck down a Texas statute setting a one-year
limitation period on paternity suits. Id. at 101. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court,
observed that a state must provide a nonmarital child with more than an illusory opportu-
nity to identify his natural father and assert his right to support. Id. at 97.
93. Id. at 99. In creating this requirement, the Court acknowledged that difficult per-
sonal, family, and financial circumstances often surround the birth of a child outside of
wedlock and encumber a mother's filing of a paternity suit. Id. at 100.
94. Id. at 99-100; see supra note 54 (observing that under Mills, preventing the litigation
of fraudulent or stale claims is the only important state interest to which a statute of limita-
tions on paternity actions can be substantially related). In her Mills concurrence, Justice
O'Connor noted that even this important state interest can be undermined by the state's
countervailing interest in ensuring that valid claims for child support are honored and by
advances in DNA testing that limit the possibility of false accusations. Mills, 456 U.S. at
103-04 & n.2 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
95. 462 U.S. 1 (1983).
96. Id. at 18.
97. Id. at 12-13.
98. Id. (citing Mills, 456 U.S. at 100).
99. Id. at 13.
100. Id. at 13-14.
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reasoned, the Tennessee statute created exceptions for nonmarital
children who were, or were likely to become, wards of the state.""'
The Pickett Court found that this exception undermined any relation-
ship that the two-year limitation period purportedly bore to the dis-
couragement of fraudulent or stale claims.10 2
In 1988,Justice O'Connor, writing for a unanimous court in Clark
v. Jeter,' °" applied the Mills test to determine that Pennsylvania's six-
year statute of limitations on paternity actions violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 10 4 Justice O'Connor
suggested that the six-year limitations period did not satisfy the first
prong of the Mills test, because even six years does not necessarily
provide those with an interest in the nonmarital child an adequate
opportunity to assert a claim on the child's behalf.'0° The Court, how-
ever, rested its decision on its conclusion that the six-year statute of
limitations did not satisfy the second prong of Mills.'°6 Just as in Pick-
ett, the Court found that statutory exceptions to the limitations period
cast doubt on the statute's relationship to the state's interest in avoid-
ing the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims.' 0 7 Because the Clark
Court found that the limitations period did not satisfy the second
prong of the Mills test, the statute of limitations did not survive the
Court's intermediate scrutiny.' 08
In sum, the Court developed its two-pronged approach in Mills to
address the constitutionality of statutes of limitations on paternity ac-
tions, specifically as they relate to nonmarital children. 09 To satisfy
101. Id. at 14.
102. Id. at 14-15.
103. 486 U.S. 456 (1988).
104. Id. at 463-65.
105. Id. at 463. The Court stressed that financial and emotional factors relating to the
child's birth may linger for years and may intensify when the mother herself is a minor. Id.
(citing Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 105 n.4 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
106. Id. at 464.
107. Id. According to the Clark Court, tolling devices aimed at minors generally under-
mine any relationship the limitations period may have to the state's interest in preventing
fraudulent or stale claims. Id. In Clark, Pennsylvania had enacted tolling statutes for most
civil actions during a child's minority. l If the length of the limitations period was calcu-
lated so as to prevent fraudulent or stale claims, then by tolling most civil actions during a
child's minority but not paternity actions, the state is conceding that either it does not have
a very strong interest in preventing fraudulent and stale claims, or that the relationship
between the limitations period and the state's interests is attenuated. See id. (citing Mills,
456 U.S. at 104-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (observing that Texas had isolated the diffi-
culty of proving paternity and the concomitant burden on illegitimate children to pursue
the action as one of the few civil actions where the limitations period was not tolled during
minority)).
108. Id. at 464-65.
109. Mills, 456 U.S. at 99-100.
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the Mills test, the limitations period must be (1) long enough to pro-
vide anyone with an interest in the nonmarital child to bring an action
on his or her behalf; and (2) substantially related to the state's interest
in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims.11 ° Under Mills
and its progeny, the Court has struck down as unconstitutional any
statute of limitations impacting nonmarital children.
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In Trembow, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the
Circuit Court for Frederick County and held that a mother is not enti-
tled to pursue a paternity action against the man purported to be the
father of her destitute adult child if she has not established the pater-
nity of that man prior to the child's eighteenth birthday.111 Writing
for the majority, Judge Wilner interpreted section 5-1006 of the Fam-
ily Law Article as creating an affirmative eighteen-year statute of limi-
tations on all paternity actions. 1 2 The court found no ambiguity in
the statute, which states that "[a] proceeding to establish paternity of
a child under this subtitle may be begun at any time before the child's
eighteenth birthday."' 13 Despite finding no ambiguity in the statutory
language, the court nevertheless offered several justifications for its
view that section 5-1006 of the Family Law Article affirmatively set a
limitations period of eighteen years rather than merely eliminating
any previous or default statutory limitation period. 14
First, the court asserted that the history of the statute, coupled
with the General Assembly's comment in the title to the bill that the
new language was to "clarify" the limitations period on paternity ac-
tions, evidenced the General Assembly's intent that the statute affirm-
atively create a limitations period.11 Second, the court found that an
affirmative eighteen-year statute of limitations was consistent with fed-
eral requirements,116 as well as statutes of limitations on paternity ac-
tions in other states.117 Third, the court found that the language in
110. Id.
111. 393 Md. at 329, 901 A.2d at 826.
112. Id. at 336, 901 A.2d at 830 (alteration in original) (citing MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW
§ 5-1006(a) (LexisNexis 2006)).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 337, 901 A.2d at 831.
115. Id. at 337-43, 901 A.2d at 831-34.
116. Id. at 341, 343, 901 A.2d at 833, 835; see also supra notes 67-68 and accompanying
text.
117. Trembow, 393 Md. at 343-44, 901 A.2d at 835. The court observed that fourteen
states require that parents wishing to file paternity actions do so before the child's eight-
eenth birthday: Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Ne-
braska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and
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section 5-1032(b) (2) of the Family Law Article established that the
legislature was aware in passing section 5-1006 that destitute adult chil-
dren also had rights under the paternity provisions of the Article." 8
Thus, the Trembow court concluded that the General Assembly knew
the "eighteenth birthday" language in section 5-1006 established an
affirmative statute of limitations on the paternity actions of destitute
adult children and did not merely eliminate any statute of limitations
on the paternity actions of minors." 9 The majority concluded that
the affirmative eighteen-year statute of limitations was enforceable be-
cause it discouraged plaintiffs from sleeping on their rights.12 °
In her dissent, Judge Raker argued that section 5-1006 should not
bar a mother from receiving financial support for her destitute adult
child because the limitations period on paternity actions violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 Judge
Raker relied on the Supreme Court's inclination-as evidenced by
Mills, Pickett, and Clark-to invalidate statutory limitations periods on
paternity actions as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. 122 Ac-
cording to Judge Raker, the Court generally has allowed statutory limi-
tation periods where the state has a legitimate interest in preventing
stale or fraudulent paternity and support claims. 123 Judge Raker ob-
served, however, that the Clark Court found that the accuracy of scien-
tific methods for proving paternity significantly reduced a state's valid
interest in preventing stale or fraudulent paternity and support
claims. 24 Although Judge Raker based her reasoning primarily on
equal protection principles, she also suggested that the majority may
West Virginia. Id. at 343 n.6, 901 A.2d at 835 n.6. The court then acknowledged, however,
that the Colorado statute permits paternity actions until the child's nineteenth birthday
while the Oklahoma and West Virginia statutes, in actuality, permit paternity actions up to
the child's twenty-first birthday. Id.
118. Id. at 344, 901 A.2d at 835. Section 5-1032(b) (2) provides: "If the child is an adult
but is destitute and cannot be self-supporting because of a physical or mental infirmity, the
court may require the father to continue to pay support during the period of the infir-
mity." MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-1032(b) (2). According to the Trembow court, this
provision evidenced the legislature's awareness that destitute adult children, and not
merely minors, had rights under the paternity law. Trembow, 393 Md. at 344, 901 A.2d at
835.
119. Trembow, 393 Md. at 342-44, 901 A.2d at 834-35.
120. See id. at 344-45, 901 A.2d at 835-36 (remarking that Trembow should not be re-
warded "for sleeping on her rights for more than eighteen years").
121. Id. at 347, 901 A.2d'at 837 (Raker, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 351-56, 901 A.2d at 840-43.
123. Id. at 352, 901 A.2d at 840.
124. Id. at 356, 901 A.2d at 843.
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have misinterpreted the legislative intent behind and the application
of section 5-1006 of the Family Law Article. 1
25
IV. ANALYSIS
In Trembow, the Court of Appeals held that the mother of a desti-
tute adult child could not collect child support from the alleged fa-
ther if she had not established his paternity prior to the child's
eighteenth birthday.126 In so holding, the court interpreted section 5-
1006 of the Family Law Article as creating an eighteen-year statute of
limitations on all paternity actions-even those involving destitute
adult children. 127  The Court of Appeals improperly premised its
holding on the state's interest in providing defendants with repose
and punishing plaintiffs for sleeping on their rights.1 2 1 In so doing,
the Trembow court ignored Supreme Court precedent,129 as well as the
underlying purpose of paternity statutes. 130 The court should have
applied the Mills test, as advocated by Judge Raker's dissent.' Be-
cause Maryland's eighteen-year statute of limitations on paternity ac-
tions fails to satisfy either prong of the Mills test, the Trembow court
should have held that the statute unconstitutionally violated the equal
protection rights of nonmarital destitute adult children.
132
125. Id. at 347-48 n.4, 901 A.2d at 837-38 n.4. Judge Raker contended that, contrary to
the majority's view, the statutory language change in 5-1006 could have meant that the
Maryland General Assembly did not intend to place a limitations period on paternity ac-
tions. Id. at 348 n.4, 901 A.2d at 838 n.4. Thus, in her view, the effect of the legislature's
1985 decision to repeal the two-year limitations period on paternity actions was unclear.
See id. (referencing letters sent to legislative judiciary committees arguing both that a three-
year statute of limitations would apply and that no limitations period existed at all).
126. Id. at 329, 901 A.2d at 826 (majority opinion). Maryland law offers four ways of
establishing paternity. The purported father must either: (1) be judicially determined to
be the father; (2) acknowledge in writing that he is the father; (3) openly and notoriously
recognize the child as his offspring; or (4) subsequently marry the mother and acknowl-
edge, either orally or in writing, that he is the father. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-
208(b) (2) (LexisNexis 2001). Because one way to establish paternity is to acknowledge it
in writing, Schonfeld may have legally established his paternity in his correspondence with
Ivan. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. Had the exhibits remained on the record,
the court might have determined that Schonfeld acknowledged himself to be Ivan's father
in the letters and that the letters constituted a writing. Moreover, if the court had deter-
mined that Schonfeld sent the correspondence before Ivan's eighteenth birthday, it may
have concluded that Trembow was entitled to support from Schonfeld.
127. Trembow, 393 Md. at 337, 901 A.2d at 831.
128. See infra Part IV.A.
129. See infra Part IV.A. 1.
130. See infra Part IC.A.2.
131. See infra Part IV.B.
132. See infra Part IV.C.
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A. The Trembow Court Erroneously Based its Holding on a Desire to
Provide Defendants with Repose and to Penalize Plaintiffs for
Sleeping on their Rights
The Trembow court should have recognized that the state's inter-
est in providing a defendant with repose and punishing a plaintiff for
sleeping on her rights conflicted with Supreme Court precedent,
countervailing state interests, and the state's purpose in passing the
paternity law.
1 33
1. The Trembow Court Ignored Supreme Court Precedent
Although the policy of providing repose and punishing those
who sleep on their rights justifies statutes of limitations on many types
of actions, 134 under Supreme Court jurisprudence, it does not justify
statutes of limitations on paternity actions. 135 To the extent possible,
statutes of limitations should be imposed so as not to infringe on a
plaintiff's constitutionally protected interests.13 6 Because the Court
analyzes classifications based on nonmarital status with heightened
scrutiny, a statute of limitations on paternity actions must be substan-
tially related to an important government objective."3 7 The Supreme
Court has recognized that preventing the litigation of fraudulent or
stale claims is an important government objective to which a statute of
limitations on paternity actions could be substantially related. 3 ' How-
ever, the Court has never recognized the government's interest in pro-
viding repose as substantially related to a statute of limitations on
133. Cf Carlotta P. Wells, Comment, Statutes of Limitations in Paternity Proceedings: Barring
an "Illegimate's" Right to Support, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 567, 573 (1983) (observing that limita-
tions periods in paternity statutes result in conflicts between the state's desire to prevent
stale claims and its belief that illegitimate children should be financially supported by their
parents).
134. See Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49
(1944) ("Statutes of limitation ... are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises
through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been
lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.").
135. See Trenbow, 393 Md. at 358, 901 A.2d at 844 (Raker, J., dissenting) (noting that the
Supreme Court has not found relevant a defendant's right to repose when weighing the
equal protection problems with limitations period on paternity actions); see also supra note
54.
136. Wells, supra note 133, at 574-75.
137. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
138. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1982). The Court has also recognized
that the state's interest in the efficient distribution of property can justify inheritance laws
that discriminate on the basis of nonmarital child status. See supra text accompanying note
53.
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paternity actions.13  The Trembow majority's elevation of repose over
the equal protection problems with limitations periods on paternity
actions inappropriately infringed on the right of illegitimate children
to financial support from their real fathers.
Furthermore, the Trembow court ignored the Court's guidance
when it failed to consider the state's interest in ensuring that valid
claims for child support are honored.'4 ° Justice O'Connor, writing
for a unanimous court in Clark, acknowledged that the state interest
supporting short statutes of limitations on paternity actions is under-
mined by the state interest in honoring valid claims for child sup-
port.14' Six years prior to authoring the Clark opinion, Justice
O'Connor noted this countervailing state interest in her Mills concur-
rence.142 In Mills, Justice O'Connor explained that this state interest
is grounded in notions ofjustice and in reducing the number of indi-
viduals receiving state assistance.' 43 Thus, the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized the state interest in honoring valid claims for child support as
additional support for invalidating abbreviated statutes of limitations
on paternity actions.' 44 Conversely, the Supreme Court has never rec-
ognized repose as a reason to uphold a statute of limitations on pater-
nity actions.' 45
By basing its holding on a desire to provide repose, the Trembow
court disregarded the Supreme Court's heightened scrutiny standard
of review for statutes of limitations on paternity actions. The Trembow
court similarly ignored Supreme Court precedent by failing to con-
sider the countervailing government interests recognized by the Su-
preme Court. In its eagerness to punish Trembow for sleeping on her
rights, the Trembow court failed to consider the state's interest in hon-
oring valid claims for child support.
139. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. The Court has also refused to recognize
that statutory classifications based on nonmarital child status can be substantially related to
the state's interest in promoting marriage or in discouraging extramarital sexual relations.
See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
140. Mills, 456 U.S. at 103-04 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Pickett v. Brown, 462
U.S. 1, 10-11 (1983) (referencing Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Mills).
141. Clark, 486 U.S. at 462.
142. Mills, 456 U.S. at 103-04 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also supra note 94 and
accompanying text.
143. Mills, 456 U.S. at 103-04 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor observed
that imposing limitations periods on paternity actions places an additional burden on the
state welfare system, as unwed mothers have difficulty obtaining child support. Id.
144. Clark, 486 U.S. at 462.
145. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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2. The Trembow Court Overlooked the Legislative Intent Behind
Paternity Laws
The Trembow court failed to observe the inherent conflict be-
tween the legislature's objective in passing the paternity law and the
state interest in providing a defendant with repose. Legislatures gen-
erally design paternity laws to determine the putative father's obliga-
tion, rather than to discipline him.' 46 Such was the case in Maryland.
In drafting the Family Law Article in 1984, the General Assembly ac-
knowledged that the purpose of the paternity statute was to promote
the general welfare and the best interests of nonmarital children by
providing them with "the same rights to support, care, and education"
as marital children.1 47 The General Assembly also acknowledged that
the paternity law was supposed to impose on mothers and fathers of
nonmarital children "the basic obligations and responsibilities of
parenthood."1
48
By justifying the eighteen-year statute of limitations as a means of
providing repose and punishing the mother of a nonmarital destitute
adult for sleeping on her rights, the Trembow court overlooked the
underlying purposes of the Maryland paternity law. A defendant has
no vested right in repose,149 whereas a child born out of wedlock has a
constitutional right to the same access to parental support as a child
146. See Wells, supra note 133, at 572 (explaining the civil nature of modern paternity
statutes). After 1963, Maryland's paternity law was no longer criminal and no longer puni-
tive in purpose. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. The General Assembly
intended for the new civil paternity law to promote the general welfare and the best inter-
ests of nonmarital children, as well as to impose parental responsibilities on fathers. See
supra note 58 and accompanying text.
Two different societal changes most likely inspired the change in legislative philoso-
phy. The growing number of nonmarital children may have been one factor. The
nonmarital child population increased dramatically throughout the latter half of the cen-
tury. In 1960, only one out of twenty births (5%) was to an unmarried woman. STEPHANIE
CooNrz, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY 264 (2005). By 1980, the rate had risen to just under 20%,
and by 2004 it had grown to 35.7%. Brady G. Hamilton et al., Preliminary Births for 2004,
National Center for Health Statistics, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/pubs/pubd/he-
stats/prelim_births/prelim_births04.htm#Figure%202 (last visited Mar. 3, 2007). The in-
creasing scope of constitutional challenges available under the Equal Protection Clause
may also have influenced the legislative reform. Before Brown v. Board of Education in 1954,
the Supreme Court rarely found any state action violative of the Equal Protection Clause.
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 617 (2d ed. 2005). After Brown, the Court be-
gan to rely heavily on the Equal Protection Clause to safeguard fundamental rights. Id.
147. MD. CODE ANN., Fiv. LAW § 5-1002(b)(1) (LexisNexis 1984).
148. Id. § 5-1002(b) (2).
149. Wells, supra note 133, at 574. In fact, because the purpose of Maryland's paternity
statute is to impose parental responsibility on the biological fathers of nonmarital children
rather than to punish them, the state's interest in providing repose is less than it would be
if the statute's purpose was punitive in nature.
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born in wedlock.15 ° The Trembow court should not have prioritized
Schonfeld's interest in repose over Ivan Trembow's right to the same
access to financial support as his marital counterparts.
The Trembow court erred in justifying its holding on a desire to
provide Schonfeld with repose and to punish Trembow for sleeping
on her rights. In so doing, it ignored both Supreme Court precedent
and the state's objectives in passing the paternity law.
B. The Trembow Court Failed to Apply the Mills Test
The Court of Appeals erred in not applying the two-pronged Mills
test in Trembow to determine whether Maryland's eighteen-year statute
of limitations on paternity actions violated the equal protection rights
of nonmarital destitute adult children. In failing to analyze the equal
protection issues presented in Trembow, the court ignored decades of
Supreme Court precedent. 5' Since Levy v. Louisiana in 1968, the Su-
preme Court has regarded nonmarital children as "persons" under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and has
analyzed discrimination based on nonmarital child status as an equal
protection issue. 15 2 Furthermore, in the nearly twenty-five years of
case law following Mills, the Supreme Court has consistently applied
the two-pronged Mills test when faced with a time-barred paternity suit
involving a nonmarital child. 5 ' The Court of Appeals should have
applied the Mills test in Trembow to determine the constitutionality of
Maryland's eighteen-year statute of limitations on paternity actions.
The court should have done so regardless of the fact that the
nonmarital "child" at issue was actually a nonmarital destitute adult,'54
and regardless of the fact that the suit was not initiated by the
nonmarital destitute adult himself.' 5
150. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (per curiam) (holding that under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state may not deny illegitimate
children any substantial benefit accorded children generally).
151. Trembow, 393 Md. at 346-49, 901 A.2d at 837-38 (Raker, J., dissenting).
152. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968); see also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S.
762, 776 (1977) (striking down a state statute allowing only marital children to inherit
from both natural parents on Equal Protection grounds); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495,
510 (1976) (imposing a level of scrutiny that is not "toothless" when evaluating the equal
protection claims of nonmarital children); Gomez, 409 U.S. at 538 (stating that it is invidi-
ous discrimination to deny a nonmarital child the right to financial support from his fa-
ther); supra note 39 and accompanying text.
153. See Clark v.Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 463-65 (1988); Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 11-18
(1983).
154. See infra Part IV.B.1.
155. See infra Part IV.B.2.
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1. The Mills Test Was Applicable Because the Trembow Court
Should Have Treated the Nonmarital Destitute Adult as a
Nonmarital Child for the Purpose of Constitutional
Review
The Trembow court should have analyzed the constitutionality of
Maryland's statute of limitations under the Mills framework despite
the fact that the nonmarital individual in Trembow had attained the
age of majority. Maryland cases support the proposition that a
nonmarital destitute adult is a nonmarital child under the law.1 56 As
the Smith court observed, the General Assembly, in criminalizing a
parent's failure to financially support his or her destitute adult child,
intended to put the parents' duty to support destitute adults "on equal
footing" with the parents' duty to support minor children.1 57 The Sin-
inger court took its analysis one step further, concluding that Maryland
law not only placed the duty to support destitute adults on equal foot-
ing with the duty to support minor children, but placed the destitute
adults themselves on equal footing with minor children.15 The Sin-
inger court concluded that the legislature statutorily enlarged the defi-
nition of "child" to include destitute adults. 159 Thus, in following
precedent, the Trembow court should have analyzed a limitations pe-
riod affecting nonmarital, destitute adult children under the same
equal protection principles it would apply to any classification based
on nonmarital child status.
2. That the Paternity Suit Was Not Initiated by the Nonmarital
Destitute Adult Child Did Not Preclude the Court from
Analyzing the Equal Protection Issue Under Mills
Although the Trembow court stressed that Ivan Trembow, the dis-
abled adult, did not initiate the proceeding himself, 6 ° this fact has
little bearing on the constitutional analysis. In many paternity actions
156. See Sininger v. Sininger, 300 Md. 604, 608, 479 A.2d 1354, 1356 (1983) (holding
that the legislature statutorily enlarged the definition of "child" to include destitute inca-
pacitated adults); Smith v. Smith, 227 Md. 355, 360, 176 A.2d 862, 865 (1962) (observing
that the legislature placed the parental duty to support destitute adults "on equal footing"
with the parental duty to support minor children); Presley v. Presley, 65 Md. App. 265, 276,
500 A.2d 322, 327 (1985) (observing that under Sininger, a divorced father may have to
support his destitute, incapacitated adult child even though she is over eighteen years of
age and emancipated).
157. Smith, 227 Md. at 360, 176 A.2d at 865. The Smith court emphasized the fact that
the General Assembly criminalized a parent's failure to support a destitute adult child so
soon after the Borchert decision. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
158. Sininger, 300 Md. at 608, 611, 479 A.2d at 1356, 1358.
159. Id. at 612-13, 479 A.2d at 1358-59.
160. Trembow, 393 Md. at 330-31, 901 A.2d at 827.
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for child support involving challenges to the constitutionality of the
statute of limitations, the child has neither initiated nor is a party to
the proceeding.'61 Because Maryland law considers destitute adults to
be children under the law, 16 2 it follows that anyone with an interest in
the destitute adult may initiate a proceeding for child support. Thus,
the fact that Ivan Trembow did not himself initiate the paternity ac-
tion for child support does not preclude the court from employing
the Mills test to analyze the constitutionality of the statute of limita-
tions that barred the action.
C. Had the Trembow Court Properly Applied the Mills Test, it Would
Have Concluded that Maryland's Eighteen-Year Statute of
Limitations on Paternity Actions Violated the Equal
Protection Clause with Respect to Nonmarital
Destitute Adult Children
Although the Trembow court briefly mentioned Mills and its prog-
eny in its analysis,' 63 the court cabined its equal protection analysis to
little more than a paragraph in a footnote.16 4 The Trembow court
should have concluded that Maryland's eighteen-year statute of limita-
tions does not satisfy either prong of the Mills test, and thus, is
unconstitutional.
1. The Court Should Have Concluded that Eighteen Years Does Not
Provide Interested Individuals with a Reasonable Opportunity
to Assert a Claim on a Nonmarital Child's Behalf
After establishing that nonmarital destitute adults are nonmarital
children for purposes of constitutional review, 165 the court should
have concluded that Maryland's eighteen-year limitations period on
paternity actions does not satisfy the first prong of the Mills test.
Under Mills, the court's first inquiry should have been whether the
limitations period was long enough to permit anyone with an interest
in the nonmarital destitute adult child to assert his right to support. 16
6
Tragically, external and often uncontrollable factors can leave a
161. See, e.g., Frick v. Maldonado, 296 Md. 304, 305, 462 A.2d 1206, 1206 (1983) (permit-
ting Edna Frick, the mother of a nonmarital child, to initiate a paternity proceeding for
child support).
162. See supra Part IV.B.1.
163. Trembow, 393 Md. at 339-40, 901 A.2d at 832-33.
164. Id. at 345-46 n.9, 901 A.2d at 836 n.9.
165. See supra Part 1V.A.2.
166. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982).
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healthy child destitute shortly before reaching the age of eighteen.167
In these circumstances, a mother who thought herself capable of pro-
viding for her child until he reached the age of eighteen 6 8 may be
left with a short window of time in which to assert her adult child's
right to long-term support from his natural father. A mother is likely
to be in shock or grieving, and initiating a paternity proceeding might
be the last thing on her mind. Therefore, eighteen years may not in
fact provide those with an interest in the nonmarital destitute adult a
reasonable opportunity to assert a claim on his behalf.
Additionally, the statute of limitations might cut off a mother's
opportunity to assert her child's right to lifelong support from his nat-
ural father. According to the Sininger court, section 13-1002 of the
Family Law Article requires parents to support their destitute adult
children, even if the adult child does not become destitute until after
reaching the age of majority. " Thus, Maryland law requires parents
to support their destitute adult child for an indefinite period, even if
they could not anticipate the need for any future support beyond the
child's eighteenth birthday.'
70
In sum, one could imagine cases where the limitations period on
paternity actions would force a mother-able to financially support
her child until he reaches the age of eighteen-to instead provide
financial support for the child for life. Therefore, an eighteen-year
limitations period does not necessarily provide a mother with an ade-
quate amount of time to assert the child's possible future right to life-
long support from his natural father.
167. Teenagers, in fact, are in a high risk category for suffering from debilitating trau-
matic brain injuries. SeeJEAN A. LANGLOIS ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND
CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY IN THE
UNITED STATES 17 tbl.1 (2006) (listing that on average, 15-19 year-olds were second only to
0-4 year-olds in hospital visits and death for brain trauma related injuries from
1995-2001).
168. For many different reasons, unwed mothers of healthy children often decline to
initiate a paternity suit and fail to assert the child's right to financial support from his
father. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
169. Sininger v. Sininger, 300 Md. 604, 611, 479 A.2d 1354, 1358 (1984).
170. See id.
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2. The Trembow Court Should Have Concluded that Maryland's
Legitimate Interest in Preventing the Litigation of Fraudulent
and Stale Claims Is Not Substantially Related to the
Eighteen-Year Statute of Limitations on Paternity
Actions
Under the Mills test, the Trembow court's second inquiry should
have been whether the statute of limitations on paternity actions was
substantially related to the state's interest in preventing fraudulent or
stale claims.1 71 The court should have concluded that any interest the
state may have in preventing the litigation of fraudulent and stale
claims 172 is not rationally related to the eighteen-year limitations pe-
riod because DNA testing can determine paternity with near perfect
accuracy. 173 As Justice O'Connor observed in her Mills concurrence,
the state's interest in preventing the litigation of fraudulent and stale
claims is substantially diminished by improvements in scientific testing
techniques that reduce the possibility of false paternity accusations.'
74
In Mills, the Supreme Court concluded that although blood tests
could disprove paternity, the same tests could not affirmatively estab-
lish paternity.175 DNA testing has come a long way since 1982, and
blood tests can now affirmatively establish paternity with 99.999999%
accuracy.' 76 Thus, had the Trembow court properly applied the Mills
test, it would have concluded that the eighteen-year statute of limita-
tions is not substantially related to Maryland's interest in preventing
fraudulent or stale claims because modern DNA testing can affirma-
tively establish paternity even after periods much longer than eigh-
teen years.
171. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1982).
172. Some subscribe to the theory that there are no stale claims in paternity actions for
child support. See, e.g., Wells, supra note 133, at 606. According to this viewpoint, a child's
right to support is continuing. Id. Because a nonmarital child's right to support is tied to a
paternity determination, the claim can never become stale. Id.
173. See Trembow, 393 Md. at 256-57, 901 A.2d at 853 (Raker, J., dissenting) (citing E.
Donald Shapiro et al., The DNA Paternity Test: Legislating the Future Paternity Action, 7 J.L. &
HEALTH 1, 29 (1993) (observing that DNA testing techniques can likely determine pater-
nity with 99.999999% accuracy)).
174. Mills, 456 U.S. at 104 n.2 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
175. Id. at 98 n.4 (majority opinion). In 1979, the Thompson court refused to find that
blood testing techniques for paternity were sufficiently reliable as to override Maryland's
two-year statute of limitations on paternity actions. Thompson v. Thompson, 285 Md. 488,
497, 404 A.2d 269, 274 (1979). When it passed the CSEA in 1984, Congress tried to per-
suade the states that arbitrary statutes of limitations on paternity actions were no longer
appropriate since DNA testing effectively discouraged the litigation of fraudulent and stale
claims. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
176. See Shapiro, supra note 173, at 29.
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V. CONCLUSION
In Trembow, the Court of Appeals considered whether the mother
of a destitute adult child could initiate a paternity proceeding to col-
lect child support from the alleged father. 177 Because the child was
over the age of eighteen, the court held that the mother's action was
barred.17 1 In so holding, the court interpreted section 5-1006 of the
Family Law Article as creating an eighteen-year statute of limitations
on paternity actions involving destitute adult children. 79  The
Trembow court improperly based its holding on a desire to provide the
defendant with repose. 8 ' The court failed to recognize that neither
Supreme Court precedent nor the legislature's purpose in passing the
paternity law supported barring a paternity action in the interest of
providing repose.18' The Court of Appeals should have applied the
Supreme Court's two-pronged Mills test to determine that Maryland's
eighteen-year statute of limitations on paternity actions, as it related to
destitute adult children, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
8 2
KELLY T. MOORE
177. 393 Md. at 329, 901 A.2d at 826.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 337, 901 A.2d at 831.
180. See supra Part IV.A.
181. See supra Part IV.A.]-2.
182. See supra Part IV.B-C.
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STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO. v. DEHAAN:
NARROWING THE CAUSATION REQUIREMENT FOR
UNINSURED MOTORIST BENEFITS
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. DeHaanj the
Court of Appeals of Maryland considered whether injuries from a
gunshot inflicted during a vehicle theft, where the assailant was in the
driver's seat of the victim's automobile with the ignition off, arose out
of the "use" of the automobile as contemplated by the uninsured mo-
torist provision of the victim's insurance policy.2 The court held that
the word "use" demanded that the injury result from the "normal use"
of an uninsured motor vehicle, and that under this standard, the inci-
dent did not "aris [e] out of the . . . use" of the vehicle as stipulated by
the language of the uninsured motorist statute and the victim's insur-
ance policy.' The DeHaan court's decision was problematic in two re-
spects. First, the court's interpretation of the statute over-emphasized
the importance of the owned-but-uninsured exclusion clause in assess-
ing the extent of coverage intended by the legislature.4 Second, al-
though the court portrayed its decision as consistent with precedent,
the narrower standard of causation applied by the court represented a
departure from the court's consistently broad interpretation of "aris-
ing out of' clauses.5 Consequently, the DeHaan court's decision to
deny coverage leaves lower courts without a clear standard and contra-
venes the purpose of the statute by limiting compensation to innocent
victims of uninsured motorists.6 Extending coverage would have logi-
cally fit with precedent and posed little danger of undermining legisla-
tive intent by allowing recovery in all cases of criminal activity
associated with a vehicle. 7
I. THE CASE
On January 28, 2001, at approximately 11:15 p.m., Richard De-
Haan pulled his 1989 Chevrolet Blazer, insured by State Farm Mutual
Copyright © 2007 by Todd W. Hesel.
1. (DeHaan II1) 393 Md. 163, 900 A.2d 208 (2006).
2. Id. at 166-67, 900 A.2d at 210.
3. Id. at 195, 900 A.2d at 226-27 (citing MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 19-509 (LexisNexis
2006)).
4. See infra Part IV.A.
5. See infra Part IV.B.
6. See infra Part IV.B.
7. See infra Part IVC.
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Insurance Company (State Farm), into a Shell gas station in Baltimore
County.8 After shutting off the vehicle, DeHaan left the keys on the
floorboard and entered the gas station's convenience store.9 Upon
leaving the store, DeHaan observed an individual sitting in the
driver's seat of his vehicle, prompting him to open the driver's side
door and ask, "What are you doing?"' The intruder responded by
shooting DeHaan in the abdomen, starting the Blazer, and driving
off." DeHaan suffered serious injuries, which caused him to miss six
months of work and incur approximately $70,000 in medical ex-
penses. 2 DeHaan's State Farm policy included $10,000 in personal
injury protection benefits (PIP) and $100,000 in uninsured motorist
benefits, and he submitted claims under both portions of the policy.1 3
After State Farm denied the claims, DeHaan filed a complaint against
it in the Circuit Court for Howard County. 4
The trial court determined that DeHaan was entitled to benefits
under both portions of the policy and granted his motion for sum-
mary judgment.1 5 Regarding the uninsured motorist claim, the trial
court held that the injury arose from the "use" of the uninsured vehi-
cle as required by section 19-509 of the Insurance Article because De-
Haan would not have been injured but for the attacker's
unauthorized use of the vehicle. 6
Following the verdict, State Farm paid DeHaan the PIP benefits
owed under the policy, but contested the trial court's ruling that De-
Haan was additionally entitled to uninsured motorist benefits.' 7 The
Court of Special Appeals agreed with the substance of the circuit
court's ruling, but vacated and remanded because of a procedural de-
fect by the trial court in the entry of the judgment.1 8 In distinguishing
its previous cases denying coverage where attackers had shot at their
victims from outside the vehicle, the Court of Special Appeals ob-
8. DeHaan II1, 393 Md. at 167, 900 A.2d at 210.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. DeHaan (DeHaan II), No. 118, slip op. at 5 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. Aug. 22, 2005). The assailant, Ronald Neely, was later arrested and con-
victed of attempted murder. DeHaan III, 393 Md. at 168, 900 A.2d at 210.
12. DeHaan III, 393 Md. at 167-68, 900 A.2d at 210-11.
13. Id. at 167-68, 900 A.2d at 210-11.
14. Id. at 168, 900 A.2d at 211.
15. Id.
16. DeHaan v. State Farm (DeHaan 1), No. 13-C-02-52183CN, slip op. at 8 (Howard
County Cir. Ct. Feb. 24, 2004).
17. DeHaan I1, 393 Md. at 168, 900 A.2d at 211.
18. Id. at 168-69 n.3, 900 A.2d 211 n.3. Specifically, the trial court failed to follow
Maryland Rule 2-601 requiring that the judgment and opinion be set forth on separate
documents. Id
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served that the assailant was inside the car and had taken control of
the vehicle when the shooting occurred.19 Consequently, the court
reasoned that there was a direct causal connection between the use of
the vehicle and the injury, as opposed to the incidental connection
seen in prior assault cases. 2
0
State Farm petitioned the Court of Appeals, which granted certio-
rari to decide whether the lower courts erred in concluding that De-
Haan's gunshot injuries arose from the "use" of an automobile under
the uninsured motorist statute, and consequently, whether these inju-
ries alone entitled him to uninsured motorist benefits under the
terms of his State Farm automobile insurance policy.21
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Maryland courts have looked to the legislative history and pur-
pose of the uninsured motorist statute and judicial interpretations of
its statutory language in determining the extent of insurance cover-
age. 22 While the statute has undergone several significant amend-
ments, the essential mandate-that insurers provide coverage for
insured victims suffering injuries "arising out of the . . . use" of an
uninsured motor vehicle-has remained unchanged since its enact-
ment.23  Maryland courts have consistently recognized the broad
scope of the provision's language and the statute's remedial
purpose.24
A. The Uninsured Motorist Statute Developed as a Remedial Scheme to
Protect Maryland Drivers from Economic Harm Caused by
Uninsured Motorists
The uninsured motorist statute25 was enacted by the Maryland
legislature in 1972 as part of a comprehensive revision of motor vehi-
cle insurance law that required automobile insurance policies issued
within Maryland to contain specific types of coverages. 26 The legisla-
19. DeHaan II, No. 118, slip op. at 23 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Aug. 22, 2005).
20. Id. at 21-23.
21. DeHaan Il, 393 Md. at 166, 900 A.2d at 209-10.
22. See infra Part II.A-B.
23. See infra Part II.A.
24. See infra Part II.B.
25. MD. CODE AINN., INS. § 19-509 (LexisNexis 2006).
26. Jennings v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 302 Md. 352, 357-58 & n.3, 488 A.2d 166,
168-69 & n.3 (1985). The court observed that these laws substantially changed Maryland's
public policy on motor vehicle insurance by mandating certain types of coverage, includ-
ing personal injury protection, property damage liability, and uninsured motorist cover-
age. Id. at 357-58, 488 A.2d at 168-69. The 1972 legislation also established a state-owned
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ture included uninsured motorist coverage to assure a source of com-
pensation for Maryland drivers injured by irresponsible motorists
without liability insurance.27 Although initially optional, uninsured
motorist coverage became mandatory in 1975.28
The legislature made significant amendments to the uninsured
motorist statute in 1981 and 1982, adding a definition of "uninsured
motor vehicle"2 9 and expanding the allowable coverage exclusions.30
The statute originally permitted insurers to deny coverage where the
insured was injured while operating an uninsured vehicle that he
owned.3 1 The primary purpose of this exclusion was to encourage
owners of multiple automobiles to obtain coverage for all their vehi-
cles, and to limit the exposure of the insurer by preventing the exten-
sion of coverage to an additional vehicle where the policy holder had
paid a premium based on a single vehicle.12 The 1982 amendment
expanded the exclusion to encompass family members residing with
the insured when occupying or struck by an uninsured vehicle owned
by the insured or a family member living in the same residence.3 3
This expansion of the permissible exclusions was a concession to in-
surers by further limiting their exposure and allowing better risk as-
sessment when issuing a policy.34 In 1997, the statute was recodified
in its present form as section 19-509 of the Insurance Article.3"
insurance company, the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund, to provide coverage for
individuals having difficulty obtaining private coverage. Id. at 357-58 n.3, 488 A.2d at 169
n.3.
27. Pa. Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 157, 416 A.2d 734, 737
(1980).
28. Act of May 15, 1975, ch. 562, 1975 Md. Laws 2716.
29. An "uninsured motor vehicle" was defined as a "motor vehicle whose ownership,
maintenance, or use has resulted in the bodily injury or death of an insured." Act of May
19, 1981, ch. 510, 1981 Md. Laws 2122.
30. Act of June 1, 1982, ch. 573, 1982 Md. Laws 3442.
31. Gartelman, 288 Md. at 158, 416 A.2d at 737.
32. Powell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 86 Md. App. 98, 107, 585 A.2d 286, 290
(1991).
33. 1982 Md. Laws 3442, 3443.
34. In Gartelman, the insurer argued that a similar provision was consistent with the
original exclusion clause, claiming that such a result was necessary to allow proper risk
assessment when issuing a policy. Gartelman, 288 Md. at 158-59, 416 A.2d at 738. The
court rejected this argument, holding that penalizing insured persons unable to obtain
insurance for vehicles they did not own would not further the statutory purpose of encour-
aging uninsured vehicle owners to obtain insurance. Id. at 160, 416 A.2d at 739.
35. MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 19-509 (LexisNexis 2006).
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B. Maryland Courts' Interpretation of "Arising out of' Requires only a
Limited Causal Relationship
Maryland courts have broadly construed the phrase "arising out
of the . . . use" to be a liberal standard of causation.16 Early cases
involving motor vehicle insurance coverage established that "arising
out of' causation required only a sufficiently direct causal relationship
between the vehicle and the harm. 7 Courts subsequently applied this
standard when encountering the same phrase in the uninsured mo-
torist statute, standard automobile insurance policies, and general
business insurance contracts. 38 Although Maryland courts have ex-
pansively construed "arising out of' causation, uninsured motorist
benefits have been denied to victims of criminal assaults when the ve-
hicle was only incidentally related to the harm.39
1. The Court of Appeals Has Rejected Proximate Cause Analysis in
Interpreting "Arising out of' Causation and Instead
Required only a Direct Causal Relationship
In National Indemnity Co. v. Ewing40 and Frazier v. Unsatisfied Claim
&Judgment Fund Board4 the Court of Appeals interpreted "arising out
of' as a liberal causation requirement in a standard automobile liabil-
ity policy and remedial statute.42 In Ewing, the court relied on its
broad treatment of the phrase "arising out of' in the Maryland Work-
men's Compensation Act and the analysis by several other state courts
to conclude that the words required only a causal relationship and
were not limited by the rules of direct and proximate cause.43 The
insured had negligently skidded off the road, causing his passenger to
be thrown from the vehicle.44 The driver then negligently walked his
passenger, who was uninjured in the crash, down the center of the
road, where he was struck by a passing car.43 The Ewing court refused
to allow Ewing's insurer to disclaim liability, concluding that a suffi-
cient nexus existed between the use of the insured's automobile and
36. See infra Part II.B.1-3.
37. See infra Part II.B.1.
38. See infra Part II.B.2.
39. See infra Part II.B.3.
40. 235 Md. 145, 200 A.2d 680 (1964).
41. 262 Md. 115, 277 A.2d 57 (1971).
42. See, e.g., Ewing, 235 Md. at 149, 200 A.2d. at 682 (automobile policy); see also Frazier,
262 Md. at 119, 277 A.2d at 59 (remedial statute).
43. Ewing, 235 Md. at 149-51, 200 A.2d 682-83.
44. Id. at 147-48, 200 A.2d at 681.
45. Id. at 148, 200 A.2d at 681.
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the harm because Ewing's negligent driving created the risk of injury,
and an unbroken chain of causation led to the harm.46
In Frazier, the court broadly construed "arising out of" language
in the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Law to include injuries
caused by a firecracker thrown from an unidentified vehicle.4 7 The
victim and her child were injured when the firecracker exploded in
the backseat of her convertible, causing her to lose control and strike
a tree.4" Pointing to the remedial purpose of the Law, the Frazier
court reasoned that case law construing standard insurance policies
was not binding.4 9 Nevertheless, the court found these decisions per-
suasive, observing that the victim could sue the Board on a theory that
the use of the vehicle was directly or incidentally connected to the
injury, regardless of whether the vehicle was the proximate cause of
the harm."°
Together, Ewing and Frazier demonstrate that the Court of Ap-
peals only requires a sufficiently direct causal relationship between
the use of vehicle and the harm to satisfy "arising out of" causation.51
Furthermore, though the Frazier court did not offer a definite stan-
dard, it did make clear that "arising out of" causation deserved special
consideration when used in a remedial statute.52
46. Id. at 150-51, 200 A.2d at 683. The court relied primarily on Schmidt v. Utilities
Insurance Co., 182 S.W.2d 181 (Mo. 1944), Merchants Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.,
188 So. 571 (Miss. 1939), and Carter v. Bergeron, 160 A.2d 348 (N.H. 1960), in its decision.
Ewing, 235 Md. at 149-50, 200 A.2d 682. In Schmidt, a pedestrian was injured after tripping
and falling over blocks that employees had negligently left on the sidewalk after using
them to unload their truck. Schmidt, 182 S.W.2d at 181-82. The Schmidt court held that
the injury arose out of the use of the truck, referring to the language as "broad, general
and comprehensive." Id. at 183, 186. Similarly, in Merchants, a driver was injured after
striking poles left on the road that had been used to remove a truck caught in a ditch.
Merchants, 188 So. at 571. The court held that the injury arose from the use of the truck
because the poles had a direct and substantial relation to the operation of the truck and
there was no intervening act to break the chain of use. Id. at 572. The Ewing court also
quoted with approval Carter's finding that coverage existed even if the insured vehicle did
not exert a physical force on the instrumentality of the harm. Ewing, 235 Md. at 150, 200
A.2d at 682 (quoting Carter, 160 A.2d at 353).
47. Frazier, 262 Md. at 119, 277 A.2d at 59. The Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund
Law allowed anyone suffering an injury "aris[ing] out of the ownership, maintenance or
use of' an unidentified motor vehicle in Maryland to bring an action for compensation
against the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Board. Id. at 117, 277 A.2d at 58 (quot-
ing Mn. ANN. CODE art. 661/2, § 7-620 (1970)).
48. Id. at 116, 277 A.2d at 58.
49. Id. at 118, 277 A.2d at 59.
50. Id.
51. See McNeill v. Md. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 48 Md. App. 411, 415-16, 427 A.2d 1056, 1059
(1981) (citing Frazier and Ewing for the proposition that proximate cause is not necessary
to establish "arising out of" causation).
52. Frazier, 262 Md. at 118, 277 A.2d at 59.
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2. The Maryland Courts Have Consistently Required Only a
Sufficiently Direct Causal Relationship to Satisfy "Arising out
of" Causation in both Private Insurance Contracts and
Where Mandated by Statute
Maryland courts applied the broad standard for "arising out of'
causation established in Ewing and Frazier in subsequent cases involv-
ing the uninsured motorist statute, standard automobile liability insur-
ance policies, and general business insurance and indemnification
contracts. In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Maryland
Automobile Insurance Fund,54 the Court of Appeals did not specifically
refer to the phrase "arising out of," but did recognize that the unin-
sured motorist statute, which used that language to describe the scope
of coverage, should be construed liberally in accordance with its reme-
dial purpose.55 The victim in State Farm, who was forced off the road
by an unidentified vehicle, was unable to recover under his insurance
policy, which required physical contact between the insured and unin-
sured vehicle to receive uninsured motorist benefits.56 Consequently,
he sued the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund (MAIF), which in
turn sought a declaratory judgment against State Farm nullifying the
policy limitation for providing less coverage than mandated by stat-
ute.57 Focusing on the statute's purpose of compensating innocent
accident victims, the court found that neither the statute, nor the case
law interpreting it required physical contact between vehicles. 58
In McNeill v. Maryland Insurance Guaranty Ass'n,59 the Court of
Special Appeals relied principally on Ewing and Frazier to expansively
construe "arising out of" causation in a standard automobile liability
policy.6" In McNeill, the victim was injured when his car battery ex-
53. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Md. Auto. Ins. Fund, 277 Md. 602, 605,
356 A.2d 560, 562 (1976) (noting the broad scope of coverage in uninsured motorist stat-
ute); McNeilU4 48 Md. App. at 415, 427 A.2d at 1059 (broadly construing "arising out of"
coverage in standard automobile liability policy); N. Assurance Co. of Am. v. EDP Floors,
Inc., 311 Md. 217, 230, 533 A.2d 682, 688 (1987) (same, general business insurance con-
tract); Mass Transit Admin. v. CSX Transp., Inc., 349 Md. 299, 315, 708 A.2d 298, 306
(1998) (same, indemnification clause).
54. 277 Md. 602, 356 A.2d 560 (1976).
55. Id. at 605, 356 A.2d at 562; see also Pa. Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gartelman, 288
Md. 151, 157, 416 A.2d 734, 737 (1980) (stating that the primary purpose of the uninsured
motorist statute is to ensure compensation for victims of financially irresponsible
motorists).
56. State Farm, 277 Md. at 602-03, 356 A.2d at 561.
57. Id. at 603, 362 A.2d at 561.
58. Id. at 605, 356 A.2d at 562.
59. 48 Md. App. 411, 427 A.2d 1056 (1981).
60. Id. at 415-20, 427 A.2d at 1059-61.
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ploded while using the insured's vehicle to jump start his car." The
driver of the insured vehicle caused the explosion when he lit a match
while standing nearby.12 The court held that the lit match was not an
intervening cause and that there was a sufficient causal relationship
between the use of the insured vehicle and the carelessly thrown
match for the victim to qualify for benefits under the statute."3
The Court of Appeals extended its broad interpretation of "aris-
ing out of' causation outside the automobile liability context in North-
ern Assurance Co. of America v. EDP Floors, Inc."4 and Mass Transit
Administration v. CSX Transportation, Inc."5 In EDP Floors, which in-
volved a dispute over an exclusion clause in a general business liability
insurance policy, the insurer argued that it had no duty to defend
EDP in a tort action because the policy excluded coverage for injuries
"arising out of' the unloading of a truck.6 6 An EDP employee, who
arrived at work intoxicated, was operating a hydraulic lift to unload
floor tiles from a truck when the tiles fell and struck the victim."7 The
victim alleged vicarious liability against EDP for the employee's negli-
gence and direct liability against EDP for negligent hiring, retention,
and supervision." EDP contended that the exclusion applied only to
the vicarious liability claim and not the additional claims of direct
negligence.6 9
Though the "arising out of' provision in EDP Floors described cov-
erage exclusions as opposed to the scope of coverage, the court found
that the language required only a causal relationship.7 0 The court
reasoned that the provision encompassed situations where the injury
was caused by additional factors other than just the actual unloading
of the truck v.7  The court observed that a proximate cause analysis was
contrary to the text of the policy and would force the insurer to pro-
61. Id. at 412, 427 A.2d at 1057.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 418-20, 427 A.2d at 1060-61. As in Ewing, the McNeill court cited Merchants
Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 188 So. 571, 572 (Miss. 1939), for the proposition
that a dangerous situation causing injury arises from the use of the vehicle, unless an inter-
vening event breaks the causal link to the vehicle. McNeil! 48 Md. App. at 419-20, 427
A.2d at 1060-61.
64. 311 Md. 217, 223-25, 533 A.2d 682, 685-86 (1987) (construing "arising out of"
causation in general business insurance contract).
65. 349 Md. 299, 306, 708 A.2d 298, 302 (1998) (construing contractual "arising out
of' causation in indemnification clause).
66. EDP Floors, 311 Md. at 225, 533 A.2d at 686.
67. Id. at 220, 533 A.2d at 683-84.
68. Id., 533 A.2d at 684.
69. Id. at 225, 533 A.2d at 686.
70. Id. at 230, 533 A.2d at 688.
71. Id.
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vide coverage for accidents that were inseparably related to the use or
unloading of the vehicle.72 Consequently, the court held that the exis-
tence of a causal connection between the unloading of the vehicle
and the harm made the exclusion applicable. 3
In CSX Transportation, the Court of Appeals refused to require
more than "but for" causation when interpreting "arising out of' as
used in a contractual indemnification clause." After reviewing its
cases construing "arising out of' causation in liability insurance poli-
cies, the court found that it had never applied proximate or "interme-
diate causation," thus reaffirming the position from FDPFoors that the
phrase required only a causal connection.75
Returning to the uninsured motorist statute, the Court of Special
Appeals applied the causal relationship test in Harris v. Nationwide Mu-
tual Insurance Co.76 to determine the extent of coverage, asking
whether the injuries at issue were directly or incidentally related to
the use of the vehicle.77 The victim in Harris sought compensation for
injuries inflicted when an unidentified driver grabbed her purse as
she was walking through a shopping center parking lot, dragging her
along the ground for fifteen feet.7" Construing the policy's provision
broadly, the court ruled for the victim, finding a direct causal connec-
tion between the use of the vehicle and the harm.
79
3. Maryland Courts Have Limited the Scope of "Arising out of'
Coverage by Declining to Extend Uninsured Motorist Benefits
to Victims Injured by Criminal Acts only Incidentally
Related to the Use of an Uninsured Motor Vehicle
In two recent cases, the Court of Special Appeals limited the ex-
tent of uninsured motorist coverage by concluding that victims of
criminal assaults conducted by assailants outside the uninsured vehi-
cle were not entitled to compensation."0 In Wright v. Allstate Insurance
Co.,"8 a husband and wife were shot by an acquaintance who had
72. Id. at 231, 533 A.2d at 689.
73. Id.
74. 349 Md. 299, 316, 708 A.2d 298, 307 (1998).
75. Id. at 316-17, 708 A.2d at 307.
76. 117 Md. App. 1, 699 A.2d 447 (1997).
77. Id. at 17, 699 A.2d at 455.
78. Id. at 4, 699 A.2d at 448-49.
79. Id. at 18, 699 A.2d at 455.
80. Wright v. Allstate Ins. Co., 128 Md. App. 694, 701, 740 A.2d 50, 54 (1999); Webster
v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 130 Md. App. 59, 67, 744 A.2d 578, 582 (1999).
81. 128 Md. App. 694, 740 A.2d 50 (1999).
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emerged from a parked car while they were at a stop sign.8 2 Although
the court found the shooting was an "accident" within the meaning of
the statute, it rejected Wright's analogies to Frazier and Harris, distin-
guishing those cases based on the "prominent role" of the vehicles in
the commission of those crimes.8 3 Because the causal connection be-
tween the injuries and use of the vehicle was only incidental to the
commission of the assault, the court found that the statute did not
cover the injuries suffered by the Wrights. 4
Likewise, in Webster v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 5 the
court denied uninsured motorist benefits to the parents of a passen-
ger who was shot and killed when the driver of the car she was riding
in attempted to flee from a carjacker 8 6 Emphasizing that the
carjacker was not inside or in control of any vehicle, the court found
no causal connection with the use of an uninsured vehicle, and attrib-
uted the passenger's injuries solely to the criminal assault.8 7
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. DeHaan, the Court
of Appeals of Maryland reversed the Court of Special Appeals, holding
that the uninsured motorist provision of the Maryland Code requires
that the claimant's injury stem from the "normal use" of an uninsured
vehicle, and granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm.8 8
Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Cathell began by noting that
the central objective of statutory interpretation is to discern legislative
intent by considering the plain meaning of the statute's terms and
avoiding illogical or unreasonable constructions.8 9 Focusing on sec-
tions 19-509(a) (1) and (c) (1) of the Insurance Article, both of which
refer to the "use" of an uninsured motor vehicle, the court observed
that the word "use" was not defined by the statute and thus was subject
to multiple interpretations.9 ° Consequently, the court found it neces-
82. Id. at 695, 740 A.2d at 50.
83. Id. at 698, 740 A.2d at 52.
84. Id. at 698-99, 740 A.2d at 52.
85. 130 Md. App. 59, 744 A.2d 578 (1999).
86. Id. at 67, 744 A.2d at 582.
87. Id.
88. DeHaan IIl, 393 Md. at 195, 900 A.2d at 226-27. Though both parties referred to
the incident as a carjacking, the court noted that there had not been proper factual find-
ings to determine whether the requirements of criminal carjacking had been met. DeHaan
III, 393 Md. at 168 n.2, 900 A.2d at 210-11 n.2. Accordingly, the court referred to the
incident as a shooting in the process of a theft. Id., 900 A.2d at 211 n.2.
89. Id. at 170, 900 A.2d at 212.
90. Id. at 171, 900 A.2d at 212.
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sary to use additional tools of statutory construction to determine leg-
islative intent.9 1
The court first discussed the legislative history of the uninsured
motorist statute, noting that the statute was originally conceived to
protect Maryland drivers from the financial consequences of accidents
with uninsured out-of-state drivers.9 2 The court then examined
amendments to the statute, which defined the term "uninsured motor
vehicle" and expanded the allowable coverage exclusions.9 3 The
court particularly focused on the changes in the exclusion clause pro-
vision. 94 Although the court found it possible that Mr. DeHaan's vehi-
cle might qualify as an "uninsured motor vehicle," the court reasoned
that it was illogical to believe that the legislature intended that insur-
ers could exclude coverage when an uninsured vehicle owned by the
victim was the instrumentality of the harm, but could not exclude cov-
erage when the injuries were only incidentally related to the actual
operation of the same uninsured vehicle.95 The court believed a
more reasonable interpretation of the amendment was that the legis-
lature viewed the entire uninsured motorist statute as applying only to
those scenarios where an uninsured motor vehicle itself caused the
harm. 96 Thus, the DeHaan court concluded that it could reasonably
infer that the legislature did not consider the statute as a source of
compensation for victims harmed by intentional criminal acts that
were only incidentally related to the use of an uninsured motor
vehicle.9 7
The court then examined the language at issue in the context of
the entire section of the statute, and once again looked to the exclu-
sion clause.9" The court found that the statute "would have to be
stood on its head" to exclude recovery if the vehicle actually hit the
owner, but to allow recovery where the vehicle was idle and did not
directly contribute to the injury.9 9
Turning next to the case law interpreting the statutory language,
the court acknowledged that the statute's remedial nature dictated a
91. Id.
92. Id. at 172, 900 A.2d at 213.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 173, 900 A.2d at 213-14. See supra Part II.A for the history and language of
the exclusion clause. The court also reviewed several additional amendments that did not
substantively change the statute. Id. at 174, 900 A.2d at 214.
95. Id. at 173 & n.4, 900 A.2d at 213-14 & n.4.
96. Id., 900 A.2d at 214.
97. Id. at 175, 900 A.2d at 215.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 176, 900 A.2d at 215.
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liberal construction, but found that the language of the statute was
more limiting than DeHaan suggested.I°° Reviewing its own cases, the
court observed that although Ewing had interpreted the "arising out
of" language as to not make recovery dependent on the strict rules of
direct and proximate cause, it nevertheless required a connection be-
tween the injury and the use of the vehicle.' ° ' The court found that
even if DeHaan's vehicle was in "use" as contemplated by the statute,
the shooting was an intervening act that broke the causal chain.'
0 2
The court reasoned that a contrary view would require insurers to pro-
vide coverage for a wide array of injuries beyond the contemplation of
the statute.1 0 3
The court also distinguished Frazier, noting that it did not de-
scribe the necessary relationship between the injury and the vehicle or
produce a clear holding.'0 4 Further, the DeHaan court found Frazier
distinguishable on its facts, as the victims in Frazier were inside the
vehicle when injured and the firecracker causing the crash was thrown
from a moving, operating vehicle; DeHaan's vehicle was immobile
with the ignition off when the shooting occurred.
0 5
After examining additional cases interpreting "arising out of' cov-
erage in insurance contracts, the court concluded that the language
was intended to focus the inquiry on the instrumentality of the
harm. 10 6 The court found that the overly broad reading advocated by
DeHaan would force insurers to cover liabilities unrelated to the pur-
pose of the statute. 10 7 Moreover, although previous cases indicated
that only "but for" causation was required, the court suggested that
such a minimal standard would result in unreasonable liability for
insurers. 1
08
100. Id. at 176-77, 900 A.2d at 216. The court rejected comparisons to a NewJersey case
offered by DeHaan, noting that the New Jersey personal injury protection statute was
broader than the Maryland uninsured motorist statute and did not contain the same lan-
guage. Id. at 177, 900 A.2d at 216.
101. Id. at 177-79, 900 A.2d 216-17.
102. Id. at 178-79, 900 A.2d 217.
103. Id. at 179, 900 A.2d at 217.
104. Id. at 180, 900 A.2d at 218.
105. Id
106. Id. at 180-83, 900 A.2d at 218-20 (reviewing N. Assurance Co. of Am. v. EDP
Floors, Inc., 311 Md. 217, 533 A.2d 682 (1987); and Mass Transit Admin. v. CSX Transp.,
Inc., 349 Md. 299, 708 A.2d 298 (1998)).
107. Id. at 183-84, 900 A.2d at 220.
108. Id. The court referred favorably to Judge Eldridge's dissent in CSX Transportation,
349 Md. at 323, 708 A.2d at 310 (Eldridge, J., dissenting), which reasoned that the phrase
"arising out of," as used in an indemnification clause, should require more than "but for"
causation. DeHaan III, 393 Md. at 183, 200 A.2d at 220.
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The court also found that several cases from the Court of Special
Appeals supported its requirement of a direct causal connection be-
tween the normal use of the vehicle and the harm. 10 9 Specifically, the
court pointed to several cases in the intermediate appellate court that
denied when recovery the victim had been wounded or killed by gun-
shots, and several permitting recovery when the vehicle actively con-
tributed to the harm."' The court found further support for its
position in the decisions of other jurisdictions interpreting uninsured
motorist statutes, concluding that they likewise required a direct
causal connection between the injury and the use of the uninsured
vehicle."'
Finally, the court noted that the language in DeHaan's insurance
policy mirrored the uninsured motorist statute, indicating that their
meanings were synonymous. 1 2 Consequently, the court held that De-
Haan was not entitled to recover under the policy because his injuries
lacked the necessary nexus to a normal use of the vehicle."'
IV. ANALYSIS
In DeHaan, the Court of Appeals examined the language of the
exclusion clause in the uninsured motorist statute, concluding that it
reflected a legislative intent to cover only those situations where the
vehicle was the instrumentality of the harm, and that the statute's re-
ferral to "arising out of the . . . use" required a nexus between the
injury and the normal use of an uninsured vehicle." 4 The court's
attempt to reconcile this narrow standard with conflicting precedent
is likely to create confusion in the lower courts and undermine the
statute's remedial purpose by limiting its scope. 1 5 Instead, the court
should have granted DeHaan compensation by interpreting the stat-
ute to require only a limited causal relationship between the injury
109. DeHaan IIl, 393 Md. at 184-86, 900 A.2d at 220-21.
110. Id. (comparing Webster v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 130 Md. App. 59, 744 A.2d 578
(1999), and Wright v. Allstate Ins. Co., 128 Md. App. 694, 740 A.2d 50 (1999), with McNeill
v. Md. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 48 Md. App. 411, 427 A.2d 1056 (1981), and Harris v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 117 Md. App. 1, 699 A.2d 447 (1997)).
111. Id. at 189-93, 900 A.2d 223-25.
112. Id. at 194, 900 A.2d at 226.
113. Id. at 195, 900 A.2d at 226-27. The Court of Appeals was also presented with the
questions of whether sitting in the driver's seat alone made the assailant an "operator" of
the vehicle, and whether DeHaan's car qualified as an uninsured motor vehicle under the
same policy that insured it. Id. at 166-67, 900 A.2d at 210. The court did not reach these
latter issues because its holding questions were dispositive. Id. at 167, 900 A.2d at 210.
114. See infra Part V.A.
115. See infra Part IV.B.
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and an uninsured motor vehicle.'1 6 This result would have fit with the
court's previous "arising out of' cases and the remedial purpose of the
statute without realizing the court's fear of turning the statute into an
uncontrollable source of benefits for all victims of crimes related to an
uninsured vehicle.' 
1 7
A. The Court Over-Emphasized the Importance of the Owned-But-
Uninsured Exclusion Clause in its Interpretation of the Word
"Use"
The court's undue reliance on the language in the exclusion
clause when examining the legislative history and structure of the stat-
ute resulted in an overly narrow interpretation of the word "use" and a
corresponding reduction in the scope of coverage.'"" The court's
analysis was flawed in two respects. First, it failed to account ade-
quately for the purpose and development of the owned-but-uninsured
exclusion when assessing the clause's relation to the extent of cover-
age provided by the statute.1 19 Second, the court's conclusion-that
the language of the exclusion clause reflected the legislature's belief
that the phrase "arising out of the ... use" referred only to situations
where the vehicle was the instrumentality of the harm-was inconsis-
tent with the plain meaning of the words and the court's rules of statu-
tory interpretation.1 2 °
1. The DeHaan Court Did not Give Proper Consideration to the
Development and Objective of the Owned-But-Uninsured
Exclusion When Considering its Effect on the Entire
Statute
The court erred by viewing the terms of the owned-but-uninsured
exclusion section as reflective of the scope of coverage under the en-
tire uninsured motorist statute rather than recognizing exclusion's
limited purpose in the overall statutory scheme.' 2 ' This method of
116. See infta Part IV.C.
117. See infra Part IV.C.
118. SeeDeHaan III, 393 Md. at 173-76, 900 A.2d at 213-15 (stressing the importance of
the exclusion section when examining both the history of the statute and the context of
the words "arising out of the . . . use" within the entire section of the statute).
119. See infta Part IV.A.1.
120. See infra Part IV.A.2.
121. See, e.g., Pa. Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 158, 416 A.2d 734,
737-38 (1980) (stating that "the purpose of exclusion is to encourage owners of uninsured
motor vehicles to become insured"); AndrewJanquitto, Uninsured Motorist Coverage in Mary-
land, 21 U. BALT. L. REV. 171, 240-41 (1992) (discussing the clause's limited purpose of
preventing unlimited coverage of vehicles when only one premium is paid, and therefore
encouraging owners of uninsured vehicles to obtain insurance).
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analysis was at odds with the court's express refusal to engage in
"forced or subtle interpretation in an attempt to extend or limit the
statute's meaning."' 22 The original statutory exclusion, which barred
recovery for individuals injured while "operating or riding in an unin-
sured motor vehicle" that they owned, was intended to encourage
owners of uninsured motor vehicles to obtain insurance and to pro-
tect insurers from unforeseen liability. 12' The subsequent amend-
ment to the owned-but-uninsured exclusion, encompassing family
*members living with the named insured, was a further concession to
the insurers' interest in reducing their liability. 24 The purpose of the
entire statute, however, was to protect innocent victims of motor vehi-
cle accidents involving uninsured drivers by assuring them of a source
of financial compensation. 125 Moreover, the uninsured motorist stat-
ute was part of a comprehensive shift of Maryland public policy to
provide greater protection for its drivers and transfer the risk of loss to
the private sector by requiring motorists to carry insurance policies
with specific types of coverage. 126 Considering the broad, remedial
objective of the statute as a whole against the more limited goals of
the exclusion clause, 127 there was no basis for the DeHaan court's as-
122. DeHaan IIl, 393 Md. at 171, 900 A.2d at 212 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Nesbit v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 382 Md. 65, 76, 854 A.2d 879, 885 (2004)).
123. See Gartelman, 288 Md. at 158, 416 A.2d at 737-38 (stating that the purpose of the
exclusion was to encourage drivers to insure all owned vehicles); Powell v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 86 Md. App. 98, 107, 585 A.2d 286, 290 (1991) (observing that the lack of
such an exclusion would frustrate premium determinations);Janquitto, supra note 121, at
240-41 (stating that the exclusion limited the insurer's exposure by preventing the insured
from claiming uninsured motorist benefits for a second or third vehicle when he had only
paid a premium based on one vehicle).
124. Janquitto, supra note 121, at 241; cf Gartelman, 288 Md. at 160-61, 416 A.2d at 739
(rejecting an argument that the original exclusion clause should be read to exclude per-
sons other than the named insured to allow insurers to better assess the risk when issuing a
policy).
125. Gartelman, 288 Md. at 157, 416 A.2d at 737.
126. See Jennings v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 302 Md. 352, 357, 488 A.2d 166, 168
(1985) (explaining that the original statutory coverage scheme enacted in 1972 was a sub-
stantial change in Maryland public policy regarding motor vehicle insurance and compen-
sation for damages caused by automobile accidents);Janquitto, supra note 121, at 173-76
(stating that the purpose of changing the insurance law was to protect Maryland citizens
from economic harm cause by motor vehicle accidents, and to alleviate the burden on the
State by shifting risk of loss to the private sector).
127. See Gartelman, 288 Md. at 160, 416 A.2d at 739 (rejecting a more expansive reading
of the exclusion clause advocated by insurance company as contrary to the statutory goal of
assuring compensation for innocent accident victims, and not furthering the purpose of
encouraging owners of uninsured vehicles to obtain insurance).
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sumption that the legislature intended the more limited language of
the clause to dictate the extent of coverage under the entire statute. 128
The evolving scope of the exclusion section, juxtaposed with the
lack of any significant changes to the coverage section, 29 further be-
lies the DeHaan court's conclusion that the legislature viewed these
provisions as synonymous. Though the language of the exclusion
clause was expanded from "operating and riding in" to "occupying, or
struck as a pedestrian by'" 0 only a minor and inconsequential change
was made to the coverage portion of the statute.' 3 ' The legislature's
decision to refer to discrete scenarios in the exclusion clause, both
before and after the amendment, while continuing to use more ex-
pansive "arising out of' language in the coverage section suggests that
legislators viewed the statute as covering a wider range of vehicle-
related harms than those specified in the exclusion section. This
reading of the legislative intent, unlike the DeHaan court's more nar-
row interpretation, is consistent with the statute's remedial
purpose.1
32
2. The Court's Interpretation of the Exclusion Clause Did Not
Comport with its Plain Meaning or Common Sense
Although the language of the amended exclusion clause differed
significantly from the language in the coverage section, the DeHaan
court nonetheless concluded that the terms of the exclusion section
revealed a legislative intent to provide coverage only where the vehicle
was the instrumentality of the harm. 133 By finding the two sections
synonymous despite their distinct language, the court did not follow
its stated practice of giving the words of a statute their plain, common
sense meaning. 134 The court followed this practice in Northern Assur-
128. See DeHaan II, 393 Md. at 175, 900 A.2d at 215 (stating that the exclusion clause
reflected the legislature's concept of coverage provided by the entire statute).
129. See id. at 172-74, 900 A.2d at 213-14 (reviewing the history of the uninsured motor-
ist statute, which included several amendments to the exclusion section but no substantive
changes to the coverage section).
130. Compare MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 243H(a)(1)(i) (1957 & Supp. 1972), with MD.
CODE ANN., INS. § 19-509(f) (LexisNexis 2006).
131. The words "motor vehicle" were inserted before the word "accident." Compare MD.
ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 541(c), with MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 19-509(c) (1).
132. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Md. Auto. Ins. Fund, 277 Md. 602, 605,
356 A.2d 560, 562 (1976) (acknowledging the uninsured motorist statute's remedial
purpose).
133. DeHaan III, 393 Md. at 173, 900 A.2d at 213-14.
134. Id. at 170, 900 A.2d at 212; see also Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137, 647 A.2d 106,
112 (1994) (stating that courts must "avoid constructions that are illogical, unreasonable,
or inconsistent with common sense").
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ance by referencing a standard dictionary to define "arising out of' as
"originating from, growing out of' or "flowing from." 1 5 In DeHaan,
however, the court relied on the uninsured motorist statute's exclu-
sion clause to conclude that "arising out of the... use" meant that the
vehicle be the instrumentality of the harm. 11 6 Based on the EDP Floors
court's definition of "arising out of," the phrase "arising out of the...
use" should logically refer to a much broader range of scenarios be-
yond those specifically delineated by the exclusion clause. 13
7
B. The Court's Effort to Reconcile its Narrow Interpretation of the
Statute's Causation Requirement with Contraiy Precedent
Leaves Lower Courts Without a Clear Standard and may
Frustrate the Statute's Remedial Purpose
The court's narrow construction of the statute resulted in a
stricter standard of causation than previous "arising out of' cases,
which required only a sufficient causal relationship between the vehi-
cle and the harm." 8 The court was unconvincing in its attempt to
reconcile its conclusion that DeHaan was not entitled to compensa-
tion with prior decisions granting coverage to the victim. The court's
placement of DeHaan within its precedent despite its narrower causa-
tion requirement leaves lower courts to guess at the proper standard
for uninsured motorist benefits. 39 The resulting confusion is likely to
produce inconsistent coverage for deserving victims, thus frustrating
the statute's remedial purpose.
The court was unpersuasive in distinguishing the causal chain
leading to DeHaan's injury from Ewing and Fraziers guidelines for
"arising out of' causation. 140 The court explained that DeHaan's in-
135. N. Assurance Co. of Am. v. EDP Floors, Inc., 311 Md. 217, 230, 533 A.2d 682, 688
(1987).
136. See DeHaan Ill, 393 Md. at 173, 900 A.2d at 214 (relying on the exclusion clause in
analyzing both the history of the statute and the context of the language at issue in order
to ascertain the scope of coverage).
137. Compare EDPFloors, 311 Md. at 230, 533 A.2d at 688 (defining "arising out of' as
"originating from, growing out of, flowing from, or the like"), with DeHaan III, 393 Md. at
173, 900 A.2d at 214 (limiting "arising out of" to an instrumentality of the harm standard).
138. See, e.g., Nat'l Idem. Co. v. Ewing, 235 Md. 145, 149-51, 200 A.2d 680, 682-83
(1964) (liberal causation requirement in automobile policy); Frazier v. Unsatisfied Claim
&Judgment Fund Bd., 262 Md. 115, 118, 277 A.2d 57, 59 (1971) (same, remedial statute);
McNeill v. Md. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 48 Md. App. 411, 417, 427 A.2d 1056, 1060 (1981) (ex-
plaining that proximate cause analysis is not required).
139. See DeHaan IIl, 393 Md. at 193, 900 A.2d at 225 (determining that uninsured motor-
ist coverage requires "a direct causal relationship between the injury and the actual use of
the vehicle").
140. The court acknowledged that the use of the vehicle in Ewing was connected to the
injury, even though the vehicle itself did not cause the harm, but failed to recognize that
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jury was not part of the chain of causation initiated by the attacker's
use of the vehicle by stating that "the shooting had no direct or sub-
stantial relation to the use" and thus broke the causal chain., 4 But
the facts belie this conclusion, as DeHaan was shot while the assailant
was in the midst of using the vehicle, and whose purpose was to effec-
tuate a continued use.' 42 The situation causing the injury was there-
fore centered on the use of the vehicle.' 4 3 In contrast, the injury in
Ewing, which the court held to arise from the use of the vehicle, was
the product of a more attenuated chain of causation, occurring well
after the use of the relevant vehicle had ceased.1 4 4 Given these facts,
the DeHaan court's argument that Ewing involved a greater connec-
tion between the use and the injury 45 carries little force. Finally, Ew-
ing involved a provision in a private insurance contract, 146 whereas the
policy provision in DeHaan was mandated by a remedial statute 4 ' that
consistently was interpreted liberally. 4 ' Thus, the standard of causa-
tion applied in DeHaan should have been less stringent than the stan-
dard in Ewing.'4 9
The court's attempt to distinguish Frazier was equally problem-
atic."0 The factual distinction made by the court-that the Fraziervic-
tims were actually using their own vehicle when injured by an act
committed from a presumed uninsured vehicle-is entirely irrelevant
to the statutory inquiry of whether the harm arose from the use of an
the same was true in DeHaan's case. DeHaan II, 393 Md. at 179, 900 A.2d at 217. Simi-
larly, the court found no conflict with its instrumentality of the harm standard when re-
viewing Frazier despite the fact that the firecracker, not the uninsured vehicle, was the
direct cause of the injury in that case. Id. at 180, 900 A.2d at 218.
141. Id. at 178-79, 900 A.2d at 217.
142. See DeHaan I, No. 13-C-02-52183CN, slip op. at 6 (Howard County Cir. Ct. Feb. 24,
2004) (stating that the assailant's actual and intended use of the Blazer resulted in De-
Haan's injuries).
143. Id. at 6 (stating that the vehicle was "the central connecting thread between the
[assailant and victim]" and the clear cause of why DeHaan was shot).
144. See Nat'l Indem. Co. v. Ewing, 235 Md. 145, 150-51, 200 A.2d 680, 682-83 (1964)
(finding that victim's injuries arose out of the use of the original vehicle even though he
was unharmed in the initial collision and was only injured after being negligently led down
the center of the road and struck by another vehicle).
145. See DeHaan IIl, 393 Md. at 178-79, 900 A.2d at 217 (distinguishing Ewing by noting
that the "use" of the vehicle in Ewing created the risk of injury, whereas the shooting in
DeHaan broke the chain of use).
146. Ewing, 235 Md. at 147, 200 A.2d at 681.
147. DeHaan IIl, 393 Md. at 193, 900 A.2d at 225.
148. See Frazier v. Unsatisfied Claim &Judgment Fund Bd., 262 Md. 115, 118, 277 A.2d
57, 59 (1971) (noting that the remedial act must be liberally construed); State Farm v. Md.
Auto. Ins. Fund, 277 Md. 602, 605, 356 A.2d 560, 562 (1976) (same).
149. See also Frazier, 262 Md. at 118, 277 A.2d at 59 (hesitating to applyjudicial interpre-
tations of standard automobile liability policies in cases involving a remedial statute).
150. DeHaan III, 393 Md. at 180, 900 A.2d at 218.
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uninsured vehicle. 15 1 The court also noted that the uninsured vehicle
in Frazier was operating and in motion when the firecracker was
thrown,15 2 suggesting that, in contrast, the vehicle in DeHaan was not
in use during the shooting because the ignition was off. This distinc-
tion is undermined by the fact that the assailant in DeHaan was in the
process of using the vehicle when DeHaan's injuries occurred: the as-
sailant was in the driver's seat when he fired his weapon, and he im-
mediately started the ignition and drove off after the shooting. 151
Moreover, the Frazier court found a sufficient causal connection
to the use of the vehicle even though the firecracker, and not the
uninsured vehicle, was the instrumentality of the harm. 154 Conversely,
the DeHaan court refused to grant coverage based on the fact that the
handgun, rather than the vehicle, actually caused the harm. 155 Under
the causal relationship standard of Frazier, DeHaan arguably had a
more persuasive case than the victims in Frazier because the shooting
was a direct consequence of the assailant's intent to use the vehicle,
whereas the use of the uninsured vehicle in Frazier did not provoke
the act of throwing the firecracker.' 56 Thus, had the court applied
the same causal standard it used in Frazier, DeHaan's injuries would
have fallen within the terms of the statute.1 57
Though the court seized on the statement in EDP Foors-that the
"arising out of' inquiry focuses on the instrumentality of the harm-
to support its position that the use of DeHaan's vehicle did not cause
the harm, 158 several countervailing factors negated this argument.
First, the EDP Floors court's broad definition of "arising out of' as
151. Id. Because the statute in Frazier, like the uninsured motorist statute, made com-
pensation dependent on whether the injuries arose from the use of an uninsured vehicle,
the fact that the Frazier victims were riding in their own insured vehicle when injured by the
firecracker thrown from a passing uninsured vehicle was immaterial. Frazier, 262 Md. at
117, 277 A.2d at 58. Likewise in DeHaan, the issue was not whether DeHaan himself was
using a vehicle, but whether his injuries arose from the use of an uninsured vehicle. De-
Haan 11, 393 Md. at 166, 900 A.2d at 210.
152. DeHaan III, 393 Md. at 180, 900 A.2d 218.
153. See DeHaan I, No. 13-C-02-52183CN, slip op. at 7 (Howard County Cir. Ct. Feb. 24,
2004) (stating that the assailant was clearly using the vehicle when confronted by DeHaan).
154. See Frazier, 262 Md. at 118, 277 A.2d at 59 (noting that the exploding firecracker
caused the driver to lose control and strike a tree).
155. See DeHaan III, 393 Md. at 176, 900 A.2d at 216 (stating that a shooting has no
relation to the use of a vehicle under the statutory scheme).
156. See Frazier, 262 Md. at 119, 277 A.2d at 59 (describing the firecracker as thrown
from a random, unidentified vehicle traveling in the opposite direction).
157. See id. at 118, 277 A.2d at 59 (observing that "arising out of" coverage in automobile
insurance policies may turn on whether the vehicle was "directly or merely incidentally
casually connected with the injury"); DeHaan I, No. 13-C-02-52183CN, slip op. at 7 (stating
that the use of the vehicle was a direct cause of the injuries).
158. DeHaan Ill, 393 Md. at 182, 900 A.2d at 219.
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"originating from, growing out of," and "flowing from" supported re-
covery for DeHaan because his injuries "flowed from" the use of the
vehicle.' 5 9 Second, the EDP Floors court also noted that the "arising
out of' language did not require that the excluded conduct be the
sole cause of injury.'6 ° Even if the use of the vehicle was not the sole
cause of DeHaan's injuries, the use was causally related to the harm
because the shooting would not have occurred without the use.' 6 ' Fi-
nally, in its discussion of CSX Transportation, which established that
"arising out of' did not require more than "but for" causation, the
court observed that the dispute in that case was over a service contract
and not an automobile liability statute.'6 2 If the DeHaan court chose
to diminish the significance of CSX Transportation on this basis, it
should have also done so with EDP Foors, which concerned a general
business insurance contract.' 63 Instead, the court relied on EDP Floors
to conclude that the handgun, and not the vehicle's use, caused the
harm.' 
64
Finally, the court analogized DeHaan to the Court of Special Ap-
peals's decisions in Webster and Wright,'65 but failed to account for the
critical factual distinction that in those cases, the shooter was outside
the vehicle, while in DeHaan, the assailant was physically inside the
car.' 66 In both opinions, the Court of Special Appeals noted that
there was only an incidental relationship between the vehicle and the
harm because the shooter was not inside or in control of the unin-
sured vehicle. 16 7 In its 2005 decision, however, the Court of Special
Appeals adopted the circuit court's finding that " [b] ut for [the assail-
ant] seizing, brutally controlling, and using [DeHaan's] vehicle, there
159. See supra notes 137, 142-143 and accompanying text.
160. N. Assurance Co. of Am. v. EDP Floors, Inc., 311 Md. 217, 230, 533 A.2d 682, 688
(1987).
161. See DeHaan I, No. 13-C-02-52183CN, slip op. at 8 (observing that there would have
been no injury "but for" the use of the vehicle).
162. DeHaan III, 393 Md. at 182-83, 900 A.2d 219-20.
163. EDP Floors, 311 Md. at 224-25, 533 A.2d at 685-86.
164. DeHaan III, 393 Md. at 182, 900 A.2d at 219.
165.. See id. at 184-86, 900 A.2d at 220-21 (discussing Wright and Webster as supporting
the idea that DeHaan's gunshot injuries did not result from the use of the vehicle).
166. DeHaan II, No. 118, slip op. at 22-23 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Aug. 22, 2005) (noting
that Webster "went to great lengths to emphasize that the assailant was not in the car at the
time the injury occurred").
167. See Wright v. Allstate Ins. Co., 128 Md. App. 694, 698, 740 A.2d 50, 52 (1999) (not-
ing that the assailant fired at his victims from outside the vehicle, which was simply a means
of transportation to the area of the planned assault); Webster v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co.,
130 Md. App. 59, 65, 744 A.2d 578, 581-82 (1999) (finding the fact that the carjacker was
never inside or in control of the vehicle as indicative of incidental use).
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would have been no injury to [DeHaan] .,,168 Despite this distinction,
the Court of Appeals favorably compared the situation leading to De-
Haan's gunshot injuries to the circumstances in Webster and Wright,
and consequently, that DeHaan's injuries did not result from the use
of the vehicle. 1
69
At best, the DeHaan's court's effort to reconcile its result with
conflicting precedent is likely to cause confusion in the lower courts,
and at worst may undermine the remedial purpose of the statute by
limiting its previously broad construction. As the circuit court sug-
gested, had the assailant slammed the door on DeHaan's hand or arm
in the process of the theft, the injuries from such a "use" would have
been compensable.1 7 ° Thus, to deny DeHaan coverage because he
was instead shot in furtherance of the theft would result in a "mechan-
istic distinction" and "would clearly not be in accord with the liberal
purposes of the statute."1 7 1
The Court of Appeals's previous cases did not limit "arising out
of' causation as it did here by interpreting the statute to require that
the uninsured vehicle be the instrumentality of the harm and a nexus
between the injury and the normal use of the vehicle. 172 Though sev-
eral of the court's prior cases, such as Frazier, Ewing, and possibly Har-
ris, would likely been decided differently based on this new restrictive
interpretation, the court did not overrule any of these cases.
171
Therefore while Frazier, Ewing, and Harris still exist to allow lower
courts to extend coverage in factually similar cases,1 74 the lower courts
could ignore these prior cases and decline coverage under DeHaan.1
75
168. DeHaan II, No. 118, slip op. at 23.
169. See DeHaan III, 393 Md. 163, 184-86, 900 A.2d 208, 220-21 (2006) (finding that
Webster and Wright supported the notion that the gunshot injuries suffered by DeHaan were
not connected to the use of the vehicle).
170. DeHaan I, No. 13-C-02-52183CN, slip op. at 8 (Howard County Cir. Ct. Feb. 24,
2004).
171. Id.
172. See supra Part II.B.
173. In Frazier, the thrown firecracker, not the uninsured vehicle, was the actual instru-
mentality of the harm and throwing a firecracker is not a normal use of a vehicle. Frazier
v. Unsatisfied Claim &Judgment Fund Bd., 262 Md. 115, 116, 277 A.2d 57, 58 (1971). In
Ewing, the victim was not injured by the vehicle covered under the policy, but was instead
injured when struck by a second vehicle as his companion negligently walked him down
the center of the road. Nat'l Indem. Co. v. Ewing, 235 Md. 145, 148, 200 A.2d. 680, 680-81
(1964). Finally, in Harris, the victim was not injured by the vehicle itself, but by the thief
who grabbed her purse and dragged her while driving a vehicle. Harris v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 117 Md. App. 1, 4, 699 A.2d 447, 448-49 (1997).
174. See DeHaan III, 393 Md. at 179-83, 900 A.2d at 217-20 (distinguishing prior "arising
out of" cases that ruled in favor of coverage).
175. See id. at 195, 900 A.2d at 226 (interpreting "use to require a nexus between the
injury and the normal use of an uninsured vehicle").
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This inconsistency means that a victim's ability to recover for injuries
caused by an uninsured motorist will directly depend on which line of
cases a lower court chooses to follow.
If courts adopt DeHaan's narrower standard of causation, the re-
sult will be more denials of coverage for victims such as DeHaan,
whose injuries were not the result of a normal use and were not
caused by the vehicle itself, but nevertheless arose from use within the
meaning of the statutory language. 76 This outcome will generally un-
dercut the statute's remedial purpose by leaving some innocent vic-
tims of uninsured motorists without a source of compensation.
177
C. The Court Should Have Found that DeHaan's Injuries had a Direct
Causal Relationship to the Use of the Vehicle as Consistent with
Precedent and the Statute's Remedial Purpose
The Courts of Appeals should have affirmed the decision of the
lower court and extended uninsured motorist benefits to DeHaan be-
cause such a result would have avoided the possibility of arbitrary dis-
tinctions in granting compensation,1 71 conformed with precedent,
and better recognized the remedial purpose of the statute.17 9 Moreo-
ver, the court's fear that extending benefits would lead to "coverage
against all criminal activity perpetrated in connection with a vehi-
cle" 8 ' was unfounded.1 8 '
As Court of Appeals precedent indicates, the statute does not re-
quire fine distinctions on causation, and demands only a sufficient
causal connection between the "use" and the injury. 82 The direct
causal relationship test for "arising out of" causation applied in previ-
176. See DeHaan II, No. 118, slip op. at 23 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Aug. 22, 2005) (holding
that DeHaan's injuries arose from the use of the uninsured motor vehicle); DeHaan I, No.
13-C-02-52183CN, slip op. at 8 (Howard County Cir. Ct. Feb. 24, 2004) (same).
177. See, e.g., Pa. Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 157, 416 A.2d 734,
737 (1980) (stating that the primary purpose of the statute is to assure compensation for
innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents).
178. See supra notes 170-171 and accompanying text.
179. See infra notes 181-183 and accompanying text.
180. DeHaan III, 393 Md. at 194-95, 900 A.2d at 226.
181. See infra notes 184-188 and accompanying text.
182. In Ewing, for example, the court expounded on the phrase "arising out of," com-
menting that "while the words import and require a showing of casual relationship, recov-
ery is not limited by the strict rules [of] direct and proximate cause." Nat'l Indem. Co. v.
Ewing, 235 Md. 145, 149, 200 A.2d 680, 682 (1964). Further, in finding it unnecessary that
the vehicle be the instrumentality of the harm, the Ewing court quoted Carter v. Bergeron,
which similarly stated that the proper test was not whether vehicle itself caused the harm
but instead whether "the use was connected with the accident or the creation of a condi-
tion that caused the accident." Id. at 150, 200 A.2d at 682 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (quoting Carter v. Bergeron, 160 A.2d 348, 353 (N.H. 1960)).
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ous cases did not require that the injuries arise from the normal use of
a vehicle or that the vehicle be the instrumentality of the harm, as the
court suggested in DeHaan.183 The court should have left this broader
standard of causation intact and granted DeHaan compensation.
Such a result would have been consistent with the statute's tradition-
ally "liberal construction"18 4 and consonant with the "primary purpose
of ... assur[ing] financial compensation to the innocent victims of
motor vehicle accidents who are unable to recover from financially
irresponsible uninsured motorists." ''"5
There was little danger that a decision in favor of DeHaan would
have turned uninsured motorist provisions into a source of compensa-
tion for all crimes associated with a vehicle. 186 The Court of Special
Appeals's decision in Wright properly established that recovery will be
denied when an uninsured vehicle is simply used for transportation to
the scene of an assault."' 7 Thus, a decision in favor of DeHaan would
have set precedent only for the limited scenario where a criminal is in
control of the vehicle and commits an assault from inside the vehicle
to further its use.' Lastly, prior opinions by the Maryland courts
granting uninsured motorist benefits to victims of criminal acts con-
nected to an uninsured vehicle did not express the same concern
about runaway coverage voiced by the Court of Appeals in DeHaan.181
183. See, e.g., Harris v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 117 Md. App. 1, 17, 699 A.2d 447, 455
(1997) (explaining that the proper test is whether the injuries had some direct causal
connection to the use of the uninsured vehicle); McNeill v. Md. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 48 Md.
App. 411, 417, 427 A.2d 1056, 1060 (1981) (same).
184. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Md. Auto. Ins. Fund, 277 Md. 602, 605, 356 A.2d
560, 562 (1976).
185. Pa. Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 157, 416 A.2d 734, 737
(1980).
186. The Court of Special Appeals's decisions in Wright and Webster had already pre-
cluded the possibility of collecting uninsured motorist benefits where an uninsured vehicle
was only incidentally related to a criminal act. See Wright v. Allstate Ins. Co., 128 Md. App.
694, 700-01, 740 A.2d 50, 54 (1999) (holding that an assailant's use of an uninsured vehi-
cle to drive to the crime scene was insufficient basis for coverage); Webster v. Gov't Em-
ployees Ins. Co., 130 Md. App. 59, 64, 744 A.2d 578, 582 (1999) (holding that injuries
caused by a carjacker from outside the vehicle lacked the necessary connection with the
use of the vehicle to qualify for uninsured motorist coverage).
187. Wright, 128 Md. App. at 701, 740 A.2d at 54; see also Webster, 130 Md. App. at 64, 744
A.2d at 581 (interpreting "arising out of' as not encompassing an attempted carjacking
when the assailant was never inside the vehicle).
188. See DeHaan II, No. 118, slip op. at 22 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Aug. 22, 2005) (distin-
guishing DeHaan's case from prior assault cases where assailant was outside the vehicle).
189. DeHaan III, 393 Md. at 183, 900 A.2d at 220 (stating that taking DeHaan's view of
the statute would force insurers to cover a "myriad of liabilities" unrelated to the statute's
purpose). The court in Frazier did recognize a need to protect the Unsatisfied Claim and
Judgment Fund, but nevertheless found that the victims injured by a firecracker thrown
from an uninsured motor vehicle were entitled to pursue their claims. Frazier v. Unsatis-
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V. CONCLUSION
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. DeHaan, the Court
of Appeals of Maryland found that the uninsured motorist statute was
only intended to cover those situations where the uninsured motor
vehicle was the instrumentality which caused the harm, and conse-
quently held that the injury must result from the "normal use" of an
uninsured motor vehicle to qualify for compensation. 9 ' However, in
discerning legislative intent, the court overemphasized the language
of the owned-but-uninsured exclusion clause of the uninsured motor-
ist statute as indicative of the scope of coverage provided by the entire
statute. 9 The court's decision to deny recovery indicated that it ap-
plied a more stringent standard than in prior cases even though the
court did not overrule any of its previous "arising out of" causation
cases favoring compensation under facts analogous to DeHaan.'9 2
Consequently, the court's holding may create confusion over the
proper standard in lower courts and potentially frustrate the statute's
remedial purpose of compensating innocent victims.'9 3 Instead of de-
nying coverage, the court should have recognized that DeHaan's inju-
ries were directly related to the use of an uninsured vehicle and
granted compensation.194 Such a result would have been consistent
with the remedial objectives of the statute and fit within the court's
precedent giving broad import to "arising out of' clauses in automo-
bile liability insurance policies.' 9'
TODD W. HESEL
fled Claim &Judgment Fund Bd., 262 Md. 115, 118-19, 277 A.2d 57, 59 (1971); see also
Harris v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 117 Md. App. 1, 18, 699 A.2d 447, 455 (1997) (making
no mention of the possibility of excessive claims in granting coverage to victim injured
when dragged by uninsured motorist who grabbed her purse).
190. DeHaan III, 393 Md. at 195, 900 A.2d at 226.
191. See supra Part [V.A.
192. See supra Part IV.B.
193. See supra Part IV.B.
194. See supra Part IV.C.
195. See supra Part IV.C.
GARFINK v. CLOISTERS AT CHARLES, INC.: GOING BEYOND
THE "PLAIN LANGUAGE" AND EXTENDING INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS AT THE EXPENSE OF COMMUNAL VALUES IN
CONDOMINIUM REGIMES
In Garfink v. Cloisters at Charles, Inc.,1 the Court of Appeals of Ma-
ryland considered whether to grant an easement to a condominium
unit owner to repair a defect in a dryer vent without prior approval
from the Cloister's Condominium Council (Council) of unit owners.2
The court held that the unit owner had an express easement from her
condominium declaration to install a new exterior dryer vent without
prior approval under the limited circumstances present in the case.3
In so doing, the court failed to consider the appropriate standard for
interpretation of an easement.4 Rather, the Garfink court expanded
the scope of the easement to prevent the unit owner from experienc-
ing further harm at the risk of a defective dryer vent.5 The result of
the court's limited holding is that condominium councils-the gov-
erning bodies of condominium regimes-lose their ability to ensure
the well-being of all residents in a communal setting, as these councils
are open to more threats of litigation and challenges to their authority
from individual unit owners.6
The Court of Appeals instead should have enforced the plain lan-
guage of the condominium declaration, which required approval by
the Council before any change to the exterior of a unit is made. 7 Re-
quiring the Council's good-faith approval would have been in the best
interest of both parties: it would allow the unit owner to install a safer,
new dryer vent without bypassing the Council's authority and threat-
ening their ability to govern the condominium complex.8
Copyright © 2007 by Gina Fenice.
1. 392 Md. 374, 897 A.2d 206 (2006).
2. Id. at 376-78, 897 A.2d at 207-08.
3. Id. at 378, 897 A.2d at 208.
4. See infra Part IV.A.
5. See infra Part V.A.
6. See infra Part IV.B.
7. See infra Part IV.C.
8. See infta Part V.C.
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I. THE CASE
Danetta Garfink owned a condominium unit at The Cloisters at
Charles Condominiums (Cloisters) in Baltimore County, Maryland.9
The Cloisters was governed by the Council, a corporation that admin-
istered the operations of Cloisters and served as a board for condo-
minium unit owners there.10 The Council provided maintenance and
enforced governing condominium rules and regulations."1 Garfink
purchased her condominium unit, which was one of the original
model units, in 1991.12 Garfink's purchase was subject to the condi-
tions that she abide by the Cloisters' Declaration and Bylaws and com-
ply with the decisions of the Council. 3
Garfink's unit included an installed clothes dryer that vented in-
ternally into the furnace room, rather than the external ventilation
system contained in the construction plans and required by local
building codes and regulations. 4 The internal venting system created
a "potentially hazardous mixture of elements," 5 but Garfink used her
dryer without harm for nine years.1 6 It was not until Garfink at-
tempted to replace the old dryer with a new one from Sears, Roebuck
& Co. that she discovered that the vent system violated the building
code.' 7 Sears refused to install the replacement dryer because it be-
lieved that the venting system was a fire hazard.'" In response, Gar-
fink decided to re-route the system and installed a vent into the
9. Garfink, 392 Md. at 378, 897 A.2d at 208. The Garfink court quoted the facts di-
rectly from the Court of Special Appeals's opinion. Id.; see also Garfink v. Cloisters at
Charles, Inc., No. 1560, slip op. at 1-4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. July 22, 2005).
10. Garfink, 392 Md. at 378, 897 A.2d at 208.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 379-80 & n.2, 897 A.2d at 209 & n.2.
14. Id. at 378, 897 A.2d at 208. The Baltimore County Building Code follows the stan-
dards contained in the 2000 version of the International Building Code. Id. at 380 n.3, 897
A.2d at 209 n.3. The International Building Code's provisions on ventilation, particularly
those addressing contaminant exhaust, express the concern that "[c]ontaminant sources
in naturally ventilated spaces shall be removed in accordance with [other International
Codes]." INT'L BLDG. CODE § 1202.4.2 (2000). The International Mechanical Code has
express provisions on clothes dryer exhaust, and states that "[d]ryer exhaust systems shall
be independent of all other systems and shall convey the moisture and any products of
combustion to the outside of the building." INT'L MECH. CODE § 504.1 (2000).
15. Garfink, 392 Md. at 379, 897 A.2d at 208. During operation, the clothes dryer emit-
ted a combination of heat, lint, and moisture through the vent system that discharged into
the furnace room. Id. There were two furnaces and a hot water heater powered by gas
burners inside the furnace room. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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exterior of the condominium's garage wall.19 She did so without seek-
ing or obtaining permission from the Council. 20
The Council contended that Garfink's installation of an exterior
vent violated a prohibition in the condominium bylaws against alter-
ing the exterior of individual condominium units.21 Garfink, how-
ever, maintained that she had the right to attach the vent to the
exterior of her home through an express grant of easement in the
condominium declaration.22
The Council sought a permanent injunction against Garfink, and
on July 1, 2003, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
County, asking the court to order Garfink to remove the exterior
dryer exhaust vent.23 The circuit court issued an order and declara-
tory judgment on August 18, 2004 in the Council's favor, enjoining
Garfink from using the vent and ordering its removal. 24 Garfink ap-
pealed the decision to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, which
affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.25 Subsequently, Garfink
filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals. 26 The
Court of Appeals granted certiorari to determine whether the ease-
ment contained in the declaration and condominium bylaws allowed
for the installation of a new dryer vent without prior approval by the
Council.27
19. Id., 897 A.2d at 209.
20. Id. Garfink's immediate neighbor complained about the newly installed venting
system, as the new vent was within seventeen feet of his front door. Id. The neighbor,
Garfink, and the Council were unable to resolve the matter, and took their dispute to
court. Id.
21. Id. at 377, 897 A.2d at 207. Article IX of the bylaws prohibits condominium owners
from making any external changes to their units without prior written approval of the
Council. Id. at 398-99, 897 A.2d at 220-21.
22. Id. at 376, 897 A.2d at 207. Article 15.2 of the condominium declaration stated that
"each unit shall have.., an easement in the common elements for the purposes of provid-
ing maintenance, support, repair or service for such unit to and for the ducts, pipes, con-
duits, vents, plumbing, wiring and other utility services to the unit." Id. at 393, 897 A.2d at
217 (emphasis removed).
23. Id. at 377, 897 A.2d at 207.
24. Id. The circuit court found it dispositive that neither the condominium declara-
tion nor the bylaws contained provisions permitting exterior alterations to individual con-
dominium units. Id. at 381, 897 A.2d at 210. The circuit court maintained that Garfink
should have obtained consent before installing the new dryer vent. Id. at 382, 897 A.2d at
210-11.
25. Id. at 377, 897 A.2d at 207. The Court of Special Appeals held that because ease-
ments contained in condominium contracts do not trigger the application of traditional
easement law, the easement expressed in the condominium declaration did not apply. Id.
at 378, 897 A.2d at 208.
26. Id. at 377, 897 A.2d at 207.
27. Id., 897 A.2d at 207-08.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Condominium regimes present an interesting lens through which
to view property rights, as they are a communal property system.
28
The rights and characteristics of condominium regimes in Maryland
are provided in the Real Property Article. 29 Each condominium unit
includes all of the incidents of real property, including the ability to
possess an easement;"( however, these property interests must be
viewed in light of the declaration, bylaws, and regulations of the con-
dominium regime, which a unit owner is subject to by virtue of
purchase."1 Furthermore, under Maryland law, condominium coun-
cils are given broad authority to govern the affairs of the condomin-
ium community so as to uphold the values of communal living in the
regime.3 2 Despite the broad discretion afforded to condominium
councils, they still must act reasonably in their decisionmaking, bal-
ancing the necessity of rules and regulations with the rights of those
living in the regime.3 3
A. Characteristics of Condominium Living
A condominium is "a communal form of estate in property con-
sisting of individually owned units which are supported by collectively
held facilities and areas." 4 A condominium unit owner possesses a
cross of two property interests: one interest in fee simple for the unit
itself to the exclusion of everyone else, and another interest as a ten-
ant in common with other unit owners for the common elements of
the condominium. 5 Condominium complexes typically involve a
number of different owners with property interests in the community,
and for the ease of administration and maintenance, owners agree at
28. See infra Part II.A.
29. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §§ 11-101 to -143 (LexisNexis 2006).
30. See infra Part II.B.
31. See infra Part II.C.
32. See infra Part II.D.
33. See infra Part II.D.
34. Andrews v. City of Greenbelt, 293 Md. 69, 71, 441 A.2d 1064, 1066 (1982).
35. Id. at 73-74, 441 A.2d at 1068; see alsoJurgensen v. New Phoenix Ad. Condo. Coun-
cil of Unit Owners, 380 Md. 106, 115, 843 A.2d 865, 870 (2004). Common elements are
those areas that are not within individual condominium units. Sea Watch Stores L.L.C. v.
Council of Unit Owners, 115 Md. App. 5, 40, 691 A.2d 750, 767 (1997). For example, the
exterior portion of individual units outside of the interior drywall and between units is a
general common element. Id. The lobby of a complex is also considered to be a common
element. Ridgley Condo. Ass'n v. Smyrnioudis, 343 Md. 357, 370, 681 A.2d 494, 501
(1996).
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purchase to abide by the rules and regulations of a board of unit
owners.
36
Condominium housing is more community-oriented than other
styles of housing because of the shared use of common areas and the
close proximity of neighbors. As the court in Ridgl-y Condominium
Ass'n v. SmyrnioudiS7 highlighted, because of the close confines and
community atmosphere, unit owners must relinquish a "certain de-
gree of freedom of choice" that they might possess in privately owned
property.38 An amicable residential situation in condominium living
requires consideration of the interests of all unit owners. 9
These important communal values are protected under Maryland
law, which provides guidelines and regulations for the condominium
regime.4 ° The Maryland Condominium Act regulates all aspects of
condominium regimes in Maryland, from development, to administra-
tion, to termination.41 In particular, these statutes: (1) provide for the
creation of a condominium regime;42 (2) give unit owners the ability
to make alterations or improvements to their unit;43 (3) confer au-
36. See Andrews, 293 Md. at 73, 441 A.2d at 1068; see also Ridgtey Condo. Ass'n, 343 Md. at
359, 681 A.2d at 495 (noting that "[i]n exchange for the benefits of owning property in
common, condominium owners agree to be bound by rules governing the administration,
maintenance, and use of the property" (footnote omitted)). The court in Ridgley Condo-
minium Ass'n further noted that the governing rules of the condominium regime include
any regulation enacted by a council or board of condominium owners, or incorporated in
any of the condominium's original documents. Id. at 359 n.2, 681 A.2d at 495 n.2.
37. 343 Md. 357, 681 A.2d 494 (1996).
38. Ridgely Condo. Ass'n, 343 Md. at 359, 681 A.2d at 495 (quoting Hidden Harbour
Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 181-82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)).
39. Dulaney Towers Maint. Corp. v. O'Brey, 46 Md. App. 464, 466, 418 A.2d 1233, 1235
(1980). The Dulaney Towers court utilized the "communal living" principle to uphold a
rule adopted by the condominium council limiting unit owners to one dog or one cat. Id.
at 465-67, 418 A.2d at 1235. The court found the rule reasonable, considering the effect
that pets may have in terms of maintenance and upkeep in common areas and possible
noise and odor pollution. Id. at 466, 418 A.2d at 1235.
40. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §§ 11-101 to -143 (LexisNexis 2006). These sec-
tions are also referred to as the "Maryland Condominium Act." Id.
41. Ridgley Condo Ass'n, 343 Md. at 360, 681 A.2d at 495.
42. REAL PROP. § 11-102. A condominium regime is created by recording a declara-
tion, bylaws, and condominium plat that satisfy the provisions of the Maryland Condomin-
ium Act. Id. A condominium plat is a recorded document containing the condominium
name, a survey of the property's boundaries showing the placement of all the buildings on
the property, floor plans of each of the buildings, and the elevation above sea level of the
upper and lower boundaries of each unit depicted property. Id. § 11-105.
43. Id. § 11-115. Subject to condominium bylaws or declaration, a unit owner may
make "alterations to his unit that do not impair the structural integrity or mechanical sys-
tems or lessen the support of any portion of the condominium." Id. § 11-115(1). But a
unit owner "[m]ay not alter, make additions to, or change the appearance of the common
elements, or the exterior appearance of a unit or any other portion of the condominium,
without permission of the council of unit owners." Id. § 11-115(2).
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thority upon a group of unit owners to govern the regime;44 (4) up-
hold the right to enjoy the common elements of the condominium
complex; 45 and (5) establish methods of interpreting the declaration
and bylaws of the regime.46
B. Property Interests and Easements in the Condominium Regime
Upon the creation of a condominium regime, "[e]ach unit in a
condominium has all of the incidents of real property."47 One dis-
tinct incident of property available to all unit owners is the easement.
An easement is a nonpossessory interest in real property owned by
another person, often deriving from an express grant or by implica-
tion.4 An easement can generally be categorized as a "right-of-way.""
An express easement by reservation occurs when a prior owner retains
the right to use part of the land as a right-of-way when conveying the
entire property to another. 50
There are two distinct tenements created by a private easement:
one dominant tenement that benefits from the easement and one ser-
44. Id. § 11-109. This statute also delineates-subject to any bylaws and the declara-
tion-a council's many powers, including the ability to establish and change any reasona-
ble rules and regulations, to supervise and administer the functioning of common
elements, to grant easements and rights-of-way, and to enforce the provisions of the Mary-
land Condominium Act, as well as any rules and regulations of the condominium council
(including the declaration and bylaws) against a unit owner. Id. § 11-109(d).
45. Id. § 11-108. Subject to any limitations in the declaration, all unit owners have
mutual fights of access and use of the common elements. Id. § 11-108(a).
46. Id. § 11-124. The declaration, bylaws, and condominium plat are construed to-
gether and stand as one document; a deficiency in one document can be cured by refer-
ence to any of the other documents. Id. § 11-124(c). If there is any conflict among the
provisions of the Maryland Condominium Act, the declaration, condominium plat, bylaws,
or rules adopted under the Condominium Act, the Condominium Act controls, followed
by the declaration, then the plat, followed by the bylaws, and finally rules adopted pursuant
to the Condominium Act. Id. § 11-124(e).
47. Id. § 11-106(a). "Incident," in this context, refers to all rights associated with prop-
erty ownership. See, e.g., S. Mgmt. Corp. v. Kevin Willes Constr. Co., 382 Md. 524, 544, 856
A.2d 626, 638 (2004) (noting that section 11-106 establishes that each condominium unit
owner has a separate, individual real property interest in that unit); Ridgley Condo. Ass'n
v. Smyrnioudis, 343 Md. 357, 371, 681 A.2d 494, 501 (1996) (listing an easement as one of
the incidents of ownership vested under section 11-106). Despite these individual property
rights, condominium councils have a degree of authority over individual unit owners. See,
e.g., Sea Watch Stores L.L.C. v. Council of Unit Owners, 115 Md. App. 5, 43, 691 A.2d 750,
768 (1997) (noting that reasonable deed restrictions on condominium units are
enforceable).
48. Boucher v. Boyer, 301 Md. 679, 688, 484 A.2d 630, 635 (1984).
49. Miller v. Kirkpatrick, 377 Md. 335, 349, 833 A.2d 536, 544 (2003) (noting that the
terms "easement" and "right-of-way" are synonymous).
50. Id.
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vient tenement that is burdened by the easement.51 Because "an ease-
ment is a restriction upon the rights of the servient property owner,
no alteration can be made by the owner of the dominant estate which
would increase such restriction except by mutual consent of both par-
ties."'52 On the other hand, the owner of the servient tenement can-
not do anything that would impede the use of the easement.
5
As with any deed, the language of an easement is construed using
the basic principles of contract interpretation. 54 Maryland courts gen-
erally seek to determine and give effect to the intent of the parties at
the time the contract was created.55 As the Court of Appeals stated in
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Cook,56 "Maryland follows the objective law of con-
tract interpretation and construction. '57 In other words, a court must
determine what a reasonable person in the position of the parties
would have thought the easement meant at the time it was
effectuated.58
A primary consideration in determining what a reasonable per-
son in the position of the parties would have intended is the plain,
customary, and accepted meaning of the language used.59 The "plain
51. Consol. Gas Co. v. Mayor of Balt., 101 Md. 541, 545, 61 A. 532, 534 (1905). "The
term 'dominant tenement' denotes that the possessor of the land to which it is applied has,
as appurtenant thereto, an easement over other land." RESTATEMENT (FiRsT) OF PROPERTY
§ 456 (1944). "The term 'servient tenement' signifies that the possessor of the land to
which it is applied is subject to an easement." Id. § 455.
52. Reid v. Washington Gas Light Co., 232 Md. 545, 549, 194 A.2d 636, 638 (1963).
53. Miller, 377 Md. at 350, 833 A.2d at 544.
54. Buckler v. Davis Sand & Gravel Corp., 221 Md. 532, 537, 158 A.2d 319, 322 (1960).
The scope of an express grant of easement depends on an interpretation of the contrac-
tual language of the conveyance. Id.
55. Id. Giving effect to this intention does not mean analyzing what the parties them-
selves thought the contract meant, but rather what a reasonable person in the position of
the parties would have thought it to mean. See infta note 60 and accompanying text.
56. 386 Md. 468, 872 A.2d 969 (2005).
57. Id. at 496, 872 A.2d at 985; see also Taylor v. NationsBank, N.A., 365 Md. 166, 178,
776 A.2d 645, 653 (2001) (same); Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B., 363 Md. 232, 250, 768
A.2d 620, 630 (2001) (same).
58. See Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Daniels, 303 Md. 254, 261, 492 A.2d 1306,
1310 (1985).
59. Fister ex rel Estate of Fister v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 366 Md. 201, 210, 783 A.2d 194,
199 (2001). For example, in Lloyd E. Mitchell, Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co., the court read
the plain language of a Maryland Casualty insurance policy. 324 Md. 44, 56-57, 595 A.2d
469, 475 (1991). The policy required the insurer to pay on behalf of the insured any sums
resulting from "bodily injury" caused by "an occurrence." Id. at 46-47, 595 A.2d at 470.
The court rejected an interpretation that would require a bodily injury to become manifest
before coverage duties ensued; the plain meaning of the policy was that coverage turned
on an "occurrence" during the policy period that resulted in "bodily injury." Id. at 57, 62,
595 A.2d at 475, 478. Similarly, in Langston v. Langston, the court analyzed the plain mean-
ing of the terms in a separation agreement between divorced parties. 366 Md. 490, 507,
784 A.2d 1086, 1095 (2001). Because the agreement specifically stated that alimony provi-
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language" doctrine requires that the terms of the contract must be
interpreted in context, and given their customary meaning. 6o When a
court finds the language to be unambiguous, it must give effect to its
plain meaning.6' Thus, because easements are interpreted using the
same standards as those used for contracts, courts must give effect to
the customary understandings of the language used in the
conveyance. 62
C. Statutes, Regulations, and Bylaws Regarding Alteration of the
Appearance of the Common Elements in a Condominium
Regime
Courts reviewing disputes concerning condominium unit owners'
rights must look to the provisions of the condominium enabling stat-
ute, the condominium declaration, and the governing condominium
bylaws, "and attempt to reconcile the three."63 The Maryland Condo-
minium Act provides that, subject to the bylaws or condominium dec-
laration, a unit owner may not modify or change the construction of
common elements or the exterior of a unit without permission of the
governing condominium board. 64 This provision is mirrored in many
other states that have adopted restrictions against altering the exterior
of the unit.6 5
sions calculated on a base-year income "were subject to further order of the court, and may
be modified," it was evident from the ordinary usage of these words that the parties antici-
pated a possible fluctuation in alimony payments. Id.
60. Langston, 366 Md. at 506, 784 A.2d at 1095. "Under the objective law of contract
interpretation, the court will give force and effect to the words of the contract without
regard to what the parties ... thought it meant or what they intended for it to mean." Id.
at 507, 784 A.2d at 1095.
61. Auction & Estate Representatives, Inc. v. Ashton, 354 Md. 333, 340, 731 A.2d 441,
444 (1999). If the language of the agreement is clear and unambiguous, the court need
not make any further examination into what a reasonable person in the position of the
parties would have thought the agreement meant. Id.
62. See, e.g., Buckler v. Davis Sand & Gravel Corp., 221 Md. 532, 537, 158 A.2d 319,
322-23 (1960) (objectively interpreting an easement by reading the easement's terms and
words using their customary meanings).
63. Dulaney Towers Maint. Corp. v. O'Brey, 46 Md. App. 464, 465-66, 418 A.2d 1233,
1235 (1980).
64. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 11-115(2) (LexisNexis 2006).
65. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 44-3-106(a) (3) (LexisNexis 1991 & Supp. 2006) (permit-
ting condominium councils to withhold approval of an action by a unit owner "if such
action would change the exterior appearance of any unit or of any other portion of the
condominium"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 515B.3-102(a) (1) (West 2002 & Supp. 2006) (author-
izing condominium councils to administer the use of common elements through rules and
regulations regarding the exterior elements of the common interest of the condominium,
such as balconies, patios, and window treatments); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 703.13(5)(a) (West
2001 & Supp. 2006) (prohibiting changes by individual unit owners that "substantially af-
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Section 11-124 of the Real Property Article requires that section
11-115 be read in conjunction with the declaration, bylaws, and con-
dominium plat to determine whether a unit owner is required to ob-
tain permission before altering the exterior appearance of a
condominium unit.66 However, if there is dissonance among the pro-
visions of section 11 of the Real Property Article, the condominium
declaration, the plat, or the bylaws, section 11 controls, followed by
the declaration, the plat, and finally, the bylaws.67
D. The Condominium Board and Its Authority
The Maryland Condominium Act provides that the affairs of con-
dominiums are governed by a council of unit owners, which is com-
prised of all unit owners.68 The council of unit owners may delegate
its powers to a board of directors pursuant to section 11-109(b). 69 A
council or board has a broad range of powers to provide for the com-
mon affairs of the condominium regime.7" These "[c]ondominium
unit owners comprise a little democratic subsociety of necessity," be-
cause there are many more restrictions and regulations in the condo-
minium regime context than would be found outside the
condominium community.7 1 The power to restrict, granted to the
council, is in place to uphold the values of communal living inherent
in the condominium regime. 72 A council's adherence to and adminis-
tration of the condominium declaration and bylaws ensures that the
rights of all unit owners are given fair consideration, and promotes "a
harmonious residential atmosphere. 73
fect[ ] the use and enjoyment of other units or the common elements" and requiring pre-
approval by the governing condominium board to alter the exterior of the unit).
66. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 11-124(e).
67. Id. Thus, if there is a conflict among those provisions regarding whether approval
is necessary for alterations to the exterior of a unit, section 11-115 of the Real Property
Article controls. But see Sea Watch Stores L.L.C. v. Council of Unit Owners, 115 Md. App.
5, 42, 691 A.2d 750, 768 (1997) (holding that when a conflict between condominium docu-
ments and provisions of section 11-115 exist, the condominium documents control).
68. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
69. REAL PROP. § 11-109(b); see also Ridgley Condo. Ass'n v. Smyrnioudis, 343 Md. 357,
361, 681 A.2d 494, 496 (1996).
70. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
71. Ridgley Condo. Ass'n, 343 Md. at 359, 681 A.2d at 495 (quoting Hidden Harbour
Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 181-82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)).
72. Dulaney Towers Maint. Corp. v. O'Brey, 46 Md. App. 464, 466, 418 A.2d 1233, 1235
(1980).
73. Id.
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1. Condominium Councils Must Exercise Their Authority Reasonably
Condominium councils have authority to monitor and control
the use and modification of condominium common elements by stat-
utory law and express provisions in the condominium documents. 4
The council's exercise of authority over common element modifica-
tion, however, must still be reasonable. 75 Accordingly, if an individual
unit owner wishes to challenge the authority of the condominium
council on any regulation made pursuant to section 11-109 of the Real
Property Article, the unit owner must demonstrate that the regulation
promulgated by the council was unreasonable.7 6
A reasonableness standard prevents condominium councils from
enacting arbitrary or capricious rules bearing little relationship to the
health and happiness of those living in the regime.7 7 For example, in
Dulaney Towers Maintenance Corp. v. O'Brey,7 8 the court observed that so
long as there is a valid rationale for a restriction, it may be upheld.7 9
But if the reasonableness boundaries are overstepped, as in Ridgely
Condominium Ass'n, courts will find that condominium councils ex-
ceeded their authority when implementing restrictions on use of com-
mon areas of the condominium property without the consent of all
owners. 
8 0
2. Condominium Regulations Involving the Modification of Common
Elements Are also Held to a Reasonableness Standard
The Maryland Condominium Act-and frequently provisions in a
condominium's bylaws or declaration-expressly give a council of
unit owners the ability "[t]o regulate the use, maintenance, repair,
replacement, and modification of common elements."8 But as is the
74. 68 Md. Op. Att'y Gen., 112, 114-16 (1983).
75. Id. at 118. A unit owner is given advance notice of the council's authority at
purchase. Id. A unit owner's purchase "involves acceptance of the condominium regime,
with its concomitant restriction on the unit owner's ability to alter the property as he or she
might otherwise desire." Id.
76. Id. (noting that reviewing courts apply a reasonableness standard in evaluating
challenges to council regulatory activity).
77. 68 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. at 119.
78. 46 Md. App. 464, 418 A.2d 1233 (1980).
79. See supra note 39.
80. 343 Md. 357, 371, 681 A.2d 494, 501 (1996). The Ridgley Condominium Associa-
tion passed and attempted to enforce a bylaw provision that prohibited use of the condo-
minium lobby by clients of the condominium's first-floor commercial unit owners. Id at
358, 681 A.2d at 495. Because the association's actions disparately affected the commercial
unit owners' enjoyment of a common element over other unit owners, the court found
that the association had overstepped its authority. Id. at 370-71, 681 A.2d at 501.
81. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 11-109(d)(12) (LexisNexis 2006).
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case with all powers reserved by the council, this authority must be
exercised reasonably.12 Thus, in regulating the maintenance and
modification of common elements, should the council require ap-
proval before any unit owner is permitted to make any changes to the
common elements of her unit, the approval or disapproval of the
change must be made in good faith."a A good faith standard requires
the council to act fairly and base its decision on legitimate principles
and objectives of condominium regulation.84
The Court of Appeals has used a good faith standard to review
the decisions of developers and associations in approving or disap-
proving plans in various property regimes. For example, in Harbor
View Improvement Ass'n v. Downey,8" the court overturned a neighbor-
hood association's rejection of a lot owner's plan to build a duplex in
the neighborhood because the disapproval was made without legal
justification.86 In Kirkley v. Seipelt,87 the court upheld a realty corpora-
tion's rejection of a homeowner's plan to add an awning and window
coverings using a good faith standard.8 The court reasoned that even
though the corporation had no specific criteria for approval of a
homeowner's plan to modify the exterior of her property, its restric-
tions were reasonable and therefore satisfied the good faith
standard. 8
9
The good faith standard articulated by such cases is applicable to
a condominium complex, another property regime with a common
design scheme. Thus, a condominium council's refusal to approve
any alteration to the exterior of a property would have to be based
upon a reason that is adequately related to the other buildings in the
complex or the general plan of the condominium development.90 If a
82. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
83. Cf Kirkley v. Seipelt, 212 Md. 127, 133, 128 A.2d 430, 434 (1957) (noting that a
developer's refusal to approve an external design plan under a restrictive covenant "would
have to be a reasonable determination made in good faith, and not high-handed, whimsi-
cal or captious in manner").
84. See id. (citing West Bloomfield Co. v. Haddock, 326 Mich. 601, 613, 40 N.W.2d 738,
743 (Mich. 1950)). The Haddock court required the approving body to "consider the facts"
and "be fair and reasonable in approving or rejecting the plan submitted." Id.
85. 270 Md. 365, 311 A.2d 422 (1973).
86. Id. at 374-76, 311 A.2d at 427-28.
87. 212 Md. 127, 128 A.2d 430 (1957).
88. Id. at 133-35, 128 A.2d at 434-35.
89. Id. at 132-33, 128 A.2d at 433-34. The corporation's refusal survived the good
faith test because it was reasonable in light of the other buildings and the general design
plan of development. Id. at 135, 128 A.2d at 435.
90. See id. at 133, 128 A.2d at 434; see also Harbor View Improvement Ass'n, 270 Md. at 374,
311 A.2d at 427 (agreeing with the trial court's view that any refusal by a development
board to approve an external design or location plan would have to be a reasonable deter-
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council objects to a unit owner's plan to make modifications that af-
fect the common design scheme of the condominium complex, this
objection must be rationally related to upholding the general plan
and design of the condominium regime.91
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In Garfink v. Cloisters at Charles, Inc., the Court of Appeals reversed
the Court of Special Appeals, holding that an easement granted in the
condominium declaration and bylaws allowed a condominium unit
owner to install an exterior dryer vent without prior approval from the
Council.9 2 Judge Cathell, writing for the majority, began by discussing
the law and its relationship to the condominium form of property
ownership.93 The court defined a condominium as a communal form
of property consisting of individual property units combined with col-
lectively held facilities and common areas. 94 In exchange for the ben-
efits of common property ownership, the court observed,
condominium unit owners agree to abide by rules enacted by the con-
dominium council for the management and use of the property.95
The majority then analyzed the pertinent statutes and condomin-
ium regulations to determine whether or not Garfink had an ease-
ment to install the new vent without approval of the Council.96 The
court referenced section 11-115 of the Real Property Article, which
governs permissible exterior changes to condominium units, and at-
tempted to reconcile it with the condominium declaration, which
grants an easement 97 in the common elements for repair and mainte-
nance in the condominium unit.9" The court rejected the view that
traditional easement principles did not apply to condominiums,
mination made in good faith and not in an arbitrary manner); Markey v. Wolf, 92 Md. App.
137, 163, 607 A.2d 82, 95 (1992) (noting the Court of Appeals's adoption of a reasonable-
ness standard with respect to the disapproval of building plans).
91. See Harbor View Improvement Ass'n, 270 Md. at 374-76, 311 A.2d at 427-28 (rejecting
a neighborhood association's disapproval of a building plan because the association's rea-
sons were arbitrary, invalid, or based upon speculative impact to the value of the property).
92. 392 Md. at 378, 897 A.2d at 208.
93. Id. at 384, 897 A.2d at 211.
94. Id. (quoting Ridgely Condo. Ass'n v. Smyrnioudis, 343 Md. 357, 358, 681 A.2d 494,
495 (1996)).
95. Id. at 385-86, 897 A.2d at 213 (citing Ridgely Condo. Ass'n, 343 Md. at 359, 681 A.2d
at 495).
96. Id. at 386-87, 897 A.2d at 213.
97. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text for a further description of easements
and the types of property interests that they create.
98. Garfink, 392 Md. at 387, 897 A.2d at 213-14.
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where unit owners have both dominant and servient estates.99 The
majority reasoned that the mutual existence of both benefit and bur-
den on the different estates was permissible and thus, the court found
that traditional easement law governed the easement granted to Gar-
fink in her condominium declaration. 100
After concluding that the traditional law of easement applied, the
court next interpreted the language and scope of the easement
granted in the declaration.10 1 Strictly construing the language of the
easement to determine the intent of the parties, 10 2 the court con-
cluded that the declaration provided condominium unit owners with
the ability to perform maintenance and support on elements such as
vents and wiring that pass through the exterior walls or common
spaces of the unit.10 3 The court further found that the intent to pro-
vide all unit owners with the ability to maintain such vents was further
evidenced by the fact that every other condominium unit had an exte-
rior dryer vent and the respective easement to service that vent with-
out prior approval from the Council.'0 4
Furthermore, the court determined, Garfink's only reasonable
option to enjoy the easement was to install the exterior dryer vent.1 5
The court maintained that an easement allowed its owner to perform
such acts that were reasonably necessary to utilize the easement and to
make alterations on the servient tenement necessitated by a change of
conditions for which the owner is not responsible." 6 The court con-
cluded that the installation of the venting system on the exterior of
99. Id. at 390-91, 897 A.2d at 216. The court recognized Garfink's express easement
and dominant estate status as an individual unit owner, and her additional interest in the
servient estate as to common elements as a member of the condominium community. Id.
The majority expressly rejected the ruling of the Court of Special Appeals that the tradi-
tional rule of easements did not apply in this case because there was no traditional set-up
of a dominant and servient estate. Id. at 391, 897 A.2d at 216.
100. Id. at 391, 897 A.2d at 216.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 392, 897 A.2d at 216. The court analogized an easement in a condominium
document to an easement by deed. Id. at 391, 897 A.2d at 216. As the majority noted, the
basic principles of contract interpretation apply to the language of a deed; thus, the grant
of an easement by deed is strictly construed. Id. at 392, 897 A.2d at 216; see also supra notes
54-62 and accompanying text.
103. Id. at 393, 897 A.2d at 217.
104. Id. at 394, 897 A.2d at 217-18. The majority observed that the fact that Garfink's
vent was installed in the interior of her unit did not change the analysis. Id., 897 A.2d at
218. Cloisters clearly intended that the unit be built to fire code specifications, as the court
noted that all forty-seven other units had an exterior vent which did not require the per-
mission of the Council-for repair. Id. at 395-96, 897 A.2d at 219.
105. Id. at 394, 897 A.2d at 218.
106. Id. at 396 n.13, 897 A.2d at 219 n.13 (citing 3 HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, THE
LAw or REAL PROPERTY § 810 (3d ed. 1939)).
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the condominium unit was essential for Garfink's unit to comply with
the building code, and thus, was reasonable and necessary. °7
Although the court granted the easement to Garfink, it limited its
holding to situations with similar circumstances-where the original
construction was defective, an express easement exists in the condo-
minium documents, and a bylaw exception 08 permits repair without
prior approval of the condominium council.1 °9 Finally, the court ad-
ded that the location of the new dryer exhaust vent was in the most
logical location, and thus Garfink reasonably exercised her ease-
ment.11 ° The Court of Appeals thereby reversed the Court of Special
Appeals, holding that Garfink's actions were a reasonable use of the
easement granted in the condominium declaration."'
Judge Wilner, writing for the dissent, started with the oft-quoted
phrase: "[H]ard cases make bad law." ' 2 Judge Wilner argued that the
majority expanded legal principles so as to avoid an unfair result for a
litigant.1 1 ' He contended that the court expanded the easement's
scope beyond its plain language, and gave short shrift to the statuto-
rily authorized powers of the condominium council.114 As a result,
Judge Wilner maintained, the law itself would become "less certain,
less reliable, and, in the end, less just."115
Judge Wilner listed three problems with the majority's ruling: (1)
the scope expressed by the court was ambiguous, creating uncertainty
in the area of law involving condominiums; (2) even if the scope was
107. Id. at 397, 897 A.2d at 220. According to the majority, the installation of the new
vent was "the functional equivalent of maintenance necessary for the reasonable and safe
operation of the dryer"-an easement all unit owners hold without requiring approval of
the Council. Id. at 398, 897 A.2d at 220.
108. Article IX of the condominium bylaws prohibits a unit owner from altering the
exterior of any condominium unit, unless those alterations are for the purposes of mainte-
nance or repair. Id. at 398, 897 A.2d at 220. The court found that the exception for
maintenance granted the same exception found in the declaration, which allowed Garfink
to make essential repairs (or in this case, installation) to the vent without permission. Id. at
399-400, 897 A.2d at 221.
109. Id. at 402, 897 A.2d at 222. The court rejected the Council's claim that allowing an
easement in this instance would give a unit owner the unbridled ability to install new sys-
tems in areas where they had not previously been installed. Id. at 397, 897 A.2d at 219-20.
110. Id. at 403-04, 897 A.2d at 223. The court rejected the Council's alternate locations
for the vent, which either violated the building code, required tearing down portions of
the unit, or were not substantially different from the place where Garfink decided to install
a vent. Id. at 402-03, 897 A.2d at 223.
111. Id. at 404, 897 A.2d at 223-24.
112. Id., 897 A.2d at 224 (Wilner,J., dissenting). Judges Harrell and Battagliajoined in
dissent. Id.
113. Id. at 404-05, 897 A.2d at 224.
114. Id. at 405, 897 A.2d at 224.
115. Id.
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not ambiguous, the ruling was so unique to one situation that it vio-
lated the principle that certiorari should only be granted to consider
issues of public importance; and (3) the court inappropriately en-
gaged in "legal gyrations and gymnastics" to permit Garfink to use her
dryer without violating the fire code.1 16 Judge Wilner further ex-
plained that these three problems arose as a result of the court's mis-
interpretation of the condominium declaration, which did not grant
an easement to install new vents, but only to provide maintenance and
support for those elements that already existed. 1 7 Similarly, he also
observed that the bylaws only gave the unit owner the ability to main-
tain and repair existing elements, and required prior approval by the
Council to alter the exterior of the unit with a new element." 8 Thus,
Judge Wilner concluded, if the bylaws and declaration were properly
read together with section 11-115 of the Real Property Article and in a
manner consistent with section 11-124(c),"' a unit owner who wants
to install a new vent in the exterior of the unit must get approval from
the Council. 1
20
The dissent criticized the majority's justification for its exception
to the requirement of council approval by making it applicable only to
the particular situation forced by Garfink. 12 1 Judge Wilner observed
that the limits the majority claimed it created for Garfink were not
well-defined. 122 Moreover, Judge Wilner argued, the court could have
avoided creating such an ambiguous exception by requiring the par-
ties to negotiate a practical solution. 123 He reasoned that when a unit
owner is required to seek approval from a condominium council
before making some alteration to the property, the council must act
reasonably and in good faith. 124 Allowing the parties to reach a rea-
sonable resolution on their own, the dissent concluded, would permit
116. Id. at 405-06, 897 A.2d at 224-25.
117. Id. at 407, 897 A.2d at 225.
118. Id. at 407-08, 897 A.2d at 226.
119. See supra note 46.
120. Garfink, 392 Md. at 406-08, 897 A.2d at 225-26 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 408-09, 897 A.2d at 226. By extending the language of condominium docu-
ments to include creation of new vents, the dissent asserted that the court created a loop-
hole that destroys the requirement of council approval. Id. at 408, 897 A.2d at 226.
122. Id. at 409, 897 A.2d at 226. The dissent posed a number of questions that sug-
gested the majority's holding was not so limited-criticizing the malleable term "construc-
tion defects," wondering what language would be sufficient for an express easement, and
pondering the extent to which "maintenance and repair" is broadened to encompass the
installation of other new elements. Id., 897 A.2d at 226-27.
123. Id. at 410, 897 A.2d at 227.
124. Id. Judge Wilner noted that a good faith standard would avoid any problems with
the Council rejecting, in an arbitrary or capricious manner, Garfink's plans for placement
of the new dryer vent. Id.
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Garfink to dry her clothes in conformity with the fire code without
distorting the law or abrogating the statutory authority of the condo-
minium council. 
12 5
IV. ANALYSIS
In Garfink v. Cloisters at Charles, Inc., the Court of Appeals held
that an easement contained in a condominium's declaration and by-
laws allowed a unit owner to install an exterior dryer vent without
prior approval from a condominium council. 12 6 In so holding, how-
ever, the court failed to properly interpret the language of the ease-
ment according to principles of contract interpretation. 127 Instead of
expanding easement interpretation principles, the court should have
followed the plain, ordinary language of the declaration, which allows
for exterior modifications of a unit solely for repair.128 Had the court
done so, it would not have restricted the ability of the Council to pro-
mote the ideal of communal living.' 29 A just and fair result to both
parties could have been achieved by requiring a unit owner to pro-
pose a location for the exterior vent to the Council, subject to the
Council's reasonable, good faith approval.1 30 Following this approach
would maintain both safety for unit owners and the necessity for an
authoritative council in a communal living context.'" '
A. The Court's Departure from Traditional Contract Interpretation
Principles Improperly Expanded the Easement Granted in the
Condominium Declaration
The Garfink court's attempt to interpret the language and scope
of the rules and regulations that govern the condominium regime im-
permissibly broadened the scope of the easement in the condomin-
ium declaration. All unit owners agree, as a condition of purchase of
a unit, to be bound by the rules governing the administration, mainte-
nance, and use of the property.13 2 One such regulation in Garfink was
the condominium declaration, which granted an easement to unit
owners in the exterior of the unit for the purpose of providing main-
tenance, support, and repair to the ducts and vents of the unit.
13 3
125. Id. at 405, 411, 897 A.2d at 224, 228.
126. Id. at 378, 897 A.2d at 208 (majority opinion).
127. See infra Part IV.A.
128. See infra Part [V.A.
129. See infra Part IV.B.
130. See infra Part IV.C.
131. See infra Part I.C.
132. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
133. Garfink, 392 Md. at 390, 897 A.2d at 215.
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The majority's interpretation of the declaration's language gave a unit
owner the right to install a new vent to replace a defective one, with-
out seeking the approval of the Council."'
Rather than liberally construing the terms in the declaration, the
Garfink court should have adhered to the accepted principle that ease-
ments are interpreted using the plain language doctrine. 3 5 This doc-
trine allows the court to determine what a reasonable person in the
position of the parties would have intended the easement to grant,
using the ordinary meanings of the declaration's terms.136 Here, the
plain language of the condominium declaration stated that each unit
owner shall have "an easement in the common elements for the pur-
poses of providing maintenance, support, repair or service for such
unit to and for the ducts, pipes, conduits, vents, plumbing, wiring and
other utility services to the unit."' 37 As Judge Wilner observed in dis-
sent, a plain reading of the declaration allows for maintenance and
repair of already existing ducts and vents, but not for installation of an
entirely new vent on the exterior of the unit. 3 1
The majority in Garfink went beyond the terms of the declaration
in granting an easement for the installation of a new dryer vent. 139 In
so doing, the Garfink court gave effect to what the individual unit
owner believed the declaration provided. 4 ° Maryland courts, how-
ever, do not consider what the individual unit owner thought the ease-
ment granted.' Garfink's belief that the easement for repair of
ducts and vents allowed for installation of an entirely new vent was
essentially irrelevant. Rather than applying the established principles
of objective contract interpretation, the court let Garfink's view of the
declaration dictate and expand the meaning of the terms solely to
grant Garfink an exception.
Instead, the court should have used the plain language doctrine
to determine what a reasonable person in the position of the parties
would have intended the terms of the easement to grant, and not
given effect to what the parties themselves thought the easement
134. Id. at 394, 897 A.2d at 217-18.
135. See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. For examples of how the Court of Ap-
peals has utilized the plain language doctrine in other contexts, see supra note 59.
137. Garfink, 392 Md. at 397, 897 A.2d at 213-14 (emphasis omitted).
138. Id. at 407, 897 A.2d at 225 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
139. Id.
140. That Garfink neither sought nor obtained approval from the Council before install-
ing the vent suggests that she believed she was well within her rights to install the vent in a
location of her choice. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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granted. 4 2 Had the court properly used the traditional plain and or-
dinary language standard for interpretation of the easement, it would
have found that the declaration did not allow for new alterations to
the exterior without approval of the Council.'43 Furthermore, with
limited exceptions, Article IX of the bylaws prohibits unit owners from
altering the exterior of the unit or the common areas in any manner
without prior approval of the Council.'44 Thus, a plain reading of
both the bylaws and declaration establishes that a unit owner is pre-
vented from installing any new vent that would alter the outside ap-
pearance of the unit without prior approval from the Council.145
As required by section 11-124(c) of the Real Property Article,
courts must also interpret the bylaws and declaration alongside sec-
tion 11-115.146 All of these provisions state that a unit owner does not
have the authority to make alterations to the exterior of the unit with-
out condominium council approval.1 47 Taken together, all three pro-
visions should be deemed to read that a unit owner lacks the authority
to install a new dryer vent that will alter the outside appearance of the
unit without first gaining approval from the council of unit owners.
Thus, Garfink did not have the authority to install a new vent on the
exterior of the unit without the Council's approval.
B. Requiring Council Approval for Exterior Modifications Upholds the
Core Values of Condominium Communal Living
In Garfink, the majority's expansion of the term "repair" allowed
it to conclude that the declaration and bylaws operated in harmony,
permitting a unit owner to alter the exterior of the unit without prior
approval of the Council. 48 However, the majority incorrectly inter-
preted the word repair to encompass the installation of an entirely
new vent rather than maintenance of an existing one. 49 If the court
instead followed the plain language doctrine and read the pertinent
142. See supra notes 55, 60.
143. Garfink, 392 Md. at 407, 897 A.2d at 225 (Wilner, J., dissenting). The declaration
only allowed for repair or maintenance of a pre-existing vent. Id.
144. Id., 897 A.2d at 226.
145. Id.
146. See supra note 46.
147. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. Subject to the bylaws and declaration,
section 11-115 forbids modifications to the exterior of a unit without condominium coun-
cil approval. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 11-115(2) (LexisNexis 2006).
148. Garfink, 392 Md. at 401, 897 A.2d at 222. Because section 11-115 of the Real Prop-
erty Article is made subject to the provisions of the declaration or bylaws, these two provi-
sions are controlling over the statute, which does not permit modifications to the exterior
of the unit without prior approval. Id.
149. See supra notes 137, 143 and accompanying text.
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portions of the bylaws with the easement contained in the declaration
and section 11-115, it is evident that a unit owner who wanted to in-
stall a new vent in the exterior of the unit must get approval from the
Council. 150 All of these documents contain similar requirements for
condominium council approval-a significant fact which demon-
strates that not only is the requirement common in condominium re-
gimes, but also that council approval has a salutary purpose.
152
Mandating council approval ensures that the rights of individuals will
not be expanded at the expense of the common interests of those
living in the condominium community.
153
Garfink's situation is a clear example of the dangers that can arise
when individuals are allowed to pursue their own objectives and do
with their property as they please. Most individuals correctly ascribe
to the belief that they can do what they want with their property.
154
But in a communal living context, an individual cannot have unfet-
tered rights to modify their property, as it may result in harm to other
unit owners.' 55 In this instance, the location that Garfink chose to
install her new dryer vent caused a problem for her immediate neigh-
bor-a problem which the two could not amicably resolve. 156 Had
Garfink instead sought the approval of the Council, this dispute-and
this litigation-potentially could have been avoided. Because the
Council must balance the interests of all individuals in the condomin-
ium regime, it would have likely considered a plan for placement of
the new vent that did not interfere with the use or enjoyment of the
150. Garfink, 392 Md. at 407-08, 897 A.2d at 226 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
151. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (noting that a number of other states have
statutory provisions prohibiting unit owners from altering the exterior of the unit or modi-
fying any of the common elements of the complex).
152. Garfink, 392 Md. at 408, 897 A.2d at 226 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
153. "The close, intimate nature of condominium living is such that 'individual [s] ought
not be permitted to disrupt the integrity of the common scheme' by doing what they want
with their property." David E. Grassmick, Note, Minding the Neighbor's Business:Just How Far
Can Condominium Owners' Associations Go In Deciding Who Can Move into the Building, 2002
U. ILL. L. REv. 185, 186 (quoting Sterling Vill. Condo., Inc. v. Breitenbach, 251 So. 2d 685,
688 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971)). In fact, these rules are often an enticement for potential
condominium unit owners. Id.
154. See Sterling Vill. Condo., 251 So. 2d at 688 (stating that "[e]very man may justly con-
sider his home his castle and himself as the king thereof").
155. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (noting that individuals in a condo-
minium regime live in close proximity to each other and often share common areas).
156. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (detailing the dispute between Garfink
and her neighbor over the location of her new vent, which discharged near the neighbor's
front door).
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property of any other unit owner.1 5 7 Accordingly, Council approval
would have ensured that Garfink's pursuit of her individual rights to
dry her clothes safely and in accordance with building codes did not
infringe upon her neighbor's right to enjoy his or her property.
The underlying dispute in Garfink thus gives credence to the
claim that condominium council approval best serves all of the inter-
ests at stake in a condominium regime.'15  A condominium complex
typically involves multiple parties with property interests in the re-
gime. 159 As a result of the number of parties involved, section 11-
109 (d) of the Real Property Article authorizes the council of unit own-
ers to ensure that the property is properly maintained. 60 Unit owners
forfeit their rights to the council's authority to ensure fair considera-
tion of the rights and privileges of all owners, and to sustain a harmo-
nious residential atmosphere. 6 ' Thus, even a limited restriction of a
council's ability to govern the condominium regime threatens to
harm the welfare of all unit owners. 1
62
The Garfink court's exception to the usual pre-approval process
by the condominium council compromises the council's ability to gov-
ern the welfare of the condominium complex and the unit owners
living there.'63 And by expanding the scope of the easement, the
court welcomes other individual challenges to the rules and regula-
tions created by the council in promotion of common order, includ-
157. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (noting that the rights and considerations
of all unit owners must be given effect in a condominium regime so as to promote a har-
monious living atmosphere).
158. See, e.g., Marvin J. Nodiff, Decision-Making in the Community Association: Do the Old
Rules Still Apply?, J. Mo. B., Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 141, 141. ("[T]he overall objective of the
association is to protect property values through preservation of an attractive, uniform ap-
pearance.... [T]he enforcement of architectural control or design review... ensure[s]
aesthetic adherence to the original development scheme and enforcement of restrictions
to guard against uses that would devalue property."); Frank Bentayou, Common Ground Com-
munity Associations Work Like Small Democracies to Keep Homeowners Happy, CLEV. PLAIN
DEALER,July 27, 2003, at El (noting a real estate attorney's belief "that a well-informed and
hard-working community association board-along with an effective set of rules-is key to
the success of a condo or planned community").
159. Andrews v. City of Greenbelt, 293 Md. 69, 73, 441 A.2d 1064, 1068 (1982).
160. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 11-109 (LexisNexis 2006).
161. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Andree Brooks, Fining the Rule Breakers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1994, at A5
(criticizing court decisions prohibiting condominium councils from imposing fines on unit
owners who break the rules because it undercuts a condominium council's ability to make
its community a valued investment and a pleasant place to live).
163. Reducing the authority of the condominium council will likely result in less consid-
eration of the interests of all unit owners living in the regime. See supra note 73 and accom-
panying text.
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ing the ability to modify the exterior of a unit.164 If the court was
willing to grant an exception for Garfink, other unit owners who wish
to challenge a condominium council's authority may come forward in
hopes that the court will grant an exception for them as well.165 Had
the court instead ruled in favor of the Council, the court would have
limited individual unit owners' ability to challenge regulations by
maintaining a consistent standard in condominium law without al-
lowing for exceptions.1 66 Unit owners could then only challenge the
condominium council in cases where they have a legitimate claim that
a condominium council has overstepped its authority.16 7 Thus, the
Garfink court's decision to grant an exception restricts condominium
councils' ability to regulate all of the property interests involved in a
condominium regime and maintain common order, free from threats
of litigation.
C. Requiring Condominium Council Approval Would Better Achieve a
Just Result for Unit Owners and Condominium Councils
The court in Garfink properly recognized that Garfink had an im-
portant interest in installing the new vent-to ensure that her unit
met building code standards and that her dryer functioned in a safe
manner.168 The majority preserved this interest, however, at the ex-
pense of the condominium council.169 Instead of granting the ease-
ment to Garfink, the court could have required that the parties
negotiate a location for the new vent.17 0 Furthermore, imposing the
164. As the dissent mentions, the majority's decision may mean that the court is willing
to grant easements that are deviations from the precise language of the conveyance, or it
also could mean that in the interest of "maintenance" and "repair," a unit owner may freely
make new modifications to the exterior wall without approval. Garfink, 392 Md. at 409, 897
A.2d at 226-27 (Wilner, J., dissenting). The ambiguous scope of the majority's decision
may therefore result in more litigation that tests the boundaries of the decision in Garfink.
Id. at 405, 897 A.2d at 224.
165. See id. at 405, 897 A.2d at 224 (noting that the majority pays "less even than lip
service" to the important function of condominium councils to control the maintenance
and administration of the common elements and building exterior).
166. See id. (arguing that the exception for Garfink will create extensive uncertainty in
the law and "will likely generate a good bit of litigation" in the context of residential
condominiums).
167. Unit owners will present such a challenge when they believe a council is acting
unreasonably or beyond the scope of its authority. See supra note 78 and accompanying
text.
168. See Garfink, 392 Md. at 397, 897 A.2d at 220.
169. Id. at 405, 897 A.2d at 224 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 409-10, 897 A.2d at 227. The majority, however, insisted that this option had
already been attempted, and failed, as none of the solutions proposed by the Council were
acceptable. Id at 402-03, 897 A.2d at 223 (majority opinion). However, the majority also
failed to consider the reasonable rejection plan that the dissent urged would require the
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commonly held principle that an approving body must act reasonably
and in good faith would ensure that the Council would not reject Gar-
fink's plan arbitrarily.
71
Although the condominium council is infused with the power to
regulate modifications to the common elements and exterior of the
units through statute and condominium documents, it must exercise
this power reasonably. 172 Despite the fact that the Maryland Condo-
minium Act and the declaration and bylaws of the condominium re-
quired council approval, the council may still not reject a unit owner's
plan in an arbitrary or capricious manner. 173 Giving the Council its
proper authority would only have permitted it to reject Garfink's plan
for a valid reason. 
174
If a council was to reject a unit owner's plan for modification of a
common element or exterior of the unit, and the unit owner believed
this rejection was unreasonable, he or she could potentially have a
valid claim in court.175 In the event that the parties are not able to
reach an agreement, a reviewing court could assess the reasonableness
of each party's position about the location for the new dryer vent176
The court would have to closely scrutinize any rejection by the condo-
minium council, because disapproval may restrain the free use and
alienability of the land. 177 If disapproval of a plan was unreasonable
and made in bad faith, the court would have the ability to overturn
the decision of the council. 178
Applying a good faith standard to a council's rejection preserves
the interest of the individual unit owner, while at the same time recog-
nizes the authority of the condominium council. If the court had ap-
plied a good faith standard for council approval in this case, Garfink
Council's reasonable and good faith consideration of Garfink's proposal. Id. at 410, 897
A.2d at 227 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
171. See supra Part II.D.1.
172. See supra Part II.D.l.
173. See supra Part II.D.2.
174. A proper application of a reasonableness standard to the facts of this case would
allow, for example, the Council to reject the placement of an exterior vent by Garfink if
this placement would have a concrete impact on the value of the property. See supra note
91 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 78-80, 91 and accompanying text (discussing cases where the Court
of Appeals has upheld or reversed the decision of a ruling board's rejection of plans to
modify an element of a property regime).
176. Garfink, 392 Md. at 411, 897 A.2d at 228 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 410, 897 A.2d at 227 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
178. See Harbor View Improvement Ass'n v. Downey, 270 Md. 365, 374-76, 311 A.2d
422, 427-28 (1973) (affirming a trial court's rejection of a council's disapproval of a unit
owner's building plan because the council's decision was based on speculation and animus
towards the unit owner).
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would have still been able to install a new vent in the interest of her
own safety, and the Council would have maintained a necessary de-
gree of authority over the exterior and common elements of the con-
dominium regime.179 Application of a good faith standard would
have served both parties' interests in the condominium regime.
V. CONCLUSION
In Garfink v. Cloisters at Charles, Inc., the Court of Appeals improp-
erly interpreted the language of the easement granted in the condo-
minium declaration to give a condominium unit owner the right to
install a new dryer vent without prior approval of the Council.180 The
court should have applied the plain language doctrine of contract in-
terpretation, and construed the declaration, bylaws, and pertinent
statutes together to find that the Council's approval was necessary.1 8'
Though granting the easement achieved a safe means for Garfink to
dry her clothes, the Garfink decision has far-reaching and deleterious
effects on the ability of condominium councils to ensure that the
rights of all individuals in the complex are fairly considered.182
Proper interpretation of the plain language would give condominium
councils greater protection from challenges from individual unit own-
ers, and maintain the core values of communal living that are an es-
sential part of the condominium regime."' The Garfink court's
decision inappropriately elevated a unit owner's individual interests
over the communal values inherent in the condominium regime. 18 4
GINA FENICE
179. Garfink, 392 Md. at 405, 411, 897 A.2d at 224, 228 (Wilner, J., dissenting).
180. See supra Part IV.A.
181. See supra Part IV.A.
182. See supra Part IV.B.
183. See supra Part IV.B.
184. See supra Part IV.C.
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A UTILITARIAN APPROACH TO THE DOCTRINE OF
IMPLIED EASEMENTS BY NECESSITY
In Stansbury v. MDR Development, L.L. C.,' the Court of Appeals of
Maryland considered whether an implied easement by necessity ex-
isted to benefit a portion of property that was accessible by navigable
waters where the remainder of the property was occupied and accessi-
ble by a public roadway.' The court held that an implied easement by
necessity existed because access by navigable waters was not a reasona-
ble gateway to the property.' This determination was proper because
all of the requirements for an easement by necessity were met.4 Fur-
thermore, the utilitarian theory supports this decision in particular
and greater flexibility in the application of the doctrine of implied
easements by necessity in general.5 The utilitarian theory, unlike
other theories of property law, allows courts to apply the doctrine with
more flexibility by considering not only the property owner's right to
exclude others from the property, but also the benefit to society for
property to be fully utilized.6
Applying this broader approach, the court properly rejected the
circuit court's balancing approach because it would add confusion to
the case law.' However, the court should have discussed in greater
detail the reasoning behind its disapproval of the circuit court's bal-
ancing approach.8 By failing to do so, the Stansbury court left lower
courts with little guidance as to whether there are any circumstances
when a balancing approach would be appropriate, or whether the
method is foreclosed with respect to the doctrine of implied
easements. 9
Copyright © 2007 by Viktoriya Mikityanskaya.
1. 390 Md. 476, 889 A.2d 403 (2006).
2. Id. at 480, 889 A.2d at 406.
3. Id.
4. See infra Part IV.A.
5. See infra Part IV.B.
6. See infra Part IV.B.
7. See infra Part V.C.
8. See infra Part V.C. The Stansbury court devoted only one footnote in its decision to
the trial court's balancing approach. Stansbury, 390 Md. at 479-80 n.1, 889 A.2d at 405 n.1.
9. See infra Part V.C.
1281
MARYLAND LAw REVIEW
I. THE CASE
In 1936, James Edward Stansbury purchased adjoining Lots 178,
179, 9A, and 1OA on the Chesapeake Bay in Maryland." ° Approxi-
mately twenty years later, Mr. Stansbury dredged a channel between
the four lots in order to access the Chesapeake Bay via Pleasant
Lake.11 He also constructed a footbridge over the channel between
Lots 9A and 178 in order to access Lot 179, which adjoined Lot 178.12
Mr. Stansbury died in 1977 and left the property to his wife,
Laura Stansbury, and his two children, Nancy R. Stansbury and James
Elijah Stansbury."3 Approximately ten years later, Laura Stansbury
transferred her share in the property to her children, so that Nancy
Stansbury owned Lots 179 and 9A and James Stansbury owned Lots
178 and 10A.' 4 In 1995, however, James Stansbury defaulted on a
mortgage, which resulted in the foreclosure of Lots 178 and 10A.15
David and Charlotte Caldwell and James and Margaret Thrift (the
Caldwells) purchased the lots at a foreclosure sale and thereafter con-
solidated the properties into one lot. 6
Since Lot 1OA was surrounded on three sides by water, the
Caldwells wanted to use the footbridge from the adjoining lot to ac-
cess their lot.'7 Nancy Stansbury, however, denied permission. 18 Con-
sequently, the Caldwells proposed building a new footbridge directly
connecting Lot 10A to Lot 178.'9 Ms. Stansbury once again rejected
this proposal because the footbridge would negatively impact her
property running underneath the channel.2 °
In response to Ms. Stansbury's opposition to the new bridge, the
Caldwells filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel
County for an implied easement by necessity across part of Lot 9A in
order to access Lot 10A.2' After the initiation of the action, MDR De-
10. Stansbury, 390 Md. at 481-82, 889 A.2d at 406-07. Lots 1OA and 179 "shared a
common lot line, as [did] lots 178 and 9a." Id. at 481, 889 A.2d at 407.
11. Id. at 481-82, 889 A.2d at 407. The channel covered the common lot lines. Id. at
481, 889 A.2d at 407.
12. Id. at 482, 889 A.2d at 407.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 482-83, 889 A.2d at 407. The Stansbury children divided the lots amongst
themselves after they became joint owners of all four of the lots. Id.
15. Id. at 483, 889 A.2d at 407.
16. Id. at 483-84, 889 A.2d at 407-08.
17. Id. at 483, 889 A.2d at 408. The adjoining lot was 9A, which Ms. Stansbury owned.
Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 484, 889 A.2d at 408.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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velopment, L.L.C. (MDR) purchased the lots from the Caldwells, and
the court substituted MDR as the plaintiff.22 The circuit court deter-
mined that neither a quasi easement nor an easement by necessity
existed over Ms. Stansbury's property.2 ' The court denied the exis-
tence of a quasi easement because the old footbridge had not pro-
vided access between Lots 178 and 10A while unity of title was
present.24 Moreover, the court found that there was no implied ease-
ment by necessity because the proposed footbridge would provide ac-
cess to Lot 10A without entering onto Ms. Stansbury's property.2 5 The
circuit court, however, allowed MDR to build the new footbridge after
balancing the parties' interests and determining that the construction
of the footbridge benefited MDR more than it injured Ms.
Stansbury.2 6
Both Ms. Stansbury and MDR appealed the circuit court's deci-
sion.27 The Court of Special Appeals vacated the judgment of the cir-
cuit court,28 holding that, because Lot 1OA was only accessible by a
small boat or crossing the channel by foot at low tide, an easement by
necessity existed.2 9
In response, Ms. Stansbury petitioned for a writ of certiorari to
the Court of Appeals, and MDR filed a conditional cross-petition. 30
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to determine (1) whether an
easement by necessity existed to provide access to a part of MDR's
property when the remaining property was occupied and could be
reached by a road; and (2) whether an easement by necessity existed
for a part of MDR's property when that portion was accessible by navi-
gable water.3 1
22. Id.
23. Stansbury v. MDR Dev., L.L.C., 161 Md. App. 594, 610, 871 A.2d 612, 621 (2005).
24. Id. at 612, 871 A.2d at 622.
25. Id. at 616, 871 A.2d at 625.
26. Id. In reviewing the parties' interests, the circuit court evaluated: (1) MDR's right
to build a footbridge to connect its properties; (2) Ms. Stansbury's right to thwart interfer-
ence with a portion of her property that is submerged beneath the channel; and (3) public
interest in using the channel for fishing and navigation. Id. at 609, 871 A.2d at 621.
27. Id. at 598, 871 A.2d at 614.
28. Stansbury, 390 Md. at 479-80, 889 A.2d at 405.
29. Stansbury, 161 Md. App. at 617, 871 A.2d at 625. The court also maintained that the
easement had not terminated simply because Ms. Stansbury's brother did not use it. Id.,
871 A.2d at 626.
30. Stansbury, 390 Md. at 480, 889 A.2d at 405-06.
31. Id., 889 A.2d at 406.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The doctrine of easement by necessity is rooted in English com-
mon law.3 2 Over time, however, the doctrine has evolved to address
concerns that are unique to American society.3 3 Particularly, Mary-
land courts have relaxed the rigid standard once applied by the En-
glish courts.3 4 At the same time, public policy concerns regarding the
full utilization of land have become much more central to the doc-
trine."5 This evolution to a more flexible doctrine of easement by ne-
cessity is mirrored in a number of other jurisdictions in the United
States.36
A. The Transplantation of the Easement by Necessity into the American
Judicial System
American common law rights are derived primarily from English
common law.3 7 Under Article 5 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights, Maryland citizens are entitled to the benefit of the English
common and statutory law as it existed on July 4, 1776.38 Accordingly,
Maryland courts have recognized the precedential value of English
common law cases and relied upon them, especially in areas of law
where a strong body of Maryland case law is lacking.39 The doctrine
of easement by necessity is no exception; early Maryland cases often
looked to English precedent for guidance.4 °
The doctrine of easements had its origins in English common
law,4 ' with Maryland courts recognizing the doctrine as early as
1855.42 Maryland courts define easements as "nonpossessory inter-
est[s] in the real property of another" which arise "through express
32. See infra Part II.A.
33. See infta Part II.A.
34. See infra Part II.B.
35. See infra Part II.B.
36. See infra Part II.C.
37. See Laney v. State, 379 Md. 522, 542, 842 A.2d 773, 785 (2004) (stating that a pur-
chaser's common law right to possess property peacefully without judicial assistance
originated from English common law).
38. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. 5(a).
39. See Mitchell v. Seipel, 53 Md. 251, 264-70 (1880) (discussing the development of
the doctrine of easement by necessity in English case law to decide the case at bar); McTav-
ish v. Carroll, 7 Md. 352, 360-65 (1855) (same).
40. See, e.g., Mitchel, 53 Md. at 264-70 (devoting much of the opinion to a review of the
contemporary English law on implied easements by necessity); McTavish, 7 Md. at 360-65
(relying in part on English precedent to conclude that an implied easement can exist
where there is a legal necessity).
41. Gillies v. Orienta Beach Club, 289 N.Y.S. 733, 735 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
42. See McTavish, 7 Md. at 364-65 (recognizing an implied easement by necessity).
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grant or implication. '43 One type of implied easement is an easement
by necessity.44
In 1880, the Court of Appeals in Mitchell v. Seipe145 summarized
the English law pertaining to easements by necessity.46 According to
Mitchell, an easement exists if: (1) it is continuous or apparent; (2)
necessary for the reasonable enjoyment of the property; and (3) the
necessity arose prior to the grant of the property and continues to
exist.4 7 The court noted that, at the time, other American jurisdic-
tions adhered to the same requirements.4" The first and third re-
quirements were fairly straightforward for courts to apply. 49 However,
the second requirement of necessity was more problematic because
different interpretations could be assigned to the word.5"
During the nineteenth century, the English common law's strict
view of the necessity requirement heavily influenced Maryland
courts.5" For example, in McTavish v. Carroll,12 one of Maryland's first
cases addressing the doctrine of implied easement by necessity, the
Court of Appeals relied primarily upon English precedent.5 3 While
the McTavish court referred to American case law as well, the court's
reasoning was structured by the English requirements for finding an
easement by necessity.54 Accordingly, McTavish and other Maryland
courts required a showing of absolute necessity, not mere inconve-
nience.5 5 As the Court of Appeals noted in Burns v. Gallagher,5 6 this
stringent standard accomplishes the doctrine's purpose of effectuat-
ing the intent of the parties. 57 Therefore, according to Burns, without
an express grant of an easement, the only way to discern the intent of
43. Boucher v. Boyer, 301 Md. 679, 688, 484 A.2d 630, 635 (1984).
44. Id.
45. 53 Md. 251 (1880).
46. Id. at 264-70.
47. Id. at 269.
48. Id. at 270.
49. See, e.g., McTavish v. Carroll, 7 Md. 352, 358-67 (1855) (mentioning in passing the
requirements for an easement by necessity, but discussing the necessity prong in detail).
50. For detailed discussions of the necessity requirement see Jay v. Michael, 92 Md.
198, 208-12, 48 A. 61, 63-64 (1900); Mitchell, 53 Md. at 272-76; McTavish, 7 Md. at 358-67.
51. See, e.g., Burns v. Gallagher, 62 Md. 462, 472 (1884) (following the English rule
requiring that the necessity be absolute).
52. 7 Md. 352 (1855).
53. Id. at 360.
54. Id.
55. Jay, 92 Md. at 210, 48 A. at 63; Burns, 62 Md. at 472; McTavish, 7 Md. at 367.
56. 62 Md. 462 (1884).
57. Id. at 472.
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the parties with any certainty is to require a showing of strict
necessity.1
8
B. The Relaxation of the Doctrine of Implied Easement by Necessity in
Maryland
Beginning in the later nineteenth century and continuing into
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the doctrine of implied ease-
ments by necessity evolved in Maryland to become more flexible.59 In
part, this evolution grew out of the distinction between implied grants
of easements by necessity and implied reservations of easements by
necessity.6 ° An implied grant of an easement by necessity occurs when
a grantor conveys inaccessible property to another.61 On the other
hand, an implied reservation of an easement by necessity is when the
grantor retains landlocked property.62
Maryland courts have distinguished between these two types of
implied easements in terms of the degree of necessity needed to sat-
isfy them.63 Much stricter necessity, known as absolute necessity, is
required for implied reservations,64 while reasonable necessity is re-
quired for implied grants. 65 The reason for the distinction is that, in
the case of an implied grant, the grantor can exert control over the
terms of the grant and hence cannot derogate from it.6 6 Therefore,
Maryland courts presume that, where the reservation of an easement
is not explicit in the grant, the two parties intended not to reserve an
easement.67 This presumption can be overcome by strict necessity,
because it would be unreasonable to presume that the parties in-
tended for the transaction to leave the grantor landlocked.68
58. Id.
59. See Hancock v. Henderson, 236 Md. 98, 103, 202 A.2d 599, 602 (1964) (resting
much of its decision on the modem view that necessity may exist where property is bor-
dered by navigable water); Condry v. Laurie, 184 Md. 317, 322, 41 A.2d 66, 68 (1945)
(considering the cost of establishing another access route to the property in determining
whether necessity existed).
60. Shpak v. Oletsky, 280 Md. 355, 360-61, 373 A.2d 1234, 1238 (1977).
61. Dalton v. Real Estate & Improvement Co., 201 Md. 34, 47, 92 A.2d 585, 591 (1952).
62. Id.
63. Shpak, 280 Md. at 360-61, 373 A.2d at 1238.
64. Id. at 361, 373 A.2d at 1238 (describing the required necessity as "imperative and
absolute").
65. Greenwalt v. McCardell, 178 Md. 132, 138, 12 A.2d 522, 525 (1940).
66. Dalton, 201 Md. at 47, 92 A.2d at 591.
67. Slear v. Jankiewicz, 189 Md. 18, 23-24, 54 A.2d 137, 139 (1947) (quoting Burns v.
Gallagher, 62 Md. 462, 471-72 (1884)).
68. Id.
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The Mitchell case, decided in the late nineteenth century, best ex-
plains this distinction.69 In Mitchell, the Court of Appeals considered
whether a property owner had an implied reservation in an alley that
ran between two houses.7' The court determined that there was no
implied reservation because the necessity was not absolute. 7 , Specifi-
cally, the Mitchell court observed, there were other means to access the
premises and the alley was merely a more convenient access route.7 2
In reaching its decision, the court rejected a reasonable necessity stan-
dard on the basis that this standard applies only to implied grants, not
implied reservations. 73 Furthermore, the Mitchell court noted that, at
the time of its decision, there was only one decision by an American
court of last resort that granted an easement by necessity in an im-
plied reservation case.7 4
The distinction between implied reservations and implied grants
has endured in Maryland into the twenty-first century. As recently as
2003, the Court of Appeals recognized the distinction and its impor-
tance in Calvert Joint Venture #140 v. Snider.7 5 In Calvert, the court held
that an owner of mineral rights did not have an implied reservation of
an easement by necessity in the surface because the minerals could
potentially be accessed from the owner's adjoining property.7 6 Thus,
the Calvert court found no absolute necessity existed to warrant an
implied reservation. 7 7
Another way that the doctrine of easement by necessity has
evolved is in the leniency with which the Maryland courts have applied
some of the doctrine's requirements. Although courts today still re-
quire that each element be met, courts are not as strict about analyz-
ing every element. 78  For example, cases merely will mention in
passing the requirement that the easement be continuous or appar-
ent.79 In Hancock v. Henderson,8 0 the court determined that an ease-
69. Mitchell v. Seipel, 53 Md. 251 (1880).
70. Id. at 262-63.
71. Id. at 275.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 264.
74. Id. at 271.
75. 373 Md. 18, 816 A.2d 854 (2003).
76. Id. at 61, 816 A.2d at 879.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 47-62, 816 A.2d at 870-79 (focusing much of its discussion on the neces-
sity requirement and assuming that the other requirements are met); Hancock v. Hender-
son, 236 Md. 98, 102-05, 202 A.2d 599, 601-03 (1964) (primarily discussing the necessity
requirement).
79. See, e.g., Condry v. Laurie, 184 Md. 317, 321, 41 A.2d 66, 68 (1945) (discussing the
necessity and original unity of title requirements but only briefly mentioning the continu-
ous or apparent requirements).
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ment by necessity existed where the owner's property was bordered by
a creek on one side and properties owned by the opposing party and
others on the remaining sides.8" The Hancock court focused primarily
on whether the necessity requirement was met8 2 and did not state that
the easement had to meet the continuous or apparent requirement as
well.
Similarly, in Shpak v. Oletsky,83 the court devoted much of its dis-
cussion to whether or not the necessity requirement was fulfilled.84
The court made only passing mention of the requirement that the
easement be continuous or apparent.85 Thus, Maryland courts have
become much less mechanical in applying the doctrine of easement
by necessity, focusing solely on the elements that are in dispute.86
The doctrine of easement by necessity has further relaxed due to
a shift in the underlying public policy justifications. When the Mary-
land courts first adopted the doctrine, the main purpose was to give
effect to the intent of the parties.87 To determine the parties' intent,
courts primarily looked to the deed to see whether the parties meant
to create an easement.88 If the deed was silent, courts inferred that
the intent of the parties was not to reserve an easement. 89 Under Ma-
ryland property law, a landowner is free to make his property inacces-
sible if he so wishes.9 ° Therefore, in order to overcome the
presumption that the parties would have included an explicit ease-
ment in the grant if they so intended, courts in early cases required a
showing of strict necessity. 91
Modern case law focuses less on the intent of the parties, and
instead emphasizes society's interest in the full utilization of land.92
80. 236 Md. 98, 202 A.2d 599 (1964).
81. Id. at 100, 202 A.2d at 600.
82. Id. at 102, 202 A.2d at 601.
83. 280 Md. 355, 373 A.2d 1234 (1977).
84. See id. at 370-71, 373 A.2d at 1243 (holding that since necessity did not exist at the
time of severance, there was no implied easement by necessity).
85. Id. at 360, 373 A.2d at 1238.
86. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of the doc-
trine from the rigid English standard to a more flexible one).
87. See, e.g., Burns v. Gallagher, 62 Md. 462, 472 (1884) (explaining that strict necessity
was required to effectuate the intent of the parties).
88. E.g., Oliver v. Hook, 47 Md. 301, 308 (1877).
89. E.g., Burns, 62 Md. at 471-72.
90. Shpak, 280 Md. at 365, 373 A.2d at 1240.
91. E.g., Burns, 62 Md. at 471-72.
92. See Hancock v. Henderson, 236 Md. 98, 103-04, 202 A.2d 599, 602 (1964) (discuss-
ing and embracing the modem view that an easement by necessity may exist where water
access is available but not suitable to put the property to its reasonable use, and also noting
the public interest in full utilization of land); Condry v. Laurie, 184 Md. 317, 321, 41 A.2d
[VOL. 66:12811288
STANSBURY v. MDR DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C.
Thus, not surprisingly, Maryland cases have trended away from a re-
quirement of strict necessity to a requirement of reasonable neces-
sity.93 Reasonable necessity is a more flexible standard since courts
consider such variables as the cost of obtaining another way of access94
and modern notions of reasonableness.95
Over the years, Maryland courts have adjusted the definition of
"reasonable," giving weight to modern trends.96 One of the clearest
examples is judicial treatment of navigable water in determining
whether the necessity requirement is met. In Woelfel v. Tyng 7 the
Court of Appeals held that access to property by navigable water is not
so burdensome as to require an easement by necessity.98 However,
just four years later in Hancock, the court distinguished Woelfel and
gave greater weight to the modern trend that water access is not al-
ways reasonable based on the intended use of the property.99
Furthermore, while the intent of the parties is still an important
inquiry,1"' judicial presumptions about that intent have changed.
During the nineteenth century, Maryland courts presumed that, if the
deed was silent regarding an easement, the parties intended to reject
the easement.' 1 Currently, however, the courts read the same silence
not as the intent to leave property landlocked, but to convey property
fit for occupancy.1 °2 In Hancock, for example, the court relied on this
presumption to find an implied easement by necessity even though
the property was accessible by water.103 The Hancock court also ac-
66, 68 (1945) (citing the public policy of full utilization of land as the basis for the ease-
ment by necessity doctrine).
93. See Hancock, 236 Md. at 103-05, 202 A.2d at 602-03 (finding an easement by neces-
sity even though the property at issue could be accessed by a water route); Condry, 184 Md.
at 322, 41 A.2d at 68 (noting that, while constructing another access route would be possi-
ble, it would require unreasonable expense and therefore justifies a finding of necessity).
94. Condry, 184 Md. at 322, 41 A.2d at 68.
95. Hancock, 236 Md. at 103, 202 A.2d at 602.
96. See, e.g., id. (taking into consideration that under the "modern view," water routes
are not always a reasonable means of access depending on the property's intended use).
97. 221 Md. 539, 158 A.2d 311 (1960).
98. Id. at 544-45, 158 A.2d at 313-14. The Woelfel court rested its decision in part on
the fact that the property was marshland that was suitable for ducking or trapping, and was
accessible by water from public wharves. Id at 542, 544, 158 A.2d at 312-13.
99. Hancock, 236 Md. at 103, 202 A.2d at 602.
100. Id.
101. Burns v. Gallagher, 62 Md. 462, 471-72 (1884).
102. Hancock, 236 Md. at 103-04, 202 A.2d at 602.
103. See id. (citing the modern view that a way of necessity may exist even if a waterway is
available). By presuming that the intent of the parties was not to leave property land-
locked, the Hancock court had a difficult time distinguishing Woelfel. In fact, the court
dodged the issue by maintaining that the facts were closer to Jay v. Michael, 92 Md. 198, 48
A. 61 (1900), where the court found an easement by necessity though the property was
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knowledged that the doctrine of implied easement by necessity is
based on the public policy of full utilization of land."°4 These two
policies motivate Maryland courts to apply the doctrine more flexibly.
Maryland courts' growing emphasis on utility rather than intent
reflects the current theoretical trend in property rights.10 5 Two im-
portant theories in American property law have been the natural
rights theory, which prevailed during the country's founding, 10 6 and
the utilitarian theory, which is prominent today.107 Depending on
which theory is applied, the outcome in an easement by necessity case
may differ. The natural rights theory supports an absolute view of
property rights that allows a property owner to exclude all others from
the property.10 8 In contrast, the utilitarian theory focuses on property
rights as a way to promote the efficient use of resources.109
C. The Doctrine of Easement by Necessity in Other Jurisdictions
Maryland's trend toward a more flexible concept of necessity is
mirrored in other jurisdictions. In particular, jurisdictions that re-
quire reasonable necessity have held that available access to one por-
tion of property does not thwart a finding of necessity if the part in
question is not reasonably accessible. 10 For example, in Miller v.
Schmitz,"' the Appellate Court of Illinois held that, where property
was bisected by a creek and only one part was inaccessible, the owner
had an easement by necessity over the neighbor's property in order to
reach the inaccessible land. The Court of Appeals of Washington
reached a similar conclusion in Beeson v. Phillips.1 12
bordered by water. One potentially important factual distinction between Hancock and
Woelfel is that in Woelfel, the property was marshland used for duck hunting, while in Han-
cock, the property was used for cutting trees for timber and firewood. However, the Han-
cock court did not note this difference.
104. Id. at 104, 202 A.2d at 602.
105. See State ex rel. Penrose Inv. Co. v. McKelvey, 256 S.W. 474, 477 (Mo. 1923) (en
banc) (noting that courts and legislatures predominantly use the utilitarian theory in de-
termining property rights).
106. Cannon v. State ex reL Sec'y of Dep't of Transp., 807 A.2d 556, 566-67 (Del. 2002).
107. Penrose Inv., 256 S.W. at 477.
108. Cannon, 807 A.2d at 567.
109. See Borough of Westville v. Whitney Home Builders, Inc., 122 A.2d 233, 240 (N.J.
Super. App. Div. 1956) (citing the Restatement of Torts for the proposition that the utilitarian
theory promotes the most beneficial use of water resources).
110. Hedger Bros. Cement & Materials v. Stump, 10 S.W.3d 926, 930 (Ark. Ct. App.
2000); Miller v. Schmitz, 400 N.E.2d 488, 491 (Ill. Ct. App. 1980).
111. 400 N.E.2d 488 (I11. Ct. App. 1980).
112. 702 P.2d 1244, 1247 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that an easement by necessity
existed to access the upper portion of the property even though the lower portion was
accessible by another route).
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In both Miller and Beeson, the courts determined that access to
one portion of property did not negate the reasonable necessity for an
easement based on the public policy of full utilization of land.'"
3
Moreover, in both cases, use of the inaccessible part of the property
was hampered because the reachable portion did not provide reasona-
ble means of access.' 1 4 Thus, to enable utilization of the inaccessible
portion of property, the courts granted easements by necessity."
5
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In Stansbury v. MDR Development, L.L. C., the Court of Appeals af-
firmed the decision of the Court of Special Appeals and held that an
easement by necessity existed over adjoining properties where a por-
tion of one property was inaccessible, except through navigable
water.' 16 Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Cathell first articu-
lated three prerequisites for the creation of an easement by necessity:
(1) original unity of tide between the properties in question; (2) "sev-
erance of the unity of tide" when one parcel of property is conveyed;
and (3) the easement is necessary for the owner to be able to access
the property, and this necessity must exist both when the title is sev-
ered and when the easement is exercised.'
1 7
Next, the Stansbury court specifically addressed the questions it
certified for review. First, the court determined that an easement by
necessity may exist to reach an otherwise inaccessible portion of prop-
erty, even though the rest of the property can be reached by a public
road. 118 The court deemed it irrelevant to the existence of an ease-
ment by necessity that Lots IA and 178 may have been consolidated
after the Caldwells' purchase." 9 Instead, according to the court, the
relevant inquiry was whether there was unity of tide between Lots 1OA
and 178, and whether, upon severance, an easement by necessity ex-
isted and continued to exist.' 20
The Stansbury court answered these questions regarding unity of
tide in the affirmative.12 1 As to the first question regarding the unity
of tide of the properties, the court concluded that unity of title in the
property existed until Ms. Stansbury and her brother divided the
113. Miller, 400 N.E.2d at 491; Beeson, 702 P.2d at 1246.
114. Miller, 400 N.E.2d at 491; Beeson, 702 P.2d at 1247.
115. Miller, 400 N.E.2d at 491; Beeson, 702 P.2d at 1247.
116. Stansbury, 390 Md. at 497-98, 889 A.2d at 416.
117. Id. at 489, 889 A.2d at 411.
118. Id. at 496, 889 A.2d at 415.
119. Id. at 492, 889 A.2d at 413.
120. Id. at 490-92, 889 A.2d at 412-13.
121. Id. at 496, 889 A.2d at 415.
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property. 122 Furthermore, the court found that an easement by neces-
sity arose at the time of the severance since Lot 1OA became inaccessi-
ble except by water or over Ms. Stansbury's property.1 23 Also, the
court determined that the necessity continued to exist, noting that
non-use of the easement by Ms. Stansbury's brother did not by itself
extinguish the easement.
24
Regarding the second question that the court certified for re-
view, 1 25 the court found that access to Lot 1OA via navigable water did
not alleviate the necessity.1 26 Although Lot 1OA could be reached by
boat, the court determined that it would be too burdensome for MDR
to obtain a boat, go to a public launching ramp, and navigate the
Chesapeake Bay in order to access its property. 12' Finally, the court
found that construction of a footbridge would have a minimum im-
pact on Ms. Stansbury's property, part of which was submerged under
the channel.
12 8
IV. ANALYSIS
In Stansbury v. MDR Development, L.L.C., the Court of Appeals
held that an implied easement by necessity exists when access to the
property by navigable water is not reasonable. The Stansbuly court ap-
plied the doctrine of implied easement by necessity to determine that
an easement existed over Stansbury's property.1 29 While the court did
not explicitly refer to the utilitarian theory of property rights, its lan-
guage and ideas are associated with the theory.' By invoking utilita-
rian concepts, the court has signaled that it will continue to take a
more flexible approach to the doctrine of easement by necessity in the
122. Id. at 490, 889 A.2d at 412.
123. Id at 490-91, 889 A.2d at 412.
124. Id. at 491, 889 A.2d at 412. The court also dismissed the argument that an ease-
ment by necessity was no longer warranted because MDR could not currently build struc-
tures, other than a footbridge, on Lot 10A. Id. at 493, 889 A.2d at 413. According to the
Stansbury court, inability to use the property for building purposes does not negate MDR's
necessity. Id. Even if the limitation was not lifted in the future, the court reasoned, the
property could still be used for other activities. Id.
125. Whether an easement by necessity existed for a part of MDR's property when that
portion was accessible by navigable water. I. at 480, 889 A.2d at 406.
126. Id. at 497, 889 A.2d at 416.
127. Id. In a footnote, the court also rejected the argument that Lot 1OA could be
accessed by walking through the channel because Ms. Stansbury's property would still be
traversed in the process. Id. at 497 n.11, 889 A.2d at 416 n.11. Furthermore, the court
noted that passing through the channel may be extremely difficult depending on weather
conditions. Id.
128. Id. at 497, 889 A.2d at 416.
129. See infra Part [V.A.
130. See infra Part IV.B.
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future. 3 ' The Stansbury court's decision to relax the doctrine was ap-
propriate because of the modern concerns associated with property
rights. 132
Furthermore, the court fittingly refused to supplant the require-
ments of the doctrine of implied easements by necessity with a balanc-
ing approach that would weigh the interests of the involved parties. 33
However, the court should have better explained this particular rejec-
tion.1"4 A more in-depth discussion of the balancing test would have
made the court's decision more comprehensive, providing a better
guide for lower courts.' 3 5
A. The Court Properly Determined that an Easement by Necessity Existed
Because MDR Proved all of the Required Elements
The Court of Appeals appropriately concluded that MDR met the
required elements for an implied easement by necessity.' 3 6 Under
Maryland law, MDR was required to prove three elements for an im-
plied easement by necessity: (1) original unity of title-that properties
in question were once one parcel; (2) severance of unity of title-that
the single parcel was divided into the separate properties that form
the dispute; and (3) necessity that arose at the time of severance and
continues to exist-that the severance of the parcel created the neces-
sity, and the necessity has been constant. 13 7 Ms. Stansbury did not
contest the first two elements, and MDR clearly met them because Ms.
Stansbury's father originally owned all of the lots in question, and Ms.
Stansbury and her brother severed the unity of title.13 8
Thus, the only element in dispute was whether necessity existed
when the unity of title was severed, and if so, whether the necessity
continued to exist.' 3 9 Ms. Stansbury argued that there was no neces-
sity because Lot 10A was surrounded on three sides by navigable
water, and because Lot 10A was consolidated with Lot 178, which was
131. See infra Part IV.B.
132. See infra Part IV.B.
133. See infra Part I.C.
134. See infra Part IV.C.
135. See infra Part IV.C.
136. See Stansbury, 390 Md. at 497, 889 A.2d at 416 (holding that MDR was entitled to an
easement by necessity).
137. McTavish v. Carroll, 7 Md. 352, 360 (1855).
138. Stansbury, 390 Md. at 490, 889 A.2d at 412.
139. Id. at 480, 889 A.2d at 406.
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accessible by a road. a4 ° However, the court properly dismissed these
arguments based on precedent and public policy concerns."'
1. Access to Property by Navigable Water Does Not Automatically
Destroy Necessity
In Stansbury, the court prudently followed previous Maryland
cases holding that an easement by necessity can exist even though nav-
igable water may provide access to the property. 14 2 For example, the
Stansbury court followed Hancock,14 which granted an easement by ne-
cessity over appellant's property because the water route was not suita-
ble.144 Similarly, in Stansbury, navigable water bordered Lot 10A.
1 45
In order to access the lot through the waterways, MDR would have to
cross the channel by a small boat or on foot, or purchase a boat and
cross the Chesapeake Bay after traveling to a public launching
ramp.146 While both of these methods make access possible, the court
correctly determined that under a reasonable necessity standard it
would be unreasonable to require MDR to go to such great lengths.
1 47
While the court properly adhered to Hancock, its reasoning is
weakened by a failure to distinguish Woelfel, an important case.1 48 The
court should have made some effort to either distinguish Woelfel or
overturn it in part, particularly because Woelfel directly conflicts with
Hancock. 49  Instead, the court in Stansbury merely mentioned
140. Id. at 486, 889 A.2d at 409.
141. See infra Part IV.A.1-2.
142. See Hancock v. Henderson, 236 Md. 98, 103, 202 A.2d 599, 602 (1964) (holding
that where a water route is unsuitable for the type of use to which the property will be put,
an easement by necessity may exist); Jay v. Michael, 92 Md. 198, 210, 48 A. 61, 63-64
(1900) (finding an easement by necessity though the property bordered a creek).
143. Stansbury, 390 Md. at 496-97, 889 A.2d at 415-16.
144. Hancock, 236 Md. at 103-04, 202 A.2d at 602-03.
145. Stansbury, 390 Md. at 481-82, 889 A.2d at 407. Specifically, Lot 10A was bounded
by Pleasant Lake, the Chesapeake Bay, and the channel dredged by Ms. Stansbury's father.
Id. at 481, 889 A.2d at 406.
146. Id. at 497, 889 A.2d at 416.
147. Id. This proposition is supported by Hancock, which allowed an easement by neces-
sity where the water route, while available, was nevertheless unsuitable. Hancock, 236 Md.
at 103, 202 A.2d at 602; see also Hunter Carroll, Recent Development, Property-Easements by
Necessity: What Level of Necessity is Required?, 19 AM.J. TRIAL ADvoc. 475, 476 (1995) (noting
that a property owner is more likely to succeed in obtaining an implied easement by neces-
sity "in a majority jurisdiction, requiring reasonable necessity, than in one requiring strict
necessity").
148. See Woelfel v. Tyng, 221 Md. 539, 158 A.2d 311 (1960) (holding that access via
navigable water renders an easement unnecessary).
149. Compare id, at 544, 158 A.2d at 313 (finding that access by water prevents the grant
of an easement by necessity), with Hancock, 236 Md. at 103-04, 202 A.2d at 602-03 (distin-
guishing Woelfel and holding that in certain factual circumstances, access by navigable
water is not a bar to an easement by necessity).
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Woelfel' 5° without indicating if the instant case and Hancock reject the
Woelfel rule or simply reach different results due to distinguishing
facts. The court's failure to do so leaves lower courts with no gui-
dance as to Woelfels continued significance.
The court's failure to distinguish Woelfel is particularly problem-
atic because Lot 1 OA seems more similar to the Woelfel property, which
was marshland,5 t than to the Hancock property, which was land used
for cutting trees for timber and firewood. 52 Access by water is unsuit-
able when one is hauling trees, but it may be perfectly appropriate
when one is using property for duck hunting or walking. 5 ' There-
fore, as in Woelfel, MDR would appear to have less necessity for an
easement because renting a small boat is arguably not an unreasona-
ble burden.
Despite the court's misstep in failing to distinguish Woelfel, public
policy reasons dictate that the court made the right decision. 154 Ease-
ments by necessity are justified not only by a presumption that the
parties intended the party with inaccessible land to have access, 155 but
also by a public policy supporting the full utilization of land, which is
increasingly critical today.156 Woelfe's approach would inhibit the lat-
ter justification. 57
To recognize water access as a suitable means of reaching one's
property, even when the property is only used for sightseeing, would
undermine this public policy because motor vehicles are the most
prevalent mode of travel today and most people do not own boats.'15
Requiring a person to purchase or rent a boat solely for the purpose
150. Stansbuy, 390 Md. at 496, 889 A.2d at 415.
151. Woelfel, 221 Md. at 543, 158 A.2d at 313.
152. Hancock, 236 Md. at 100, 202 A.2d at 600.
153. See id. at 103-04, 202 A.2d at 602-03 (distinguishing Woelfel in order to find that
navigable water is not a reasonable route given the uses to which the property in question
would be put).
154. See Carroll, supra note 147, at 476 (public policy supports granting an easement by
necessity where the land would otherwise lay useless or underused); Kirstin Kanski, Note,
Property Law-Minnesota's Lakeshore Property Owners Without Road Access Find Themselves up a
Creek Without a Paddle-In re Daniel for the Establishment of a Cartway, 30 WM. MITCHELL
L. REv. 725, 752-53 (2003) (maintaining that in view of the growing importance of auto-
motive transportation, Minnesota's cartway statute, which is analogous to the common law
doctrine of easements by necessity, should be altered to allow an easement by necessity
even though the property is accessible by navigable water).
155. CalvertJoint Venture # 140 v. Snider, 373 Md. 18, 39-40, 816 A.2d 854, 866 (2003).
156. Hancock, 236 Md. at 103-04, 202 A.2d at 602; see also infra Part IV.B (discussing the
issue of population growth and land use in the nation).
157. See Kanski, supra note 154, at 751-52 (summarizing cases holding that water access
is no longer considered a reasonable means of accessing property for certain land uses).
158. Attaway v. Davis, 707 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Ark. 1986).
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of reaching his property would impose an onerous burden on land-
owners. 159 Based on precedent and public policy, therefore, the Stans-
bury court appropriately determined that water access was not a
suitable means of accessing Lot 10A.
The court also properly resolved the question of whether an ease-
ment over Ms. Stansbury's property was reasonably necessary for MDR
to enjoy Lot 10A given that a separate conservation easement prohib-
ited the company from building on the property.'6 ° The Court of Ap-
peals reasoned that the limitations could be lifted in the future, or at
the very least, the property could still be used for walking along the
waterfront and using the pier.16' Thus, the Stansbury court aptly rec-
ognized that unlike a denial of an easement by necessity, the existing
limitations on the property were not permanent and the land could
still be used for other purposes.
2. Consolidation of Lot IOA with Property Accessible by a Public
Road Does Not Destroy the Necessity
The court also properly rejected the contention that necessity
ceased to exist because the prior owner consolidated Lots 10A and
179.162 After the consolidation, the two lots merged into one and a
portion of the lot, the former Lot 179, was accessible by a public
road. 161 However, the court refused to assign significance to the con-
solidation because the portion of property that was inaccessible prior
to the consolidation remained inaccessible after the consolidation. 64
Thus, the Stansbuy court fittingly determined that necessity did not
cease to exist.
165
While this issue was one of first impression for the Court of Ap-
peals, a number of other state courts, such as Illinois and Washington,
have addressed the question and similarly concluded that an ease-
ment by necessity exists even where a portion of the property is acces-
sible.' 66 The Stansbuy court properly aligned itself with these
159. Id.
160. At the time of the lawsuit, a conservation easement prohibited the construction of
any structure, except a footbridge, on Lot 10A. Stansbury, 390 Md. at 492, 889 A.2d at 413.
161. Id. at 493, 889 A.2d at 413-14.
162. Id. at 492, 889 A.2d at 413.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See also Hedger Bros. Cement & Materials v. Stump, 10 S.W.3d 926, 930 (Ark. Ct.
App. 2000) (finding an easement by necessity to exist although part of the property in
question was accessible by other means).
166. See Michael DiSabatino, Annotation, Way of Necessity Where Only Part of Land is Inac-
cessible, 10 A.L.R.4th 500, 505-06 & supp. at 241 (1981 & Supp. 2006) (making note of
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jurisdictions on the issue of consolidation because, like Maryland,
these jurisdictions require reasonable necessity, which can exist when
only a portion of the property is accessible.' 6 7 In contrast, jurisdic-
tions that use strict necessity often hold that necessity does not exist
where a portion of property is accessible.' 6 ' Thus, the court in Stans-
bury correctly determined that consolidation of the properties did not
frustrate the necessity because unlike strict necessity, reasonable ne-
cessity is more flexible and does not demand impossibility.'69
Moreover, the Court of Appeals appropriately recognized the
utility justification underlying easements by necessity.'17  As Judge
Cathell noted, the ability to utilize Lot 10A does not change because
of the consolidation since it continues to be impractical for MDR to
access Lot 1OA without crossing over Ms. Stansbury's property.
17
'
Even after MDR consolidated its two lots, access to Lot 10A was not
improved because a channel separated the two lots and Ms. Stansbury
had a property interest in the land under the water.' 72 Thus, the
court properly concluded that consolidation of the two lots did not
diminish the necessity to traverse Ms. Stansbury's property.
B. The Court Properly Applied the Utilitarian Theory of Modern
Property Rights
Although not explicitly stated, the Court of Appeals harmonized
its decision with the utilitarian theory.1 73 The court indicated its pref-
erence for the utilitarian theory by requiring only reasonable necessity
instead of strict necessity.' 74 Reasonable necessity is more conducive
to full utilization of the land.1
75
decisions in which courts have held that necessity exists where only a portion of property is
inaccessible).
167. See id. at 505 & supp. at 241 (listing jurisdictions that have made similar rulings to
Stansburiy).
168. Id. at 504-05.
169. See Greenwalt v. McCardell, 178 Md. 132, 138, 12 A.2d 522, 525 (1940) (applying
the reasonable necessity standard).
170. See Hancock v. Henderson, 236 Md. 98, 104, 202 A.2d 599, 602 (1964) (citing the
public policy of full utilization of land as justification for granting an easement to property
that was accessible by water).
171. Stansbury, 390 Md. at 495, 889 A.2d at 415.
172. Id. at 492, 889 A.2d at 413.
173. See id. at 488, 889 A.2d at 410 (alluding to the utilitarian theory by recognizing that
"[t]he doctrine [of easement by necessity] is based upon public policy, which is favorable
to full utilization of land," though never expressly mentioning the theory as a basis for its
conclusion).
174. Id.
175. See supra Part V.A. 1.
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The Stansbury court's decision properly corresponded with the
utilitarian theory because the natural rights theory is outdated in
twenty-first century property law,' 7 6 particularly in its support of abso-
lute rights. The natural rights theory is based on the accumulation of
property through one's labor,'77 and does not take into account how
effectively that property is used. Thus, though the natural rights the-
ory allows for limitations on the right to exclude, t7 ' these limitations
are very narrow.'
79
While the right to exclude has many benefits, this right also has a
number of drawbacks if left unchecked.' ° Thus, the Stansbury court
appropriately shaped its decision in accordance with the utilitarian
theory, which is best able to duly consider these concerns by allowing
for exclusive property rights when it is in the best interest of society.' 81
Hence, Ms. Stansbury can have an exclusive right to property if a
greater benefit results than if the property were in the commons.'8 2
However, if exclusivity works to the detriment of society, then it
should be limited.18 3 One important limitation on the right to ex-
clude is an easement by necessity.
184
In Stansbury, the Court of Appeals properly signaled to lower
courts that the right of exclusivity should be limited, particularly in
light of the modern concerns of overpopulation. 8 5 Effective utiliza-
tion of land is more necessary than ever due to the increasing scarcity
of land.'86 When the doctrine of easement by necessity first became
prominent in England in the nineteenth century, it arose out of the
need for rights of way over privatized land that had once been in the
176. RICHARD SCHLATTER, PRIVATE PROPERTY: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 281 (1951).
177. LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 32 (1977).
178. Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DuKE
LJ. 1, 53-54 (2004).
179. See Richard A. Epstein, Book Review, Rights and "Rights Talk," 105 HARV. L. REV.
1106, 1110 (1992) (discussing limitations on the right to exclude under the natural rights
theory in regard to water rights, which are treated differently from rights associated with
land or chattels).
180. See Carrier, supra note 178, at 29-31 (discussing incompatible uses, wealth inequal-
ity, and other potential dangers of an unchecked private property system).
181. See id. (discussing the various limitations to the property right of exclusion and the
benefits of such limits).
182. Id.
183. See id. (noting the different limitations on the right to exclude and the benefits
society derives from these limitations).
184. Id. at 55.
185. See infra notes 191-197 and accompanying text (discussing population growth and
land utilization in America).
186. See infra notes 206-213 and accompanying text (describing the rapidly increasing
need for land).
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commons. 187 However, the Stansbury court recognized that today's cri-
sis in property law with respect to the need for easements resulted
from the subdivision of large tracts of property into smaller lots to
meet the growing demand for land. 8' The Stansbury facts exemplify
the subdivision trend because Nancy Stansbury and her brother di-
vided a large tract of land after they inherited it.'8 9 In subdividing the
tract, some property was left landlocked and, without an easement,
was useless. 9 0
Full utilization of land is increasingly critical due to the growing
population and correspondingly increased need for land. Every year
in the United States, "1.0 to 1.5 million acres of rural and undevel-
oped landscape are being converted to urban use."' 9' From.1945 to
2002 alone, urban land area quadrupled in size.' 9 2 Moreover, home
ownership has risen by over 20% since the beginning of the twentieth
century. 9 3
America's growing need for land utilization is not surprising
given the immense population growth the country has experienced.
In 1850, five years before Maryland courts decided the first implied
easement by necessity cases, the United States had a population of 23
million people.' 4 However, at the turn of the century, the popula-
tion more than tripled to 76 million. 9 5 Currently, the population has
187. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 784 (5th ed. 2002).
188. See Edward J. Heisel, Comment, Biodiversity and Federal Land Ownership: Mapping a
Strategy for the Future, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 229, 231 n.4 (1998) (noting that many large tracts of
northeastern forestland have been subdivided for vacation property); Janet Kealy, Com-
ment, The Hudson River Valley: A Natural Resource Threatened by Sprawl, 7 ALB. L. ENVrL.
OuTLOOKJ. 154, 162-63 (2002) (projecting that population growth in the Hudson River
Valley would increase the rate of "parcelization"-the subdivision of large parcels of land
for development-causing open land to decline from 60% to 30% by 2050); Sean F. Nolon
& Cozata Solloway, Comment, Preserving Our Heritage: Tools to Cultivate Agricultural Preserva-
tion in New York State, 17 PACE L. REV. 591, 595 (1997) (noting that more and more farmers
succumb to the pressure of developers and sell their land for subdivision).
189. Stansbury, 390 Md. at 481-83, 889 A.2d at 406-07.
190. Id. at 481-84, 889 A.2d at 406-08.
191. G.S. Kieppel, Urbanization and Environmental Quality: Implications of Alternative Devel-
opment Scenarios, 8 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOKJ. 37, 44 (2002).
192. RUBEN N. LUBOWSKI ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRic., MAJOR USES OF LAND IN THE
UNITED STATES 5 (2002), http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/EIB14/eib14.pdf.
193. U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Census of Housing Tables, http://www.census.gov/
hhes/www/housing/census/historic/owner.html (indicating that in 1900, 46.5% of the
population owned a home); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS BUREAU REPORTS ON RESIDEN-
TIAL VACANCIES AND HOMEOWNERSHIP 4 (2006), http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hous-
ing/hvs/qtr306/q3O6prss.pdf (showing that by the third quarter of 2006, homeownership
rates rose to 69%).
194. U.S. Census Bureau, Population and Housing Unit Counts (1993), http://www.
census.gov/population/censusdata/table-2.pdf.
195. Id.
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risen to over 300 million people' 96 and continues to rise at a rate of
0.89% per year.1
9 7
Utilitarianism is best able to address these modern concerns be-
cause of its flexibility in limiting the exclusivity right.' In Stansbury,
the Court of Appeals reached the most efficient end by drawing on
utilitarian principles-MDR can now utilize Lot 1OA because it is ac-
cessible by a footbridge, and Ms. Stansbury's property rights have only
been minimally affected because the easement intrudes upon only a
small portion of her property that is under water.' 99 It is doubtful that
the same result would have been reached under the natural rights
theory because of the theory's dominant focus on the right to ex-
clude.2 °° Thus, the Stansbury court properly promoted the utilitarian
theory and, in light of this decision, Maryland courts will likely be-
come more sympathetic to landowners who lack reasonable access to
their properties, and less concerned about protecting the property
right of exclusion.
C. The Stansbury Court Properly Refused to Apply a Balancing
Approach Because Easements by Necessity Inherently Consider
the Parties' Rights
The Court of Appeals wisely rejected the circuit court's adoption
of a balancing test to resolve whether MDR could build a footbridge
over Ms. Stansbury's property. Instead of deciding the issue based on
the doctrine of implied easement by necessity, the circuit court al-
lowed MDR to build a footbridge to access Lot 10A after balancing the
competing interests of the parties.2 1' Both the Court of Special Ap-
peals and the Court of Appeals refused to follow suit, and instead
found that an easement by necessity existed.20 2 This was the proper
result because to do otherwise would wreak havoc on a longstanding
doctrine that remains effective.20 3 Furthermore, the doctrine of ease-
196. U.S. Census Bureau, Population and Household Economic Topics, http://www.
census.gov/population/www/index/html (last visited Sept. 3, 2007).
197. CIA, The World Factbook (2007), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world.factbook/geos/us.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2007).
198. See SCH.ATrER, supra note 176, at 254 (discussing justifications for the utilitarian
theory).
199. See Stansbury, 390 Md. at 497, 889 A.2d at 416 (holding that MDR is entitled to an
easement by necessity).
200. SeeJoan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IowA L. REv. 277, 286 (1998) (describ-
ing the natural rights theory of property).
201. Stansbury v. MDR Dev., L.L.C., 161 Md. App. 594, 616, 871 A.2d 612, 625 (2005).
202. Stansbury, 390 Md. at 479-80, 889 A.2d at 405-06.
203. See Schwab v. Timmons, 589 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Wis. 1999) (refusing to adopt a balancing
approach because it would overturn settled precedent and conflict with public policy).
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ment by necessity already encompasses a balancing of the parties' in-
terests, rendering a separate balancing test unnecessary.20 4
The court properly eschewed a balancing approach because it
would unduly infringe upon the property right of exclusion.205 While
implied easements by necessity interfere with this right as well, a bal-
ancing approach would give lower courts far more discretion to con-
travene the property rights. 20 6 Thus, if the Stansbury court had used a
balancing test, trial courts would have less guidance in applying the
standard and hence be free to ignore the right of exclusion more
often.207
Another argument against the circuit court's approach is that the
doctrine of easement by necessity already has a balancing of rights
component. 208 The Court of Appeals expressly weighed the impact of
an easement on Ms. Stansbury's property.209 Moreover, in determin-
ing whether MDR had met the necessity requirement, the court
looked at the potential use of Lot 10A and whether current access to
the lot was reasonably adequate for that use.210 Other Maryland cases
have considered the reasonableness of constructing alternate access in
relation to the value of the property.21 ' Thus, the Court of Appeals
properly rejected a separate balancing test as unnecessary because the
doctrine of implied easements already considers the parties' interests.
Had the Stansbury court embraced a balancing test, the result
could have been confusion in the lower courts regarding the long-
standing doctrine of implied easements by necessity.212 The doctrine
of implied easements has been applied consistently by Maryland
204. See Carroll, supra note 147, at 476-77 (acknowledging that in determining whether
to grant an implied easement by necessity, courts balance the needs and the burdens of the
parties under the circumstances at hand).
205. See Stansbury, 390 Md. at 480 n.1, 889 A.2d at 405 n. 1 (noting the importance of the
right of exclusion to a private property system).
206. See Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, What Is Legal Doctrine?, 100 Nw. U. L. REv.
517, 532 (2006) (noting that a rule-based approach, rather than a balancing test, permits
higher courts greater control over inferior tribunals and leaves them less discretion).
207. Id.
208. See Carroll, supra note 147, at 476-77 (explaining that the doctrine of implied ease-
ments by necessity encompasses a balancing of the interests of the parties).
209. Stansbuiy, 390 Md. at 497, 889 A.2d at 416 (finding the impact of an easement to be
minimal).
210. Id.
211. See, e.g., Condry v. Laurie, 184 Md. 317, 322, 41 A.2d 66, 68 (1945) (determining
that the cost of constructing alternative access was unreasonable).
212. See Schwab v. Timmons, 589 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Wis. 1999) (refusing to overturn the well-
established doctrine of implied easement by necessity).
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213courts from the nineteenth through the twenty-first centuries.
While some doctrines become obsolete due to societal changes, ease-
ments by necessity have retained their effectiveness because of the
flexible way that Maryland courts have applied the doctrine. 214 Thus,
there was no need for the Court of Appeals to replace the doctrine
because it continues to sufficiently meet contemporary concerns.2 t5
Although the court's rejection of the balancing approach was ap-
propriate, it should have more thoroughly discussed its rejection to
give more comprehensive guidance to lower courts.2 16 Appellate
courts have a duty to anticipate the possible effects of their decisions
and give guidance as to how decisions should be applied in future
cases. 2 17 Here, the Court of Appeals failed to provide such guidance
and left lower courts to guess at whether use of a balancing approach
was completely foreclosed or merely circumscribed in easement by ne-
cessity cases. 2 1 Lower courts have only a footnote in the Stansbuy
decision to explain why the balancing test was rejected and in what
circumstances.2 9
V. CONCLUSION
In Stansbury v. MDR Development, L.L.C., the Court of Appeals
held that an implied easement by necessity existed where a property
could not be reasonably accessed through navigable waters. 220 The
court properly found that MDR met all of the requirements for an
implied easement by necessity, including that the easement was rea-
sonably necessary for the enjoyment of the property.221 While the
court did not explicitly ground its holding on the utilitarian theory, it
correctly invoked its principles in light of the modern concerns in
property law.22 2 Because the utilitarian theory allows greater flexibil-
ity in applying the doctrine of easements by necessity, the Stansbuy
213. See Calvert Joint Venture #140 v. Snider, 373 Md. 18, 40-47, 816 A.2d 854, 866-70
(2003) (reciting the history of the doctrine in Maryland's jurisprudence).
214. See supra Part II.B (discussing the evolution of the doctrine of easement by necessity
in Maryland).
215. See supra Part IV.B (discussing how the Stansbury court's decision corresponds with
the utilitarian theory and how the theory addresses current public policy concerns).
216. See Tiller & Cross, supra note 206, at 531 (describing the judicial hierarchy of courts
and the importance of higher court precedent in guiding lower courts).
217. Id.
218. See Stansbury, 390 Md. at 479-80 n.1, 889 A.2d at 405 n.1 (merely stating that the
balancing of the parties' rights is irrelevant without explaining why or when).
219. Id
220. See supra Part W.A.
221. See supra Part IV.A.
222. See supra Part IV.B.
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court properly recognized that the balancing test applied by the cir-
cuit court was unnecessary to reach the proper conclusion in this case
and in future cases.223
VI KTORIYA MIKITYANSKAYA
223. See supra Part 1V.C.
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Recent Decisions
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FOURTH CIRCUIT
WALTON v. JOHNSON: FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE
IMPORTANCE OF AN ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENT TO
ADEQUATELY PROTECT MENTALLY ILL
PRISONERS ON DEATH ROW
In Walton v. Johnson,' the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit considered the proper legal standard to determine
whether an inmate is mentally competent and therefore eligible to
receive the death penalty.2 The court held that to be executed a pris-
oner must understand (1) that his punishment is by execution and
(2) why he is being punished.3 The Fourth Circuit appropriately
adopted and applied this two-part test, which serves as a constitutional
baseline for evaluating the mental competency of death row
prisoners.4
The Fourth Circuit erred, however, by not appending a third
prong to its test, which would require that prisoners be allowed to
participate in the determination of mental competence.5 Known as
an assistance requirement, this third prong is recognized in common
law and is advantageous because it furthers the rationales behind the
death penalty.6 By not adopting an assistance requirement, the
Fourth Circuit failed to consider future cases and protect against the
execution of prisoners who may be unjustly sentenced to death.7
I. THE CASE
In November 1996, Percy Levar Walton murdered three individu-
als in their homes in Danville, Virginia.8 Taking into account an ex-
Copyright © Christine I. Betzing.
1. (Walton X), 440 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
2. Id. at 162.
3. Id at 162, 173.
4. See infra Part IV.A.
5. See infra Part IV.B.
6. See infra Part IV.B.
7. See infra Part IV.C.
8. Walton X 440 F.3d at 162. In two separate incidents, Walton brutally murdered
elderly couple Elizabeth and Jessie Kendrick, and a young man, Archie Moore. Walton v.
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tensive amount of physical evidence,' paired with Walton's own
admission of guilt to several inmates," Walton pled guilty to all three
murders.1 ' The Circuit Court for the City of Danville sentenced Wal-
ton to death based on the likelihood that Walton would commit vio-
lent criminal acts in the future and would continue to be a danger to
society.
12
Over the next several years, Walton challenged his death sen-
tence at both the state and federal levels.' 3 On direct review, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia affirmed Walton's capital murder convictions
and death sentence. 4 Walton petitioned the Supreme Court of the
United States for a writ of certiorari, but the Court denied his re-
quest. a5 In 2000, Walton filed his first federal writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his capital murder and re-
lated convictions. 6 Walton's petition argued in part that: (1) he was
not competent to stand trial or be executed; (2) his guilty plea was not
knowing, voluntary or intelligent; and (3) his attorney failed to serve
as effective counsel.1 7 The United States District Court for the West-
Commonwealth (Walton 1), 501 S.E.2d 134, 136-37 (Va. 1998). All three victims died of
gunshot wounds to the head. Id.
9. Walton 1, 501 S.E.2d at 137-38. The police discovered several of Moore's personal
effects within Walton's bedroom. Id. at 137. Police officers also identified Walton's finger-
prints on items in Moore's car and apartment and on a shotgun discovered in the Ken-
dricks' car. Id. Additionally, the police discovered Moore's car parked across the street
from Walton's home. Id. Within the car, police officers found bullets that matched the
ballistics specifications of a pistol of Mr. Kendrick's and keys that fit locks in the Kendricks'
car and home. Id.
10. Id. at 137-38.
11. Id. at 135. Walton also pled guilty to other counts including robbery and burglary.
Id.
12. Id.
13. Walton X, 440 F.3d at 162.
14. Walton I, 501 S.E.2d at 141. The Virginia Supreme Court found that the trial court
gave thorough consideration to the evidence and appropriately applied a sentence propor-
tionate to the crime committed. Id at 140. Specifically, the court found the gruesome
factual circumstances surrounding the murders, including Walton's own admission to
laughing during the shootings, to be strong evidence of his propensity for violence. Id at
139. In affirming Walton's death sentence and establishing his future threat to society, the
court noted Walton's prior convictions for burglary, grand larceny, resisting arrest, assault
and battery on a police officer, and juvenile offences, as well as testimony from a fellow
inmate who recounted that Walton "'wanted to be famous .. .for killing a bunch of
folks."' Id.
15. Walton v. Virginia (Walton I1), 525 U.S. 1046 (1998).
16. Walton v. Angelone (Walton V), 321 F.3d 442, 452 (4th Cir. 2003). Walton's state
habeas claim was filed and dismissed by the Supreme Court of Virginia in 1999. Id. at 451.
17. Walton v. Angelone (Walton III), No. Civ. A. 7:99CV00940, 2002 WL 467142, at
*6-7 (W.D. Va. Mar. 27, 2002). Walton's petition raised additional claims concerning pro-
cedural issues with the trial court, allegations of violations based on stipulations, testimony,
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ern District of Virginia failed to find merit in any of these claims."8
Walton sought leave to appeal in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit. 9 The Fourth Circuit dismissed the petition,2 °
finding that Walton was mentally competent at this trial21 and his
counsel had performed reasonably. 22
In 2003, Walton filed a second federal habeas petition, asserting
that his execution should be barred because: (1) he was mentally re-
tarded; (2) he was incompetent; and (3) he was "not competent to
choose his method of execution. '23 The district court dismissed Wal-
ton's mental retardation claim.24 The court then ordered an eviden-
tiary hearing to determine whether Walton was competent to be
executed.2' After reviewing extensive evaluations from several psychi-
atric experts, 26 including testimony from a neutral expert,27 the dis-
trict court concluded that Walton was competent to be executed.28
evidence, and outside statements, as well as the argument that the death penalty is uncon-
stitutional. Id. The court dismissed each of these claims. Id. at *9-23.
18. Id. at *1. The district court determined that Walton's mental competency claims
were procedurally defaulted and that Walton was not prejudiced by the strategic decisions
made by his attorney at trial. Id. at *10-19. The district court also refused to review Wal-
ton's competency claim because Supreme Court precedent requires that execution must
be imminent for a court to consider such a claim. Id. at *23. Three months later, the
court denied Walton's motion to alter or amend the court's previous judgment. Walton v.
Angelone (Walton IV), No. Civ. A. 7:99CV00940, 2002 WL 1398634, at *1 (W.D. Va. June
24, 2002).
19. Walton V, 321 F.3d at 446.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 460. To determine Walton's mental competence, the Fourth Circuit applied
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960), to establish that Walton had the ability to con-
sult with his attorney and that he had a rational understanding of the facts and the pro-
ceedings against him. Walton V, 321 F.3d at 459-60.
22. Walton V, 321 F.3d at 461-62. The court concluded that Walton's ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim failed both the cause and prejudice prongs of the test established in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Walton V 321 F.3d at 461. First, the court
found that Walton did not prove that his counsel's performance "fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness." Id. Second, the court determined that Walton did not
demonstrate with a reasonable probability that the results of the proceedings would have
been different, had it not been for his counsel's alleged errors. Id. at 461-62.
23. Walton v. Johnson (Walton VI), 269 F. Supp. 2d 692, 696 (W.D. Va. 2003).
24. Id. at 702.
25. Id.
26. Walton v. Johnson (Walton IX), 407 F.3d 285, 288-90 (4th Cir. 2005). The court
heard conflicting testimony from mental health experts who testified on Walton's behalf
and the expert presented by the Commonwealth. Id.
27. Id at 290. Dr. Mark Mills, a forensic psychiatrist, testified that Walton likely suf-
fered from a significant psychiatric disorder, such as schizophrenia. Walton X 440 F.3d at
167. In Dr. Mills's opinion, however, such a disorder did not preclude Walton from realiz-
ing that he was to be executed as punishment for murdering three people. Id.
28. Walton v. Johnson (Walton VII), 306 F. Supp. 2d 597, 598 (W.D. Va. 2004). To
determine Walton's competency, the district court applied the standard from Justice Pow-
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The court based its finding on Walton's understanding that he was
being punished by execution for murdering three individuals, and
that to be executed means he will die.
29
Walton appealed the district court's denial of his second federal
habeas petition.3 ° On appeal, the Fourth Circuit determined that the
district court failed to consider Walton's ability to "prepare for his
passing," as required by Ford v. Wainwright.3' The court vacated and
remanded for further proceedings on the Ford inquiry, as well as addi-
tional consideration of evidence of possible testing deviations that
may have affected Walton's mental retardation claim.32 The Fourth
Circuit subsequently granted a rehearing en banc to review Walton's
claim that he is both mentally incompetent and mentally retarded,
and thus unable to be executed based on Ford v. Wainwright and Atkins
v. Virginia."
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In Gregg v. Georgia,34 the Supreme Court of the United States de-
termined that a limited application of the death penalty is constitu-
tional. 35 The Court reasoned that the use of capital punishment is
justified when it serves both retributive and deterrent functions. 6 To
ensure that these two objectives are accomplished, the death penalty is
restricted to those offenders who are the most culpable.37 In Ford v.
Wainwright,38 the Court held that this restriction prohibits the execu-
tion of the mentally insane. To evaluate whether a prisoner is men-
tally insane, and thus unable to be executed, a majority of
jurisdictions have adopted the standard proposed by Justice Powell in
ell's concurrence in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). Walton VII, 306 F. Supp. 2d at
601.
29. Walton VII, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 601. Following the district court's dismissal of his
second federal habeas petition, Walton moved for reconsideration and to alter the judg-
ment. Walton v. Johnson (Walton VIII), 318 F. Supp. 2d 345, 347 (W.D. Va. 2004). The
court granted Walton's motion for reconsideration, but denied his motion to alter the
judgment. Id. at 347, 350.
30. Walton IX, 407 F.3d at 287.
31. Id. at 293 (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 (Powell,J., concurring) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
32. Id. at 293-96.
33. Walton X, 440 F.3d at 162, 168, 176.
34. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
35. See infra Part II.A. Despite the current constitutionality of the death penalty, Jus-
tices have expressed fractured views in past opinions. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972) (including separate opinions by all nine Justices).
36. See infra Part II.A.
37. See infra Part II.A.
38. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
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his Ford concurrence: the prisoner must understand the proceedings
against him and the prisoner must understand the nature of the death
penalty.39 Some states also require that in order to receive the death
penalty, a prisoner must be able to assist in his own defense.4"
A. Constitutionality of the Death Penalty in the United States
Throughout the history of the United States, the Supreme Court
has generally recognized that capital punishment does not violate the
Constitution.4" In 1976, Gregg v. Georgia reaffirmed that the death
penalty does not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.4 2
In Gregg, the Court upheld the imposition of the death penalty as a
proportional punishment for the crime of deliberate murder.4 3 The
Court emphasized that capital punishment is reserved for those indi-
viduals who commit a narrow category of the most extreme crimes.4 4
The Gregg Court also noted that when implicated, the death penalty
39. See infra Part II.B-C.
40. See infra Part II.C.
41. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176-78 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Ste-
vens, JJ.). This historical recognition derives from the Framers' acceptance of capital pun-
ishment. Id. at 177. At the time of the Eighth Amendment's ratification, every state
allowed the imposition of the death penalty. Id. Decades later, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment affirmed the potential use of capital punishment by stating that no person can be
deprived of life without due process. Id. Additionally, two hundred years of Supreme
Court precedent recognizes that capital punishment is not per se invalid. Id. at 177-78.
42. Id. at 168-69. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of "cruel and unu-
sual punishments." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that
no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. In Gregg, the Court examined evolving standards of decency
to establish the constitutionality of the death penalty under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 428 U.S. at 179 (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.). To support a
finding of constitutionality, the Court referenced the longstanding historical acceptance of
the death penalty in the United States, recent legislative endorsement of capital punish-
ment by the states, and the proportionality of the punishment of death as a consequence
for taking the life of another individual. Id. at 176, 179-80, 187.
43. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.). The Gregg Court
reviewed a conviction under an amended Georgia death penalty statute that required the
identification of at least one aggravating circumstance in order for a convicted prisoner to
receive a death sentence. Id. at 196-97. Only four years earlier, the Court had invalidated
the arbitrary application of the death penalty based on state laws that afforded wide discre-
tion to judges andjuries. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256-57 (1972) (Doug-
las, J., concurring). In response, several states reformed their death penalty statutes to
enable the courts to use more guided discretion throughout the sentencing and appellate
process. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179-80 (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.). Georgia's
aggravating circumstance identification requirement was an example of guided discretion.
Id. at 197-98. In Gregg, the Court characterized the statutory reform by several state legisla-
tures as a societal endorsement of the death penalty. Id. at 179-80.
44. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.).
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should serve two social purposes-retribution and deterrence." The
Court commented that the death penalty serves a retributive function
because capital punishment is a societal response to particularly egre-
gious conduct.4" The Court in Gregg also acknowledged that the pun-
ishment of death may serve a deterrent function by preventing
individuals who fear a possible death sentence from engaging in vio-
lent crime.47
Immediately following Gregg, the Court continued to restrict the
application of the death penalty to ensure that only the most culpable
individuals are executed. For example, in Woodson v. North Carolina,4"
the Court invalidated the imposition of a mandatory death penalty
statute. In Woodson, four men were involved in a convenience store
robbery in which a cashier was shot and killed.49 The trial testimony
differed as to which participant actually fired the fatal shot and
whether coercion was involved.5 ° All four men were found guilty and
sentenced to death, as required under North Carolina law.5 In strik-
ing down the state statute, the Court stressed that the law failed to
take into account the individual character and record of each defen-
dant, which is crucial to achieve a just result.5 2
The following year, in Coker v. Georgia,5" the Court overturned a
capital sentence imposed on a rapist because the Court determined
that the punishment was disproportional to the crime. 54 The Court
emphasized that although rape is a serious and often a violent crime,
sentencing a rapist to death would violate the Eighth Amendment bar
on "excessive" punishments.55 The Court adhered to the position that
the death penalty is reserved for the most egregious crimes and stated
that capital punishment is only applicable to individuals who have
taken the life of another.56
45. Id. at 183.
46. Id. at 183-84.
47. Id. at 185-86. The Gregg Court conceded, however, that there is no substantial
evidence either establishing or disproving the death penalty's deterrent effects. Id. at 185.
48. 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion).
49. Id. at 282-83.
50. Id. at 284.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 303-04.
53. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
54. Id. at 592 (plurality opinion).
55. Id. at 592, 597-98. A punishment is "excessive" if it: (1) fails to further the goals of
punishment and simply imposes needless pain and suffering; or (2) is "grossly out of pro-
portion to the severity of the crime." IM. at 592.
56. Id. at 598.
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In three subsequent cases, the Court further narrowed the impo-
sition of the death penalty by prohibiting its application to prisoners
lacking the mental capacity to further the goals of capital punishment.
First, in Roper v. Simmons, 7 the Court held that the death penalty can-
not be imposed upon criminals who were under eighteen years old at
the time of the offense. In support of this restriction, the Court noted
that juveniles cannot be included among the most culpable offenders
because they lack maturity and responsibility, are vulnerable to peer
pressure and negative influences, and may not have formed a fixed
character.
58
Second, in Atkins v. Virginia,59 the Court declared that the execu-
tion of individuals who are mentally retarded violates the Eighth
Amendment. The Court reasoned that the execution of a mentally
retarded individual calls into question the two justifications behind
the death penalty.6" Noting that retribution is only served when a
criminal acts with a depraved conscience, the Court found it unlikely
that individuals with limited mental capacity could fall into this cate-
gory.6" Moreover, the Court reasoned that deterrence is realized only
when murder is the result of premeditation and deliberation, whereas
mentally retarded offenders do not likely have the capacity to inhibit
their conduct to further the death penalty's deterrent effect.62
Third, in Ford v. Wainwright,6  the Court held that the execution
of the mentally insane is unconstitutional because it fails to comply
with the rationales behind the death penalty as well as societal stan-
dards of decency. In support of its conclusion, the Ford Court refer-
enced an extensive common law history prohibiting the execution of
insane individuals.64 The Court also emphasized that there is little
retributive value for society in executing an individual whose dimin-
ished mental capacity and recognition of culpability is not equivalent
to the crime committed.65
57. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
58. Id. at 569-70.
59. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
60. Id. at 318-19. The Court also stated that the reduced capacity of mentally retarded
individuals justifies their exclusion from capital punishment. Id at 320. In support of this
proposition, the Court cited to the potential for mentally retarded individuals to give false
confessions and their diminished ability to assist counsel and serve as meaningful witnesses.
Id.
61. Id. at 319.
62. Id. at 319-20.
63. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
64. Id. at 406-08.
65. Id. at 408.
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B. Creation of a Two-Part Test to Determine Whether an Inmate Is
Mentally Competent to be Executed
Beginning in the 1600s and continuing for several centuries,
common law decisions denounced the execution of those deemed
mentally insane. 66 Legal scholars such as Edward Coke and William
Blackstone argued that the execution of a mentally deranged person
represents extreme inhumanity and cruelty, and fails to provide an
example to others.6 7 Additionally, Blackstone asserted that the execu-
tion of an insane prisoner should be suspended because if the pris-
oner had a clear mind, he might have been able to make allegations
to stay his execution.68
The Supreme Court formally recognized the restriction against
executing the mentally insane in Ford v. Wainuright.69 As discussed
above, in Ford, the Court held that the Constitution forbids the execu-
tion of insane individuals based on the Eighth Amendment ban
against cruel and unusual punishment.7" The Court supported its de-
cision by citing to common law history and the fact that no state stat-
ute in existence sanctioned the execution of the insane." In
addition, a plurality of Justices noted that a heightened standard for
66. Id. at 406-08. In the United States, the prohibition against the execution of men-
tally insane individuals was accepted at both the federal and state levels. See, e.g., Youtsey v.
United States, 97 F. 937, 940 (6th Cir. 1899) (recognizing as fundamental that insane pris-
oners cannot be punished and that their executions should be stayed); Musselwhite v.
State, 60 So. 2d 807, 809-11 (Miss. 1952) (recognizing the long common law history
prohibiting the execution of the mentally insane and staying the execution of a convicted
murderer found to be insane after judgment against him).
67. Ford, 477 U.S. at 406-07. Legal commentators have offered numerous reasons for
banning the execution of the insane over the years. Id. at 407-08. These justifications
include the notion that executing the mentally ill is offensive to humanity, fails to provide
an example to others, serves no deterrent value, serves no retributive purpose, and that
madness is its own punishment. Id.
68. Id. at 407; see also Grammer v. Fenton, 178 N.W. 624, 626 (Neb. 1920) (noting that
the prohibition against executing the insane exists because such individuals are incapable
of saying anything in order to stay their execution (quoting Barker v. State, 106 N.W. 450,
451 (Neb. 1905)); Bingham v. State, 169 P.2d 311, 315 (Okla. Crim. App. 1946) (observing
that as a matter of public decency, it is not appropriate to execute those who have no
understanding of the nature of the punishment that is to be imposed).
69. 477 U.S. at 401. In Ford, a death row prisoner began to manifest signs of mental
deterioration and challenged his ability to be executed based on a lack of mental capacity.
Id, at 401-03.
70. Id. at 401, 405. The Court noted that the Eighth Amendment not only proscribes
acts that were considered cruel and unusual at the time of the adoption of the Bill of
Rights, but also recognizes society's evolving standards of decency. Id. at 405-06.
71. Id. at 406-08.
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evaluating claims of mental insanity that occur after the sentencing
phase may be necessary to prevent non-meritorious claims.12
Although a majority of the Ford Court agreed that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the execution of mentally insane individuals, v3
the Court remained split on the appropriate procedure or test to de-
termine whether a prisoner is competent to be executed. A plurality
left to the individual statues the job of crafting a specific test to assess
mental competence." Justice Marshall, writing for the plurality,
stressed that when creating a test, states must afford prisoners the op-
portunity to be heard through an adversarial process during compe-
tency proceedings.75  Specifically, the plurality emphasized the
importance of unrestricted presentation of evidence, a neutral selec-
tion of experts, and a prisoner's ability to present professional judg-
ments as to his comprehension of the death penalty.7 6
In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell disagreed with the plural-
ity's determination that an extensive procedural hearing is required to
satisfy due process. 7 Instead,Justice Powell argued that a significantly
less elaborate inquiry is appropriate.7s In place of a formal trial, Jus-
tice Powell advocated for a procedure imbued with basic fairness.79
Justice Powell suggested that examples of basic fairness might include
the selection of an impartial officer or the creation of a board to re-
ceive evidence, such as expert psychiatric evaluations of the
prisoner.80
Additionally, Justice Powell outlined a two-part test to determine
whether a prisoner is mentally competent to be executed.81 He ar-
gued that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of prison-
ers "who are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and
72. Id. at 417 (plurality opinion); see, e.g., Bingham, 169 P.2d at 316 (noting that unfet-
tered right of review for insanity claims might thwart the administration of justice for an
indefinite period of time).
73. Ford, 477 U.S. at 401, 410.
74. Id. at 416-17 (plurality opinion).
75. Id. at 413-17. The Ford plurality invalidated a Florida law that left the determina-
tion of a prisoner's insanity in the hands of the Governor and certain state-appointed psy-
chiatrists. Id. at 413-16. In finding the Florida procedure to be deficient, the plurality was
also concerned with a Florida prisoner's inability to challenge any of the evidence against
him or to cross-examine the state-appointed psychiatrists' views on his sanity. Id.
76. Id. at 417.
77. Id. at 425 (Powell, J., concurring).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 427.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 422.
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why they are to suffer it." 2 According to justice Powell, this standard
is consistent with the rationales of the death penalty and ensures that
a prisoner will be able to mentally and spiritually prepare for his
passing.
83
C. Lower Courts' Application of Justice Powell's Ford Test as a
Constitutional Minimum
Over the past twenty years, a majority of jurisdictions have
adopted the two-part mental competency test developed by Justice
Powell in his Ford concurrence. Specifically, courts require that an
inmate understands the punishment he is about to suffer and why.
8 4
Although the Supreme Court has not directly revisited the issue, the
Court has subsequently cited to Justice Powell's Ford concurrence in
dicta, and noted that Powell's test is the standard for determining
mental competence to be executed. 5
At the federal level, Justice Powell's test is recognized by the four
circuits that have considered the issue. 86 For example, in Coe v. Bell,87
the Sixth Circuit reviewed the death sentence of a prisoner who al-
leged that he was not competent to be executed.88  The court ex-
amined the Ford opinion and looked to Justice Powell's concurrence
as the judgment on the narrowest grounds agreed upon by a majority
of the court.8 " The Sixth Circuit adopted Justice Powell's test and de-
nied the inmate's stay of execution, finding that he had the mental
capacity to understand his impending death sentence and the reason
behind his punishment."°
82. Id. Justice Powell recognized that several states have more rigorous standards. Id.
at 421-22 & n.3. However, he rejected a requirement that a defendant be able to assist in
his own defense. Id. at 422 n.3.
83. Id. at 422.
84. See, e.g., Massie ex rel. Kroll v. Woodford, 244 F.3d 1192, 1197 (9th Cir. 2001).
85. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 333 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
86. See, e.g., Massie, 244 F.3d at 1197 (referring to Justice Powell's test when discussing
the standard to determine mental competence for execution); Coe v. Bell, 209 F.3d 815,
821 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating that Powell's concurring opinion in Ford is the standard to
determine mental competence); Garrett v. Collins, 951 F.2d 57, 59 (5th Cir. 1992) (per
curiam) (upholding a finding of prisoner competence to receive the death penalty under
Justice Powell's test); Rector v. Clark, 923 F.2d 570, 572 (8th Cir. 1991) (upholding a com-
petency determination through the application of the two-part test from Justice Powell's
Ford concurrence).
87. 209 F.3d 815 (6th Cir. 2000).
88. Id. at 818.
89. Id. at 818-19.
90. Id. at 822, 827.
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Similarly, in Rector v. Clark,91 a death row inmate challenged his
capital conviction on the basis that he was mentally incompetent.92
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the inmate's death sentence following a
competency evaluation that confirmed that the prisoner was aware of
his upcoming execution and the reason for the execution.9" The
court agreed with the district court's adoption of Justice Powell's Ford
test as the appropriate standard to evaluate the inmate's compe-
tence.94 In addition to federal courts, several state courts have
adopted Justice Powell's Ford test to determine mental competency to
be executed.95 For example, in Billiot v. State,96 the Supreme Court of
Mississippi observed that an inmate must be able to understand the
connection between his crime and punishment, and also be aware
that death is approaching, in order to execute the inmate.97
Justice Powell's test is not, however, the only standard used by
courts to determine competency for execution. 98 Some courts addi-
tionally require that to receive the death penalty, an inmate must also
demonstrate that he is able to assist in his own defense. 99 In Rector v.
Bryant,1° ° Justice Marshall dissented from the Court's denial of certio-
rari. 1 °1 In his dissent, Justice Marshall revisited his plurality opinion
in Ford and commented on the historical significance and general im-
portance of an assistance requirement.' 2 Justice Marshall noted that
in Ford, a plurality of the Court approved of an assistance require-
ment, which is essential to ensure that a prisoner can convey facts or
information that could demonstrate that his death sentence is either
unlawful or unjust.'" 3
91. 923 F.2d 570 (8th Cir. 1991).
92. Id. at 571.
93. Id. at 572-73.
94. Id. at 573.
95. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jermyn, 652 A.2d 821, 823 (Pa. 1995) (finding that a
version of Justice Powell's Ford formulation was the only necessary inquiry when determin-
ing competence for execution).
96. 655 So. 2d 1 (Miss. 1995).
97. Id. at 16.
98. See, e.g., Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53, 58 (S.C. 1993) (adopting a two-prong test
to determine mental competence that includes a cognitive prong similar to the Powell test
and a second assistance prong that Justice Powell expressly rejected in Ford).
99. Id. But see Coe v. Bell, 209 F.3d 815, 826 (6th Cir. 2000) (striking down any need
for an assistance requirement); Rector, 923 F.2d at 572-73 (rejecting an assistance of coun-
sel requirement on the basis that it is not required under Ford); Jerryn, 652 A.2d at 823
(concluding that an assistance requirement is unnecessary when determining a prisoner's
competence for execution).
100. 501 U.S. 1239 (1991).
101. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
102. Id. at 1241-42.
103. Id. at 1241.
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Utilizing similar reasoning, some state courts also require an assis-
tance prong. In State v. Harris,'0 4 the Supreme Court of Washington
adopted a version of the Powell test, and added the requirement that
an inmate have the ability to communicate with counsel in order to be
competent to receive the death penalty. °5 The Harris court noted
that at trial, a defendant's ability to assist in his defense is a minimum
requirement because it ensures that the defendant is able to relate
past events to his attorney.1"6 The Harris court determined that a sim-
ilar showing is necessary in post conviction proceedings to preserve
fairness and defendants' due process rights, as well as to protect state
interests in the finality ofjudicial decisions.107 Similarly, in Singleton v.
State,'08 the Supreme Court of South Carolina adopted an "assistance
prong," requiring that to be found competent, a prisoner must have
the capacity to rationally communicate with counsel. 0 9 In support of
this requirement, the court cited to American Bar Association (ABA)
standards that include an assistance requirement, and the assistance
prong's extensive common law background.110
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In Walton v. Johnson, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision of
the district court and held that Walton, a death row prisoner, was
mentally competent to be executed."' In finding that the district
court applied the proper legal standard, the Fourth Circuit adopted
the test for mental competency that Justice Powell proposed in his
concurrence in Ford v. Wainwright.'2 Under this standard, in order to
104. 789 P.2d 60 (Wash. 1990).
105. Id. at 66.
106. Id. at 65-66; see also Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam). In
Dusky, the Supreme Court clarified that to be competent to stand trial, a petitioner must
have an adequate ability to consult with his attorney, reasonably understand their commu-
nications, and "maintain a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings
against him." Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402; see also Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402 (1993)
(noting that a competency requirement aims to ensure that the defendant understands the
proceedings and can help counsel); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (observ-
ing that a defendant's competency to stand trial must be tied to his understanding of the
type of proceedings against him, his ability to consult with his counsel, and his capacity to
assist in his defense).
107. Harris, 789 P.2d at 66.
108. 437 S.E.2d 53 (S.C. 1993).
109. Id. at 58.
110. Id. at 56-58. The ABA standards explain that the assistance requirement ensures
that prisoners maintain the capacity to understand and convey circumstances that would
cause their execution to be unjust. Id. at 55.
111. Walton X, 440 F.3d at 162.
112. Id. at 170.
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receive the death penalty, a prisoner must understand (1) that he is to
be punished by execution and (2) the reason why he is being
punished.'
1 3
Writing for the majority, Judge Shedd opened by addressing Wal-
ton's argument that his mental incompetence and mental retardation
blocked his execution under Ford v. Wainwright and Atkins v. Vir-
ginia."' The court first considered Walton's mental incompetence
claim under Ford."5 Judge Shedd noted that in Ford, the Supreme
Court recognized that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execu-
tion of the insane, and that states must provide an inmate with a con-
stitutionally sufficient level of due process to determine the inmate's
level of mental competence.1 16 In the present case, Judge Shedd em-
phasized, the court treated Walton in accordance with the constitu-
tionally appropriate level of due process.1 1 7
The court then discussed the appropriate standard for determin-
ing whether an inmate is mentally competent and therefore eligible
for execution.' Although Ford lacked a majority agreement, Judge
Shedd asserted that the Supreme Court effectively adopted the test
outlined in Justice Powell's concurrence. 1 9 The court therefore de-
termined that in order to be found mentally competent to be exe-
113. Id. at 173.
114. Id. at 162 (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 401 (1986) (prohibiting the
execution of insane inmates); and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (prohibiting
the execution of mentally retarded inmates)).
115. Id. at 168.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 169. The court noted that contrary to the Florida system struck down in Ford,
the district court provided Walton with an evidentiary hearing and appointed a neutral
expert to examine his mental state. Id.
118. Id. at 170-73.
119. Id. at 170-71 n.10. In reaching this conclusion, the court referred to Greggv. Geor-
gia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), where the Supreme Court explained that "the holding of the
Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judg-
ments on the narrowest grounds," to support the idea that Justice Powell's test in Ford
represents the narrowest agreed upon standard. Walton X 440 F.3d at 170 (citing Gregg,
428 U.S. at 169 n. 15 (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.)). Judge Shedd also empha-
sized the agreement between the plurality and concurring opinions in Ford as to the ratio-
nales behind prohibiting the execution of the insane, which include a lack of retributive
value and the fact that the mentally ill cannot comprehend the justifications for the death
penalty. Id. Additionally, the court referred to the Supreme Court's acknowledgment of
Justice Powell's test in dicta in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 333 (1989), as well as the
test's adoption by several circuits, state legislatures, and state courts. Walton X, 440 F.3d at
171 & nn.11-12. Finally, Judge Shedd dismissed the import of subsequent statements
made by Justice Marshall, who argued that Ford did not actually establish a test for deter-
mining mental incompetence. Id. at 170 n.10.
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cuted, the sole test is whether an inmate comprehends that he is
being sentenced to death and the reasons why. 120
After finding the above test to be the only necessary inquiry, the
court rejected Walton's contention that two additional requirements
were needed to determine competency.12 ' The court first denied
Walton's contention that an inmate must be able to assist in his own
defense to be deemed competent. 22 Judge Shedd instead reasoned
that such a requirement is unnecessary, given the inherent series of
safeguards and procedures in the current criminal system that are de-
signed to protect condemned inmates. 12 3 In light of these safeguards,
the court deemed it unlikely that a defendant could be executed with
knowledge of information or error that might have stayed his
execution. 
24
Next, the court rejected Walton's proposal that an inmate must
be able to mentally and spiritually prepare for his passing in order to
be executed. 21 In refusing to adopt this requirement, the court con-
cluded that there is nothing in Ford to suggest such a specific in-
quiry, 126 and as a result, the Eighth Amendment does not mandate
that an inmate must have the mental capacity to prepare for his pass-
ing in order to be executed. 127
Finding that the correct legal test had been applied, the court
evaluated the district court's factual findings using a narrow scope of
review.' 28 Judge Shedd noted that the district court made a thorough
examination into Walton's mental state, which included hearings and
the appointment of a neutral expert.129 Consequently, Judge Shedd
concluded that it was unlikely that the lower court made a mistake
when it determined that Walton was competent to be executed.'
120. Id. at 173.
121. Id. at 172.
122. Id.
123. Id. For example, Judge Shedd referred to the extensive procedural history of Wal-
ton's case as evidence of the protective nature of the criminal justice system. Id
124. Id. (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 420 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring)).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 173.
128. Id. The court applied the clear error standard of review. Id. (citingJiminez v. Mary
Washington Coll., 57 F.3d 369, 378-79 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that factual findings by
district courts are determinative on appeal "unless they are plainly wrong")). Under such a
standard, a district court's factual determination may be reversed only if the appellate
court is left with a "definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Id. at
173-74 (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
129. Id. at 174.
130. Id.
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The court also responded to the dissent's proposed requirement
that an inmate's competency should be tied to an understanding that
his execution will result in the end of his physical life. 13' The court
dismissed this proposition, noting that case law does not support the
dissent's assertion that a broader inquiry into the meaning of death is
necessary. 3 2 Finally, the court addressed whether Walton was men-
tally retarded under Virginia law. 133 The court found that Walton had
failed to allege sufficient facts to uphold such a claim, and affirmed
the district court's dismissal of Walton's mental retardation claim.' 34
Judge Wilkinson concurred in the judgment, but wrote individu-
ally to stress that the court's application of the Powell test was appro-
priate because it did not venture into philosophical spheres. 1 5 Judge
Wilkinson emphasized that a more specific inquiry into the meaning
of death was not only beyond the scope of judicial responsibility, but
also unrealistic due to the abundance of viewpoints on death. 136
In a separate concurrence, Judge Williams discussed why she be-
lieved the dissent's proposed test on the meaning of death was
flawed.1 3 1 Judge Williams explained that Justice Powell's Ford test
does not require a definition of death.3 8 She also stated that the dis-
sent's test failed to recognize that many individuals understand death
in unscientific terms, and thus, requiring such a definition would
force district courts to evaluate the meaning of complicated non-legal
concepts. 1
39
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Wilkins argued that based
on the evidence, Walton may not understand that execution will result
131. Id. at 175.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 176. The current Virginia statute prohibits the execution of an inmate who
can demonstrate significant "subaverage intellectual functioning" and "significant limita-
tions in adaptive behavior" by the age of eighteen. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1 (A)
(2006).
134. Walton X, 440 F.3d at 178. To support this finding, the court observed that Walton
did not produce sufficient evidence that his IQ score before the age of eighteen was
equivalent to that of a mentally retarded individual. Id. at 177-78.
135. Id. at 179 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 179 (Williams, J., concurring).
138. Id. at 179-80. Judge Williams also observed that the cases cited by the dissent in
support of its position simply require that a defendant must understand the "nature" of the
death penalty, and do not include a definition of death. Id. at 180.
139. Id. at 180. Judge Williams believed that the dissent's test would require a judicial
inquiry into a religious, poetic, or metaphysical examination of death and afterlife that is
inappropriate and unrealistic. Id. at 180-81.
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in the end of his physical life. 4 ' Thus, Judge Wilkins proposed that
Walton's case should be remanded to determine Walton's under-
standing of death."' ChiefJudge Wilkins disputed the perspective in
Judge Williams's concurrence that the physical life inquiry is too sub-
jective by arguing that the definition focuses strictly on the physical
state of the body.' 1 2 According to ChiefJudge Wilkins, because of the
rarity of this particular case, 14 3 and the conflicting testimony of the
many psychiatrists who examined Walton, the evidence necessitated a
further inquiry into Walton's understanding that execution will put an
end to his physical existence.1 4
4
IV. ANALYSIS
In Walton v. Johnson, the Fourth Circuit adopted and applied Jus-
tice Powell's Ford test to an inmate's mental incompetence claim. 145
The court's adoption of Justice Powell's test was appropriate because
it is consistent with both Supreme Court precedent and the objectives
of capital punishment. 4 6 However, the Fourth Circuit should have
also adopted a third prong to the test, requiring that an inmate be
able to assist in his own defense.' 4 7 Adding an assistance requirement
furthers the rationales behind the death penalty and promotes consis-
tency across the criminal process.148 By rejecting an assistance re-
quirement, the Fourth Circuit failed to look beyond the specific facts
of Walton's case and include a crucial safeguard to prevent the execu-
tion of prisoners who may be unjustly sentenced to death. 49
140. Id. at 182 (Wilkins, CJ., dissenting). Judges Michael, Motz, Traxler, King, and
Gregory also joined in dissent. Id. at 162. Although Chief Judge Wilkins agreed with the
majority's adoption of the Powell test, he explained that a prisoner about to be executed
must also understand that death means "the end of his physical life." Id. at 184 (Wilkins,
C.J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 183. Judge Wilkins cited several cases to support his view that in order to be
executed, Walton must understand that death will result in the end of his physical life. Id.
at 184-85.
142. Id. at 187. Objectively, in Chief Judge Wilkins's view, this refers to a cessation of
heart and brain activity. Id.
143. Chief Judge Wilkins observed that this could be the rare case where the prisoner
could state that he is to be executed, but not understand that this means the end of his
physical life. Id. at 186.
144. Id. at 187-91.
145. Id. at 170, 173 (majority opinion); see infra Part IV.A.
146. See infra Part V.A.
147. See infta Part IV.B.
148. See infra Part IV.B.
149. See infta Part LV.C.
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A. The Fourth Circuit Appropriately Adopted and Applied Justice
Powell's Test to Determine an Inmate's Mental Competence
In Walton v. Johnson, the Fourth Circuit correctly adopted and
used Justice Powell's two-part Ford test to determine whether a pris-
oner is mentally competent to be executed.15 ° The court properly
adopted Justice Powell's test because his standard represents the Su-
preme Court's narrowest common position in Ford v. Wainwright. 5'
In Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme Court observed that when the Court
fails to reach a majority decision, the holding is viewed as the position
taken by the members who concurred in the judgment on the narrow-
est grounds. 152 In Ford, Justice Powell believed that at a minimum, a
prisoner must be aware of the punishment he is about to suffer and
must understand why he is to suffer such punishment.' The Ford
Court's four member plurality also observed that there is no value in
executing a prisoner who does not understand why he is being pun-
ished by death. 54 As a result, five members of the Court agreed upon
the premise behindJustice Powell's concurrence 155 and therefore, the
Fourth Circuit properly adopted Justice Powell's test in Walton.
The Walton court's use of Justice Powell's test was also prudent
because the test is consistent with the rationales behind the death
penalty.' 56 In Gregg and subsequent cases, the Supreme Court empha-
sized that only the most culpable individuals should be sentenced to
death in order to advance the retributive and deterrent goals of capi-
tal punishment.157 Justice Powell's test as applied in Walton aims to
ensure that an inmate is aware of the connection between his crime
and punishment.5 ' An acknowledgement of a prisoner's awareness
of the association between his crime and death sentence satisfies the
150. Walton X, 440 F.3d at 170, 173.
151. 477 U.S. 399, 422 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
152. 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (plurality opinion). The Court subsequently recog-
nized the narrowest grounds doctrine in Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
153. Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 417 (plurality opinion).
155. See Coe v. Bell, 209 F.3d 815, 818 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating that federal courts are
obligated to adopt Justice Powell's test because it is the position taken by the majority of
the members of the court who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds).
156. See, e.g., Richard J. Bonnie, Mentally Ill Prisoners on Death Row: Unsolved Puzzles for
Courts and Legislatures, 54 CATH. U. L. REv. 1169, 1172 (2005) (noting that a majority of
commentators agree that Justice Powell's competence test is based on the retributive goal
of punishment).
157. See supra Part II.A.
158. See Walton X 440 F.3d at 172-73; see also Martin v. Dugger, 686 F. Supp. 1523, 1570
(S.D. Fla. 1988) (noting that when a defendant understands the connection between his
crime and punishment, the retributive and deterrent aspects of the death penalty are
served).
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goals of the death penalty by confirming that a prisoner is conscious
of his actions.1
5 9
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit appropriately employed Justice
Powell's two-part test because this narrow interpretation promotes a
relatively objective inquiry into a prisoner's mental state.' 6 ' The use
of an objective standard is advantageous because it allows a court to
utilize straightforward language and refrain from inquiries into the
meaning of death.' 61 The court properly rejected the dissent's propo-
sal of a broader interpretation of Justice Powell's test, including a
demonstration that an inmate understands the meaning of death.
162
A broader inquiry could venture into highly subjective discussions
about death and the afterlife.' 63 Potentially subjective discussions
would place an unnecessary burden on the judiciary by requiring
courts to examine non-scientific standards and beliefs on death.' 64
Also, a broader inquiry would inappropriately permit judges to insert
their personal opinions and beliefs into an end-of-life analysis that is
beyond the scope of the judiciary.' 65
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit's narrow application of Justice
Powell's test is beneficial not only to courts, but also to mental health
professionals who must engage in competency determinations. 66 A
number of mental health professionals are critical of the relationship
between law and psychiatry, especially within the context of insanity
proceedings and the death penalty.'6 7 One commentator notes that
the absence of coherent or workable standards contributes to the
problem.168 Thus, the Fourth Circuit's attempt to remain objective
through the adoption ofJustice Powell's test furthers the goal of estab-
159. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring).
160. Walton , 440 F.3d at 179 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
161. Cf Roberta M. Harding, "Endgame": Competency and the Execution of Condemned In-
mates-A Proposal to Satisfy the Eighth Amendment's Prohibition Against the Infliction of Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, 14 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. Rxv. 105, 135 (1994) (finding Justice Powell's
standard to be narrow and noting that the competence test focuses exclusively on a pris-
oner's cognitive abilities).
162. Walton X, 440 F.3d at 175.
163. Id. at 180-81 (Williams, J., concurring).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 179 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
166. Cf Douglas Mossman, The Psychiatrist and Execution Competency: Fording Murky Ethi-
cal Waters, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1992) (noting that mental competency determi-
nations for prisoners raise considerable practical and procedural problems and as a result
many professionals believe that psychiatrists should not participate in such proceedings).
167. See Barbara A. Ward, Competency for Execution: Problems in Law and Psychiatry, 14 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 35, 76 (1986) (recognizing a "heated debate" behind the participation of
mental health professionals in competency proceedings).
168. Id.
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lishing a practical standard for psychiatrists to use when evaluating
prisoners' competency on death row.
B. The Fourth Circuit Should Have Adopted an Additional Assistance
Requirement to Determine Mental Competence to be Executed
Although the Fourth Circuit properly required that a prisoner be
aware of the punishment he is about to suffer and why, the Walton
court erred by failing to add a third prong mandating that a prisoner
be able to assist in his own defense.' 69 The Fourth Circuit should
have adopted a third prong in Walton because an assistance require-
ment serves to further the rationales behind the death penalty and
promotes consistency throughout criminal proceedings.' 7
An assistance requirement promotes the justifications for the
death penalty by ensuring that only the most blameworthy criminals
will be executed.17 ' An assistance prong accomplishes this goal by cer-
tifying that an inmate is able to convey any information or circum-
stances that might diminish his level of culpability.1 72 Without an
assistance requirement, there is a grave danger of executing a pris-
oner who is not categorized among the most culpable.1 73 This danger
was historically recognized as the primary motivation behind the pro-
hibition against executing the insane.' 74 In Walton, the Fourth Circuit
169. See Walton X 440 F.3d at 172 (rejecting an assistance requirement). See generally
Bonnie, supra note 156, at 1177 (noting that many courts and commentators have added
an assistance requirement to justice Powell's test).
170. See infra notes 171, 182.
171. Cf Harding, supra note 161, at 136 (explaining that a "functional" assistance re-
quirement examines a prisoner's ability to communicate possibly "exculpatory or mitigat-
ing information").
172. Id.
173. Id. at 136-37. An example of this possibility is illustrated in a study by psychiatrist
Dorothy Lewis. Id. at 136. The study focused on condemned inmates and found that all
study participants suffered from various psychiatric disorders that were not discovered
before trial. Id. Several of the inmates reported that they did not realize that information
on their mental status was relevant and as a result did not convey the information to coun-
sel. Id. at 136-37. The results of the Lewis study demonstrate that individuals may be able
to understand why something is occurring, but they may not have the capacity to commu-
nicate effectively with their attorneys. Id at 137. If these inmates had effectively communi-
cated with their counsel prior to trial and sentencing, the inmates may not have received a
death sentence. Id. Instead, without an assistance requirement the same injustice contin-
ues at post-sentencing proceedings. Id. at 136-37.
174. See id, at 137 (suggesting that history supports the addition of an assistance require-
ment to the Ford test); John E. Theuman, Annotation, Propriety of Carrying Out Death
Sentences Against Mentally Ill Individuals, 111 A.L.R. 5th 491, 500 (2003) (noting that early
common law decisions regarding mental competence to be executed applied a dual test-
first, whether the prisoner was able to comprehend the nature and purpose of the pro-
ceedings and the penalty, and second, whether the prisoner could assist in his own de-
fense); see also Grammer v. Fenton, 178 N.W. 624, 626 (Neb. 1920) (noting the prohibition
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failed to consider the historical importance of an assistance require-
ment and its direct connection to the objectives of the death penalty.
The court should have adopted a third prong to ensure that a pris-
oner's punishment is proportional to his crime and that the prisoner
deserves the death sentence.
175
Further support for the adoption of a third prong is found in the
recent case of Atkins v. Virginia, in which the Supreme Court recog-
nized a connection between an assistance requirement and the ratio-
nales behind the death penalty. 176 In Atkins, the Court acknowledged
two justifications in support of the restriction against executing men-
tally retarded individuals. 177 These justifications centered on the no-
tion that individuals with a reduced mental capacity are unable to
fulfill the goals of retribution and deterrence, and additionally may be
unable to provide meaningful assistance to their attorneys.77 Al-
though the mentally retarded and mentally insane are two separate
classifications of individuals, commentators suggest that the principles
and reasoning supporting the Court's decision in Atkins are applicable
to the mentally ill.'1 7  In Walton, the Fourth Circuit should have ac-
knowledged the Court's recent emphasis on the importance of an as-
sistance requirement in the context of mental capacity and extended
it to prisoners who are mentally ill in order to ensure that only the
most blameworthy prisoners are executed.
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit should have adopted an assis-
tance requirement because the standard promotes consistency and
against executing the insane exists because such individuals are incapable of saying any-
thing to stay their execution); Bingham v. State, 169 P.2d 311, 314 (Okla. Crim. App. 1946)
(recognizing that common law deemed it inappropriate to execute those who cannot
make a defense, and instead required that inmates have the intelligence to convey informa-
tion to their attorneys or the court).
175. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Ste-
vens, JJ.).
176. 536 U.S. 304, 319-20 (2002).
177. Id. at 318-21.
178. Id. at 320-21.
179. E.g., Ronald J. Tabak, Overview of Task Force Proposal on Mental Disability and the Death
Penalty, 54 CATH. U. L. REv. 1123, 1123 (2005). Following the Atkins decision, the ABA
established a Task Force to consider issues of mental competence and the death penalty.
Id.; see also Recommendations of the American Bar Association Section of Individual Rights and
Responsibilities Task Force on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty, 54 CATH. U. L. REv. 1115
(2005). The Task Force concluded that when a mental disorder arises after sentencing, a
prisoner's ability to assist counsel by understanding and communicating relevant informa-
tion in relation to legal proceedings is essential for a competency determination. Id. at
1116. Tabak suggests that the Task Force determined that without an assistance require-
ment, it would be "fundamentally unfair" to decide claims against a mentally ill prisoner
because a different outcome may have been reached had the prisoner been able to prop-
erly communicate with his attorney. Tabak, supra, at 1131.
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uniformity throughout the criminal justice process.'" 0 At trial, a de-
fendant is required to be able to consult with his lawyer and assist in
the preparation of his own defense. 1 ' Extending an assistance re-
quirement to post-sentencing competency determinations would al-
low courts to apply a uniform standard throughout the criminal
proceedings. 1 2 Thus, the Fourth Circuit should have adopted an as-
sistance requirement to create a threshold standard for competence
that serves to promote the death penalty's goal of executing only
those prisoners who are most culpable.
C. The Fourth Circuit's Failure to Adopt an Assistance Requirement
Puts Future Prisoners at Risk
In eschewing an assistance requirement, the Fourth Circuit failed
to consider future mental competency cases in which prisoners may
be unjustly sentenced to death. The court should have adopted an
assistance requirement to protect subsequent inmates whose guilt or
factual circumstances may not be as certain as Walton's case.18 An
assistance requirement is necessary to protect inmates in future cases
who have knowledge that could make their death sentence unjust, but
as a result of insanity, are unable to convey that information to their
lawyers. 18
4
Instead, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the benefits of an assistance
requirement.1 8 5 In his majority opinion in Walton, Judge Shedd cited
to Walton's high number of direct appeals and habeas petitions and
argued that such procedures served as a safeguard for prisoners, ren-
dering an assistance prong unnecessary."8 6 While these safeguards
180. Cf State v. Harris, 789 P.2d 60, 65-66 (Wash. 1990) (suggesting that a defendant's
ability to assist counsel at post-conviction proceedings is equally as important as the same
ability at trial).
181. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam) (explaining that
the proper test for competency to stand trial is whether a defendant has sufficient ability to
consult with his lawyer and a rational understanding of the charges against him).
182. See, e.g., Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 408 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(noting that a single standard for competency in both the pleading and trial processes will
likely promote fairness in the criminal justice system).
183. In Walton's case, the physical evidence establishing his participation in multiple
murders was overwhelming and Walton pled guilty to the charges. See supra Part I. How-
ever, it is not difficult to imagine a case with less convincing physical evidence and where
the defendant refutes the charges.
184. See Harding, supra note 161, at 137 (noting that the prevalence of unknown mental
conditions in convicted prisoners suggests that an assistance requirement will help ferret
out those that are unable to communicate possible exculpatory information with counsel).
185. Walton X 440 F.3d at 172.
186. Id.
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may have been in place for Walton, not all inmates are afforded the
same protection. 1
7
In Walton, the evidence of Walton's guilt was overwhelming. Not
only did Walton himself plead guilty to three murders, but the police
also obtained substantial physical evidence linking Walton to the
crimes. 188 However, such convincing guilt is not always present.'89
The United States criminal justice system grants judges and juries
broad discretion to make guilt and sentencing determinations. 9 ' As
a result, human error may cause innocent individuals to be pun-
ished.'9 1 Some experts have estimated that one innocent person may
be exonerated for every seven individuals who are executed. 9 2 One
study on the execution of innocent inmates cites to over four hundred
cases in which individuals were wrongfully convicted in capital or po-
tentially capital cases.' 93 The real potential of executing innocent in-
dividuals militates against the Fourth Circuit's narrow focus on
Walton's case and should have prompted the majority to adopt an
assistance requirement to protect future inmates who are unable to
convey information that could potentially reduce a death sentence.
The Walton court should have also considered two additional real-
ities of the criminal justice system that bolster the need for an assis-
tance requirement. First, the presence of mentally ill prisoners on
death row is not an isolated problem.' 94 Facts in certain cases indicate
that a positive correlation may exist between mental illness and im-
prisonment on death row.1 95 Often capital inmates live in seclusion
and "experience a lack of exercise, poor diet," and strained social in-
teractions, 196 all of which are conditions conducive to insanity. 19 7 For
example, "it has been estimated that as many as fifty percent of Flor-
ida's death row inmates become intermittently insane."' 98 As a conse-
187. See infra notes 200-202 and accompanying text.
188. See supra Part I.
189. See generally Bernard A. Williams, Guilty Until Proven Innocent: The Tragedy of Habeas
Capital Appeals, 18 J.L. & POL. 773 (2002) (reviewing the death penalty trial process and
finding that mistakes often result in death sentences for innocent defendants).
190. Id. at 787-89.
191. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 367 & n.158 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
192. Jean Coleman Blackerby, Note, Life After Death Row: Preventing Wrongful Capital Con-
victions and Restoring Innocence After Exoneration, 56 VAND. L. REv. 1179, 1183-84 (2003).
193. Michael L. Radelet & Hugo Adam Bedau, The Execution of the Innocent, 61 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 105 (1998).
194. See Ward, supra note 167, at 37-38.
195. Id. at 42.
196. Id. at 38.
197. Harding, supra note 161, at 115-16 (suggesting that confinement on death row
creates an environment conducive to mental incapacitation).
198. See Ward, supra note 167, at 42.
2007] 1325
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
quence, these individuals are often too mentally ill to assist in the
preparation of their own appeals.1 99
Second, in a significant number of capital cases, defendants fail
to receive adequate representation. 2"0 Statistics reveal that a number
of death row prisoners receive representation from attorneys who are
later disbarred or disciplined.2 ' For example, in Kentucky, this num-
ber is estimated at almost twenty-five percent.20 2 In capital cases, an
assistance requirement is essential to ensure that inmates are able to
effectively convey information to the court, regardless of the quality of
counsel.
In Walton, the Fourth Circuit should have considered the statisti-
cal probability that there are inmates on death row who are unjustly
sentenced to death and who may have a heightened possibility of
mental illness and received inadequate representation. An assistance
requirement could combat these potential problems and reduce the
probability of unjust death sentences.
V. CONCLUSION
In Walton v. Johnson, the Fourth Circuit held that in order to be
competent to be executed, a prisoner must be aware of the punish-
ment he is about to suffer and why.203 Taken from Justice Powell's
concurrence in Ford v. Wainwright, this legal standard has been
adopted by a majority of courts that have considered the same is-
sue.2 0 4 Although the Fourth Circuit appropriately adopted and ap-
plied this two-part test, the Walton court should have additionally
required that a prisoner demonstrate that he is able to assist in his
own defense. 205 Requiring that a prisoner be able to assist in his own
defense finds support in common law, serves to further the rationales
behind the death penalty, and promotes consistency across criminal
proceedings. 206 By failing to adopt an assistance requirement, the
199. Id.
200. Michael L. Perlin, "The Executioner's Face is Always Well-Hidden". The Role of Counsel
and the Courts in Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rv. 201, 202 (1996). Problems
with inadequate representation in capital cases include inexperienced representation, lack
of legal knowledge, failure to investigate basic threshold issues, a lack of advocacy on ques-
tions of guilt, and the failure to present arguments for life at sentencing. Id. at 205 (quot-
ing American Bar Association Policy Recommendations on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, 40 AM. U.
L. REv. 53, 66 (1990)).
201. Id. at 204.
202. Id.
203. Walton X, 440 F.3d at 170, 173.
204. See supra Part II.C.
205. See supra Part IV.A-B.
206. See supra Part LV.B.
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court neglected to protect future prisoners who may be unjustly sen-
tenced to death.2 °7
CHRISTINE I. BETZING
207. See supra Part V.C.
BALTIMORE SUN CO. v. EHRLICH: A DEPARTURE FROM
UNIFORM FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS AT
THE EXPENSE OF A DISFAVORED PROFESSION
In Baltimore Sun Co. v. Ehrlich,' the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit considered whether a Governor-issued directive
instructing all executive state government employees to cease commu-
nications with two Baltimore Sun reporters constituted unconstitutional
retaliation for the reporters' exercise of their First Amendment
rights.2 The court held that the Governor's action did not constitute
retaliation because a government official may freely deny a reporter
access to discretionarily afforded information when he or she dis-
agrees with the reporter's published viewpoint.3 Although the Fourth
Circuit ostensibly followed the settled test for First Amendment retali-
ation claims, it significantly altered the test by creating an entirely new
distinction between the ordinary citizen and the ordinary reporter.4
The court's creation of such a distinction is problematic in three
ways. First, the court overlooked First Amendment precedent indicat-
ing that no legal distinction exists between reporters and ordinary citi-
zens.5 Second, the court allowed the distinction to influence its
conclusion that accepting the plaintiff's case would create a cause of
action for virtually every interaction between the Governor and the
press, and thus overburden the courts and seriously interfere with reg-
ular business operations of executive governments.6 Finally, the court
ignored the judicially articulated purposes of the objective adverse im-
pact test by expressing the relevant standard as that of an ordinary
reporter, rather than that of an ordinary citizen.7 Ultimately, by in-
venting a distinction between reporters and ordinary citizens for pur-
poses of retaliation jurisprudence, the court carved out a particular
class of plaintiffs-in this case, reporters-and excluded them from
having recourse for what would normally be considered retaliatory ac-
tion if taken against an ordinary citizen.'
Copyright © 2007 by Arnalia L. Fenton.
1. 437 F.3d 410 (4th Cir. 2006).
2. Id. at 413.
3. Id. at 420.
4. See infra Part V.A.
5. See infra Part IV.A.
6. See infra Part IV.B.
7. See infra Part IV.C.
8. See infra Part I.C.
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I. THE CASE
On November 18, 2004, Maryland Governor Robert L. Ehrlich,
Jr. issued a directive prohibiting any employee in the state govern-
ment executive department or its agencies from speaking with Balti-
more Sun reporter David Nitkin or columnist Michael Olesker.9
Governor Ehrlich indicated that he drafted the directive in response
to Nitkin and Olesker's past articles criticizing the Governor's admin-
istration.'° After the Governor issued the directive, state government
employees who regularly spoke to Nitkin and Olesker refused to do
so." Olesker and Nitkin alleged that the employees in the Governor's
Press Office who had formerly communicated with them refused to
answer their phone calls or e-mails.12 Moreover, when Nitkin was able
to reach executive employees, those employees told him that they
could not speak to him because of the Governor's ban.' 3
The directive applied only to Nitkin and Olesker, as all other Sun
reporters' communications with the executive department remained
unchanged.' 4 For example, Nitkin testified that the Governor ex-
cluded him from several press briefings that were open to other Sun
reporters.15 The directive, however, did not cut off all access to infor-
mation, as the state government continued to respond to requests
under Maryland's Public Information Act as legally required. 6
In December 2004, the Baltimore Sun Company, Nitkin, and
Olesker (collectively, the Sun) sued Governor Ehrlich, Deputy Direc-
tor of Communications Gregory Massoni, and Press Secretary
Shareese DeLeaver (collectively, the Governor) in response to the di-
rective. 7 The Sun sought preliminary and permanent injunctions
against enforcement of the Governor's directive, claiming that the di-
9. Bait. Sun, 437 F.3d at 413.
10. Id. Explaining the reason for the ban, the directive stated: "The Governor's Press
Office feels that currently both [Nitkin and Olesker] are failing to objectively report on
any issue dealing with the Ehrlich-[Lieutenant Governor Michael] Steele Administration."
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, during a press interview, Ehrlich ex-
pressly referred to limiting reporters' access as the only "arrow in [his] quiver," which
suggested that the ban against Olesker and Nitkin was intended to chill future speech by
the two reporters. Id. at 420 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
11. Balt. Sun Co. v. Ehrlich, 356 F. Supp. 2d 577, 579 (D. Md. 2005).
12. See Bait. Sun, 437 F.3d at 413-14.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 414.
15. Id. Although Nitkin received invitations to public press conferences and press
briefings, he was excluded from several press briefings conducted in the Governor's con-
ference room in December 2004 and early January 2005. Id.; Bait. Sun, 356 F. Supp. 2d at
579-80.
16. Bait. Sun, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 579-80.
17. Bait. Sun, 437 F.3d at 413.
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rective was an unconstitutional retaliation against the reporters for ex-
ercising their First Amendment right of free speech."8
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland
granted the Governor's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, and denied the Sun's request for a
preliminary injunction. 9 In so doing, the district court focused pri-
marily on the absence of any constitutionally protected right of access
to information.2 0 The district court emphasized that reporters have
no legal right of access to any information within an administration's
control. 21 Furthermore, the opinion stated that in bringing suit, the
Sun was demanding a greater degree of access than that accorded to
ordinary citizens.22 The Sun appealed the decision to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.23 The issue on appeal
was whether the district court erred in finding that a reporter has no
actionable claim when a government official issues a directive denying
access to information regularly supplied to other, similarly situated re-
porters for the stated reason that the public official disagrees with the
reporter's published point of view.24
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The First Amendment protects citizens from governmental ac-
tions that "abridge[ ] the freedom of speech. '25 Initially, First Amend-
ment retaliation jurisprudence was concentrated most frequently in
the employment context.26 Subsequently, courts began to apply the
principles of the retaliation claim to situations outside the employ-
ment context based on the underlying policy reasons for the rule.2 7
After expanding the retaliation claim to both employment and non-
employment situations, courts arrived at the modern state of retalia-
tion jurisprudence which incorporates not only the basic rule, but also
two limiting principles to balance the competing speech rights of ac-
tors and claimants. 28 Throughout the evolution of First Amendment
18. Id.
19. Balt. Sun, 356 F. Supp. 2d at 578.
20. Id. at 580.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 582.
23. Balt. Sun, 437 F.3d at 415.
24. See id. at 413-15.
25. U.S. CONsr. amend. I. The First Amendment applies to the states via the Four-
teenth Amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
26. See infra Part H.A.
27. See infta Part II.B.
28. See infra Part II.C.
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jurisprudence, the Supreme Court of the United States has consist-
ently held that members of the press enjoy no greater or lesser speech
protections than those enjoyed by the public generally. 29
A. Origin of the Pickering Balancing Test
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan," the Supreme Court endorsed a
broad reading of the First Amendment to accomplish the fundamen-
tal goal of uninhibited debate on matters of public importance.31 New
York Times involved a libel claim brought by a city commissioner of
Montgomery, Alabama, against the New York Times for running a series
of editorial advertisements in favor of the civil rights movement and
critical of government officials.32 The Supreme Court ruled against
the commissioner, denying his libel claims and curtailing the availabil-
ity of damages for libel to protect the newspaper's free speech inter-
ests." The New York Times Court emphasized the importance of
uninhibited public debate in the representational form of govern-
ment, even when that speech is critical of government officials.34 The
Court further noted that criticism of government in particular is a
central concern of free speech protections.35
On the heels of the New York Times decision, the Supreme Court
recognized the retaliation cause of action in Pickering v. Board of Educa-
tion.36 In Pickering, the Supreme Court examined whether a county
board of education could legally dismiss Pickering, a teacher, for writ-
ing and publishing a letter in a local newspaper criticizing the board's
handling of fundraising.37 In finding a clear infringement of Picker-
ing's right to free speech, the Court emphasized that the threat of
discharge from public employment was as effective a limitation on
free speech as an outright prohibition of that speech.38
The Court in Pickering cited New York Times in its discussion of the
reasoning behind the retaliation rule.39 Relying on the underlying
29. See infra Part I.D.
30. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
31. See id. at 270 (noting that the Constitution evinces a "profound national commit-
ment" to the protection of free speech, that free and open debate is a cornerstone of an
effective democracy, and that such debate often centers around criticism of government
officials).
32. Id. at 256.
33. Id. at 279-80, 292.
34. Id. at 270.
35. See id.
36. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
37. Id. at 564.
38. Id. at 574.
39. Id. at 573-74.
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principle that the First Amendment protection of free speech should
be interpreted broadly, the Pickering Court accepted Pickering's retali-
ation claim. 40 The Court noted that without the retaliation cause of
action, the government could inhibit free speech simply by threaten-
ing dismissal, and employees will temper their speech to avoid adverse
government action.41 Thus, the Pickering Court articulated a balanc-
ing test for retaliation claims where the government's interest in main-
taining workplace order is balanced against the employee's speech
interest.
42
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Pickering balancing test and
added an additional element in Perry v. Sindermann" In Perry, the
Court examined whether an untenuredjunior college professor's dis-
missal for his public criticism of the college's policies ran afoul of the
First Amendment.44 In finding for the professor, the Court stated that
there was no constitutional significance to the professor's lack of ten-
ure and, thus, lack of a legally protected right to continued employ-
ment.45 The Court emphasized that the retaliation rule was not
grounded in a right to a particular benefit, but rather in preventing
government officials from denying valuable benefits for the purpose
of curtailing citizens' future exercises of their speech rights.46
Thus, the Supreme Court's original articulation of the Pickering
test involved a balancing of the employer's right to maintain an or-
derly workplace against the employee's right to freely comment on
matters of public concern where those comments do not interfere
with his or her work, recognizing that the employee need not have a
legally enforceable right to employment in order to have a cognizable
retaliation claim.47
B. Extension of the Pickering Test to Cases Outside of the Employment
Context
After developing the basic contours of the retaliation claim in the
employment context, the Supreme Court subsequently extended the
retaliation claim to protect against indirect infringement of First
Amendment rights in other settings. This extension began incre-
40. Id.
41. See id. at 574.
42. Id. at 568-69.
43. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
44. Id. at 596.
45. Id. at 597-99.
46. Id. at 597.
47. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568; Perry, 408 U.S. at 597-98.
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mentally with Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr,48 in which the
Supreme Court confronted the issue of whether to apply the Pickering
test to the Board of County Commissioners' decision not to renew a
contract with an independent contractor who exercised his speech
rights to criticize the Board.4 9 The Court analogized the independent
contractors' relationship with the government to that of employees,
emphasizing that the government cannot withhold valuable benefits
in order to suppress the exercise of speech rights, even where there is
no legal entitlement to those benefits.5 ° In Umbehr, the Court applied
the Pickering test to the independent contractor, noting that the gov-
ernment's interest as employer and the contractor's interest as
speaker are similar to the interests involved in an actual employment
context.
5
'
In its opinion, the Umbehr Court recognized that the level of def-
erence owed to the government in retaliation cases depends directly
upon the closeness of the government's relationship with the
speaker. 52 The Court explained that where the government acts as an
employer, the retaliation analysis requires a balancing of interests;
however, where the government interacts with an ordinary citizen, the
government rarely has a legitimate reason for suppressing speech.
The Fourth Circuit echoed the Supreme Court's emphasis on the
relationship between the retaliated-against and the retaliator in Suarez
Corp. Industries v. McGraw.54 The Suarez court addressed the question
of whether allegedly defamatory remarks made by two high-ranking
individuals in the West Virginia Attorney General's office against a di-
rect mail marketer constituted unconstitutional retaliation.5 5 The
Suarez court stated that the retaliation analysis turns in part on a fac-
tual inquiry as to the relationship between the government and the
retaliated-against, specifically noting that an employment relationship
involves competing interests not relevant in a non-employment
context.
56
The Fourth Circuit applied its reasoning in Suarez to the actions
taken by a law school against a student in Constantine v. Rectors and
48. 518 U.S. 668 (1996).
49. Id. at 670-71.
50. Id. at 674.
51. See id. at 673, 680.
52. Id. at 680.
53. Id.
54. 202 F.3d 676, 686 (4th Cir. 2000).
55. Id. at 682-83.
56. Id. at 686-89.
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Visitors of George Mason University.5 7 The student alleged that she was
improperly denied certain grade grievance procedures because of her
public criticism of the school's policies.5 8 The court did not engage in
a Pickering balancing analysis due to the lack of an employee-employer
relationship as was found in Umbehr.5 9 Instead, the court focused
solely on the adverse effect of the government's action.6 ° Specifically,
the analysis focused on whether the school's actions had the effect of
"chilling" the student's exercise of her speech rights, with no mention
of whether the school had a legitimate interest in curtailing her
speech.6 ' Thus, the Constantine court, like the Suarez court, implicitly
differentiated between retaliation claims in an employment context
and those arising where the government acts solely as sovereign
against a private citizen.
6 2
The Constantine court articulated the modern test for retaliation
claims outside the employment setting as distinct from the Pickering
balancing test.6" Under the Constantine court's formulation, a plaintiff
in a non-employment context seeking to recover for First Amendment
retaliation must show: (1) that the plaintiff's speech was protected;
(2) that the government official's alleged retaliatory action "adversely
affected" the plaintiff's protected speech rights; and (3) that a causal
relationship existed between the plaintiffs speech and the defen-
64dant's retaliatory action.
57. 411 F.3d 474, 500-01 (4th Cir. 2005).
58. Id. at 478, 499. Carin Constantine suffered from "intractable migraine syndrome"
and experienced a migraine during her constitutional law final examination. Id. at 478.
As a result, she requested a re-examination pursuant to George Mason University's grade
appeals process. See id. When her initial request was denied, Constantine publicly criti-
cized the school's grade grievance process in the law school newspaper. Id. When Con-
stantine's request for a re-examination was accepted, the school refused to accommodate
her request to change the date for the re-examination to accommodate her other already
scheduled exams. Id. at 478-79. Constantine claimed that the school had determined in
advance to give her a failing grade on the exam in retaliation for her public criticism of
their policies. Id. at 479.
59. See id. at 500.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 500-01 (applying a "chilling" test in the non-employment context rather
than the Pickeringbalancing test); see also Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 664, 671 (1994)
(plurality opinion) (noting that government employers have more freedom to regulate
employee speech than the speech of the general public); Kirby v. City of Elizabeth City,
388 F.3d 440, 445-46 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating that the Pickering balancing test is utilized in
the employment context because the government, when acting as employer, has legitimate
reasons for restricting employee speech, whereas those reasons are not present in its inter-
actions with general citizens).
63. See Constantine, 411 F.3d at 499 (using a chilling, rather than balancing, analysis).
64. Id.
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C. Modern Retaliation Jurisprudence-Two Limiting Principles
The modern test for a First Amendment retaliation claim both
inside and outside of the employment context involves a considera-
tion of whether a person of ordinary firmness would feel inhibited in
exercising his or her First Amendment rights because of the govern-
ment official's actions.65 Whether an employment relationship exists
has a direct effect on the latitude given to the government to curtail
First Amendment rights-in the employment context, the govern-
ment is granted far more deference than when it is interacting with an
ordinary citizen.6 6 The retaliation analysis is limited in two ways.
First, the Supreme Court limits liability in the employment context
where the alleged retaliatory activity is commonplace.67 Second,
though never expressly adopted by the Supreme Court, most circuit
courts limit liability to only those cases where a sufficient adverse im-
pact can be shown objectively.68
1. The Everyday Interchange Exception
After the initial balancing test articulated in Pickering, the Su-
preme Court created a limitation on the general rule of retaliation
liability to protect the government workplace from a flood of litiga-
tion.6' Courts limit liability when the challenged government action
is so commonplace that finding retaliation liability would create a
cause of action in virtually every day-to-day interaction in the
workplace.7 °
Fifteen years after the landmark Pickering case, the Supreme
Court articulated this limiting principle in Connick v. Myers.7' In Con-
nick, the Court examined whether the New Orleans District Attorney's
Office violated the First Amendment by dismissing an assistant district
attorney for circulating a questionnaire on employee job satisfac-
tion.72 The Court found that although the assistant district attorney,
as a government employee, had some limited First Amendment rights
in the employment setting, these rights were overcome by the govern-
ment employer's important interest in maintaining working relation-
65. See supra Part II.A.
66. See supra Part II.B.
67. See infra Part I.C..
68. See infra Part II.C.2.
69. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-49 (1983) (restricting the type of speech
deemed to be of public concern to quell the potential tide of retaliation litigation).
70. See id. (emphasizing the danger of turning every instance of work-related criticism
in a governmental office into a constitutional claim).
71. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
72. Id. at 140-41.
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ships within the office and preventing workplace disruptions.73 Thus,
the Court found no retaliation claim, emphasizing that the suit was
essentially a case of employee grievance based on a personnel deci-
sion."4 The Court's implication was that to constitutionalize such a
conflict would tend to seriously interfere with the efficient operation
of government.
75
The Fourth Circuit reiterated the Supreme Court's reasoning in
the government-employee retaliation context in DiMeglio v. Haines.76
In DiMeglio, the court found little merit to a county zoning inspector's
retaliation claim, in which he alleged that he was reassigned and de-
nied promotions for exercising his free speech rights. 7 7 The DiMeglio
court reasoned that limiting retaliation liability in circumstances of
day-to-day operations preserves the government-employer's ability to
make business-related personnel decisions without a fear of
litigation.78
2. The Objective Adverse Impact Test
The second limit on the scope of liability in a retaliation claim in
both the employment and non-employment context, though never ex-
pressly adopted by the Supreme Court, is an objective adverse impact
test. Under this test, the existence of a sufficient adverse impact giv-
ing rise to a retaliation claim depends on whether the government
action "would likely deter 'a person of ordinary firmness' from the
exercise of First Amendment rights," and not upon the actual effect
on the plaintiff.79 To satisfy the test, the plaintiff need not produce
actual proof that he or she individually was discouraged from exercis-
73. Id. at 150-52.
74. Id. at 148, 154.
75. Id. at 149-50.
76. 45 F.3d 790 (4th Cir. 1995).
77. Id. at 794, 805-06.
78. Id. at 806; see also Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384-88 (1987) (emphasizing
that where the government is acting as an employer, retaliation liability is limited to speech
touching upon matters of public concern, so as to avoid interfering with the normal opera-
tion of the place of employment).
79. See, e.g., Constantine v. Rectors and Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474,
500 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Washington v. County of Rockland, 373 F.3d 310, 320 (2d Cir.
2004) (emphasizing that analysis of whether the plaintiff was sufficiently adversely affected
by government action is an objective examination)); Keenan v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252,
258-59 (5th Cir. 2002) (using an objective test to determine whether a plaintiff was ad-
versely affected by government action); Carroll v. Pfeffer, 262 F.3d 847, 850 (8th Cir. 2001)
(same); Smith v. Plati, 258 F.3d 1167, 1176 (10th Cir. 2001) (same); Suppan v. Dadonna,
203 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2000) (same); Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 678 (6th Cir. 1998)
(same); Bart v. Telford, 677 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 1982) (same).
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ing free speech rights, but rather, need only show that the govern-
ment action would tend to chill speech as an objective matter.8 °
The Fourth Circuit adopted the objective adverse impact rule in
Constantine.8 The Constantine court reasoned that a subjective stan-
dard would shift the focus of litigation from the legal issue of the al-
leged retaliatory act to the factual issue of whether the particular
plaintiff involved felt sufficient pressure to curtail his or her speech.82
The Constantine court also feared that a subjective inquiry would leave
public officials confused about their obligations under the First
Amendment, because those obligations might shift depending on the
firmness of any particular person with whom they interacted.83 Thus,
the adverse impact test requires an objective examination of how the
government's retaliatory act would affect a person of ordinary firm-
ness, rather than a fact-intensive inquiry into the actual impact of the
act on the individual.84
D. Journalists' Rights under the First Amendment
The Supreme Court has deemed journalists no different from the
general public for purposes of First Amendment analysis.85 First,
members of the press have no special immunity from universally appli-
cable laws.86 Second, members of the press have no right of access to
information above and beyond that afforded to the public.87
As early as 1937, the Supreme Court in Associated Press v. NLRB88
rejected a claim by the Associated Press that as a news gathering en-
tity, the First Amendment should exempt it from having to comply
with the regulations of the National Labor Relations Board.89 The
NLRB Court emphasized that the First Amendment erects no special
immunity for members of the press from generally applicable laws.9"
80. Constantine, 411 F.3d at 500.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. E.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1978) (plurality opinion) (finding
that a television station did not have an unbridled right of access to speak with prisoners at
a county jail).
86. See, e.g., Assoc. Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937) (holding that the First
Amendment does not require that journalists be held immune from labor laws).
87. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972) (stating that reporters have
no special right to access information beyond that enjoyed by ordinary citizens).
88. 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
89. Id. at 130-33.
90. Id. at 132. The Court went on to list several different areas of the law, emphasizing
that members of the press received no special exemption from any of them. Id. at 132-33.
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The Supreme Court reaffirmed the NLRB holding in Oklahoma Press
Publishing Co. v. Walling when it held that application of the Fair La-
bor Standards Act to newspaper publishing did not abridge First
Amendment rights.9 Thus, the Supreme Court established a general
rule of evenhanded application of laws to members of the press and
members of the public.92
In addition to holding the press liable in the same manner as
ordinary citizens, the Supreme Court has also held thatjournalists en-
joy no special right of access to information beyond that enjoyed by
the general public.93 For instance, in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,94
the Supreme Court rejected a claim by journalists that a prison regula-
tion barring interviews with inmates violated their First Amendment
rights.95 The Washington Post Court emphasized that members of the
press were given equal access as that enjoyed by the general public,
and that the First Amendment required no special access for the press
above and beyond that afforded to the public.96 The Supreme Court
subsequently reaffirmed these principles in Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia,9" explaining that the access rights of the media in the con-
text of public trials are the same as those of the public generally.
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In Baltimore Sun Co. v. Ehrlich, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
judgment of the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland and
held that the Sun had no actionable retaliation claim against the Gov-
ernor.9" Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Niemeyer first de-
91. 327 U.S. 186 (1946); see also Assoc. Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1945)
(rejecting claims that application of the Sherman Act to newspapers would violate publish-
ers' First Amendment rights).
92. See, e.g., Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 846-47, 850 (1974) (finding a
prison regulation prohibiting interviews by the media with certain prisoners nonviolative of
the First Amendment, noting that it was applied equally to members of the general public
and members of the press).
93. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972) (stating that "the First
Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to infor-
mation not available to the public generally").
94. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
95. I& at 850.
96. Id. at 846-47, 850.
97. 448 U.S. 555, 572-74 (1980) (plurality opinion); see also Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982) (noting that the right to attend criminal trials
has the same scope for the press and the public); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16
(1978) (plurality opinion) (emphasizing that the media have no greater right of access to
visit prisoners than the public generally); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974)
(same).
98. Balt. Sun, 437 F.3d at 421.
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scribed the elements of a retaliation claim.99 Judge Niemeyer stated
that to prove a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) he
or she was engaged in a constitutionally protected activity; (2) the gov-
ernment official responded to that activity with conduct or speech;
and (3) that conduct or speech would tend to chill or adversely affect
the protected activity.'
The court next articulated that successful retaliation claims re-
quire that a plaintiff show more than a de minimis inconvenience so
that the government's conduct amounts to a substantial adverse ef-
fect.1 0 ' The court also noted that the alleged retaliatory conduct must
not be so "pervasive, mundane, and universal in government opera-
tions" that accepting the Sun's argument would allow for retaliation
claims in any government interaction. 10 2 Moreover, the court ex-
plained that no retaliation liability attaches when the allegedly retalia-
tory action by the government is speech, unless the government's
speech touches upon "private information about an individual," or is
"threatening, coercive, or intimidating."10 3
After outlining the elements of a retaliation claim, the court
turned to the facts of the case at hand.'0 4 First, the court considered
whether allowing the Sun's retaliation claim would create constitu-
tional claims arising from nearly any interaction between the Gover-
nor and the press.'0 5 The court answered this question in the
affirmative, reasoning that permitting such a claim would encourage
reporters to bring suit when denied access by government officials for
any reason.10 6 Additionally, the court stated that government officials
commonly favor and disfavor certain reporters with important infor-
mation based on the reporters' past work. 0 v Thus, the court found
that the Governor's actions were too commonplace to warrant a cause
of action.' 0 8
99. Id. at 416.
100. Id. at 415-16.
101. Id. at 416-17.
102. Id. at 416 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148-49 (1983)).
103. Id. at 417 (quoting Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 202 F.3d 676, 689 (4th Cir.
2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 418. Specifically, the court analyzed whether treating the Governor's direc-
tive as unconstitutional would lead to lawsuits every time a government official denied
access to a reporter. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 417-18.
108. Id. at 418.
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Second, the court determined whether the directive adversely im-
pacted the Sun's exercise of its First Amendment rights.' °9 The court
found the Governor's directive and its effect on Nitkin and Olesker to
be more similar to a de minimis inconvenience than an actual chilling
effect." 0 The court explained that it is normal practice among jour-
nalists to curry favor from government officials in order to cultivate
useful sources."' Thus, the court held that the journalists who were
denied access by the Governor's directive suffered no more harm than
is customary for journalists who fall out of favor in their trade." 2 Be-
cause the harm suffered was no more severe than that routinely exper-
ienced by journalists, the court found that the limitation of access
would not deter the ordinary journalist from exercising his or her
First Amendment rights.'
Finally, the court evaluated whether the Governor's response it-
self was protected government speech, and therefore not subject to
retaliation liability." 4 The court determined that the Governor's
challenged action constituted speech that was protected by the First
Amendment just as the reporters' speech was protected." 5 Citing
Saurez, the court maintained that the Governor's protected speech
could only give rise to a retaliation claim if the speech revealed private
information about the reporters, or was so threatening as to suggest
that some sort of punishment by the Governor was imminent." 6 The
court concluded that the Governor's speech," 7 while demonstrating
annoyance with the reporters, did not constitute an actual threat ris-
ing to the required level for a successful retaliation claim based upon
government speech." 8
109. Id. at 419.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 419-20.
114. Id. at 420.
115. Id.
116. Id. (citing Saurez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 202 F.3d 676, 687 (4th Cir. 2000)).
117. The court analyzed the actual directive and several comments that the Governor
made about the directive. Id. Specifically, the court focused on a comment the Governor
made, referring to the directive as "the only arrow in [his] quiver" against critical report-
ers. Id. (alteration in original).
118. Id. The court concluded by reiterating that the Governor's speech and directive
were not actionable under a First Amendment retaliation claim because the Governor was
free to express his opinion and to select those reporters with whom he chose to speak. Id.
at 421.
1340 [VOL. 66:1328
BALTIMOR.E SUN Co. v. EHRLICH
IV. ANALYSIS
In Baltimore Sun Co. v. Ehrlich, the Fourth Circuit held that no
retaliation claim exists where a government official cuts off access to
discretionarily provided information from certain reporters based on
their past work.' The Baltimore Sun court purported to follow the
settled test for First Amendment retaliation claims; however, the court
created a wholly new distinction between the ordinary citizen and the
ordinary reporter when applying the test.'2 ° This distinction is prob-
lematic for three reasons. First, the court overlooked precedent sug-
gesting that there is no difference of constitutional magnitude
between reporters and ordinary citizens. 12 1 Second, the court's crea-
tion of such a distinction prompted it to apply the "everyday in-
terchange" limiting principle to situations outside of the employment
setting, thereby ignoring the purpose of that principle. 12 2 Finally, in
determining whether the allegedly retaliatory acts had an adverse im-
pact, the court's invented distinction contradicted the purposes be-
hind the objective adverse impact test. 123 The impact of the Fourth
Circuit's decision to distinguish between reporters and ordinary citi-
zens is that reporters may be precluded from having recourse for what
would normally be considered retaliatory action if taken against ordi-
nary citizens.
124
A. The Court Failed to Follow Precedent Indicating that There Is No
Distinction Between Reporters and Ordinary Citizens for First
Amendment Purposes
The Fourth Circuit in Baltimore Sun Co. v. Ehrlich erred by failing
to follow precedent suggesting that there is no difference of constitu-
tional significance between reporters and ordinary citizens for pur-
poses of retaliation claims.' 21 This failure to adhere to precedent is
problematic because the creation of a distinction between reporters
119. Id. at 418.
120. See infra Part [V.A.
121. See infra Part IV.A.
122. See infra Part IV.B.
123. See infra Part IV.C.
124. See infra Part IV.C.
125. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980) (plurality
opinion) (finding that the media and the public generally enjoy the same First Amend-
ment right of access to criminal trials).
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and ordinary citizens limits reporters' First Amendment
protections. 1
26
In First Amendment retaliation jurisprudence, the illegality of
any government act depends upon the identity of the retaliator, the
identity of the speaker, and the relationship between the two.' 27 Re-
taliation cases offer a spectrum of relationships between the govern-
ment and speaker, spanning from the tight relationship of
government employee and employer, to the minimal relationship be-
tween an ordinary citizen and a government official. 12 ' This spectrum
is reflected in retaliation cases such as Board of County Commissioners v.
Umbehr, in which the Supreme Court recognized that where the gov-
ernment acts as employer, the government is more likely to have a
legitimate interest in curbing certain exercises of First Amendment
rights.' 29 Thus, courts grant more deference to government actions
which might give rise to retaliation claims outside of the employment
context. 130 Conversely, where the government is interacting with ordi-
nary citizens outside the employment context, such as the law student
in Constantine, courts grant little deference to any potentially retalia-
tory acts against those citizens for exercising their free speech
rights.13' In Baltimore Sun, the court erroneously treated the two re-
porters more similarly to government employees than ordinary citi-
zens, granting the government far more deference than is mandated
by precedent. 1 32
The Baltimore Sun court erred because reporters are far more sim-
ilar to the student in Constantine than to government employees or the
independent contractor in Umbehr. Reporters, like students and other
ordinary citizens, are not charged with the duty of speaking as repre-
126. See Stephanie L. Hogan et al., Litigating Retaliation Claims After Baltimore Sun v.
Ehrlich, COMM. LAW., Winter 2006, at 7, 8-9 (arguing that the Baltimore Sun decision sin-
gles out members of the press in curtailing their First Amendment protections).
127. See, e.g., Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 202 F.3d 676, 686 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating
that a retaliation determination is a factual inquiry focusing in large part upon the rela-
tionship between the speaker and the alleged retaliator).
128. See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 680 (1996).
129. Id.
130. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994) (plurality opinion); see also Pickering
v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (noting that where the government acts as em-
ployer, it may have a legitimate interest in regulating employee speech, but that no such
interest exists with respect to the speech rights of the public generally).
131. See Constantine v. Rectors and Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474,
500-01 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding in favor of a student's retaliation claim); see also Umbehr,
518 U.S. at 678 (emphasizing that government action taken against private citizens involv-
ing their First Amendment rights is subject to strict scrutiny).
132. See Balt. Sun, 437 F.3d at 418-19 (focusing on the reporters' status as reporters,
rather than as ordinary citizens, in analyzing the elements of their retaliation claim).
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sentatives of the government the way employees are often understood
to represent their employers. 3 3 Indeed, the government has an as-
serted interest in encouraging reporters' speech, unlike its interest in
curtailing employees' speech, because of the universally accepted be-
lief in the primacy of free debate on matters of public importance in a
representative democracy."'
Further, the Baltimore Sun court ignored the oft-reinforced rule
that members of the press are to be granted the same privileges as
members of the public in terms of First Amendment rights to access
and gather information. 135 Instead of treating the reporters as ordi-
nary citizens, the Baltimore Sun court improperly relied on their status
as reporters for purposes of its retaliation analysis.136 This is seen in
the court's articulation of the adverse impact test as whether the Gov-
ernor's actions would chill a "reporter[ ] of ordinary firmness," rather
than a person of ordinary firmness.13 7 Phrasing the test in such a way
creates a specific subclass of plaintiffs for purposes of retaliation analy-
sis, categorizing reporters as somehow different from ordinary citizens
in a legally relevant way. 1
3 8
Because there is no difference of constitutional importance be-
tween reporters and ordinary citizens, the Fourth Circuit's differentia-
tion between the two for purposes of its retaliation analysis was
improper. The troubling result of the Baltimore Sun court's distinction
between the two classes is a lesser level of First Amendment protection
for reporters than for ordinary citizens; reporters are expected to have
a higher degree of tolerance for retaliatory acts than would be ex-
133. See Thomas E. Wheeler II, Striking a Faustian Bargain: The Boundaries of Public Em-
ployee Free Speech Rights, REs GESTAE, Sept. 2006, at 13, 18 (noting that government employ-
ers have broad latitude to limit employment-related speech because employee speech is
often thought of as "attributable to the employer").
134. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573; see also Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863
(1974) (Powell, J., dissenting) (asserting that the press acts as an agent of the general
public in its information-gathering activities, and that those activities are essential to mean-
ingful democratic processes); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966) (stating that
the press serves as a check on government power and abuse, and that the First Amendment
is designed in part to maintain the integrity of political processes).
135. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980) (plurality
opinion) (noting that the rights of the media are the same as those of the public generally
with respect to access to public trials).
136. Balt. Sun, 437 F.3d at 419.
137. Id.
138. See Hogan et al., supra note 126, at 8-9 (noting that the Baltimore Sun decision
creates an altogether unprecedented distinction between reporters and ordinary citizens).
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pected of an ordinary citizen.' 39 To preserve the rights of reporters,
the Fourth Circuit should have treated them as legally equal to ordi-
nary citizens for the purposes of retaliation analysis.
B. The Court's Distinction Between Ordinary Citizens and the Press Led
to Its Inappropriate Application of the Everyday Interchange
Exception
In addition to curtailing reporters' First Amendment rights by
drawing a distinction between reporters and ordinary citizens, the
Fourth Circuit's differentiation further limited reporters' rights by ap-
plying the everyday interchange exception to claims outside the em-
ployment context. 4 ° The Baltimore Sun court's reasoning is flawed
because the court ignored the purposes behind the everyday in-
terchange exception to the retaliation rule. The everyday interchange
rule is uniquely relevant to situations of employer-employee con-
flict. 1 ' This is evidenced by the fact that courts analyzing the every-
day interchange question have rarely treated the retaliated-against
differently from an ordinary citizen except in cases of an employment-
type relationship. 42
The purpose of the everyday interchange exception is not, as the
Fourth Circuit suggests in Baltimore Sun, to de-constitutionalize any
and all acts which, when taken for neutral reasons, would be permissi-
ble curtailments of speech.' 43 Rather, the purpose of this exception,
uniquely rooted in employment retaliation claims, is to allow employ-
139. See Hogan et al., supra note 126, at 9 (stating that the Baltimore Sun opinion "is
unique in doling out First Amendment rights less protectively to journalists than to 'ordi-
nary' people").
140. See Balt. Sun, 473 F.3d at 418 (applying the "everyday interchange" exception).
141. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983) (emphasizing that the First
Amendment retaliation claim should not be used to insert a legal cause of action into every
intra-office interchange).
142. See, e.g., id. at 148-49 (finding that most of an employee's questionnaire was not a
matter of public concern and thus no retaliation claims were available on those questions
because such a finding would constitutionalize virtually every critical remark made by an
employee against her employer); Kirby v. City of Elizabeth City, 388 F.3d 440, 448 (4th Cir.
2004) (refusing to extend constitutional protection to public employees' petitions for re-
dress for fear of allowing employees to constitutionalize private employment disputes by
simply filing a lawsuit).
143. Compare Balt. Sun, 437 F.3d at 419 (emphasizing that the Governor has every right
to cut reporters off from "discretionarily afforded information," thus, no retaliation claim
arises from such commonplace, permissive actions), with ACLU of Md., Inc. v. Wicomico
County, 999 F.2d 780, 785 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting that action taken by public officials in
retaliation for the exercise of a constitutional right is actionable whether or not the govern-
ment act would be permissible if taken for other, nonretaliatory reasons).
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ers to conduct day-to-day business "without fear of reprisal in the form
of lawsuits" brought by affected employees.'
4
For example, in Connick, the Supreme Court analyzed whether
allowing a plaintiff to recover for retaliation when she was dismissed
for circulating an allegedly disruptive questionnaire around her office
would tend to create a lawsuit out of everyday interactions between
employer and employee. 11 5 The Connick Court emphasized that judi-
cial interference in a government office with respect to every matter
concerning office personnel would seriously impede the efficiency
and effectiveness of such places of business. 1 4'6 Thus, the purpose of
the everyday interchange rule is to keep disgruntled employees from
disturbing the workplace by bringing retaliation claims in response to
every unfavorable personnel decision."' 7 Indeed, the Fourth Circuit
in Baltimore Sun entirely relies on cases employing the everyday in-
terchange limitation on retaliation liability only in the employee-
employer context. 14 8 Courts are hesitant to interfere with day-to-day
personnel decisions, and thus use the everyday interchange rule to
avoid such interference.14 9 This is reflected in Kirby v. City of Elizabeth
City, where the Fourth Circuit narrowly interpreted a police officer's
public statement to be outside the realm of public concern, and thus
not actionable as a First Amendment retaliation claim. 15 0
The Baltimore Sun case is markedly different from the situations in
Kirby and Connick, which required the everyday interchange exception
to maintain order in the workplace. Specifically, the relationship be-
tween reporters and the government is factually distinguishable from
the relationship between employers and employees. 1 51 Although em-
ployers have an interest in curbing employees' speech when necessary
to maintain order,1 52 the Governor has no need to control the con-
tents of newspapers to enable state government to function prop-
144. DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 806 (4th Cir. 1995).
145. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148-49.
146. See id. at 149.
147. Id.; see also Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 676 (1996) (noting
the significant interests of the government in maintaining workplace control and the def-
erence given to government claims of disruption in the employment context).
148. Bait. Sun, 473 F.3d at 416.
149. See, e.g., Connick, 461 U.S. at 149 (warning against the dangers of creating grounds
for a constitutional challenge for every word spoken in a governmental office).
150. 388 F.3d 440, 445-47 & n.4 (4th Cir. 2004).
151. See Wheeler, supra note 133, at 19 (explaining that government employees are
treated differently from ordinary citizens under the First Amendment partially because
employees must cede some of their First Amendment tights while acting (and speaking) as
agents of their employers).
152. See id. at 18 (noting that employers' interest in maintaining order in the workplace
often enables them to curtail employees' exercises of speech).
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erly.153  Furthermore, the Governor has no authority to deny
reporters the full exercise of their speech rights because reporters are
the same as ordinary citizens for First Amendment purposes.154
Moreover, courts have emphasized that fear of excessive future
litigation by a particular class of plaintiffs is not a legitimate reason for
excluding that class of people from the protections of the First
Amendment. 155 For example, in Board of County Commissioners v.
Umbehr, the Supreme Court refused to carve out an exception to the
retaliation rule excluding a particular class of plaintiffs (independent
contractors) from the First Amendment's protections, even in the face
of arguments suggesting that allowing the claim to go forward would
increase caseloads. 156 Importantly, Umbehr involved an independent
contractor, whom the Court treated as similarly situated to a govern-
ment employee. 151 Yet, even in a situation so closely resembling the
employment context, the Supreme Court refused to allow the fear of
excess litigation to lead to an application of the everyday interchange
exception precluding retaliation liability.1 58 In light of Umbehr, the
Fourth Circuit's view that allowing the reporters' retaliation claims to
go forward would cause an unmanageable amount of future litigation
was an impermissible basis for applying the everyday interchange ex-
ception to a circumstance outside the employment setting.
Because there is no difference of constitutional magnitude be-
tween reporters and ordinary citizens and the everyday interchange
rule is uniquely intended for situations of employment, the Fourth
Circuit's special treatment of reporters as different from ordinary citi-
zens and its decision to apply the everyday interchange rule is prob-
lematic. 15' By applying this limiting principle to the Sun reporters, a
situation not involving employment, the Fourth Circuit improperly ex-
153. See Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press, "26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975) (positing that
the Framers intended friction between press and government when they drafted the Free
Press Clause, and that the purpose of a free press was to create a "fourth institution outside
the Government" to act as a check on government processes).
154. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704-05 (1972) (noting that members of the
press and members of the general public who publish any type of written expression are
both equally protected from government interference).
155. See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 681 (1996) (emphasizing that
"fears of excessive litigation . . . cannot justify a special exception" to First Amendment
retaliation liability).
156. See id. at 681.
157. Id. at 677.
158. See id. at 681.
159. See supra Part IV.A-B.
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panded the principle beyond the bounds of its limited use in person-
nel decisions. 160
C. The Court's Distinction Between the Ordinary Reporter and the
Ordinary Citizen Ignores the Objective Nature of the Adverse
Impact Test and Curtails Reporters' First Amendment
Rights
The Fourth Circuit's distinction between the ordinary reporter
and the ordinary citizen is problematic because such a distinction ne-
gates the purposes of an objective adverse impact test.161 Under the
established objective adverse impact standard, courts analyze whether
the government's conduct "tends to chill the exercise of constitutional
rights." 16
2
The objective nature of the test is evident in Constantine, where
the Fourth Circuit emphasized that an individual need not show that a
particular government action actually resulted in complete cessation
of her First Amendment exercises. 16 The Constantine court clearly ex-
plained the reasons behind the objective nature of the rule: uniform-
ity of application in the adverse impact test ensures that the results of
retaliation claims do not vary depending on the firmness of any partic-
ular plaintiff.164 Thus, public officials can more easily be aware of
their obligations under the First Amendment and their susceptibility
to liability. 165 Additionally, an objective standard ensures that even
where a particular plaintiff may not subjectively have ceased or slowed
First Amendment activities, government officials cannot use a
favorable result to chill similarly situated plaintiffs from exercising
their constitutional rights.1 66 Importantly, to retain the objectiveness
of the test, the Constantine court framed the adverse impact test in
160. See supra Part LV.B.
161. See, e.g., Constantine v. Rectors and Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474,
500 (4th Cir. 2005) (stating that an objective examination based on a person of ordinary
firmness standard focuses on the conduct at issue, while a subjective, fact-intensive inquiry
would impose liability depending upon a plaintiff's firmness, rather than the underlying
conduct itself).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (stating that the objective retali-
ation claim keeps government officials from indirectly restricting speech that could not be
directly prohibited); see also Kirby v. City of Elizabeth City, 388 F.3d 440, 449 (4th Cir.
2004) (emphasizing that allowing a police chief to reprimand an officer for his testimony
at a public hearing was a form of indirect pressure that could seriously inhibit truthful
testimony by officers in the future).
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terms of "a person of ordinary firmness," without mention of the fact
that the particular plaintiff was a law student. 167
The Baltimore Sun court abandoned the Constantine precedent
and created an exception to the rule of objectivity by treating the
plaintiffs' profession as a relevant factor in the adverse impact analy-
sis.' 6 8 In its articulation of the adverse impact test, the Baltimore Sun
court referred to the "reporter of ordinary firmness," rather than the
"person of ordinary firmness."169 The court emphasized that such a
reporter operating in the "rough and tumble" of political reporting
would not feel any harm from the Governor's actions. 17' Thus, by
assuming that reporters have a "thicker skin" than ordinary citizens,
and applying that assumption to its finding of no adverse impact, the
Baltimore Sun court created a higher standard of proof for reporters
attempting to establish a retaliation claim than that required for the
ordinary citizen. 171 Creating such an exception to the adverse impact
rule for journalists undermines both of the stated purposes of the ob-
jective standard and, thus, the protections of the retaliation claim
itself.172
First, the Baltimore Sun court's decision undermines the purpose
of achieving uniformity of application in the adverse impact test. In
drawing a distinction between reporters and ordinary citizens under
the adverse impact test, the court inappropriately mandates that any
particular case's outcome turn on the identity of the plaintiff rather
than on the retaliatory nature of the act.1 73 As a result, future courts
grappling with retaliation claims will no longer focus on the nature of
the government's act, and will instead focus on whether the plaintiffs
identity-specifically the competitive nature of the plaintiffs profes-
sion-places him or her in such a position as to be hardened against
167. See Constantine, 411 F.3d at 500 (articulating the adverse impact test without refer-
ring to the plaintiffs specific profession or status).
168. See Balt. Sun, 437 F.3d at 419 (stating the adverse impact test in terms of the profes-
sion of the plaintiffs).
169. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
170. Id.
171. See Hogan et al., supra note 126, at 8 (stating that the Baltimore Sun decision re-
placed the standard of a person of ordinary firmness with a new standard specifically mea-
suring a plaintiffs firmness based on his or her vocation, thereby undercutting the
objective nature of the test).
172. See id. at 8-9 (noting that under the Baltimore Sun decision, journalists are distin-
guished from the public generally, undercutting the purposes of the adverse impact test,
which is generally accepted as an assessment of whether the government act would tend to
deter the First Amendment activity of an ordinary citizen).
173. See Balt. Sun, 437 F.3d at 420 (phrasing its holding in terms of whether the govern-
ment's actions are retaliatory against a reporter, rather than analyzing the actions them-
selves as retaliatory regardless of the identity of the plaintiff).
1348 [VOL. 66:1328
BALTIMORE SUN Co. v. EHRLICH
feeling the suppressive effects of such treatment by the govern-
ment. 17 4 This, in turn, inserts an element of uncertainty for govern-
ment officials attempting to navigate which acts are permissible and
which are retaliatory.'17 After the Baltimore Sun decision, government
officials' exposure to liability for the very same conduct will differ de-
pending upon the profession of the plaintiff, and how hardened
against the chilling effect a particular profession makes its
practitioners. 
76
Second, the Baltimore Sun court's insertion of a profession-
oriented element into what was formerly an objective standard dimin-
ishes protection for all members of a class of plaintiffs simply by virtue
of their profession.1 77 In the future, reporters not as "firm" as Nitkin
and Olesker might temper their criticism of governmental officials to
preserve their access to information and avoid being singled out and
punished for unpopular opinions.' 78
By undermining the two purposes of the objective adverse impact
test, the Baltimore Sun court weakens the retaliation claim itself. Be-
cause there is no difference of constitutional magnitude between re-
porters and ordinary citizens, there is no rational reason to distinguish
between reporters and ordinary citizens for purposes of the adverse
impact test.' 79 Introducing a subjective element of profession into the
test inserts an element of uncertainty into what is supposed to be an
objective and therefore straightforward standard. 8 ' After the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Baltimore Sun, government officials will not only
have to consider the nature of their speech, but also the profession of
174. See id. at 417-19 (emphasizing that reporting is a competitive profession in which
reporters are accustomed to vying for favor from government officials, and, as such, report-
ers suffer no harm from instances of disfavor).
175. See Constantine v. Rectors and Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 500
(4th Cir. 2005) (noting that a subjective standard for adverse impact would result in differ-
ing assignments of liability based solely on individual plaintiffs' firmness).
176. See Hogan et al., supra note 126, at 9 (noting that the Fourth Circuit essentially
creates a rule that sorts out plaintiffs according to their "tenacity to litigate").
177. See Bait. Sun, 437 F.3d at 419-20 (rejecting a retaliation claim by reporters assumed
to be hardened against retaliation by public officials).
178. See Brief of Amici Curiae for the Washington Post et al. in Support of Appellants
Urging Reversal at 20-21, Bait. Sun, 437 F.3d 410 (No. 05-1297) (asserting that the Gover-
nor's actions in this case serve as a warning to all members of the press against public
criticism of the administration, noting that the punishment for such criticism is denial of
access to information required for performance of their jobs).
179. See supra Part IV.A.
180. See Constantine v. Rectors and Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 500
(4th Cir. 2005) (articulating the reasoning behind the objective standard for the adverse
impact test, and emphasizing that an objective standard better instructs officials as to the
boundaries of permissible and impermissible conduct).
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the citizen they interact with and whether that profession will be con-
sidered less-protected than the ordinary citizen.181
Ultimately, the Baltimore Sun court should have applied the ad-
verse impact test absent any differentiation between the ordinary re-
porter and the ordinary citizen. l 2 In so doing, the court would have
recognized what the Governor admitted in the district court: that "he
could not constitutionally subject an ordinary citizen to the very same
edict he ha[d] issued against" Nitkin and Olesker."'8 By drawing a
distinction between reporters and ordinary citizens for purposes of
the retaliation claim, the Fourth Circuit in Baltimore Sun made subjec-
tive the otherwise uniformly objective adverse impact test and signifi-
candy lessened reporters' First Amendment protections.
V. CONCLUSION
In Baltimore Sun Co. v. Ehrlich, the Fourth Circuit held that a de-
partment-wide directive instructing executive employees to cut off
communication with two reporters was not an instance of actionable
First Amendment retaliation. 84 The Baltimore Sun court drew a sharp
distinction between reporters and ordinary citizens for purposes of
the First Amendment retaliation cause of action.185 By failing to rec-
ognize the constitutional equality of ordinary citizens and report-
ers,"' ignoring the purposes behind the limiting rules in retaliation
jurisprudence,18' and eschewing an objective adverse impact stan-
dard,188 the court created a new exception to the retaliation claim,
significantly curtailing the First Amendment protections of the
press.18 By making such an exception, the court not only diminished
the First Amendment rights of the press, but also set a precedent for
181. See Balt. Sun, 437 F.3d at 419 (finding no retaliation claim because reporters are
accustomed to competing for information from government sources and, therefore, are
hardened against the effects of retaliatory government action).
182. See supra Part IV.B.
183. Reply Brief of Appellants at 15, Balt. Sun, 437 F.3d 410 (No. 05-1297).
184. 437 F.3d at 420.
185. See id. at 419 (suggesting that reporters should have a stronger will to resist against
government action that would create a First Amendment retaliation claim if taken against
an ordinary citizen).
186. See supra Part V.A.
187. See supra Part IV.B.
188. See supra Part IV.C.
189. See supra Part IV.C.
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future curtailment of constitutional rights based on mere membership
in a particular, unfavored profession.190
A.MALIA L. FENTON
190. See supra Part V.C.
Comment
CLEANING MARYLAND'S WATERS ONE DAY AT A TIME: THE
CLEAN WATER ACT'S CLEAR MANDATE FOR DAILY
POLLUTANT LIMITATIONS UNDER THE
"TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY
LOAD" PROVISION
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress passed the Clean Water Act (CWA)1 in 1972 to address
the nation's growing water quality problems. Through the CWA,
Congress developed several mechanisms for improving water quality,
including a requirement for states to develop "total maximum daily
loads" (TMDLs) for pollutants in impaired waters.' Despite the
TMDL mechanism, nearly 40% of the nation's waters4 and 20,000 in-
dividual water bodies fail to meet state water quality standards.5 This
lack of progress is the result of lenient implementation of the TMDL
provision by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and states,
which has been characterized by lax compliance with strict statutory
deadlines and preparation of grossly inadequate TMDLs.6
The poor management of the TMDL program by both the EPA
and states has led to several lawsuits challenging TMDL implementa-
tion and these lawsuits have compelled the EPA and states to prepare
more adequate TMDLs.7 In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. EPA,' the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
held that TMDLs must be developed as daily pollutant limitations,'
Copyright © 2007 byJayni A. Shah.
1. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000). The official name of the Act is
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat.
816, 816 (1972). It became known as the Clean Water Act after the 1977 Amendments.
Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566, 1566 (1977).
2. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a).
3. Id. § 1313(d)(1)(C).
4. ASSESSMENT & WATERSHED PROT. Div., EPA, THE TWENTY NEEDS REPORT: How RE-
SEARCH CAN IMPROVE THE TMDL PROGRAM 36 (2002) [hereinafter TwENTY NEEDS REPORT].
5. Sarah Birkeland, Note, EPA's TMDL Program, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 297, 303 (2001).
6. See infra Part II.B.
7. Mandi M. Hale, Comment, Pronsolino v. Marcus, the New TMDL Regulation, and
Nonpoint Source Pollution: Will the Clean Water Act's Murky TMDL Provision Ever Clear the Wa-
ters?, 31 ENVrL. L. 981, 988-89 (2001).
8. (Fiends of the Earth II), 446 F.3d 140 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
9. Id. at 144, 148.
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rather than as annual or seasonal limitations, a view that many states,
including Maryland, have followed in the past." The D.C. Circuit
properly decided Friends of the Earth because the plain text of the CWA
indicates that TMDLs should be daily loads." Maryland should follow
the D.C. Circuit's interpretation of the CWA, rather than the Second
Circuit's approach in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC) v.
Muszynski,"2 which permitted seasonal and annual loads. Unlike the
Second Circuit's decision in NRDC, the Friends of the Earth court prop-
erly applied canons of statutory interpretation to ascertain the mean-
ing of the TMDL provision."3 Accordingly, Maryland should ensure
that all existing and future TMDLs set forth daily load requirements
for Maryland's impaired waters.' 4 Even though developing daily load
requirements could be costly and time-consuming, these potential
downsides are outweighed by the benefits of adhering to the plain text
of the CWA: (1) improvement of state water quality, (2) government
accountability, (3) consistency among states in the implementation of
TMDLs, and (4) avoidance of lengthy and costly litigation in the
future. 5
10. See Initial Brief for National Association of Clean Water Agencies as Amici Curiae in
Support of Affirmance of Decision of the District Court at 10-11, Friends of the Earth, 446
F.3d 140 (No. 05-5015) [hereinafter NACWA Brief] (referencing annual or seasonal
TMDL load approaches in Maryland, Virginia, and other states); see also MD. DEP'T OF THE
ENV'T, TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOADS OF BIOCHEMICAL OXYGEN DEMAND (BOD), NITROGEN
AND PHOSPHORUS FOR TOWN CREEK INTO WHICH THE TOWN OF OXFORD WASTEWATER TREAT-
MENT PLANT DISCHARGES IN TALBOT COUNTY, MARYLAND, at iv (2002) [hereinafter TOWN
CREEK TMDL] (discussing Maryland TMDLs containing annual and monthly limitations);
MD. DEP'T OF THE ENV'T, TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOADS OF NITROGEN, PHOSPHORUS AND
BIOCHEMICAL OXYGEN DEMAND FOR BRETON BAY IN ST. MARY'S COUNTY, MARYLAND, at iii
(2005) [hereinafter BRETON BAY TMDL] (discussing Maryland TMDLs containing annual
and growing season limitations).
11. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (2000).
12. 268 F.3d 91, 98-99 (2d Cir. 2001).
13. See infra Part III.
14. In developing TMDLs, Maryland has followed a variety of approaches that have led
to the adoption of daily TMDLs, seasonal TMDLs, and annual TMDLs. E.g., MD. DEP'T OF
THE ENV'T, TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOADS OF FECAL COLIFORM FOR THE RESTRICTED SHELL,-
FISH HARVESTING AREA IN LAWS THOROFARE AND UPPER THOROFARE OF THE TANGIER SOUND
BASIN IN SOMERSET COUNTY, MARYLAND, at iv (2006) [hereinafter TANGIER SOUND BASIN
TMDL] (daily loads); TowN CREEK TMDL, supra note 10, at iv (monthly and annual loads);
BRETON BAY TMDL, supra note 10, at iii (annual and growing season loads).
15. See infra Part III.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Clean Water Act
1. History
In the early 1970s, the United States was in the midst of a water
quality crisis.1 6 The indelible image of the burning Cuyahoga River
was the embodiment of this crisis, as it caught fire in 1969 due to
industrial pollutants. 17 But the water quality crisis spread far beyond
the Cuyahoga River and waters in industrialized areas, ultimately per-
vading the entire nation."i In 1971, only 10% of the nation's waters
were rated as unpolluted, 9 and in 1972, only 36% of the nation's
stream miles were considered safe for swimming.2° Although Con-
gress had regulated water quality in the past through the Rivers and
Harbors Appropriation Act 2 and the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act of 1948 (FWPCA), 22 the poor state of the nation's waters com-
pelled Congress to adopt a more comprehensive regulatory scheme.23
16. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND
POLICY 590-92 (5th ed. 2006) (discussing the nation's poor water quality and ineffective
state pollution control measures in the 1960s and early 1970s).
17. Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing a History of Environmental
Protection, 14 FORDH" ENVTL. L.J. 89, 90-91 (2002).
18. Bills Amending the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and Other Pending Legislation Re-
lating to Water Pollution Control: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the S.
Comm. on Public Works, 92d Cong. 1, 1 (1971) (statement of David R. Zwick, Student,
Harvard Law School).
19. Water Pollution Control Legislation-1971 (Proposed Amendments to Existing Legislation):
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Public Works, 92d Cong. 1149 (1971) [hereinafter 1971 Water
Pollution Hearings] (statement of David Zwick, Project Director, The Nader Water Pollution
Project).
20. EPA, Environmental Progress: Earth Day, http://www.epa.gov/EarthDay/history.
htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2007).
21. Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121 (codified as
amended at scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.). Section 13 of this Act prohibited the dis-
charge of refuse into navigable waters or their tributaries. § 13, 30 Stat. at 1152.
22. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948)
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000)). The FWPCA assigned primary
responsibility for water quality to state and local governments and provided for financial
and technical assistance by the federal government. § 2, 62 Stat. at 1155-56.
23. See 1971 Water Pollution Hearings, supra note 19, at 1149 (statement of David Zwick,
Project Director, The Nader Water Pollution Protect) (describing the nation's water qual-
ity problems and suggesting the need for an improved regulatory scheme). Before the
House Committee on Public Works, David Zwick stated:
After 15 years of Federal efforts and longer than that of State and local ef-
forts with the problem, we are informed by the Council on Environmental Quality
in their latest report that only some 10 percent of the Nation's water can be rated
as unpolluted, or even moderately polluted.
Federal officials have, in regarding their own problem, had a difficult time
naming a place where the Federal abatement efforts, particularly in the enforce-
ment area, brought about a sufficient improvement in the lakes, rivers, and
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In response to the water quality crisis, Congress passed the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 "to restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters." 24 To meet this objective, Congress enumerated sev-
eral goals, which included: (1) eliminating "the discharge of pollu-
tants into the navigable waters" by 1985; (2) attaining "water quality
which provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish,
and wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the water" by 1983;
(3) prohibiting "the discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic amounts";
(4) providing "[fiederal financial assistance ... to construct publicly
owned waste treatment works"; (5) creating and implementing "area-
wide waste treatment management planning processes"; and (6) de-
veloping technology "to eliminate the discharge of pollutants into the
navigable waters. ' 25 These amendments later became known as the
Clean Water Act when the FWPCA was amended again in 1977.26
2. Substantive Provisions
The CWA contains several mechanisms to meet its goals of im-
proving water quality. These mechanisms include research pro-
grams,27 funding programs, 28 water quality standard and effluent
limitations programs, 29 and permit and licensing programs.30 In addi-
tion, the CWA allows private citizens to seek review of the EPA's deci-
streams in this country to return any of them to their original uses as fishing
spots, recreation spots, or public drinking water sources.
The question we have to consider is how to reverse that pattern before we are
overwhelmed with the cost, the health costs, the property damage costs, the cost
in livelihood, the cost in beauty and pleasure to everyone.
I think the key lesson to be learned is that we cannot count on good, effec-
tive, strong administration. We have to design laws that will, to the greatest extent
possible, defy administrative timidity and incompetence.
Id.
24. Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 816, 816 (1972).
25. Id. § 2, 86 Stat. at 816.
26. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977).
27. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1274 (2000) (authorizing funding for research and grant
programs).
28. See id. §§ 1281-1301 (establishing municipalities in the construction of sewage
treatment works).
29. See id. § 1311 (prohibiting the discharge of point source pollutants into navigable
waters without a permit); id. § 1313 (requiring states and tribes to adopt water quality stan-
dards for all waters and total maximum daily loads for impaired waters); id. § 1314 (man-
dating that states and the EPA develop control strategies for waters with toxic pollution);
id. § 1329 (charging states to develop water management plans for nonpoint pollutant
sources).
30. See id. § 1342 (establishing the national pollutant discharge elimination system
(NPDES) permit program); id. § 1344 (creating the permit program for the dredge and fill
of wetlands).
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sions under the Act,31 to sue the EPA for nonperformance of a
statutory duty under the Act,3 2 and to sue an entity in violation of the
Act. 3
3
The CWA's provisions on water quality standards and effluent
limitations are especially important in meeting the Act's goals because
they provide a mechanism for states and the EPA to succeed if other
procedures-such as the National Pollution Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permitting process-fail to achieve water quality
standards.3 4 Under section 303 of the CWA, each state is required to
adopt water quality standards for its intrastate waters.3 5 In adopting
water quality standards, the state must identify "the desired use for
each stream segment... and the amount of pollution [which] would
impair [this] use."3 6 Then, each state must review its water quality
standards on a triennial basis37 and identify waters where the current
effluent limits are insufficient to meet applicable standards.3 ' These
waters are considered to be water quality limited segments
(WQLSs).3' After identifying WQLSs, the state must rank the priority
for cleaning each segment.4 Then, in order of priority, the state
must establish TMDLs of pollutants that can enter each WQLS, for
those pollutants that the EPA has identified as suitable for TMDL cal-
culation.4 States must submit these TMDLs to the EPA for approval
before they can go into effect.4 2 If the EPA disapproves of a state's
WQLS identification and TMDL development, the EPA will instead
establish TMDLs for that state.43
31. Id. § 1369(b) (1).
32. Id. § 1365(a) (2).
33. Id. § 1365(a) (1).
34. See Michael M. Wenig, How "Total" Are "Total Maximum Daily Loads"?-Legal Issues
Regarding the Scope of Watershed-Based Pollution Control Under the Clean Water Act, 12 TUL.
ENVrL. L.J. 87, 98 (1998) (stating that the NPDES permitting program has "fall[en] far
short" of meeting the "holistic" water quality goals of the CWA); id. at 113-14 (suggesting
that the EPA considers the TMDL program to be the "primary mechanism" for addressing
these broad water quality concerns) (internal quotation marks omitted).
35. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a) (3) (A).
36. Dianne K Conway, Note, TMDL Litigation: So Now What?, 17 VA. ENVrL. L.J. 83, 90
(1997).
37. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c).
38. Id. § 1313(d)(1)(A).
39. 40 C.F.R. § 130.20) (2006).
40. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A); 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(b)(4).
41. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C); 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(c) (1).
42. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2).
43. Id.
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B. Implementation of the TMDL Provisions by the EPA
1. The EPA's Early Efforts at TMDL Implementation
Even though TMDLs are important in meeting the CWA's water
quality goals, the EPA's implementation of TMDL provisions has been
plagued by inaction and indifference.44 Under section 303 of the
CWA, the EPA was required to identify pollutants for which TMDL
calculations were suitable by October 18, 1973."5 Once these pollu-
tants were identified, states were then required to begin submitting
WQLSs and TMDLs to the EPA within 180 days.46 However, the EPA
failed to meet this statutory deadline.47 Although the EPA outlined
initial regulatory guidelines for developing TMDLs in 1975,48 it still
had not identified those pollutants for which TMDLs were suitable.49
In 1978, five years after the statutory deadline, a court order fi-
nally compelled the EPA to identify those pollutants. 50 Still, the EPA
did not issue its first regulation pertaining to the TMDL program,
which involved nonpoint source pollutants and load allocations, until
1985.51 In 1992, the EPA issued additional regulations, requiring
states to submit lists of impaired waters and their priority for TMDL
development to the EPA on a biennial basis. 2
Like the EPA, states were lax with statutory requirements of the
CWA and failed to timely implement TMDL programs.53 Most states
either ignored the TMDL requirements or confused the TMDL pro-
gram with other programs.54 As a result, most states failed to submit
44. See Linda A. Malone, The Myths and Truths that Ended the 2000 TMDL Program, 20
PACE EN -rL. L. REv. 63, 63 (2002) (recognizing that, thirty years after the enactment of the
CWA, the TMDL program "has never seemed farther from effective implementation").
45. 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (a)(2)(D).
46. Id. § 1313(d) (2).
47. See Conway, supra note 36, at 98 (noting that by 1975, the EPA had not identified
pollutants that were suitable for calculation as TMDLs).
48. 40 Fed. Reg. 55,343, 55,345-46 (Nov. 28, 1975).
49. See Conway, supra note 36, at 98. The EPA failed to take action regarding TMDLs
because it was overwhelmed with implementing the other provisions of the CWA. Id.
50. See also Total Maximum Daily Loads under Clean Water Act, 43 Fed. Reg. 60,662,
60,664, 60,665 (Dec. 28, 1978); Kenneth M. Murchison, Learning from More than Five-and-a-
Half Decades of Federal Water Pollution Control Legislation: Twenty Lessons for the Future, 32 B.C.
ENVrL. A'. L. REv. 527, 553-54 (2005).
51. Water Quality Planning and Management, 50 Fed. Reg. 1774 (Jan. 11, 1985).
52. Surface Water Toxics Control Program and Water Quality Planning and Manage-
ment Program, 57 Fed. Reg. 33,040, 33,050 (July 24, 1992).
53. Conway, supra note 36, at 93.
54. James R. May, The Rise and Repose of Assimilation-Based Water Quality, Part I: TMDL
Litigation, 34 ENVrL. L. REP. 10,247, 10,247 (2004).
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lists of impaired waters, prioritize the cleanup of those waters, and
promulgate TMDLs.55
2. Lawsuits Challenging the Failure of States and the EPA to Develop
TMDLs
As a result of state and federal inaction regarding TMDL develop-
ment, in the late 1970s environmental groups began to file lawsuits
against the EPA, alleging that the EPA had failed to exercise its statu-
tory duty to develop TMDLs when states failed to develop their own.57
Until 1984, these lawsuits failed because courts either decided that the
issues were not ripe for decision or that TMDLs were not required.58
Beginning in 1984 with Scott v. City of Hammond,59 courts began to
recognize that the EPA had a duty under the "constructive submis-
sion" theory to develop TMDLs when states failed to develop their
own.6° In Scott, the plaintiff complained about severe pollution in
Lake Michigan that led to beach closures in 1980 and alleged that the
EPA had a duty to promulgate a TMDL for the lake.6' The plaintiff
argued that notwithstanding the failure of Illinois and Indiana to de-
velop a TMDL for Lake Michigan,62 the EPA had a nondiscretionary
duty to achieve water quality standards to protect health and public
welfare.63 The Seventh Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs rationale,
finding that under the constructive submission theory, a state's failure
to develop TMDLs was equivalent to the state affirmatively submitting
"no TMDLs" for a WQLS.64 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit deter-
mined that if the district court agreed that the states' failure to pro-
mulgate TMDLs amounted to a constructive submission of no TMDLs
for Lake Michigan, the EPA was required by law to approve or disap-
55. James Boyd, The New Face of the Clean Water Act: A Critical Review of the EPA's New
TMDL Rules, 11 DUKE ENVrL. L. & POL'Y F. 39, 49 (2000).
56. See id. at 39 (characterizing the TMDL program as a "long-neglected part of the
Clean Water Act").
57. Conway, supra note 36, at 93.
58. Id. at 93-94; see, e.g., Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 657 F.2d 275, 295 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (finding that a claim concerning TMDL implementation against the EPA was prema-
ture because the EPA had not had sufficient time to review state TMDL submissions);
Homestake Mining Co. v. EPA, 477 F. Supp. 1279, 1288 (D.S.D. 1979) (concluding that
South Dakota was not required to develop a TMDL for the Cheyenne River Basin because
the EPA had not yet identified pollutants suitable for TMDL calculations).
59. 741 F.2d 992 (7th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
60. Id. at 996; Conway, supra note 36, at 94.
61. Scott, 741 F.2d at 993-94.
62. Id. at 996 n.10.
63. Id. at 999.
64. Id. at 996.
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prove of that submission and to develop a TMDL for the lake if it
deemed one was necessary.
6 5
After Scott, environmental groups filed numerous successful law-
suits compelling the EPA to promulgate TMDLs for states that failed
to do so themselves.66 Many of these lawsuits resulted in settlement
agreements, which forced the EPA to work with the states to develop
TMDLs.67 In further response to these lawsuits, the EPA issued guide-
lines to states, including revised regulations requiring states to list im-
paired waters and TMDLs every two years68 and a draft TMDL
Program Implementation Strategy.
69
By 1993, a series of court rulings beginning with Sierra Club v.
Browner7° temporarily stalled the initial success seen in Scott and subse-
71quent cases. In Sierra Club, the United States District Court for the
District of Minnesota considered whether the EPA's approval of Min-
nesota's TMDLs was arbitrary and capricious,72 and whether the EPA
had the duty to develop TMDLs for Minnesota because the state had
only developed forty-three TMDLs in thirteen years. 7' Although the
court found that the EPA had a mandatory statutory duty to imple-
ment TMDLs in the face of inadequate state action, the court deter-
mined that the EPA's approval was not arbitrary and capricious
because Minnesota had submitted TMDLs and was working to develop
more.7 1 On this ground, the court distinguished Scott and held that
state action in proposing and implementing TMDLs displaced the
EPA's duty to develop TMDLs for the state.75
3. Lawsuits Challenging the Inadequacy of TMDLs
Despite the temporary setback in Sierra Club, the EPA and states
were forced to develop TMDLs as environmental groups began to suc-
65. See id. at 997-98.
66. See, e.g., Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Reilly, 762 F. Supp. 1422 (W.D. Wash. 1991)
(holding that the EPA was required to develop TMDLs for Alaska).
67. TwENTY NEEDS REPORT, supra note 4, at 35.
68. 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(d)(1) (2006).
69. Malone, supra note 44, at 65.
70. 843 F. Supp. 1304 (D. Minn. 1993).
71. See, e.g., S.F. Baykeeper v. Whitman, 297 F.3d 877 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the
EPA had no duty under the constructive submission theory to establish TMDLs for Califor-
nia); Dioxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Clarke, 57 F.3d 1517 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding the
TMDL for dioxin discharge into the Columbia River Basin).
72. Id. at 1306.
73. Id. at 1311-12.
74. Id. at 1313-14.
75. Id.
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cessfully challenge the adequacy and quality of TMDLs.76 In 1996, in
Idaho Sportsmen's Coalition v. Browner,7 the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington determined that the EPA's ap-
proval of Idaho's list of three TMDLs-despite the fact that there were
962 Idaho WQLSs-was arbitrary and capricious.7" Additionally, the
court found that a proposed twenty-five year implementation schedule
for TMDLs was unreasonable, and that five years was a reasonable
amount of time to develop all Idaho TMDLs.79
Likewise, in Sierra Club v. Hankinson,8 0 environmental groups
mounted a successful challenge to the adequacy of TMDLs in Geor-
gia. In Hankinson, the court fqund that Georgia's proposed TMDL
implementation schedule, which would take over 100 years to com-
plete, was insufficient under the CWA. 1 Accordingly, the court or-
dered Georgia and the EPA to establish all Georgia TMDLs within five
years.8 2 Such cases led to an explosion of successful litigation, as envi-
ronmental groups prevailed in obtaining consent decrees for TMDL
implementation." By 2004, over forty suits had been filed in thirty-
eight states.8 4
4. The EPA's Response to Early TMDL Litigation
Legal challenges to the implementation of the TMDL program
also prompted the EPA to make improvements. In 1997, the EPA rec-
ommended that states receive eight to thirteen years to prepare
TMDLs for all impaired waters 5 and appointed an advisory commit-
tee to study the TMDL program. 6 Three years later, the EPA promul-
gated a new rule pertaining to TMDLs. 7 This rule, which was later
76. See Hale, supra note 7, at 989.
77. 951 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
78. Id. at 967, 969.
79. Id.
80. (Hankinson 1), 939 F. Supp. 865 (N.D. Ga. 1996), remedy ordered, (Hankinson I1), 939
F. Supp. 872 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
81. Hankinson 1, 939 F. Supp. at 871 & n.5.
82. Hankinson 11, 939 F. Supp. at 873.
83. See Conway, supra note 36, at 97.
84. See May, supra note 54, at 10,247.
85. Murchison, supra note 50, at 575.
86. Id. at 576.
87. Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revi-
sions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,586
Uuly 13, 2000). The EPA recognized that although the TMDL program had significantly
improved water quality nationwide, more comprehensive regulations were necessary to im-
prove the efficacy of the program. Id. at 43,587-88.
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withdrawn in 2003,88 included nonpoint pollution sources within the
TMDL framework,8 9 set ten-year timetables for state TMDL imple-
mentation,"' required the placement of impaired waters not needing
TMDLs on a prioritized list,9 and obliged states to provide reasonable
assurances that TMDLs would be properly implemented.9 9 To date,
the EPA has prepared over twenty technical support and guidance
documents pertaining to TMDL development.
9 3
While litigation efforts have compelled the EPA and states to im-
plement the TMDL program more diligently, the EPA and states still
face several challenges. In 2002, the EPA recognized that 40% of the
nation's assessed waters still do not meet state water quality stan-
dards.94 Similarly, states have indicated that 20,000 individual water
bodies fail to meet state water quality standards.95 In Maryland, for
example, 473 individual water bodies do not meet state water quality
standards.96 Furthermore, as of 2004, despite the implementation of
TMDLs, no impaired waters have improved to the extent that they
now meet water quality standards.9 7 Thus, litigants continue to chal-
lenge the adequacy of TMDLs with the goal of improving the efficacy
of the TMDL program. 98
C. Recent Challenges to the Implementation of TMDL Provisions
The most recent challenges to the adequacy of TMDLs involve
whether TMDLs can take the form of seasonal or annual limits on
pollutants entering regulated waters as opposed to daily limits on pol-
88. Withdrawal of Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regula-
tion and Revisions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program, 68
Fed. Reg. 13,608 (Mar. 19, 2003). The EPA withdrew the July 2000 rule because it recog-
nized that the rule would not succeed in making the TMDL program more efficient and
effective. Id. at 13,612. In addition, the EPA needed more time to review and revise imple-
menting regulations so that it could determine the best way to achieve the goals of the
CWA. Id.
89. Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revi-
sions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 65 Fed. Reg. at 43,588.
90. Id. at 43,591.
91. Id. at 43,590.
92. Id. at 43,591.
93. See EPA, Total Maximum Daily Loads: Technical Support Documents, http://www.
epa.gov/owow/tmdl/techsupp.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2007); Total Maximum Daily
Loads: Laws, Regulations, Treaties, http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/policy.html (last vis-
ited Apr. 10, 2007).
94. TwEN'ry NEEDS REPORT, supra note 4, at 36.
95. Birkeland, supra note 5, at 303.
96. EPA, 2004 Section 303(d) List Fact Sheet for Maryland, http://oaspub.epa.gov/
waters/state rept.control?p-state=MD [hereinafter 2004 Maryland Fact Sheet].
97. May, supra note 54, at 10,247.
98. See infra Part II.C.
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lutants. In 2001, the Second Circuit was the first court to address this
issue in NRDC v. Muszynski, suggesting that TMDLs could be ex-
pressed in terms of seasonal and annual loads.99 In contrast, when the
D.C. Circuit confronted the same issue in Friends of the Earth v. EPA, it
determined that TMDLs must take the form of daily loads, in accor-
dance with the plain meaning of the CWA.10°
1. NRDC v. Muszynski
NRDC v. Muszynski involved a challenge to the EPA's approval of
TMDLs for phosphorus in eight New York reservoirs. 10 1 These reser-
voirs and eleven others suffered from increasing phosphorus pollu-
tion from sewage discharge and runoff from nonpoint pollution
sources. 102 Despite the increasing threat to the water quality of the
reservoirs, New York failed to implement TMDLs.10 ' In 1994, the
NRDC filed a citizen suit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, under the constructive submission the-
ory, to compel the EPA to develop TMDLs for these nineteen reser-
voirs.14 After the district court denied the NRDC's motion for
summary judgment, New York designated all nineteen reservoirs as
waters falling below state water quality standards and accorded them
priority for TMDL development.10 5
ByJanuary 1997, New York had submitted TMDLs for eighteen of
the nineteen reservoirs to the EPA. 06 In April 1997, the EPA ap-
proved the TMDLs for the eight phosphorus-polluted reservoirs that
were the focus of the litigation. 10 7 In response to the EPA approval,
the NRDC amended its complaint to challenge the adequacy of the
eight approved TMDLs.' °8 Specifically, the NRDC claimed that the
EPA did not have the authority to approve the TMDLs because they
were expressed in terms of annual rather than daily loads.109 In May
99. 268 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2001).
100. Friends of the Earth I, 446 F.3d 140, 148 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
101. NRDC, 268 F.3d at 93.
102. Id. at 94.
103. Id. at 95.
104. Id. The NRDC argued that New York's failure to develop TMDLs for these waters
"amounted to a constructive submission of no TMDLs." Id. Under this theory, the NRDC
contended that the EPA had a duty to develop TMDLs for the waters itself. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. EPA rejected TMDLs for the other ten reservoirs because it determined that
pollution levels in those reservoirs did not exceed water quality standards requiring TMDL
implementation. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 96.
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2000, the district court ruled that the EPA's approval of the TMDLs
was valid because the EPA reasonably concluded that in some in-
stances, "total maximum load" could have a flexible meaning encom-
passing more than a daily expression.' ° The court further found that
the EPA's decision to approve the phosphorus TMDLs as annual
TMDLs in terms of mass per year was reasonable."'
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the dis-
trict court and accorded deference to the EPA's interpretation of the
TMDL provision." 2 The Second Circuit examined the plain meaning
of the TMDL provision and determined that it was ambiguous." 3 In
light of this ambiguity, the court examined the reasonableness of the
EPA's interpretation of the statute, which allowed annual limita-
tions.'1 4 Rather than adopting the NRDC's view that TMDLs are daily
load calculations, the Second Circuit determined that Congress would
not have confined the EPA to such a narrow position.1 1 5 Further, the
NRDC court found that the EPA needs the discretion to analyze pollu-
tants requiring TMDLs and to regulate them using the most appropri-
ate time increment." 6  Thus, the court deferred to the EPA's
interpretation of the CWA, and held that the annual TMDLs were
valid so long as the TMDLs took seasonal variations into account.1
17
2. Friends of the Earth v. EPA
In Friends of the Earth v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit held that TMDLs
must take the form of daily loads." 8 In so doing, the court rejected
the NRDC court's reasoning that TMDLs could take the form of sea-
sonal or annual loads." 9 Friends of the Earth involved a challenge to
EPA-approved TMDLs for the Anacostia River.' 2 ° The Anacostia River
110. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 103.
113. Id. at 98. The Second Circuit perceived the term "total maximum daily load" to be
ambiguous because the structure of the CWA required the EPA to apply its expertise to a
large number of different pollutants. Id. at 98-99.
114. Id. at 98-99.
115. Id. at 98.
116. Id. at 98-99. The Second Circuit observed that phosphorus is an example of a
pollutant that is more effectively regulated by nondaily periodic measures. Id. at 98. The
court reasoned that the varying seasonal tolerance level of water bodies and the unpredict-
able latency periods of phosphorus suggest that an annual measure would be more effec-
tive. Id.
117. Id. at 99. The court remanded the case so that the EPA could explain why phos-
phorus was best regulated by annual TMDLs. Id. at 103.
118. Friends of the Earth 11, 446 F.3d 140, 148 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
119. See id. at 146.
120. Id. at 143.
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flows through Maryland and the District of Columbia, and has "the
dubious distinction of being one of the ten most polluted rivers in the
country."' 2 1 In 1998, the District of Columbia began developing
TMDLs for dissolved oxygen and turbidity12 2 in the Anacostia River
because the river was in violation of the District's water quality stan-
dards for these pollutants. 23 In 2001, the District submitted and the
EPA approved a TMDL for dissolved oxygen that limited the annual
discharge of oxygen-depleting pollutants.1 24 The EPA established a
subsequent TMDL for turbidity in 2002, that limited the seasonal dis-
charge of pollutants contributing to turbidity.
1 25
After the EPA issued its final decision approving the TMDLs,
Friends of the Earth sought review of the approval in the D.C. Circuit,
arguing that the TMDLs were insufficient and would fail to meet water
quality standards. 1 26 Specifically, Friends of the Earth alleged that the
TMDLs were inadequate because they were calculated on annual and
seasonal bases rather than on a daily basis. 127 The court held that it
lacked original jurisdiction to review the EPA decision 12' and trans-
ferred the case to the district court for review under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA).129
The district court held that the EPA is not restricted by the CWA
to develop only daily TMDLs,' s and that the EPA's use of seasonal
and annual TMDLs was a reasonable interpretation of the CWA. l '' In
reaching its holding, the court found that Congress did not intend for
TMDLs to be calculations of daily loads for water pollutants "for all
circumstances, at any regulatory cost, and for zero or trivial regulatory
121. Id. at 142 (quoting Kingman Park Civic Ass'n v. EPA, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C.
1999)).
122. Friends of the Earth v. EPA (Friends of the Earth I), 346 F. Supp. 2d 182, 186 (D.D.C.
2004). Turbidity is a measure of the cloudiness or murkiness of water. EPA, Terminology
Reference System: Turbidity, http://iaspub.epa.gov/trs/trsproc-qry.navigate-term?p-
termid=29601&ptermcd=TERMDIS (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
123. Friends of the Earth I, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 186.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Friends of the Earth v. EPA (Friends of the Earth 1), 333 F.3d 184, 187 (D.C. Cir.
2003).
127. Friends of the Earth II, 446 F.3d 140, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
128. Friends of the Earth , 333 F.3d at 193. Under the CWA, the federal courts of appeals
have original jurisdiction to review EPA action "in approving or promulgating any effluent
limitation or other limitation under section 1311, 1312, 1316, or 1345 of this title." 33
U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(E).
129. Friends of the Earth I, 333 F.3d at 185.
130. Friends of the Earth II, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 189.
131. Id. at 195.
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benefit."' 13 2 Further, the court found that the annual and seasonal
loads approved by the EPA would not jeopardize daily water quality
standards.' 3 Therefore, the district court held that the annual and
seasonal TMDLs were sufficient and that the EPA's approval of the
TMDLs was neither arbitrary nor capricious.'13 4
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed, finding that the plain
meaning of the CWA requires daily TMDLs. 35 In accordance with
the test for reviewing agency decisionmaking set forth in Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,136 the D.C. Circuit
examined the text of the CWA to determine if Congress clearly spoke
to the issue of whether seasonal or annual TMDLs are permissible.13 7
The D.C. Circuit found that the use of the word "daily" in "total maxi-
mum daily load" was clear and unambiguous, and that regulations for
daily loads of pollutants were required under the statute." 8 Further-
more, the D.C. Circuit determined that there was no indication in the
text of the statute that the EPA has the authority to approve maximum
or annual TMDLs. t39 The court found that because Congress spoke
directly to the issue of whether TMDLs should be daily, it need not
look beyond the text to ascertain the meaning of the TMDL provi-
sion."' Therefore, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court's deci-
sion and remanded the case with instructions to vacate the annual and
seasonal TMDLs.
t4 1
132. Id. at 190.
133. Id. at 195, 198, 202.
134. Id. at 188, 195.
135. Friends of the Earth III, 446 F.3d 140, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
136. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
137. Friends of the Earth III, 446 F.3d at 144.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 148; see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 ("If the intent of Congress is clear,
that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."); Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S.
249, 253-54 (1992) (stating that "a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in
a statute what it says there"); Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981) (stating that
"[w]hen we find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete"); Con-
sumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) (stating that
statutory construction begins with the text of the statute).
141. Friends of the Earth III, 446 F.3d at 142, 148.
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D. Implementation of the Clean Water Act's TMDL Provisions in
Maryland
TMDL implementation in the states has generally mirrored the
inaction and indifference exhibited by the EPA.14 2 Accordingly, many
states have had to defend multiple lawsuits that have compelled them
to enter into various consent decrees. 143 However, Maryland has been
more responsive to the TMDL program than the EPA and most other
states. In Maryland, lawsuits regarding TMDLs have been limited and
courts have not forced Maryland to enter any consent decrees to de-
velop TMDLs under the "constructive submission" doctrine. 144 In
fact, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland has
recognized that Maryland has complied with TMDL requirements to a
greater degree than other states.
1 45
Maryland began implementation of its TMDL program in 1992
and the courts quickly upheld it. Maryland, through the Maryland
Department of the Environment (MDE), published its first list of im-
paired waters in 1992.146 Several years later, the Sierra Club chal-
lenged the EPA's approval of Maryland's 1996 and 1998 lists of
impaired waters. 147 The Sierra Club alleged that the EPA's approval
of the lists was arbitrary and capricious because the lists did not con-
tain all impaired waters in Maryland.'14  The district court rejected
these allegations, finding that the EPA's approval of Maryland's im-
paired water lists was reasonable because Maryland complied with
EPA regulations and the CWA. 1 49 Accordingly, the court upheld the
EPA's approval of the impaired water lists. 5 '
In 2006, a federal district court in Maryland again upheld Mary-
land's TMDL program in Potomac Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA.15 ' Potomac
Riverkeeper, a nonprofit organization, challenged Maryland's pace in
implementing the TMDL program and Maryland's priority designa-
142. See Conway, supra note 36, at 93 (noting that states have avoided implementation of
the TMDL program).
143. See May, supra note 54, at 10,247. There are nearly thirty consent decrees forcing
action by the EPA and the states. Id.
144. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 162 F. Supp. 2d 406, 418 n.18 (D. Md. 2001) (finding
the constructive submission doctrine inapplicable because Maryland had made several
TMDL submissions).
145. Potomac Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, No. RDB 04-3885, 2006 WL 890755, at *15 (D.
Md. Mar. 31, 2006).
146. Sierra Club, 162 F. Supp. at 412.
147. Id. at 413.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 413-16.
150. Id. at 416.
151. No. RDB 04-3885, 2006 WL 890755, at *1, *15 (D. Md. Mar. 31, 2006).
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tions for impaired waters under the program. 15 2 Specifically, Potomac
Riverkeeper alleged that the EPA's approvals of Maryland's 2002 and
2004 lists of impaired waters were arbitrary and capricious because the
MDE was taking too long to develop TMDLs for impaired waters. 151
According to Potomac Riverkeeper's calculations, TMDLs for im-
paired waters would not be completed until the 2030s.154 The court
rejected these claims, finding that the EPA's approvals of Maryland's
2002 and 2004 lists were not unreasonable because Maryland was com-
pleting TMDLs on the basis of priority, and that the MDE was doing a
betterjob developing TMDLs for high priority impaired waters than it
had in the past.
155
Along with the courts, the EPA has also determined that Mary-
land is making good progress with its TMDL program. In 2004, the
EPA acknowledged that Maryland had made "significant progress" in
developing TMDLs since 1998.56 The EPA found that Maryland was
committed to developing TMDLs for the state's impaired waters and
that it was unnecessary for the EPA to interfere with TMDL
implementation. 57
Currently, Maryland lists 473 impaired waters 5 ' and 134 im-
paired watersheds that need to be addressed by the TMDL pro-
gram.159  These waters are impaired by nutrients, sediment,
pathogens, metals, pH, oxygen depletion, polychlorinated biphenyls,
mercury, pesticides, sulfates, toxic inorganics, total toxicity, and tur-
bidity. 6' The most common sources of pollutants are nutrients, sedi-
ments, pathogens, and metals. 161 As a result, these waters will require
the development of over 655 potential TMDLs. 1 62
The MDE has already developed TMDLs for 168 impaired wa-
ters, 163 following a variety of approaches that have resulted in annual
152. Id. at *14.
153. Id. at *8.
154. Id.
155. Id. at *10, *15. The court noted that the MDE had addressed 30% of high priority
water impairments, as compared to 4% of medium priority impairments, and 9% of low
priority impairments. Id.
156. See id. at *3.
157. Id.
158. 2004 Maryland Fact Sheet, supra note 96,
159. MDE, Introduction to TMDL, http://www.mde.state.md.us/Programs/WaterPro-
grams/TMDL/index.asp (last visited Apr. 15, 2007) [hereinafter Maryland TMDL].
160. 2004 Maryland Fact Sheet, supra note 96.
161. Id.
162. Maryland TMDL, supra note 159.
163. 2004 Maryland Fact Sheet, supra note 96.
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TMDLs, seasonal TMDLs, and daily TMDLs.'6 4 For example, the
MDE has developed TMDLs for fecal coliform as daily load limita-
tions; 65 TMDLs for nitrogen, phosphorus, and biochemical oxygen
demand as monthly load limitations;1 6 6 and TMDLs for nitrogen,
phosphorus, and biochemical oxygen demand as annual load limita-
tions. 1 17 Some of the TMDLs that are represented as both monthly
and annual loads include those for (1) nitrogen and dissolved oxygen
in the Manokin River,1 6 (2) nitrogen, phosphorus, and dissolved oxy-
gen in the Lower Wicomico River,16 9 (3) nitrogen and phosphorus in
the Corsica River,' 70 (4) phosphorus in the Sassafras River,17 1 and (5)
nitrogen and phosphorus in the Chicamacomico River. 172
MDE is expected to develop TMDLs for the remaining waters and
pollutants by 2011.173 Currently, Maryland is waiting on the EPA to
approve twenty-three TMDLs, 174 and is in the process of developing
an additional thirty-seven TMDLs. 175 These additional TMDLs are ad-
dressing some of the most pressing water quality issues in Maryland
and the surrounding region, and are focused on pervasive pollutants
in Maryland's waters and the tributaries of the Chesapeake Bay. For
example, Maryland is working with the District of Columbia to de-
velop a TMDL for PCBs in the Potomac River and its tributaries.' 7 6
Maryland and Virginia volunteered to aid the District of Columbia in
164. E.g., BRETON BAY TMDL, supra note 10, at iii (annual and growing season loads);
TANGIER SOUND BASIN TMDL, supra note 14, at iv (daily loads); TOWN CREEK TMDL, supra
note 10, at iv (monthly and annual loads).
165. TANGIER SOUND BASIN TMDL, supra note 14, at iv.
166. TowN CREEK TMDL, supra note 10, at iv.
167. BRETON BAY TMDL, supra note 10, at iii.
168. MD. DEP'T OF THE ENV'T, TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOADS OF NITROGEN AND BIOCHEM-
ICAL OXYGEN DEMAND FOR THE MANOKIN RIVER, SOMERSET COUNTY, MARYLAND, at iv (2000).
169. MD. DEP'T OF THE ENV'T, TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOADS OF NITROGEN, PHOSPHORUS
AND BIOCHEMICAL OXYGEN DEMAND FOR THE LOWER WICOMICO RIVER, WICOMICO COUNTY
AND SOMERSET COUNTY, MARYLAND, at iv (2000).
170. MD. DEP'T OF THE ENV'T, TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOADS OF NITROGEN AND PHOS-
PHORUS FOR CORSICA RIVER, at iv (2000).
171. MD. DEP'T OF THE ENV'T, TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOADS OF PHOSPHORUS FOR THE
SASSAFRAS RrVER, CECIL AND KENT COUNTIES, MARYLAND, at iii (2002).
172. MD. DEP'T OF THE ENV'T, TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOADS OF NITROGEN AND PHOS-
PHORUS FOR THE CHICAMACOMICO RIVER, DORCHESTER, MARYLAND, at iv (2000).
173. Potomac Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, No. RDB 04-3885, 2006 WL 890755, at *7 (D.
Md. Mar. 31, 2006).
174. MDE, Current Status of TMDL Development in Maryland, http://www.mde.state.
md.us/Programs/WaterPrograms/TMDL/Sumittals/index.asp (last visited Apr. 15, 2007)
[hereinafter Current Maryland TMDL Development].
175. Id.
176. Jeff Day, Water Pollution: State Agencies Plan Daily Load Limits for PCBs in Tidal Potomac
River, Tributaries, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), No. 113, June 13, 2006, at A7.
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developing these water quality standards for the Potomac River. 177
Likewise, Maryland is developing TMDLs for PCBs in the Back River,
the Baltimore Harbor, Bear Creek, and Curtis Creek; TMDLs for nu-
trients in the Pocomoke River; and TMDLs for mercury in fish tissue
in various waters.
178
In the future, Maryland could be involved in the EPA's develop-
ment of a TMDL for the entire Chesapeake Bay. If the Chesapeake
Bay fails to meet water quality standards by 2010, the terms of the
2000 Chesapeake Bay Agreement between the EPA and states in the
Chesapeake Bay watershed will require the EPA to establish TMDLs
for the Chesapeake Bay. 179 Because most of Maryland lies within the
Chesapeake Bay watershed, it will likely have input into the TMDL.
III. ANALYSIS
As Maryland continues to develop TMDLs, it should look to the
guidance set forth by the D.C. Circuit in Friends of the Earth v. EPA, and
develop TMDLs as daily limitations rather than as seasonal or annual
limitations.' Maryland should adhere to the D.C. Circuit's interpre-
tation of the CWA rather than the interpretation allowing for seasonal
and annual loads set forth in NRDC v. Muszynski.'81 Even though de-
veloping daily TMDLs could be costly and time-consuming, 82 the
costs are outweighed by the benefits, which include: (1) improvement
of state water quality, (2) government accountability, (3) consistency
among states in the implementation of TMDLs, and (4) avoidance of
lengthy and costly litigation in the future.'83
A. Maryland Should Adhere to the Interpretation of TMDLs in Friends
of the Earth Because it is Faithful to the Clear Meaning and
Congressional Intent of the CWA
As Maryland continues to implement its TMDL program, it
should adhere to the D.C. Circuit's interpretation of TMDLs in Friends
of the Earth. The D.C. Circuit properly determined that TMDLs must
be daily limitations by examining the plain meaning of the statute. 184
177. Id.
178. See Current Maryland TMDL Development, supra note 174.
179. Jeff Day, Chesapeake Bay: Removal of Bay From Impaired Waters List Not Likely By 2010
Deadline, Regulators Say, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), July 21, 2006, at B1.
180. See infra Part III.A.
181. See infta Part III.B.
182. See infra Part III.C.
183. See infra Part III.D.
184. Friends of the Earth III, 446 F.3d 140, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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It is a well-settled rule of law that statutes should be interpreted in
accordance with their plain meaning when they are clear and unam-
biguous.1 8 5 Moreover, as the Supreme Court asserted in Chevron,
when "Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue"
in the statute, the agency must adhere to congressional intent.186
In accordance with these canons of statutory interpretation, the
D.C. Circuit held that the text of the CWA is clear and unambigu-
ous. 8 ' The text of the CWA clearly states: "Each State shall estab-
lish ... the total maximum daily load, for those pollutants which the
Administrator identifies... as suitable for such calculation." 188 As the
D.C. Circuit correctly acknowledged, there is nothing ambiguous
about the word "daily" in the statute. 8 9 Thus, it is clear that Congress
intended states to develop daily limitations for pollutants in impaired
waters and that states must adhere to this intent. Given this clarity,
Maryland should adhere to the D.C. Circuit's interpretation that
TMDLs must be expressed as daily limitations.
B. Maryland Should Not Adhere to the Interpretation of TMDLs in
NRDC v. Muszynski Because it is Inconsistent with the Text
of the CWA
Maryland should not follow the broad approach of the Second
Circuit in NRDC v. Muszynski that allowed for seasonal and annual
loads because it conflicts with the text of the CWA. In NRDC, the
Second Circuit improperly found that the word "daily" in "total maxi-
mum daily load" could be interpreted more broadly to allow for sea-
sonal or annual limitations on pollutants.1 90 It ignored the basic
canon of statutory construction as described by the Chevron Court,
that when Congress speaks directly to the issue, "that is the end of the
matter."'9 1 Instead, the Second Circuit looked beyond the text and
determined that Congress did not intend for TMDLs to be daily limi-
tations on pollutants, because such an interpretation would "lose[ ]
sight of the overall structure and purpose of the CWA. '92 The Sec-
ond Circuit further found that interpreting "total maximum daily
185. See cases cited supra note 140.
186. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
187. Friends of the Earth III, 446 F.3d at 144.
188. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (2000).
189. See Friends of the Earth III, 446 F.3d at 144.
190. See NRDC v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d 91, 98-99 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that "the term
,total maximum daily load' is susceptible to a broader range of meanings" than "daily"
loads).
191. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
192. NRDC, 268 F.3d at 98.
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loads" to require daily limitations would be "absurd" because some
pollutants could be better regulated by other periodic increments.1""
However, the text of the CWA and congressional intent belie the
Second Circuit's erroneous interpretation. Congress enacted the
CWA during a national water quality crisis with goals of eliminating
pollutant discharges into navigable waters and making water safe for
swimming and fishing.1" 4 Members of Congress acknowledged that
the CWA was a "tough law," and provided "precise standards and defi-
nite guidelines on how the environment should be protected."'
195
Given these ambitious goals of restoring and maintaining water qual-
ity at a level that is safe for swimming and fishing,'9 6 and Congress's
belief that the standards set forth in the texts of the law were precise
and definite,"9 ' it is unreasonable to think that Congress intended for
"total maximum daily load" to be construed imprecisely as a total max-
imum seasonal load or total maximum annual load on pollution dis-
charges. Therefore, Maryland should not develop annual or seasonal
TMDLs in accordance with NRDC.
C. The Friends of the Earth Court Appropriately Elevated the Clear
Statutory Mandate of the CWA over Potential Financial
Burdens of Daily TMDL Implementation
Maryland should also adhere to the Friends of the Earth approach
to TMDLs despite concerns over the cost of daily TMDLs, because of
the clear statutory mandate for daily TMDLs and because Maryland
may have other alternatives for reducing costs associated with daily
TMDLs. Advocates for seasonal and annual TMDLs cite cost as a rea-
son to ignore the plain meaning of the statute.' 98 For example, in an
amicus brief in Friends of the Earth, the National Association of Clean
Water Agencies (NACWA) argued that requiring states to develop
daily TMDLs would slow the pace of TMDL development because the
states and the EPA have adhered to seasonal and annual TMDL ap-
proaches in the past.' The NACWA also argued that the costs of
TMDL development, which already range from $4,000 to $1 million
193. Id. at 98-99.
194. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000) (stating that the purpose of the CWA is "to restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters").
195. E.g., 117 CONG. REc. 38797, 38804-805 (1971) (statement of Sen. Randolph).
196. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a).
197. 117 CONG. Rac. 38797, 38804-805 (1971) (statement of Sen. Randolph).
198. See NACWA Brief, supra note 10, at 14-15 (citing the billions of dollars already
spent on TMDLs using average annual loads).
199. See id. at 11.
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per TMDL,2 °° could increase with a requirement for daily TMDLs.20
The NAWCA explains that this cost will increase as past monetary in-
vestments into the TMDL program targeting annual TMDLs would
essentially become meaningless. 20 2
No matter how compelling these economic arguments are, an-
nual and seasonal approaches are not permitted under the statutory
mandate of the CWA. As the D.C. Circuit correctly recognized in
Friends of the Earth, the term "total maximum daily load" is clear and
unambiguous.2 °3 It cannot be read more broadly, as the Second Cir-
cuit asserted in NRDC,204 to mean some violation of hourly, weekly,
monthly, or annual load.20 5 Thus, under Chevron, implementing
agencies are required to adhere to these plain terms when developing
TMDLs.2 6 Therefore, Maryland should implement its TMDL pro-
gram in accordance with the statutory mandate of the CWA and en-
sure that it adopts daily TMDLs, rather than the seasonal or annual
variety.
If Maryland wants to address economic concerns, it can look to
alternatives other than seasonal or annual TMDLs. For instance, Ma-
ryland could create pollution trading schemes that would provide eco-
nomic incentives for polluters to reduce daily pollutant levels.20 7
Maryland could also petition the EPA to reexamine its regulations
pertaining to the TMDL program.2 " The text of the CWA provides
that states shall establish "the total maximum daily load, for those pol-
lutants which the Administrator identifies ... as suitable for such calcula-
tion.''2°0 Therefore, if pollutants are not technically or economically
suitable for calculations as TMDLs, the EPA might consider eliminat-
200. Birkeland, supra note 5, at 299-300.
201. See NACWA Brief, supra note 10, at 11.
202. Id.
203. Friends of the Earth III, 446 F.3d 140, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
204. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d 91, 98-99 (2d Cir. 2001).
205. See Friends of the Earth IIl, 446 F.3d at 144.
206. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)
(finding that agencies implementing statutory directives must adhere to the text of the
statute if "Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue").
207. See Wenig, supra note 34, at 111-12. Pollution trading is a pollution reduction
scheme that sets a limit on the quantity of a pollutant that may be emitted, allocates al-
lowances for pollutant sources to emit the given pollutant within the set limit, and then
allows for sources to trade those allowances so that pollution reductions occur at the lowest
cost. DALLAS BURTRAW ET AL., ECONOMICS OF POLLUTION TRADING FOR SO 2 AND NO., at 2-4
(2005), available at http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-05-05.pdf.
208. See Friends of the Earth III, 446 F.3d at 146 (noting that although the CWA restricts
TMDL development that is not based on daily loads, the EPA has the authority to define
which pollutants are suitable for TMDL calculation).
209. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (2000) (emphasis added).
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ing them from the list of pollutants. 210 These alternatives would be
acceptable for Maryland, and would not contravene the CWA's re-
quirement for daily TMDLs.
D. Following the "Daily" Approach to TMDL Development Will Improve
Water Policy in Maryland
Even if Maryland considers the statute's mandate to be ambigu-
ous, Maryland should adhere to the Friends of the Earth court's inter-
pretation of the CWA because it will improve water quality21 ' and
government accountability,212 create more consistency in the imple-
mentation of the TMDL program, 213 and reduce future litigation.2 14
1. The Implementation of Daily TMDLs Will Improve Water Quality
in Maryland
Maryland will improve water quality more effectively by develop-
ing daily TMDLs rather than seasonal or annual TMDLs. By limiting
the pollution that enters impaired waters on a daily basis, the MDE
will ensure that every day of the year, water quality remains at accept-
able levels.21 5 But, if the MDE allows for seasonal or annual loads of
pollutants, there could be peaks and valleys in water quality that could
be dangerous to wildlife or humans. 216 The goal of the CWA is to
provide for consistently good water quality, and Congress created the
TMDL provision to allow for such consistency. 217 Because daily load
TMDLs produce consistently high water quality, Maryland should fol-
low this approach over an annual or seasonal TMDL calculation.
210. The Friends oftheEarth court emphasized that the EPA's own regulations had forced
them into making the argument that non-daily loads were "daily." Friends of the Earth IIl,
446 F.3d at 146 (citing Total Maximum Daily Loads under Clean Water Act, 43 Fed. Reg.
60,662, 60,665 (Dec. 28, 1978)).
211. See infta Part III.D.1.
212. See infra Part III.D.2.
213. See infra Part III.D.3.
214. See infra Part III.D.4.
215. Limiting pollution discharges on a daily basis keeps water quality acceptable by
maintaining safe levels of pollutants and restricting the possibility of large pollutant dumps
over a short period of time that can quickly contribute to water quality decline. See Chesa-
peake Bay Program, Nutrient Pollution, http://www.chesapeakebay.net/info/nutrl.cfm
(last visited May 11, 2007) (noting that excessive concentrations of pollutants and nutrients
can cause rapid algae growth and impair water quality).
216. See, e.g., id. (noting that excessive amounts of nitrogen and phosphorus cause rapid
growth of algae, deplete water oxygen, and cause fish to die). In the past, excessive
amounts of nutrients such as nitrogen and phosphorus have caused algae blooms and out-
breaks of diseases like Pfisteria, endangering wildlife and humans. Christine Mlot, The Rise
in Toxic Tides: What's Behind the Ocean Blooms?, 152 Sci. NEws 202, 204 (1997).
217. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
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2. The Implementation of Daily TMDLs Will Improve Government
Accountability in Maryland
Maryland should also develop daily TMDLs for the purpose of
governmental accountability. When Congress passed the CWA in
1972, it intended that these water quality standards be stringent re-
quirements. 21  Following the letter of the CWA requires Maryland to
strictly adhere to the CWA's water quality and TMDL provisions in-
stead of finding ways to avoid its clear mandates. The implementation
of TMDL provisions by the federal government and the states has gen-
erally been weak. 219 The EPA and the states did not take the TMDL
program seriously until environmental groups secured key victories
compelling TMDL implementation. 220 Although implementation of
the TMDL provisions has been better in Maryland than in other
221 has2bstates22 ' and has been upheld in courts,2 2 2 Maryland still needs to de-
velop TMDLs for the majority of its waters.223 Maryland is faced with
this large burden because it did not begin listing impaired waters until
1992, twenty years after the CWA's enactment. 224 Maryland still can
take steps to improve its accountability. Failure to follow Congress's
clear mandate in this context diminishes Maryland's accountability, as
it puts Maryland's environmental programs into question and shows a
disregard for the clear meaning of the law.
3. The Implementation of Daily TMDLs Will Promote Consistency in
State Water Pollution Control Efforts
The development of daily TMDLs will also help Maryland pro-
mote consistency in state environmental efforts. Currently, state water
pollution control efforts in the TMDL context are inconsistent, 225 and
such inconsistency could circumvent the purpose of the CWA by lead-
ing to differences in water quality standards and water quality levels in
218. See 2 FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAw § 3.03 (2006).
219. See supra Part II.B.
220. See supra notes 59-69, 77-82 and accompanying text.
221. See supra Part II.D.
222. See Potomac Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, No. RDB 04-3885, 2006 WL 890755 (D. Md.
Mar. 31, 2006); Sierra Club v. EPA, 162 F. Supp. 2d 406 (D. Md. 2001).
223. See 2004 Maryland Fact Sheet, supra note 96 (listing that of the 473 impaired waters
in Maryland, only 175 TMDLs have been approved by the EPA).
224. See supra Part II.D; see also Potomac Riverkeeper, EPA and Maryland, http://www.
potomacriverkeeper.org/cms/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id=75&Itemid
=50 (last visited Apr. 16, 2007) (stating that it will take fifty-two years for Maryland to de-
velop TMDLs for all of its water bodies because of deadline extensions).
225. See Malone, supra note 44, at 75-76 (discussing the varied state definitions for mea-
suring impaired water quality and different data sources for load calculations).
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different states.226 Maryland should develop daily TMDLs and share
this information with other states in an effort to improve regional and
national water quality. Such cooperation will reduce the costs that are
feared in requiring daily TMDLs,227 and will lead to greater consis-
tency and uniformity in pollution control measures.228
Consistency is important for achieving compliance with TMDLs
for downstream waters and regional water bodies that cross state
lines.229 As a result of the D.C. Circuit's ruling in Friends of the Earth,
the District of Columbia is now required to develop daily TMDLs for
impaired water bodies.23° Several water bodies in the District of Co-
lumbia, including the Anacostia River (the subject of the Friends of the
Earth litigation), and the Potomac River, flow from Maryland into the
District of Columbia. These water bodies include the Potomac River,
Rock Creek, and Paint Branch. Once the District of Columbia sets
daily TMDLs for these waters, they can only be met if upstream pollu-
tants in Maryland enter the waters in accordance with daily limita-
tions.2 ' This concern will be especially pressing if the EPA is
required to develop a TMDL for the Chesapeake Bay in 2011,22 be-
cause most of Maryland's waters are tributaries to the Chesapeake
Bay.233 Unless Maryland develops daily TMDLs, it will be unable to
adhere to its responsibility of meeting TMDLs in downstream loca-
tions like the District of Columbia. Daily TMDL implementation will
help promote uniform water pollution control efforts across state
lines.
226. Cf 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (2) (2000) (stating that one of the goals of the CWA is to
make water safe for swimming and wildlife in the entire nation).
227. See Conway, supra note 36, at 120 (noting that by sharing TMDL pollution control
measures, states can reduce costs by avoiding missteps made by other states).
228. Id.
229. When a state develops TMDLs, it must consider all sources of pollution when allo-
cating limitations. See 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(i) (2006) (defining a TMDL as the sum of all waste
allocations designated to point sources of pollution and load allocations designated to
nonpoint sources of pollution). Thus, since upstream states have pollution sources that
affect downstream states, the loads in the upstream states would have to be allocated in a
consistent manner to comply with the TMDLs in the downstream state.
230. See Friends ofthe Earth III, 446 F.3d 140, 148 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (remanding the case to
the district court to decide whether the District of Columbia should be given a reasonable
period of time to establish daily TMDLs).
231. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
232. See Day, supra note 179, at B-1 (stating that the EPA will be required to develop a
TMDL for the Chesapeake Bay if it is not restored to "health" by 2010).
233. See Maryland Public Television, Maryland Public Television Presents Bayville, http:/
/bayville.thinkport.org/resourcelibrary/faq.aspx (last visited May 11, 2007) (stating that
93.3% of Maryland is in the Chesapeake Bay watershed).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
4. The Implementation of Daily TMDLs Will Prevent Costly and
Lengthy Lawsuits in the Future
Daily TMDL implementation will also help Maryland avoid future
costly and lengthy litigation. Environmental groups will continue to
bring legal challenges until states are meeting the requirements of the
CWA.23 4 Because Maryland has developed daily TMDLs for some im-
paired waters but seasonal or annual TMDLs for others,215 it could be
the subject of lawsuits employing the Friends of the Earth court's ap-
proach. In addition, Maryland could be involved in litigation chal-
lenging the adequacy of a proposed TMDL for the Chesapeake Bay, if
that water body fails to reach water quality standards by 2010.236 It is
likely that there will be litigation challenging the adequacy of any pro-
posed TMDL for the Chesapeake Bay because of the Bay's high value
to the State of the Maryland.237
As the EPA acknowledged in a memorandum responding to the
Friends of the Earth decision, it is uncertain whether the courts will ad-
here to the narrow view of the D.C. Circuit or the broad approach of
the Second Circuit to TMDL implementation. 23 ' Therefore, the EPA
recommends that states develop daily TMDLs to avoid litigation, even
though the EPA itself adopts the position that TMDLs can be ex-
pressed in non-daily increments. 239 Accordingly, Maryland should de-
velop daily TMDLs, as this policy adheres to the EPA's
recommendation and the provisions of the CWA, and will help avoid
costly litigation concerning the development of future TMDLs.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Friends of the Earth, the D.C. Circuit properly interpreted the
CWA when it decided that TMDLs must be daily limitations on pollu-
tants entering impaired waters.24° Maryland should follow this inter-
234. See supra Part II.B-C (noting the history of lawsuits challenging TMDL implementa-
tion and the present lawsuits challenging the adequacy of TMDLs).
235. See supra Part II.D.
236. See Day, supra note 179, at B-1 (stating that it is likely that the EPA will be forced to
establish a TMDL for the Chesapeake Bay in 2011 in the face of state inaction).
237. See Rebecca Hanmer, Chesapeake's Value Worth More than the Sum of its Parts, CHESA-
PEAKE BAY J., Oct. 2004, available at http://www.bayjournal.com/article.cfm?article=2395
(noting that the Chesapeake Bay is valuable to the states in the watershed as a fishery,
recreational venue, tourist attraction, and historical and cultural landmark).
238. See Memorandum from Benjamin H. Grumbles, Assistant Adm'r, EPA, to Dir., Of-
fice of Ecosystem Prot., Region 1 et al. 1-2 (Nov. 15, 2006), available at http://www.epa.
gov/owow/tmdl/pdf/anacostiamemol 1 1506.pdf.
239. Id.
240. See supra Part III.A.
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pretation and develop daily TMDLs for its impaired waters, in contrast
to the view of the Second Circuit in NRDC v. Muszynski allowing for
seasonal and annual loads.24 ' This interpretation is warranted be-
cause the plain text of the CWA unambiguously requires states to de-
velop daily TMDLs.242  Even though developing daily load
requirements could be costly,243 Maryland must develop TMDLs for
several important reasons. 244 Daily TMDLs will help improve state
water quality,245 ensure the environmental accountability of the state
and the MDE, 246 foster consistency among states in the development
and implementation of TMDLs, 247 and prevent future litigation which
may prove costly and time consuming.2 48 For improved water quality
in Maryland and the region, it is imperative that Maryland adhere to
the reasoning of the Friends of the Earth court and develop daily
TMDLs for its impaired waters.
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241. See supra Part III.B.
242. See supra Part III.B.
243. See supra Part III.C.
244. See supra Part III.D.
245. See supra Part III.D.I.
246. See supra Part III.D.2.
247. See supra Part III.D.3.
248. See supra Part III.D.4.
